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The question posed by this thesis is how limits can be constructed to the exercise of EU 
powers. While there are limits to the exercise of EU competences in the Treaties and in the 
Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, it is argued that those limits suffer from conceptual and 
practical problems. In particular, the Court does not have appropriate criteria to examine 
whether the limits of the Treaties have been exceeded by the Union legislator. 
 
The thesis uses one of the new, and controversial, competences that the Union has obtained, 
the power to impose criminal sanctions, as a case study to propose a mechanism by which 
legislative powers can be kept in check. This is an illuminating and relevant case study. 
Firstly, it nicely illustrates the limits to the exercise of EU competences. Secondly, legislative 
practice and political statements suggest that this competence will be used regularly in the 
future.  
 
The thesis makes two proposals. First, by interpreting the scope of the EU’s powers under the 
Treaties to impose criminal sanctions the thesis shows the limits to the exercise of EU 
competences. It demonstrates the scope of EU’s competences by analyzing current and 
proposed criminal law measures. Secondly, noting that a construction of the limits to EU 
competences also needs to tackle the institutional challenges of judicial review, it develops an 
argument for a more intense and evidence-based judicial review. It constructs a procedural 
standard of legality which demands that the EU legislator shows that it has adequately 
reasoned its decisions and has taken into account relevant evidence. By testing the legality of 
discretely chosen criminal law measures on the basis of this standard, it is demonstrated how 
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
 
I  Research question  
 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, EU law scholarship and the political debate was primarily pre-
occupied with the existence of EU competences1 and the division of powers between Member 
States and the EU.2 Davies aptly stated in 2006 that “competence anxiety” was about 
safeguarding national autonomy in important policy fields. The point had been reached where 
EU law and requirements were touching on sensitive and traditional national competences - 
criminal law, the welfare State, taxation and economic policy. The choices that countries 
could make in these areas were becoming increasingly tightly constrained by the 
consequences and requirements of removing borders. The fundamental problem lay in 
deciding the extent to which the EU could legislate and the extent to which the capacity of 
Member States to make and carry out policy autonomously should be respected.3  
However, the evolution of EU law and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty suggest that EU 
scholars no longer have to focus on the question of the existence of powers. The concern to 
protect national autonomy from encroachment of the EU in sensitive national matters is no 
longer the issue of the day. The development of ‘regulatory criminal law’4 competence of the 
EU is a case in point. Prior to Lisbon there was a long-standing debate on whether the 
Community enjoyed the competence to enforce its rules through criminal sanctions. This was 
a discussion about the ‘existence’ of the competence. The debate certainly touched on the 
core of national autonomy as it had been assumed for a long time that political sensitivity and 
concerns for state integrity automatically made criminal law a matter of Member State 
competence.5 The Commission advanced a Community criminal law competence in criminal 
                                              
1 See Stephen Weatherill, ‘Competence creep and competence control’ (2004) 23 Yearbook of European Law 1; 
Paul Craig, ‘Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Containment and Consideration’ (2004) 29 European Law Review 
323. 
2 See Theodore Konstadinides, Division of Powers in European Union Law: The Delimitation of Internal 
Competence between the EU and the Member States (Kluwer Law International 2009); Armin Von Bogdandy 
and Jürgen Bast, ‘The Federal Order of Competences’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast, Principles of 
European Constitutional Law (Hart 2009). 
3 Gareth Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review 63, 80. 
4 See Maria Fletcher, Bill Gilmore and Robin Lööf, EU Criminal Law and Justice (Edward Elgar 2008) 183, for 
a description of the concept.  
5 See Sandra Lavenex and William Wallace, ‘Justice and Home Affairs- Towards a European Public Order’ in 
Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark Pollack (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union (OUP 2005); 
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matters on the basis that it was needed for the effective enforcement of EU policies.6 The 
Council and the Member States strongly disagreed, arguing that the absence of an express 
conferral of competence in the Treaties together with concerns for sovereignty militated 
against recognizing such a competence in the first pillar.7 The Court of Justice of the 
European Union (‘Court’, ‘Court of Justice’) was called on to settle the issue. The Court 
accepted the Commission’s argument and recognized, in two famous judgments, 
Environmental Crimes8 and Ship-Source Pollution9, that the Community had a competence to 
impose criminal sanctions in the field of environmental law and maritime safety if this was 
essential for the effective enforcement of EU environmental policy. The debate on the 
existence of a first pillar competence was ultimately brought to an end by the Lisbon Treaty, 
which abandoned the pillar system and explicitly conferred a competence on the Union to 
impose criminal sanctions to enforce substantive Union policies.10 This example of regulatory 
criminal law shows that the competence question, both in the field of EU criminal law and in 
the general field of EU competences, has transformed in character. Instead of discussing the 
existence of competence, commentators now debate how EU competences should be 
exercised.11  
There was also a political debate that was equally concerned with the existence of 
competences and the division of competences. The general public perception among EU 
citizens and politicians prior to Lisbon was that the delimitation of competences between the 
                                                                                                                                            
Michael Dougan, ‘From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist: Criminal Sanctions for the Enforcement of Union 
Law’ in Marise Cremona (ed), Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law (OUP 2012) 74-78, 91-92. 
6 See Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-07879, paras 19-21; Case C- 440/05, Commission 
Communities v Council [2007] ECR I-09097, paras 24-25, 28-39; Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs 
Law (OUP 2011) 769-771; Dougan, ‘From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist’ (n 5) 95-99. The idea that the 
effective enforcement of EU law would require criminal sanctions had been advanced earlier by scholars and 
Advocate Generals: Case C-240/90, Germany v Commission [1992] ECR I-05383, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para. 
12; Hanna G Sevenster, ‘Criminal Law and EC Law’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 29, 53-59. 
7 See Martin Wasmeier and Nadine Thwaites, ‘The "battle of the pillars": does the European Community have 
the power to approximate national criminal laws?’(2004) 29 European Law Review 613, 616; Case C- 176/03 
Commission v Council (n 6), paras 26-27.  
8 See Case C-176/03 Commission v Council (n 6), paras 47-48. The criminal law competence was conferred on 
the basis of Article 175 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community [2002] 
OJ C 325/33 (‘EC’ ‘EC Treaty’). 
9 See Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (n 6), paras 66-69. The Court inferred the competence on the basis 
of Article 80(2) EC.  
10 See Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, politics and Treaty reform (OUP 2011) 364; Ester Herlin-Karnell, 
‘EU Competence in Criminal Law after Lisbon’, in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley (eds) EU 
Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012) 333. 
11 See regarding EU criminal law: Steve Peers, ‘Mission Accomplished? EU Justice and Home Affairs Law after 
the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 661, 692, 693; Herlin-Karnell, ‘EU Competence 
in Criminal Law after Lisbon’ (n 10) 334, 338-339. See generally for this development of EU law: Robert 
Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (OUP 2009); Loïc Azoulai, ‘Introduction: the Question of 
Competence’, in Loïc Azoulai (ed), The Question of Competence in the European Union (OUP 2014) 7. 
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Member States and the Union was not precise enough.12 To find a solution to this problem 
the Laeken Declaration asked the Convention, which was responsible for the negotiation of 
the Lisbon Treaty, to devise a’ better division and definition of competence in the European 
Union’.13 Working Group no V on Complementary Competences14, having taken on this task, 
suggested that the Treaties should contain a clean and easily understood delimitation of the 
competence granted to the Union in each policy field. More radical solutions, such as having 
a detailed definition of all Union competences, were also discussed in the negotiations. 
Working Group no V, however, considered it sufficient to enshrine the ‘basic delimitation’ of 
competence in each policy area, while keeping the precise and detailed definition of 
competence similar to the in the EC Treaty.15 The Member States ultimately decided to adopt, 
as suggested by the Convention, a competence catalogue and a description of the nature of 
EU powers which was enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty16.  
However, these solutions show that given the fundamental concern that the EU should not 
intrude on sensitive national policy fields, the focus on the existence of competences and a 
clear division of powers is misplaced. The question of whether the EU or Member States 
have retained competence in a specific policy field is not the most pertinent question. The 
more fundamental question after Lisbon is how the EU exercises its functional powers. This 
is what will determine whether Member States retain powers in specific policy fields. The 
competence catalogue does not solve the problem of ‘competence creep’17 that exists by 
virtue of the wide functional legal powers in Article 114 and Article 352 TFEU. The 
negotiations did place on the table radical proposals, such as removing those legal bases from 
the Treaties. Working Group no V nevertheless decided to maintain both Article 114 and 
Article 352 TFEU in order to preserve a certain degree of flexibility in the Treaty’s system of 
competence, allowing the Union to respond to new challenges that might emerge as the 
                                              
12 See European Convention, CONV 47/02, ‘Delimitation of competence between the European Union and the 
Member States – Existing system, problems and avenues to be explored’, Brussels, 15 May 2002, 3-5, 16; 
Weatherill (n 1) 2-3.  
13 See European Council, ‘Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union’, 14–15 December 2001, 21-
22.  
14 See European Convention, CONV 375/1/02, ‘Final Report of Working Group V on Complementary 
Competencies’, Brussels, 4 November 2002. 
15 ibid 2-3. 
16 See Articles 3-6 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union [2010] 
OJ C 83/47 (TFEU). The Lisbon Treaty more particularly distinguishes different types of EU competences: 
exclusive competences, shared competences, coordinating competences and complementary competences, see 
Article 2(1)-2(3) and 2(5) TFEU.   
17 See Weatherill, ‘Competence creep and competence control’ (n 1). 
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objectives of the Treaties were attained.18 However, the Convention failed to remove all 
possibility of competence creep as it did not limit the scope of these provisions. Admittedly, 
the EU does not, under the Lisbon Treaty, enjoy a competence to harmonize Member States’ 
laws in relation to fields such as public health, education or culture. It is nevertheless 
perfectly entitled under Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU, to enact legislation in these 
policy fields if that legislation benefits the internal market or if it is necessary for the pursuit 
of one of the Union’s policies.19  
While these reasons should be sufficient to convince the reader that the question of 
‘existence’ of competence no longer is relevant, the sceptical observer may object by 
referring to the wording of Article 5 TEU. The Lisbon Treaty indeed invites us to analyse the 
‘existence’ of a competence20 and to distinguish this question from the question of how 
competences are ‘exercised’. Von Bogdandy and Bast have endorsed this idea and explained 
the distinction between ‘existence’ and ‘exercise of powers’. Competence rules are abstract 
titles conferring the power to act. Their exercise is directed and delimited by legal norms that 
specifically provide formal, procedural and substantive requirements for the proper exercise 
of the particular competence, as well as by the general scheme relating to the lawful exercise 
of power, such as fundamental rights.21 Bast and Von Bogdandy’s attempt to clarify in 
conceptual terms the difference between the existence and the exercise of competence is 
commendable. However, I am not sure whether this distinction has any significance in legal 
practice. This is because the principle of conferral, like the principle of proportionality and 
subsidiarity, is concerned with ‘how’ a competence is employed. If a measure is annulled 
because of ‘lack of competence’, this is not necessarily because the Union did not have 
competence to adopt the measure at all. It is more likely that the annulment is caused by the 
fact that the proposed measure did not fall within the scope of the designated legal basis. 
Admittedly, in the Tobacco Advertising judgment, the contested directive was annulled 
because of ‘lack of competence’. However, the Court never held that the Union lacked 
competence whatsoever to adopt the measure. The measure was annulled because the EU 
                                              
18 See CONV 375/1/02 (n14) 14-15; CONV 47/02 (n 12) 10-11, 15; Weatherill, ‘Competence creep and 
competence control’ (n 1) 23-24. 
19 See Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP 2012) 368-371, 386-390; Stephen Weatherill, ‘Better 
Competence Monitoring’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 23, 29-40. 
20 See Article 5 of Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/13 (TEU): ‘The 
limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is 
governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.’ Article 263 (2) TFEU states that the Court shall 
have jurisdiction to hear cases ‘on grounds of lack of competence’. 
21 See Von Bogdandy and Bast (n 2) 283, 287. 
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‘exercised’ its powers incorrectly and because the measure fell outside the designated legal 
bases for the measure.22   
Having shown, by numerous examples, that it no longer makes sense to examine the question 
of the existence of EU competences and that we must shift the focus to the question of how 
competences are ‘exercised’, I now turn to the relevance and justification for the research 
question. We can then state the research question which is to examine how limits can be 
constructed to the exercise of EU powers.  
II  The problems of existing legal and political limits to EU competences 
  
The Treaties and the Court’s case-law contain numerous limits to the exercise of EU 
competences. There is the principle of conferral in Article 5 (2) TEU, which states that the 
EU can only act ‘within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member 
States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein.’23 In addition to the principle of 
conferral, there is, as mentioned above, the subsidiarity principle and the proportionality 
principle. 24 The Lisbon Treaty has furthermore, by providing for a special review procedure 
for national parliaments of EU legislation25, by adopting a specific protocol on subsidiarity 
and proportionality26 and by adopting a new provision for the protection of the constitutional 
identity of Member States27, made an effort to construct new limits to the exercise of EU 
powers.28 It is further well-known that the Court in its jurisprudence has limited the EU’s 
power to regulate the internal market by requiring the EU legislator to show that measures 
                                              
22 See Case C- 376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] ECR I-08419, paras 
107, 115-116. 
23 In addition to Article 5(2) TEU, there are a number of other provisions which expressly or implicitly reinforce 
the principle of conferral: Article 1(1) TEU; 3(6) TEU; Article 4(1) TEU; Article 13(2) TEU 48(6) TEU; 2(1) 
TFEU; 2(2) TFEU;4(1) TFEU; Article 7 TFEU; Article 19 TFEU; Article 130 TFEU;  Article 207(6) TFEU; 
Article 226 TFEU; 314(10) TFEU; 351(3) TFEU: Declaration no. 18 in Relation to the Delimitation of 
Competences; Declaration no. 24 Concerning the Legal Personality of the European Union; Declaration no. 42 
on Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; Article 51 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/389. 
24 Article 5 (3)-(4) TEU provides that: ‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. …Under the principle 
of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaties.’ 
25 See Protocol (No 1) On the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union OJ [2010] C 83/203 
(‘Protocol no 1’). 
26 See Protocol (No 2) On the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality OJ [2010] C 
83/206 (‘Protocol no 2’). 
27 See Article 4(2) TEU. 
28 See Azoulai (n 11) 10-11. 
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pursued under Article 114 TFEU genuinely have as their objective the removal of obstacles 
to trade or ‘appreciable’ distortions to competition.29 The Court has also repeatedly held that 
the question of competences is not a political choice. The choice of the legal basis for a 
measure may not depend simply on an institution’s belief as to the objective pursued but must 
be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review.30  
Given all those limits, it might seem legitimate to question the need of embarking on an 
examination of how limits can be constructed to the exercise of competence. The point, as 
hinted above, of this study is that there are problem with those limits. First, it seems that that 
the theoretical limits to EU competences do not coincide with the practice. Already in in the 
negotiations that lead to the Lisbon Treaty, Working Group V raised the concern that the EU 
institutions, with the approval of the Court of Justice, has been pursuing an illegitimate 
interpretation of EU powers, paying mere lip service to the principle of conferred powers, 
proportionality and subsidiarity. The limits on competences are not taken seriously by the EU 
institutions, which allow political reason take precedence over observance of the rules on the 
exercise of competence in the Treaties.31 These perceptions have been detrimental to the 
legitimacy of the Union in the eyes of its citizens and in the eyes of national constitutional 
courts.32  
Secondly, there is conceptual vagueness as to the content of the limits to the exercise of EU 
competences. The Treaties have not given the Court sufficient tools to seriously engage in 
competence control. Because the Union’s competence is associated with its objectives and 
policies and because important competence norms such as Article 114 and Article 352 TFEU 
are framed in a wide manner, the Court’s task of supervising the exercise of this power is 
made very difficult.33 Thirdly, there are problems related to the structure of the EU legal 
                                              
29 See Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising (n 22), paras 83-84, 106-107.  
30 See Case C-300/89 Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide) [1991] ECR I-02867, para 10. 
31 See Joseph H H Weiler, ’The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 The Yale Law Journal 2403, 2431-2453; 
Schütze (n 11) 134-138; Ester Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (Hart 
2012) 66-76; Michael Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’ (2008) 45 Common 
Market Law Review 617, 654-655; Roman Herzog and Lüder Gerken “Stoppt den Europäischen Gerichtshof”, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (8 September 2008) < 
http://www.cep.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Pressemappe/CEP_in_den_Medien/Herzog-EuGH-Webseite.pdf> 
Accessed 23 April 2014; Editorial Comments “The Court of Justice in the limelight – again” in (2008) 45 
Common Market Law Review 1571; Lucia Serena Rossi,’ Does the Lisbon Treaty Provide a Clearer Separation 
of Competences between EU and Member States?’ in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley, EU 
Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012) 95. 
32 See CONV 47/02 (n 12) 3-5, 16; Joseph H H Weiler, ‘The European Union Belongs to its Citizens: Three 
Immodest Proposals’ (1997) 22 European Law Review 150, 155; Gareth Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in 
the Shadow of Purposive Competence’ (2013) European Law Journal, 4. Doi: 10.1111/eulj.12079. 
33 See Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’ (n 32) 6. 
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order. Despite the existence of the principle of conferral, the EU institutions are not well-
placed to effectively enforce provisions relating to the distribution of competences. This is 
because the EU faces structural constraints that impede it from effectively sanctioning the 
vertical division of powers.34 These constraints have to do with the idea of integration. 
Indeed, this concept supports the view that the EU is granted new powers to accomplish its 
objective of integration35 and that the EU political institutions and the Court of Justice give a 
wide interpretation of the EU’s legislative powers.   
What of the political limits to the exercise of EU competences? It is true that for a long time 
EU law has trusted the political safeguards of federalism. It has been maintained that the 
principal place for addressing the problems of ‘competence creep’ should lie in the 
institutional culture of the EU, nourished by input from national political cultures and a 
stronger political monitoring of competences.36 The current Treaty system of competence 
monitoring is also founded on the assumption of political control. The task of determining 
whether the Treaties confer on the Union competence to act in a specific case, and to what 
extent the subsidiarity principle is being complied with, rests with the EU political 
institutions.37 It is however questionable whether the political limits of the Treaties provide 
for sufficient safeguards of federalism. Self-interest and perverse incentives lead the EU 
political institutions to expand EU competences to the detriment of state powers and implies 
that they cannot be trusted to fulfil their review function in a satisfactory manner. The history 
of EU law shows that leaving the issues of the limits of EU competences to the political 
institutions is a hazardous policy.38 The inadequacies of political control of competences have 
been most tellingly demonstrated by the use of Article 352 TFEU. Weiler has noted that from 
1973 until the entry into force of the Single European Act, there was a dramatic shift in the 
understanding of the qualitative scope of Article 352 TFEU. In a variety of fields, the 
Community made use of this provision in a manner that was clearly inconsistent with a 
conventional interpretation of that provision. Only a radically broad reading of the article 
                                              
34 See below chapter 2- section II (B) for a development of this idea. 
35 See François-Xavier Millet, ‘The Respect for Constitutional Identity in the European Legal Space: An 
Approach to Federalism as Constitutionalism’ in Loïc Azoulai (ed), The Question of Competence in the 
European Union (OUP 2014), 255-259.  
36 See Stephen Weatherill ‘The limits of legislative harmonisation ten years after Tobacco Advertising: how the 
Court’s case law has become a “drafting guide’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827, 854-860. 
37 See CONV 47/02 (n 12) 10, 18. 
38 See Craig, ‘Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Containment and Consideration’ (n 1) 324-25; Herlin-Karnell, 
The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (n 31) 66; Serena Rossi (n 31) 95-96; Dorota 
Leczykiewicz ‘‘Constitutional Justice’ and Judicial Review of EU Legislative Acts’ Oxford Legal Studies 




could justify its usage as, for example, the legal basis for granting emergency food aid to non-
associated states.39 Schütze has similarly observed that the Community decided to pursue the 
so-called ‘flanking policies’ on the foundations of Article 352 TFEU despite the obvious 
linguistic contradiction this would entail. These wide readings meant that it would become 
impossible to find an activity which could not be brought within the ‘objectives of the 
Treaty.’ If the Union could adopt acts which endeavoured to achieve closer relations between 
the States, such a competence would be devoid of internal boundaries since all harmonization 
diminishes legislative disparities and increases the legal proximity between the Member 
States. The expansive interpretation of the scope of Article 352 TFEU thus suggested a 
competence for the Union under this provision to create new competences.40 The application 
of subsidiarity and proportionality also reveals a poor record in providing a check against 
competence creep. The perception is that the EU’s political institutions do not take these 
principles seriously. The EU acts when the relevant majorities exist, with no one taking a 
keen interest in proportionality and subsidiarity concerns as a distinct set of considerations.41 
The legislative practice of subsidiarity at the EU political institutions is illustrative. The 
Commission is seldom able to offer examples of when subsidiarity lead to a decision not to 
advance a proposal. The Council is equally untrustworthy in protecting subsidiarity concerns 
in legislative practice. Once it is decided to introduce rules at EU level, the bargaining 
process involves Member States seeking to secure a result as close as possible to their own 
pre-existing systems and to prevent the adoption of standards of protection lower than their 
own. This institutional climate is capable of generating a proliferation of rules adversely 
impacting on the expression of local autonomy. None of the EU institutions are structured to 
ensure that political decisions are made at the lowest level of government possible. 42   
Despite this scepticism against political control of competences, it must be recognized that 
the Convention leading up to Lisbon engaged in a specific effort to strengthen political 
safeguards. It suggested that monitoring of the exercise of EU competences should be 
intensified by strengthening control by national parliaments through an early warning 
                                              
39 See Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (n 31) 2444-46. 
40 See Schütze (n 11) 135, 137, 155;  
41 See Matthias Kumm, ‘Constitutionalizing Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ 12 (2006) European Law Journal 503, 528; Weatherill, ‘Better Competence 
Monitoring’ (n 19) 26- 28. 
42 See Weatherill, ‘Better Competence Monitoring’ (n19) 26; George A Bermann ‘Taking Subsidiarity 
Seriously’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 332, 395-400. 
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mechanism.43 On the basis of the Convention’s proposal, the Lisbon Treaty enshrined a direct 
involvement for national parliaments in the legislative procedure of the EU by means of the 
early warning system in Protocol no 244 (EWS) which allows national parliaments to review 
legislation on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.45 It is however questionable whether 
the EWS and the reasoned opinion procedure are solutions capable of fully addressing 
concerns of competence creep. The first problem with EWS is that this monitoring system 
could aggravate the lack of transparency. The risk is that one source of the EU’s legitimacy, 
its capacity to address transnational problems and collective action problems that Member 
States are unable to deal with individually, will be restrained by deference to another source 
of its legitimacy, the democratic processes within the individual Member States. 46 The 
second problem relates to the fact that the Lisbon Treaty does not allow national parliaments 
to review legislation on the basis of a ‘lack of competence’47 and proportionality. The third 
point is that national parliaments lack the ability to challenge Union legislation directly under 
Article 263 TFEU.48 In sum, it does not appear that there are sufficiently strong political 
limits in the Treaties on the exercise of EU powers. 
III Main arguments of the thesis  
 
The argument of the thesis is divided in two parts. First, building on the existing substantive 
and procedural limits to the exercise of EU competences and on the problems associated with 
those limits, the thesis suggests that we need to reconceptualise the existing limits if they are 
to act as checks on the exercise of EU legislative powers. Limits are, as demonstrated in Part 
II and chapters 4-6 of the thesis, constructed by interpreting the legal bases and principles 
restraining the exercise of EU competences according to conventional canons of 
interpretation of EU law.49 The second strand of the argument contends that a better 
conceptual understanding of the limits of EU competences is not helpful unless those limits 
can be enforced by the EU Courts. For this reason, I devote Part 1 and chapters 2-3 of the 
                                              
43 See CONV 47/02 (n12), 3-5; European Convention, CONV 353/02, ‘Final report of Working Group IV on the 
role of national parliaments’, Brussels, 22 October 2002, 10. 
44 See Protocol (No 2) On the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality (n 26). 
45 See Federico Fabbrini and Kasia Granat, ‘“Yellow card, but no foul”: The role of the national parliaments 
under the subsidiarity protocol and the Commission proposal for an EU regulation on the right to strike’ (2013) 
50 Common Market Law Review 115, 117-125; Weatherill, ‘Competence creep and competence control’ (n 1) 
33-43, 54; 
46 See Weatherill,’ The limits of legislative harmonisation’ (n 36) 855-860. 
47 See Article 263(2) TFEU. 
48 See Fabbrini and Granat (n 45) 120-123; Schütze (n 11) 134-156; Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional 
Dimension of European Criminal Law (n 31) 119. 
49 See Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministero della Sanità [1982] ECR 03415, paras 18-20. 
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thesis to tackle the practical institutional problems of how the exercise of EU powers can be 
challenged before the Court. This argument is outlined in the next section. 
A Problems of competence creep should be addressed by more intense judicial 
review 
 
The thesis suggests that the main responsibility of providing checks against the exercise of 
EU powers lies with the EU judiciary. If the Court is unable to fulfil this function, the rules 
restraining excessive EU harmonization, although nicely phrased, are emptied of practical 
meaning.50 I construct a comprehensive argument for how judicial enforcement of the limits 
of the Treaties could be improved. This argument is divided in four parts. In the first stage, I 
argue that the Court’s current standards and intensity of review is insufficient for attaining the 
goal of serious competence control. In the second, I question whether the institutional reasons 
advanced for a lenient form of review are tenable. Admittedly, the Court suffers from 
institutional imperfections in the shape of a lack of legitimacy and competence.51 I however 
challenge the view, which is the dominant one in the literature52 that those imperfections 
require the Court to defer to the EU legislator.53 In the third stage, I develop a tool, 
procedural review, which is capable of enhancing competence control.54 I try to build a 
comprehensive framework for the appropriateness of procedural review. I argue that a 
procedural enquiry and the proposed legality standard can be applied generally to the Court’s 
review of the exercise of EU legislative powers. My solutions on overcoming institutional 
problems for judicial review are based on the argument that the Court must have at its 
disposal an objective standard of legality under which it can review EU legislation. The 
proposed legality benchmark, derived from the Court’s ruling in Spain v Council55, is that the 
Court must ask the EU legislator to provide for ‘adequate reasoning’ and show that it has 
taken into account ‘relevant circumstances’.56 This test is then applied to discrete examples of 
                                              
50 See Von Bogdandy and Bast (n 2) 300-301. 
51 See Miguel Maduro, We, the Court- The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution 
(Hart 1998); A G Toth’ Is Subsidiarity justiciable?’ (1994) 19 European Law Review 269; Gráinne De Búrca, 
‘The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law’ (1993) 13 Yearbook of European Law 105; 
Craig, EU Administrative Law (n 19). 
52 See Craig, EU Administrative Law (n 19) 592-593, 600-601;Weatherill,’ The limits of legislative 
harmonisation’ (n 36) 843, 848, 850; Janneke H Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine’, (2011) 17 European Law Journal 80, 86 
53 See below chapter 3- section II. 
54 See below chapter 3- section III. 
55 See Case C- 310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-07285, paras 122-123. 
56 See below chapter 3- section IV. 
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EU criminal law legislation to show how the Court can monitor the exercise of Union 
competences.57  
B Rethinking the limits to the exercise of EU competences  
  
I will also briefly map out the tentative proposals for how the limits of the Treaties can be 
reconceptualised by reference to legislative initiatives that provide for the imposition of 
criminal sanctions. First, I elaborate two important substantive limits to EU competences. 
The first one is the ‘essentiality’ condition, which is codified in Article 83(2) TFEU and also 
determines the EU’s general criminal law competence as it is derived from the Environmental 
Crimes judgment. I provide a comprehensive interpretation of the new competence in Article 
83(2) TFEU and of the EU’s general criminal law competence. It is argued that the EU’s 
express and implied criminal law competence are constrained by the EU legislator’s need to 
show that criminal sanctions are not only suitable but also more effective than other non-
criminal sanctions in the enforcement of EU policies.58 This argument is illustrated by the 
case studies of the Environmental Crimes Directive59 and the Market Abuse Crimes 
Directive.60 The other important substantive limit to the exercise of EU powers is the need for 
the EU legislator to show that internal market legislation addresses a ‘market failure’.61 I 
maintain that subsidiarity and the conditions in Article 114 TFEU require that EU 
harmonization can only take place if the EU legislator is able to demonstrate the existence of 
a market failure and that those failures are of such a nature that they require EU action.62 This 
claim is exemplified by through an examination of the Intellectual Crimes Property 
Proposal63 and the Market Abuse Crimes Directive.64  
Secondly, I elaborate two procedural limits to EU competences. The first one is the 
‘harmonization’ requirement in Article 83(2) TFEU. I suggest that this entails that the 
                                              
57 See below chapter 4- section I (A); chapter 4- section II (A); chapter 5- section I (C); chapter 6- section III. 
58 See below chapter 4- section I (A); chapter 5- section I (A-B). 
59 See below chapter 4- section I (A). 
60 See below chapter 5- section I (C).  
61 ‘Market failure/market dysfunctions’ can generally be defined as’ deviations from perfect markets due to 
some element of the functioning of the market structure’; See World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat, 
’World Trade Report 2004- Exploring the linkage between the domestic policy environment and international 
trade’ Chapter 3, 150-151. <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr04_2c_e.pdf>. Accessed 24 
April 2014. Market failures include for example protectionist trade barriers, distortions to competition, 
regulatory costs and inefficiencies arising from multiple regimes and the externalities arising from negative 
effects occurring in one state as a result of an activity that is regulated or not regulated in another Member State, 
see Niamh Moloney, EC Securities Regulation (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 27.  
62 See below chapter 4- section II (A); chapter 6- section I (B). 
63 See below chapter 4- section II (A) . 
64 See below chapter 6- section III. 
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criminal law competence in Article 83(2) TFEU can only be triggered if the EU legislator 
prior to the criminal law measure had adopted substantive harmonization measures by means 
of regulations and directives through the ordinary or special legislative procedure prescribed 
for in Article 294 TFEU. That argument is represented by looking at two fields of EU policy; 
EU Competition Law and EU Market Abuse rules.65 The other procedural limit to the 
exercise of EU competences is the requirement to act on the correct legal basis. I illustrate 
this limit by looking at the debate on the correct legal basis for criminal law measures after 
Lisbon. I argue that the nature of Article 83(2) TFEU suggests that this is a lex specialis in 
relation to other legal bases in cases where the envisaged criminal law measures fall within 
the procedural and material scope of that provision. However, in areas such as competition 
law, which are excluded from harmonization under this provision and in relation to criminal 
law measures, which by providing for decriminalization in the form of regulations fall outside 
the textual confines of Article 83(2) TFEU, other Treaty articles such as Article 114 and 
Article 352 TFEU could be used.66   
IV Case study 
Individual criminal sanctions for the enforcement of EU law 
 
Because the research question is very wide, the scope of the enquiry has been restricted to the 
EU’s competence to enforce its policies through criminal sanctions, i.e. ‘regulatory criminal 
law’. The topic of the thesis falls within the confines of EU Criminal Law,67 which is a broad 
field covering a multi-layered patchwork of legislation and case law in which both European 
and national courts and European and national legislatures play a role.68 EU Criminal Law as 
a concept covers all instances where EU has normative influence on either substantive 
criminal law/criminal procedure or on the judicial cooperation between the Member States.69 
                                              
65 See below chapter 5- section II. 
66 See below chapter 5- section III. 
67 While there may be some terminological difficulties with the concept of ‘EU criminal law’ (see Cristopher 
Harding, ‘review of V Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law’, (2010) 35 European Law Review 301), it should be 
underlined that this concept differs from ‘European criminal law’. ‘European criminal law’ not only concerns 
the impact of EU law on national criminal laws but also the legal activities of the Council of Europe and other 
European organizations, flanking the European Union; see Geert Corstens and Jean Pradel, European Criminal 
Law (Kluwer Law International 2002) 2-3; Christopher Harding and Joanna Banach-Gutierrez, ‘The Emergent 
EU Criminal Policy: Identifying the Species’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 758, 759. 
68 See André Klip, European Criminal Law (Intersentia 2012) 1. 
69 See Klip (n 68) 2; Helmut Satzger, European and International Criminal Law (Beck/Hart 2012) 43-44. 
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In substantive terms, it contains the legislative competences in Articles 82-86 TFEU and 
those legal bases providing for criminal law competence outside Title V.70  
To understand the notion of EU regulatory criminal law it is easiest to have a brief look at 
Article 83 TFEU. This is the main provision that governs the EU’s substantive criminal law 
competence to harmonize ‘substantive criminal laws’ in relation to offences and sanctions.71 
This provision has formalized the general national division between ‘core’ and ‘regulatory 
criminal law’. Article 83(1) TFEU deals first with ‘core’ criminal law. These are rules which 
are held to be ends in themselves and not objectives to achieve further political objectives. 
This provision lists 10 offences72 for which the EU has a right to establish minimum rules 
concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions. These offences are considered 
to be of a ‘particularly serious nature’ and the provision assumes that these offences deserve 
criminalization because of the general harm and damage incurred by such offences.73 Then 
there is regulatory criminal law in Article 83(2) TFEU. Regulatory criminal law covers all 
criminal law provisions aimed at achieving the political objectives of the Union; protection of 
the environment, protection of the financial market, the four freedoms and undistorted 
competition.74 EU regulatory criminal law is defined pursuant to Article 83(2) as 
encompassing all criminal law measures which are adopted ‘to ensure the effective 
implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to’ regulatory 
‘harmonisation measures’.75  
The field of EU regulatory criminal law has been chosen for two reasons. First, a study of this 
policy area, constituting a general field of EU policy76 illustrates the limits to the exercise of 
EU competences. The harmonization of EU regulatory criminal law, like other important EU 
                                              
70 See Harding and Gutierrez (n 67) 761; Herlin Karnell, Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law 
(n 31) 3. 
71 See Petter Asp, The Substantive Criminal Law Competence of the EU—Towards an Area of Freedom, 
Security & Justice—Part 1 (Jure 2013)19-20. 
72…’Terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug 
trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer 
crime and organised crime’.  
73 See Asp (n 71) 85; Fletcher, Gilmore and Lööf (n 4) 183. 
74 See Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 September 2005’ (Case C-176/03 Commission v Council), COM 
2005 (583) final/2, paragraph 7; Commission, ’Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions- 
Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law’, 
COM 2011/573 final (‘COM 2011/573’) , 10-11. 
75 See Memorandum by Maria Fletcher, in House of Lords’ European Union Committee, ’The Treaty of Lisbon: 
an impact assessment, ‘10th Report of Session 2007–08, Volume II: Evidence, HL Paper 62-II, London : The 
Stationery Office Limited, E 149, 150. 
76 See Articles 3(2) and Article 67 TFEU. 
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policies, has been proposed by scholars and the EU legislator under the functional power of 
Article 114 TFEU.77 Secondly, it is argued that regulatory criminal law is an important policy 
field. The EU’s power to enforce its existing policies by criminal sanctions is not only a 
theoretical question but a practical one. The EU has already adopted four regulatory criminal 
law measures, the Environmental Crimes Directive, the Ship-Source Pollution Crimes 
Directive78 and the Employer Sanctions Directive,79 the Market Abuse Crimes Directive,80 
and submitted another proposal, the Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal,81 which was 
subsequently rejected.82 It is clear from the legislative practice and the Commission’s 
Communication in 201183 that EU regulatory criminal law will remain a priority area for the 
EU legislator. 
It will become apparent from the discussion in the thesis that there is another limitation to the 
scope of my research. This is the fact that I only deal with individual84 criminal sanctions in a 
‘strict’ sense. This is not obvious from the concept of EU regulatory criminal law since this 
concept sometimes encompasses administrative sanctions/criminal sanctions in a broad sense. 
For example, the fines under competition law in Regulation 1/2003 would most likely fall 
within the definition of a ‘criminal charge’ according to Article 6 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 85 This means that specific criminal law safeguards must be 
applied when such competition law fines are imposed.86 However, when it comes to the 
                                              
77 See Commission,’ Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights’, Brussels, 26.4.2006, 
COM(2006) 168 final. For scholarly support for the use of Article 114 TFEU for criminalization of EU 
Competition Law: Peter Whelan, ‘Contemplating the Future: Personal Criminal Sanctions for Infringement of 
EC Competition Law’ (2008) 19 King’s Law Journal 364, 369; Manfred Zuleeg, ‘Criminal Sanctions to be 
Imposed on Individuals as Enforcement Instruments in European Competition Law’ in Claus Dieter Ehlermann 
and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC 
Antitrust Law (Hart 2003), 456-57. 
78 Directive 2009/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 amending 
Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements [2009] OJ 
L 280/52. 
79 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum 
standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals [2009] OJ L 
168/24. 
80 See Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal 
sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive) [2014] OJ L 173/79. 
81 See above n 77 for full reference to this proposal. 
82 See Withdrawal of Obsolete Commission Proposals, 2010/C 252/04, OJ 252/7, 9. 
83 See COM 2011/573 (n 74) 2, 5-6. 
84 Whilst several directives in the field of EU Criminal Law contain provision for criminal penalties for firms, it 
is more appropriate to focus on individual penalties. This is because discussions on the effectiveness of 
imprisonment and the fundamental rights implications of criminal sanctions only make sense within the 
framework of individual sanctions.  
85 Council of Europe, ‘European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14’, 4 November 1950, ETS 5. 
86 See Asp (n 71). 
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question of this thesis, such administrative fines are not considered to be criminal in nature.87 
My definition of criminal sanctions in EU law is that they must communicate moral stigma, 
have a punitive purpose, be imposed after criminal procedures and finally entail intrusive and 
severe consequences for individuals, for example liberty deprivation and a criminal record.88 
This basically implies that I will only look imprisonment and other sanctions89 that can be 
replaced by imprisonment sanctions if they are not complied with.90 The main focus in the 
discussion of specific EU legislative measures91 will be on imprisonment sanctions. This 
focus can be explained on two grounds. First, imprisonment sanctions reflect particular social 
disapproval and are in that respect of a qualitatively different nature as compared with other 
punishments such as administrative sanctions.92 It makes sense to focus on such sanctions 
from the point of view of deterrence and dissuasion. It is arguably the imposition of 
imprisonment sanctions, in contrast to fines and other non-criminal sanctions that makes a 
difference in the effectiveness of the enforcement system.93 Imprisonment sanctions are 
arguably the most important and intrusive sanction that can be imposed for regulatory 
offences because of their harsh consequences and the moral condemnation they entail.94  If 
the criminal sanctions imposed by Member States are to comply with the requirement of 
being ‘proportionate, dissuasive and effective’95, it is often necessary for Member States to 
impose ‘imprisonment sentences’ for the enforcement of the relevant EU policies.96 
Secondly, the EU legislator’s general argument for criminalization of the enforcement of EU 
policies can only be understood in terms of the envisaged sanction for breaches of EU law. 
Harmonization of EU criminal law has often been limited to rationalising the use of 
                                              
87 See Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 21 February 1984, Öztürk v. Germany, Series A no 
73 [1984] 6 EHRR 409, paras 47-49; Asp (n71) 60-64.  
88 See Asp (n 71) 64-68. 
89 Criminal fines, conditional sentences, community service orders and probation orders. 
90 See Satzger (n 69) 51. 
91 See below chapter 4- section I (A); chapter 5- section I (C). 
92 See Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (n 6), Opinion of AG Mazak, para 67. 
93 See Wouter PJ Wils, ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’ (2005) 28 World Competition 
117, 138-148. 
94 Dan M Kahan, ‘What do alternative sanctions mean?’ (1996) 63 University of Chicago Law Review 593, 
621- 24, 645, 649 , 652 ; Michael G Faure, Effective, proportional and dissuasive penalties in the 
implementation of the Environmental Crime and Ship-source Pollution Directives: Questions and Challenges’ 
(2010) 19 European Energy and Environmental Law Review 256, 266-267; John C Coffee JR, ‘Corporate Crime 
and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions’ (1980) 17 American Criminal 
Law Review 419, 436-439, 449, 462, 468-469. 
95 This is the standard formula used in recent EU criminal law directives. The formula can be derived from the 
Court of Justice’s case-law: Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965, para. 24. 
96 See Peter Whelan, ‘A Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions as Punishment under EC Cartel 
Law’ (2007) 4 Competition Law Review 7, for the case for imprisonment sentences for EU competition law 
infringements. See also Faure (n 94), 266, for an argument why imprisonment sentences, instead of fines, may 
be needed for the enforcement of EU environmental laws. 
16 
 
imprisonment at the EU level by ensuring that severe criminality faces tough sanctions in the 
whole of Europe.97 It is clear that those arguments are based on the presupposition that 
imprisonment sanctions are needed for the effective and uniform application of EU law.98  
V Structure of thesis 
 
A Scope of research 
 
The case study of EU regulatory criminal law has shaped the scope of the research. The thesis 
rethinks the limits to EU competences in this area by exploring a new provision in the Lisbon 
Treaty, Article 83(2), by analysing the scope of Article 103 TFEU and Article 192 TFEU, by 
re-examining the notorious functional provision of Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU 
and finally through a reconsideration of the subsidiarity principle. The reason for choosing 
Article 114 and 192 TFEU is related to the fact that those legal bases are two of the four legal 
bases99 which were used for EU regulatory criminal law measures before Lisbon Treaty.100 A 
further reason for choosing Article 114 TFEU is that an analysis of this provision makes it 
possible to revisit some of the perennial constitutional questions of the limits to EU 
harmonization.101 Article 83(2) TFEU is chosen because it is the new legal basis specifically 
envisaged for criminal law under the Lisbon Treaty and because this is the legal basis for the 
new Market Abuse Crimes Directive. Articles 103 and 352 TFEU were chosen because there 
have been proposals in the literature that these legal bases could be used for 
criminalization.102 Subsidiarity was chosen because this principle is, after the changes made 
in the Lisbon Treaty, potentially an important check against excessive EU harmonization. 103 
                                              
97 See Kimmo Nuotio, ‘Harmonization of Criminal Sanctions in the European Union- Criminal Law Science 
Fiction’ in Asbjørn Strandbakken and Erling Johannes Husabø (eds)  Harmonization of Criminal Law in Europe 
(Intersentia 2005)100; Commission,’ Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council  on 
criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation’, Brussels, 20.10.2011, COM(2011) 654 final 
(‘Market Abuse Crimes Proposal’) 5; Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal law’, Brussels, 9.2.2007 COM(2007) 51 
final, 6; COM 2006/168 (n 77) 3. 
98 See e.g. COM 2011/654 (n97), 2-3; COM 2007/ 51 (n97), 2-3; COM 2006/168 (n 77), recital 7. 
99 See also the Ship-Source Pollution Directive (n 78) which was adopted on the basis of 80 (2) EC (100(2) 
TFEU) and the Employers Sanctions Directive (n 79) which was adopted on the basis of Article 63(3) (B) EC 
(79 TFEU). 
100 See Dougan ‘From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist’ (n 5) 91-113. 
101 See Schütze (n 11) 144-156; Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (n 31) 
87-108. 
102 Wils (n 93); Whelan (n 96). 
103 See Andrea Biondi, ‘Subsidiarity in the Courtroom’ in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley 
(eds) EU Law after Lisbon (OUP 2012)  
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It is therefore appropriate to examine whether this principle is apt to restrain the exercise of 
the EU’s criminal law competence. 
Four different areas of Union regulatory criminal law are considered. One is EU competition 
law since it has been suggested that EU anti-trust enforcement needs criminal sanctions.104 
Although no action has been proposed at Union level for the imposition of criminal sanctions 
for breach of EU Competition rules such a proposal could be possible, given the 
Commission’s interpretation of the Environmental Crimes judgment, the new legal basis in 
83(2) TFEU and given the fact that competition policy is a priority Union policy.105 Another 
field of law that will be examined is EU financial regulation. As a case study, it is analysed 
whether the Commission is correct in adopting the new Market Abuse Crimes Directive 
under Article 83(2) TFEU.106 The thesis also discusses criminal sanctions in the field of 
environmental law. The choice of this area is related to the judgments of the Court, which 
were concerned with environmental law, and the fact that the Union legislator has already 
enacted legislation, on the basis of Article 192 TFEU imposing criminal sanctions for 
infringement of EU environmental rules.107 Finally, I consider criminal sanctions in the field 
of intellectual property infringements. I choose this case study because the EU legislator had 
already proposed criminal law legislation in this field of law.108  
B Chapter synopsis 
 
The thesis is divided in two parts and 7 chapters. Part I is a general part examining the 
problems of judicial review in setting limits to the exercise of EU powers. This part also 
builds a framework of legality to be used when reviewing discrete pieces of EU legislation. 
Part II then applies this framework and illustrates the limits of EU competences by analysing 
specific pieces of legislation and by examining the scope of the EU’s competence to impose 
criminalization measures under different legal bases of the Treaties.  
The first part of thesis (chapters 2-3) deals with the general debate on the nature of the 
competence problems, grounds of judicial review and the debate on judicial review. In order 
to construct limits to the exercise of EU competences, chapter 2 considers whether there are 
                                              
104 See above n 93, n 96, n 103, for references to authors advocating criminalization of EU competition law. 
105 See Anthony Dawes and Orla Lynskey, ‘The Ever-longer Arm of EC Law: The Extension of Community 
Competence Into the Field of Criminal Law’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 131, 151. 
106 See Market Abuse Crimes Directive (n80). 
107 See Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the 
protection of the environment through criminal law [2008] OJ L 328/28. 
108  See COM 2006/168 (n 77). 
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any grounds on which the exercise of EU competences could be challenged. The chapter 
considers three grounds for judicial review; lack of competences, subsidiarity and 
proportionality. It discusses the theoretical problems of the existing limits to EU competences 
and evaluates whether those limits are sufficient safeguards of federalism. The chapter 
particularly examines whether the limits imposed by the Court’s case law are apt to act as 
checks on the exercise of EU powers. This entails a conceptual discussion of whether certain 
limits are predestined to be unsuccessful in litigation. Previous scholarly contributions 
criticising the conceptual basis for limiting the exercise of EU competences are also 
discussed for and appraised. The chapter finally evaluates, on the basis of the literature 
review and the Court’s case-law, which grounds for judicial review are capable of 
challenging the exercise of EU competences before the Court. 
Having established the grounds for judicial review on which EU legislation can be 
challenged, the thesis proceeds in chapter 3 to examine how judicial enforcement of those 
grounds can be improved. The chapter also tries to develop a framework for reviewing EU 
legislation. It analyses not only conceptual problems with existing grounds of judicial review 
but also institutional factors that have militated against serious judicial review. In particular, 
it is examined whether the institutional reasons advanced for justifying the Court’s current 
approach to review of broad EU policy measures are defensible. The chapter also discusses 
how to improve the Court’s weak existing role in competence monitoring. A conceptual tool, 
‘procedural review’ is elaborated to enhance judicial enforcement of the limits of the 
Treaties. The final part of the chapter suggests, on the basis of the procedural review 
framework, a standard of review and test for legality for review of EU legislation.  
Having tackled some of the institutional challenges for enhancing judicial enforcement of 
competences, Part II of the thesis applies the legality framework developed in chapters 2 and 
3 by discussing specific limits to the exercise of Union competences. Chapter 4 considers the 
limits to the EU’s dormant criminal law competence. The first part examines whether the 
sectorial bases of the Treaties, Article 103 TFEU and Article 192 TFEU, confer, on the basis 
of the Court’s case-law in the Environmental Crimes judgment, a power on the Union to 
impose criminal laws. It is firstly discussed whether the ‘essentiality’ condition in the Court’s 
case-law can act as a check on the adoption of criminal law measures under Article 192 
TFEU. There is then an examination of whether the Environmental Crime Directive conforms 
to the ‘essentiality’ condition. Secondly, the scope of the EU’s sectorial competences under 
Article 103 TFEU is considered. It is discussed whether the ‘effectiveness’ rationale can be 
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employed to justify criminalization of EU competition law. The second section of the chapter 
analyses the scope of the functional provisions of the Treaties, Article 114 and Article 352 
TFEU, to criminalize breaches of existing EU rules. In terms of Article 114, both conceptual 
and practical problems of competence review are tackled. First, it is discussed whether there 
is any substantive constraint for the exercise of powers under this provision. Secondly, it is 
analysed whether there is any way to improve judicial review of the exercise of EU 
competences under this provision. The limits of Article 114 TFEU are illustrated by means of 
a case study of the Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal. The chapter finally examines 
whether there is any limit on enacting EU criminal law legislation under Article 352 TFEU.  
Chapter 5 is exclusively focussed on the new legal basis for criminal sanctions in Article 
83(2) TFEU. The chapter considers firstly the substantive conditions of Article 83(2) TFEU, 
i.e. the meaning of the ‘essentiality’ condition, the scope of judicial review under the 
provision and the meaning of ‘effective implementation’ of EU law. Secondly, the procedural 
conditions of Article 83(2) TFEU are examined. In particular, it is discussed whether the 
‘harmonization’ requirement in this provision can act as a check on EU criminalization. 
Finally, it is examined whether the nature of Article 83(2) TFEU can act as a restraint for EU 
criminalization under other legal bases of the Treaties conferring criminal law competence to 
the EU.  
Chapter 6 considers the principle of subsidiarity as a principle limiting the exercise of EU 
competences. The first part of the chapter examines how a re-construction of the subsidiarity 
principle can help to challenge the basis for excessive EU harmonization. Secondly, it is 
discussed how judicial review of subsidiarity could be improved. Recognising that judicial 
enforcement of subsidiarity has so far been unsatisfying, it is examined whether procedural 
review offers a solution to the problem of judicial review of subsidiarity. There is a specific 
case study of whether the Market Abuse Crimes Directive conforms to the subsidiarity 
criterion. Chapter 7 contains the conclusions of the thesis and an assessment of the lessons we 












PART I- A FRAMEWORK FOR LEGALITY 
REVIEW 
 




As indicated in the introductory chapter,1 it has been generally very difficult to identify 
conceptual means of delimiting the scope of EU powers. The principle of conferral and the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in Article 5 TEU have proved inadequate as 
safeguards against the expansion of EU powers. This expansion has taken place by a broad 
and teleological interpretation by the EU political institutions of existing Treaty provisions 
such as Article 114 and Article 352 TFEU, tacitly supported by the Court.2 Although the 
general critique against the conceptual basis for challenging the exercise of EU competences 
is partly valid, I argue in this chapter that there is still hope for credible competence review. 
We can overcome the conceptual criticism if existing limits to EU law are reconceptualised in 
a way that provides for more exact standards.  
In terms of structure and arguments, the chapter first introduces the different heads of review 
relevant for the enquiry. First, there is an analysis of ‘lack of competence’ which provides an 
account and evaluation of the Court’s current approach to review in competence litigation. 
Then there is a discussion of whether this limit is a sufficient check on the exercise of EU 
competences. I argue that ‘lack of competences’ is a meaningful ground of review. Despite a 
questionable judicial record, there are limits in the Court’s case-law and recent evolutions of 
EU law suggest that the criticism against this head of review can be countered. The second 
part of the chapter considers proportionality. Having evaluated the case-law and the literature, 
there is a discussion of whether this principle is destined to be unsuccessful in judicial 
litigation. Secondly, it is argued that proportionality is not a credible principle to limit the 
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 See above chapter 1-section I for a description of the practical and conceptual problems of restraining the 
expansion of EU competences. 
2
 See Stephen Weatherill, ‘Better Competence Monitoring’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 23, 24-25; Paul 
Craig, ‘Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Containment and Consideration’ (2004) 29 European Law Review 323, 
324; Lucia Serena Rossi, ‘Does the Lisbon Treaty Provide a Clearer Separation of Competences between EU 




exercise of EU competences. This is demonstrated by the weak judicial record on the matter 
and by the fact that there is no conceptual basis for serious proportionality review in 
competence cases. The final part of the chapter accounts for subsidiarity. It considers whether 
the Court’s case-law on subsidiarity has provided any limit to the exercise of EU 
competences. Based on this analysis and a discussion of the scholarly contributions on 
subsidiarity, the chapter evaluates whether subsidiarity is capable of challenging the exercise 
of EU competences before the Court. It is argued that subsidiarity, whilst witnessing little 
attention in the case law and being condemned as being essentially political in nature, is a 
head of review capable of challenging the exercise of EU competences. By rethinking 
subsidiarity as a principle challenging the broad internal market justification for EU 
harmonization, it is argued that the principle is capable of challenging the exercise of EU 
competences.  
I HEADS OF REVIEW IN COMPETENCE LITIGATION- THEORY AND 
JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE 
 
Pursuant to Article 263 TFEU there are four grounds for annulment of Union acts: lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty 
or of any rule of law relating to its application and misuse of powers.3 This section, however, 
only accounts for three heads of review, ‘lack of competence’, ‘subsidiarity’ and 
‘proportionality’. The reason for limiting the enquiry to these three grounds is that these 
heads of review are the most important for understanding the division of powers between the 
Union and its Member States. Consequently, I will not discuss other grounds of review 
falling under Article 263 TFEU and the general heads of review4 used when addressing an 
‘infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application’ such as: i) 
fundamental rights, ii) legitimate expectations, iii) transparency, iv) the precautionary 
principle, v) essential procedural requirements, vi) misuse of power, vii) legal certainty, viii) 
                                              
3
 Article 263 TFEU (1) - (2) provides that: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality 
of legislative acts…intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties…It shall for this purpose have 
jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on 
grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers…’ 
4
 See Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law (2nd edn, CUP 2010) 401-402 
and Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law- Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2011) 519-556, for 
an account of these grounds of review. 
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non-discrimination, ix) the obligation to respect the national identities of the Member States.5 
Why are the enumerated heads of review less important in a thesis on EU competences? 
Generally, because the enumerated grounds of review are not principles employed or 
intended to delineate the powers between the Member States and the EU. 6 While the Court’s 
approach to proportionality, subsidiarity and lack of competences have a large influence for 
shaping the actual division of competences between the EU and its Member States, this is not 
the case for the Court’s approach to general principles, essential procedural requirements, 
fundamental rights or misuse of powers. 7  
I furthermore argue that the most important head of legal review is ‘lack of competence’. The 
reason for this is that the Court’s approach to this head of review has constitutional 
implications for the Union legal order. First, disputes on the correct legal basis have to a great 
extent shaped the order of competences. Secondly, the choice of legal basis defines the 
applicable standards for testing the legality of a Union act.8 For these reasons, it is important 
to examine ‘lack of competence’ in detail.   
II Lack of competence 
 
A Theory and judicial review  
 
It is well-known that one of the characteristic features of the European Union is that it 
exercises public authority i.e. it has a legal capacity to unilaterally determine and shape 
natural persons’, legal persons’ and Member States’ legal or factual situation. This authority 
is enshrined and defined in the Treaties. We know however from the above that while the EU 
has broad powers, its powers are, pursuant to Article 5(2) TEU, limited by the competences 
conferred upon it by the Treaties and the objectives of the Treaties. Article 5(2) TEU implies 
                                              
5
 See Thomas Horsley, ‘Reflections on the Role of the Court of Justice as the Motor of European Integration: 
Legal Limits to Judicial Lawmaking’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 931, 949; European Convention, 
CONV 375/1/02, ‘Final Report of Working Group V on Complementary Competencies’, Brussels, 4 November 
2002, 11-12. 
6
 However, for a divergent opinion see: Koen Lenaerts and José A Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional 
Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1629. 
7
 See Alan Dashwood, ‘The Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union/European 
Community’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 355, 356. 
8
 See Opinion 2/00 Cartagena Protocol [2001] ECR I-9713, para 5; Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community 
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I-
01759, paras 23-36; Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (OUP 2009) 132-156; Armin Von 
Bogdandy and Jürgen Von Bast, ‘The Federal Order of Competences’ in Armin Von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast, 
Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart 2009) 279, 301. 
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that the Union lacks power to create  new substantive competences or new Treaty objectives.9 
Therefore it is always necessary to tie a Union measure to a legal basis in order ensure that 
the objective pursued can validly be pursued under that provision. If the Union act at issue 
does not fall within the scope of a legal basis or pursues an objective that is not recognized as 
a Union objective, the legal act can be declared invalid by the Court.10 The requirement of a 
legal basis demands that the choice of the legal basis may only be founded on objective 
elements subject to judicial review. The limits of the powers conferred by a specific provision 
of the Treaty must thus be inferred from an interpretation of the wording of the provision in 
question analysed in the light of its purpose and placed in the scheme of the Treaty.11  
But is the principle of conferral in Article 5(2) TEU a limitation prone to work before the 
Court? Dashwood answers this question in the affirmative and suggests that the principle of 
conferral is one of the core principles in delimiting the exercise of Union competences. He 
explains that competences of the Union are conferred by particular provisions, legal bases 
which only authorize action by one or several designated institutions in a determined policy 
area or in pursuance of a determined objective, and no other. The technique of specific 
attribution remains the most successful method of setting identifiable limits to the 
competences of the EU.12 Recent Treaty revisions have also strengthened the principle.13 
Although in the original Treaties legislative competence was generally conferred upon the 
Union on the basis of objectives to be attained and the means of attaining them, i.e. the 
functional method,14 successive revisions of the Treaties have replaced this method by a 
substantive allocation of competence consisting of defining the precise actions to be taken by 
the Union.15  
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 See Case C-155/07 Parliament v Council (European Investment Bank) [2008] ECR I-8103, para 34: Alan 
Dashwood, ‘The limits of European Community Powers’ (1996) 21 European Law Review 113, 115. 
10 
See Articles 263 and 264 TFEU. 
11
 See Joined Cases 188-190/80 France, Italy and United Kingdom v Commission [1982] ECR 2545, para. 6. 
12
 See Dashwood, ‘The Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union/European 
Community’ (n 7) 357-358, 361. 
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 See above chapter 1, n 23, for an enumeration of references in the Treaties and the accompanying protocols 
and declarations to the principle of conferral. 
14
 See Serena Rossi (n 2) 86. 
15
 See Dashwood, ‘The Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union/European 
Community’ (n 7) 380; European Convention, CONV 47/02, Discussion Paper, ‘Delimitation of competence 
between the European Union and the Member States – Existing system, problems and avenues to be explored’, 
Brussels, 15 May 2002, 6.  
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Despite these theoretical predictions of the potential of the principle of conferral, the judicial 
record suggests16 that the principle of conferral has not acted as a check to the exercise of EU 
competences before the Court.  
There are only two cases in the history of competence litigation, Opinion 2/9417 and Tobacco 
Advertising,
18 where the Court annulled a whole piece of legislation or envisaged agreement 
for the ‘lack of competence’.19 Because these cases are potentially important for identifying 
the genuine limits to the exercise of Union powers, a brief recapitulation of them seems 
appropriate. 
The first case where an envisaged Union measure was considered to fall outside the Union’s 
competence was the famous Opinion 2/94. Here the Court considered that accession by the 
Union to the European Convention on Human Rights fell outside the scope of Article 352 
TFEU since that provision could not serve as a basis for widening the scope of Union powers 
beyond the general framework created by the provisions of the Treaty as a whole and, in 
particular, by those that define the tasks and the activities of the Union. More specifically, it 
could not be used as a basis for the adoption of provisions whose effect would amount to a 
Treaty amendment without following the procedures for Treaty revision.  The Court observed 
that Accession to the Convention would entail a substantial change in the Union system for 
the protection of human rights in that it would entail the entry of the Union into a distinct 
international institutional system as well as integration of all the provisions of the Convention 
into the EU legal order. Such a modification of the system for the protection of human rights 
in the EU, with equally fundamental institutional implications for the EU and for the Member 
States, would be of constitutional significance and would therefore be such as to go beyond 
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 See above chapter 1- section II for a brief account of the Court’s problem of restraining the exercise of EU 
competences. 
17 
See Opinion 2/94, Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention (n 8).  
18 
See Case C–376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] ECR I-8419. 
19
 See for partial annulment of the Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain 
aspects of the organization of working time [1993] OJ 1993 L 307/18 (‘Working Time Directive’): Case C-
84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] I-05755. The Court annulled the second sentence of Article 5 of the 
Working Time Directive (Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council, para 37). See also Joined Cases C-402 and 
C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] 
ECR I-6351. The contested regulation in Kadi (Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 
imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with 
Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 
prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending 
the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan [2002] OJ 2002 L 139/ 
9) was only annulled in so far as it concerned Kadi and Al Barakaat (Joined Cases C-402 and 415/05 P Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, paras 372-376).  
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the scope of Article 352 TFEU. It could be brought about only by way of Treaty 
amendment.20  
The second case, where Union was found to have acted outside its competence was the 
Tobacco Advertising judgment which concerned an action for annulment of a Tobacco 
Advertising Directive.21 In this case the German Government challenged the validity of the 
Directive inter alia on the ground that it was adopted on the incorrect legal basis. The Court 
held that Article 114 TFEU could not be construed as vesting in the Union legislature a 
general power to regulate the internal market. Such an interpretation would not only be 
contrary to the express wording of Article 114 TFEU but would also be incompatible with the 
principle of conferral. A mere finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract 
risk of obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition 
liable to result therefrom was not sufficient to justify the choice of Article 114 as a legal base. 
If such evidence was sufficient to justify compliance with Article 114 TFEU the Court would 
be prevented from discharging the function entrusted to it by Article 19 TEU of ensuring that 
the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaty.22 On the basis of these 
propositions, the Court proceeded to annul the Tobacco Advertising Directive. According to 
the Court, the prohibitions on tobacco advertising on posters, parasols, ashtrays and other 
articles used in hotels, restaurants and cafés, and the prohibition of advertising spots in 
cinemas, did not in any way help to facilitate trade in the products concerned. Nor were those 
prohibitions were liable to remove ‘appreciable distortions’ to competition.23 
It has been argued that the Court’s approach in Tobacco Advertising and Opinion 2/94 is 
compelling evidence of the Court’s ability to police the limits of the Treaties. Von Bogdandy 
and Bast submit that the Court has become increasingly self-confident with regard to the 
Council. They claim that the Court, by its decision in Tobacco Advertising, confirmed that it 
is able to assert itself as the highest constitutional court willing to act as an honest broker 
between the EU and its Member States. According to von Bogdandy and Bast the Court has 
in this ruling delimited the problematic breadth of Article 114 TFEU as a blanket clause for 
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 See Opinion 2/94, Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention (n 8), paras 30, 
35-36. 
21
 Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the approximation of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and sponsorship 
of tobacco products [1998] OJ 1992 L 213/9. 
22
 See Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising (n 18), paras 83-84. 
23
 ibid, paras 99-105, 109-116. 
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the regulation of the economy.24 In a similar vein, Dashwood has concluded that Opinion 
2/94 imposed a serious limitation to the use of Article 352 TFEU. The principle of conferral 
was not treated in this case by the Court as a rhetorical flourish or a political statement but as 
expressing one of the general organising principles of the post-Maastricht constitution. The 
Court demonstrated that it takes the principle of conferral seriously by not allowing the 
political institutions to fall back on Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis of last resort where an 
action could be seen as furthering one or other of the Union’s objectives. Opinion 2/94 also 
shows that the principle of conferral places the onus of proof on the party asserting that a 
power exists or can be used in a certain way.25 
Although the observations of Von Bogdandy/Bast and Dashwood seem promising, I argue 
that they do not capture the reality of the legal landscape post-Tobacco and post-Opinion 
2/94. First, it appears that ensuing case-law on the scope of Article 114 and Article 352 
TFEU casts serious doubts on the potency of the limits laid in Tobacco Advertising and 
Opinion 2/94. Rather than being an honest broker, the Court appears to have diminished its 
role as a constitutional adjudicator by showing substantial deference to the Union legislator.26 
In BAT27, concerned with the validity of a new tobacco advertising directive28, the EU 
legislator had enacted a ban on the manufacture of cigarettes within the EU for export to non-
Member countries. The export ban could hardly be said to fall within the confines of Article 
114 TFEU. This ban was not ‘likely’ to remove ‘obstacles to trade’ or ‘appreciable 
distortions to competition’, which were the limits imposed by the earlier Tobacco Advertising 
judgment. The Court even recognized that the prohibition did not aim to improve directly the 
conditions for the functioning of the internal market. Even if a Union measure can be 
addressed to future trade obstacles which are ‘likely’ to arise under Article 114 TFEU 
according to the Tobacco Advertising judgment29, the risk for unlawful trade in cigarettes and 
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 See Alan Dashwood, ’Commentary’ in (1996) Centre of European Legal Studies, Cambridge Occasional 
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 See Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453. 
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Article 3(2) of Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the 
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 See Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising (n 18), para 86. 
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fraudulent practices was in this case too remote and uncertain to constitute a relevant 
justification. The evidence in the case rather pointed to the fact that it was not possible to 
evaluate with precision the volume of unlawful trade in cigarettes. It was furthermore clear 
that the circumvention of the provisions relating to the composition of the cigarettes was not 
the cause of unlawful trade.30 The measure was, however, upheld by the Court as falling 
within the scope of Article 114 TFEU. 
In Swedish Match, a case concerned with a challenge to a directive prohibiting the marketing 
and selling of ‘snuff’ products31, the Court accepted that the Union legislator had  
competence under Article 114 TFEU to adopt the ‘Snuff’ Directive. The Court found that 
there were national divergences in relation to the regulation of snuff products at the time of 
adoption of the Snuff Directive. Some Member States had prohibited ‘snuff’ while others had 
not. Moreover, as the market in tobacco products is one in which trade between Member 
States represents a relatively large part, those prohibitions of marketing contributed to a 
heterogeneous development of that market and were therefore such as to constitute obstacles 
to the free movement of goods.32 Nevertheless, there was no evidence that a prohibition 
against marketing ‘snuff’ products improved the trade for that product.33 It rather seemed that 
the prohibition in the Snuff Directive instead of facilitating trade, which surely should be the 
main objective of a Directive adopted under Article 114 TFEU, completely banned trade in 
the product concerned.34 In addition, there was not even a provision in the ‘Snuff’ Directive 
enabling the free movement of goods, contrasting this case to the contested directive in the 
Tobacco Advertising judgment.35  
Alliance for Natural Health
36 is another case demonstrating the Court’s weak enforcement of 
the limit that EU measures have a link to the internal market. This case concerned a challenge 
to the legality of a number of provisions in the Food Stuffs Directive37 which had been 
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 See Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco (n 27), paras 81-88; 
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adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. The claimants in Alliance for Natural Health 
submitted that Article 114 TFEU was an inadequate legal basis for the prohibition on 
marketing food stuffs not complying with the Directive since this prohibition did not 
contribute to improving the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market. The recitals of the Directive showed that food supplements were regulated, before the 
Directive was adopted, by differing national rules liable to impede their free movement and 
thus had a direct impact on the functioning of the internal market. These assertions were 
demonstrated by the fact that, prior to the adoption of the Directive, a number of cases were 
brought before the Court which related to situations in which traders had encountered 
obstacles when marketing in a Member State other than their State of establishment food 
supplements lawfully marketed in the latter State. Furthermore, the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Directive stated that before the proposal was presented, the Commission 
services had received ‘a substantial number of complaints from economic operators’ on 
account of the differences between national rules. In those circumstances the Court accepted 
that reliance on Article 114 TFEU for the Directive was valid.38 
Alliance for Natural Health showed that the EU legislature needs to do very little to show 
compliance with the conditions of Article 114 TFEU. The claim that there were obstacles to 
trade was supported by a simple reference to the preamble stating that there were divergences 
in the regulation of food supplements in trade. Those divergences would potentially have an 
adverse effect on the internal market in the future. The link to the internal market was 
hypothetical and pre-emptive. While divergent legislations in relation to the regulation of 
food supplements may give rise to obstacles to trade, this is a too weak a justification for 
harmonizing national laws. If Tobacco Advertising would have been properly enforced, then 
a simple mention of the justification in the recitals in the Food Stuff Directive would not have 
been accepted as sufficient to justify recourse to Article 114 TFEU.  
BAT, Swedish Match and Alliance for Natural Health show that the Court has taken a 
questionable approach39 to the requirement in Tobacco Advertising that a link to the internal 
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market should be demonstrated. There is also evidence in the case-law that other legal limits 
to the functional competences have been proved unworkable in practice. Supposedly, the 
Court should enforce the limit that Union legislative acts can only pursue an internal market 
objective within the framework of Article 114 TFEU or the limit in Article 352 TFEU that 
only Union objectives can be pursued. A measure that only marginally pursues internal 
market goals, and is primarily aimed at some other goal exceeds the competence of the Union 
under Article 114 TFEU and should be annulled.40 Furthermore, if the objective of a Union 
legislative act would fall outside the definition of ‘Union objectives’ as defined in the 
Treaties, e.g. an objectives relating to the field Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
or a general objective of achieving peace in the European Union41, it would supposedly be 
invalid under Article 352 TFEU. The case-law nevertheless indicates that those limits would 
not be successful in restraining the exercise of Union competences.42 
The Kadi case provides a nice illustration of this observation. In this case, it was clear that the 
objective of the Regulation was a CFSP objective and not a Community objective. The 
Community did not at this stage have a competence to combat terrorism. The Community, 
however, had under Articles 60 and 301 EC a competence to authorise the adoption of 
sanctions against states. The issue in Kadi was that the Court not only recognised that the 
Community had the above mentioned competence but went even further and stated that 
Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC (352 TFEU) conjointly included the objectives of imposing 
sanctions against individuals. Even if this objective did not fall within the Community’s 
competences, Article 308 EC (352 TFEU) could according to the Court bridge the gap 
between the pillars and provide for this objective.43 
Critically, the Court’s reasoning failed to appreciate the distinction between means and 
objectives and its conclusion flies in the face of the wording of Article 308 EC which limited 
the Community’s competence to ‘one of the objectives of the Community’. A proper reading 
of Article 308 EC did not give room for including CFSP objectives as this provision cannot 
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create new objectives but only provide the means to achieve the objectives of the 
Community. The Court’s ruling also undermined its earlier finding that it was wrong to 
assume that Article 308 EC could allow, in the special context of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, 
the adoption of Community measures that concerned not one of the objectives of the 
Community but one of the objectives under the EU Treaty in the sphere of external relations, 
including the CFSP.44 In light of this, it is remarkable how the Court later in the judgement 
could come to the conclusion that Article 308 EC could include CFSP policies. The Court’s 
reasoning seems patently inconsistent. If all provisions of the Treaty intend to pursue the 
common market, even those that are directly related to the CFSP, everything that the EU does 
will logically pursue the common market and will fall within the scope of Article 308 EC.45 
Another potential limit that has proved inadequate in restraining the exercise of Union 
powers is the explicit prohibitions in the Treaties for the Union to harmonize certain policy 
field such as public health. 46 Tobacco Advertising II47, which was concerned with a new 
tobacco advertising directive48, illustrates the argument. The important fact of the case is that 
the contested directive was primarily designed to deal with a public health problem, the 
increased use of cigarettes.49 It is also clear from the Court’s case-law that Article 114 TFEU 
cannot be used as a legal basis in order to circumvent the express prohibition in Article 
169(5) TFEU for the EU to harmonize Member States laws and regulations in the field of 
public health.50 These points were raised by Germany who contested the new tobacco 
advertising directive on this basis.51 The Court nevertheless held that the contested directive 
could be adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. According to the Court, notwithstanding 
the existence of Article 169(5) TFEU, that provision did not imply that harmonizing 
measures adopted on the basis of other provisions of the Treaty could not have any impact on 
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the protection of human health. Since the conditions for recourse to Article 114 TFEU were 
met in this instance, the contested directive could not be challenged on the basis that it 
pursued public health objectives.52 
Basically the reason provided by the Court in Tobacco Advertising II is that insofar as the 
internal market is served to any extent through the measure, the exclusion of competence in 
Article 169(5) TFEU does not work as a constitutional limit.53 While internal market 
measures must primarily serve the purposes of free movement and undistorted competition, 
this need not be their ‘primary impact’.54 This is however a questionable conclusion given the 
structure, aim and wording of this provision. It is quite obvious that the Member States’ 
express exclusion of a harmonization competence of public health in Article 169 (5) TFEU 
was intended to have some legal consequences. The practical effectiveness of that provision 
would be seriously jeopardized if the Court can so easily circumvent it by holding that this 
provision does not impede Union measures from having an effect on public health. In 
addition, it is argued that the contested directive in Tobacco Advertising II entailed much 
more than an ‘effect’ on public health. The direct consequence of the Third Tobacco 
Advertising Directive was strictly speaking harmonization since all Member States were 
required to harmonize their public health policies in relation to the marketing, sponsoring and 
advertising of tobacco products.55 Given this and the fact that the interpretation of Article 
169(5) TFEU raises complicated value judgments or empirical issues, it is remarkable that the 
Court did not enforce this provision. However instead of doing this, in Tobacco Advertising II 
the Court advanced arguments for circumventing this exclusion.56 
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Having shown how subsequent case-law, post-Tobacco Advertising and Opinion 2/94 has 
diluted the limits of Article 114 and Article 352 TFEU, we still have to ask ourselves whether 
there are some conceptual problems with the limits imposed by the Court in Tobacco 
Advertising and Opinion 2/94. Perhaps the fact that the Court has not invalidated any 
legislation since the Tobacco Advertising judgment has more to do with the factual context of 
subsequent cases and more careful drafting of legislation57, than inherent problems with the 
limits imposed by the Court?  
In this regard, I suggest that the opposite conclusion is a more accurate reflection of reality. 
First, BAT, Swedish Match, Alliance for Natural Health, Kadi and Tobacco Advertising II 
were all cases where the Court should have, if it had enforced the limits imposed by Tobacco 
Advertising and Opinion 2/94, accepted the challenges as well-founded.58 All the claimants in 
these cases argued coherently on the basis of the Court’s own case-law that the measures did 
not fall within the competences of the Union, either because the measures showed no 
convincing link to the internal market, because they infringed the constitutional savings 
clause or because the pursued objectives, as non-Community objectives, could not arguably 
be pursued under the designated legal basis as demanded by Opinion 2/94. Presumably these 
were limits that would be enforced according to the Tobacco Advertising judgment. However, 
despite this all challenges were unsuccessful.59 
Secondly, I argue that while the limits in Tobacco Advertising and Opinion 2/94 may have 
great appeal in theory, the Court’s finding that the Union had transgressed the limits of its 
competences were strongly related to the specific circumstances of these cases. Rather than 
being hard cases where the Court boldly policed the limits of the powers of the Union to the 
detriment of the Union legislator, Opinion 2/94 and Tobacco Advertising were clear-cut 
cases. The Tobacco Advertising judgment involved, as mentioned above, a directive which 
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encompassed a prohibition of advertising on posters, parasols, ashtrays and other articles used 
in hotels, restaurants and cafés, and a prohibition of advertising spots in cinemas, prohibitions 
which had no effect on the internal market and cross-border trade. Further, as Member States 
had a right to lay down stricter requirements they deemed necessary to guarantee the health 
protection of individuals, the Directive did not ensure free movement of products that were in 
conformity with its provisions. Therefore, it was clear that the Directive fell outside the scope 
of Article 114 TFEU. 60 
In terms of Opinion 2/94, the matter at hand was the envisaged accession to the ECHR, which 
was indeed an extraordinary measure. First, this measure had no genuine link to the ‘common 
market’ as required by Article 352 TFEU. The adoption of a catalogue of human rights 
provisions was not a measure necessary for the operation of the ‘common market’.61 More 
importantly the envisaged accession was and still is today a measure which would have 
serious institutional and constitutional implications for the Union, especially in terms of 
uniform application of Union law, the jurisdiction of the Court and the primacy of Union law. 
Such an important measure could only be agreed through the means of a Treaty revision, 
providing for specific powers for the Union to accede to the Convention.62 
The lessons from this discussion are quite straightforward. First, Tobacco Advertising and 
Opinion 2/94 were two exceptions to the general approach of the Court of showing deference 
to the Union legislator when it reviews measures adopted under the broad flexibility 
provision in Article 114 and 352 TFEU.63 However, they are best explained as instances 
where the legislator exceeded its limited powers by a very significant margin. Secondly, the 
Court seems to assume that the Union legislator had acted within the limits of its competence 
vis-á-vis the Member States.64 These two observations lead to the tentative conclusion that the 
limits imposed by the Court have failed to provide for sufficient checks on the exercise of EU 
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powers. In the light of this, we have to examine whether ‘lack of competences’ is still a 
meaningful ground of review.  
B Is lack of competence a meaningful ground for judicial review?  
 
In order to evaluate whether ‘lack of competence’ is pre-destined to be ineffective in 
litigation before the Court we must consider in more depth the reasons behind the Court’s 
deferential approach. It was already indicated in the introductory chapter that there are 
practical, contextual and political explanations for why the principle of conferral has not 
worked as a proper limit for the exercise of EU competences.65  
First, there are conceptual problems of the existing limits. The principle of conferral, 
restraining the EU’s competence to its objectives, is a case at point. Constitutional 
interpretation of EU competence norms is an exercise in ascertaining the objectives of the 
Union, taking into account the context of political power and the open-ended finality of 
European integration.66 Appeals to objectives cannot work as a limit to EU competences 
since they do not provide the Court with hard legal criteria to resolve disputes. Furthermore, 
we should also take into account that the EU Treaties are a framework of principles and an 
‘incomplete’ political ‘bargain’.67 In addition, since the founding Treaties have defined the 
policies and objectives of the Union in a broad manner, they have provided grounds for an 
expansive interpretation by the Union legislator of the scope of the Union’s powers.68 Several 
Treaty provisions are purposive powers, defined by the goal to be achieved in contrast to 
more precise sector-specific powers allocating a certain defined legislative field to the EU.69 
Several important legislative powers, such as the functional powers in Article 114 and Article 
352 TFEU, have been framed in a fluid and imprecise manner. Since the limits imposed on 
the Union when exercising its functional competences, a link to ‘market making’ under 
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Article 114 and a link to the Union’s policies under Article 352 TFEU, lack precision the 
Court’s policy of deference is understandable.70  
Secondly, the teleological imperative of further market and political integration and design of 
the EU legal order has placed constraints on the Court to effectively enforce the principle of 
conferral. If the Court engages in more strict scrutiny of the exercise of Union competences, 
it will have to involve itself in fundamental political and social questions. The choice the 
Court makes determines the powers of the Union and its Member States and may have a 
serious impact on the means of European integration.71 Strict judicial review of the exercise 
of EU competences would compromise the Union’s capacity to act efficiently in order to 
fulfil the tasks of the Treaties and would impose significant costs reflected in inflexibility.72 
The Court has instead supported expansive interpretations of the scope of Union competences 
in order to enhance the effectiveness of Union law.73 The Court’s ‘purposive’ approach to 
interpreting the scope of EU competences fits well with the objectives and the design of the 
EU legal order.74 First, the Treaties list several objectives that the Union should achieve. 
Secondly, the design of EU legislative powers is very much directed towards political goals 
to be achieved functionally.75 If the Union is to achieve the objectives and tasks set out in the 
Treaties and resolve functional problems, the necessary powers must be placed at the service 
of the Union.76 Competence provisions such as Article 114 TFEU, being the principal vehicle 
for the passage of harmonisation measures are central to the scheme of the Treaty and should 
consequently be given a broad interpretation to ensure the attainment of the internal market 
objectives.77 The Court’s broad interpretation of the exercise of Union competences also 
makes sense from a contextual perspective. The reality of the political environment is that the 
Member States have by several Treaty amendments affirmed the telos of European 
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integration. They have done so by conferring additional competences to the Union, by 
providing the Union with new tasks and objectives to be achieved and by defining new policy 
areas where the Union shall take action.78 In addition, as discussed above, the Convention 
rejected a competence model involving exhaustive lists of the areas in which the EU is 
competent to act, models of sector-specific competences or identification of political areas 
outside the competences of the EU. Furthermore, the deletion of Articles 114 and Article 352 
TFEU as the principal problems of ‘competence creep’ was also intentionally vetoed by the 
Member States.79 Political concerns that the EU has too much power, voiced by the German 
Lander as well as some Member States, and calls for restraint of the Union powers, seem to 
ignore somewhat what the Member States have actually agreed upon. 80 
Whilst the picture painted above seems pessimistic, there are still reasons to believe that the 
Court is up to the task of reviewing the exercise of EU competences. First of all, we have to 
deal with the criticism that the limits, imposed by the Treaties and devised by the Court in 
Tobacco Advertising and Opinion 2/94, are insufficient. This criticism should be taken 
seriously. For this reason, I devote the whole part II of the thesis including chapter 4 and 
chapter 6 to reconceptualising and elaborating the existing limits to the exercise of EU 
competences.  
Without going into detail of how those limits can be reconceptualised at the moment, I will 
tentatively suggest a couple of ideas to be developed later in the thesis. First, in order for the 
Court to maintain its own legitimacy, it must re-assert the limits imposed by Tobacco 
Advertising and Opinion 2/94 and disallow Union measures which are used as instruments of 
‘general governance’81 or that compromise the ‘constitutional identity of the Union’.82 The 
Court must control whether the measure is likely to remove either obstacles to trade or 
‘appreciable’ distortions to competition. These are the two justifications for harmonization 
and the measure must always have one of these as a primary objective.83 But this is not 
sufficient. The measure must contribute to dealing with an actual or imminent problem in the 
creation or establishment of the internal market. The Court should, in cases of proposed 
harmonization measures, require the EU legislator to show that there is a market failure that 
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is of such a nature that only the EU can remedy it.84 Secondly, the Court needs to be provided 
with a solid basis of evidence and reasoning to perform this task. In order for the Court to 
obtain sufficient material and to be able to seriously review the exercise of EU competences, 
it should engage in procedural review.85 This procedural enquiry should be implemented 
through a standard of legality asking the EU legislator to show that it has provided for 
adequate reasoning and taken into account all relevant evidence when adopting a piece of 
legislation. This legality standard, which should be applied to the review of all broad EU 
policy measures, empowers the Court to become a credible arbiter in competence disputes. If 
for example, it is claimed a measure for example promotes the internal market, the Court 
must scrutinize the reasons and evidence for this assertion. If the reasoning is inadequate and 
the evidence fails to demonstrate that the envisaged measure has any effect on the internal 
market or removes appreciable distortions of competition, the Court should proceed to annul 
the measure. 86  
Thirdly, as demonstrated later in the thesis87, the Court may subject its review to certain 
limits. The Court may, because of its fragile legitimacy and questionable competence, be 
disinclined to engage in intense review of whether the policy choices of the EU legislator are 
compatible with broad legislative powers such as Article 83(2) TFEU, Article 114 and Article 
352 TFEU. The Court may however, in contrast, police strictly conventional legal issues such 
as whether the Union measure is adopted on the right legal basis88, whether EU legislation 
constitutes a ‘harmonization’ measure for the purposes of Article 83(2) TFEU89  or whether a 
specific measure falls within the EU’s exclusive or shared competence.90 Those limits 
express, because of their nature and wording, hard legal criteria which the Court is well-
equipped to monitor. In relation to such limits, the institutional reasons for deferential 
review91  are no longer valid because the Court’s competence and expertise is higher than the 
legislator’s in such cases.  
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Finally, we have to deal with the concern that the Court is not well-placed to review the 
exercise of EU competences. Whilst this is a compelling argument, there are two 
considerations to counter this argument. First, the evolution of the Union and the Treaties 
give the Court good reasons to take a more serious stance on the exercise of EU competences. 
The increased emphasis in the Lisbon Treaty on the limitation of competences92 and the 
adoption of new protocols and the inclusion of new actors in the monitoring of EU 
competences demonstrate this point.93 It seems that the Lisbon Treaty intends to submit both 
the attribution and the exercise of the EU competences to stricter control. This is shown by 
the attention dedicated to the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality. The 
Lisbon Treaty makes so many references to the principle of conferral94 that it seems to have 
become almost an obsession.95 The Lisbon Treaty furthermore gives the Court a broad 
mandate to adjudicate as a neutral arbiter of competences. Articles 5, 19(1) TEU and Article 
263 TFEU empower the Court to review all secondary legislation on the basis of a ‘lack of 
competence’.96 Secondly, there are additional considerations relating to the Court’s own 
legitimacy and the political context which may prompt the Court to enforce the limits of the 
Treaties more seriously after Lisbon. Kumm and Dougan suggest that the pressure from 
national courts will induce the Court to become a credible arbiter in competence disputes. 
The tortured ratification process which engulfed the Constitutional Treaty, and then almost 
derailed Lisbon itself, will embolden the national judges to police with greater confidence the 
legal limits governing Union power.97 This is demonstrated by recent challenges from 
national constitutional courts which have expressed the view that they consider it their task to 
ensure that EU institutions do not amend the Treaties and enact legislation ultra vires. The 
most notable challenge came from the German Constitutional Court which in its Lisbon 
Judgment insisted that it had the right to intervene if there were indications that the Court of 
Justice was not fulfilling its task of controlling the exercise of EU competences according to 
the principle of conferral.98 It thus seems that European national constitutional courts provide 
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an important check on the Court.99 This point makes a great deal of sense. The Court cannot 
continue with a low-level review without endangering its own legitimacy. The increased 
emphasis on the limitation of competences, the recent conflicts on jurisdictional boundaries 
and the publicly voiced concern that the Court is not an objective arbiter in competence 
disputes, give the Court strong reasons to move to more intense judicial review in order to 
maintain its credibility. 100 
III Principle of proportionality 
 
A Theory and judicial review 
 
The principle of proportionality is a safeguard against the excessive use of legislative 
powers.101 It embodies a binding rule of primary law which the Union legislature has to 
comply with when it exercises its powers. The principle implies that ‘the content and form of 
Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’.102 
Protocol no 2 attached to the Lisbon Treaty substantiates the principle of proportionality. It 
implies that ‘any draft legislative act should contain a detailed statement making it possible to 
appraise compliance with the principles of…. proportionality’ and a duty ‘to take account of 
the need for any burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Union, national 
governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be minimised 
and commensurate with the objective to be achieved’.103 Despite recent codifications of the 
principle, it has been present since the early days of the Community as a general principle of 
law fleshed out in the case-law of the Court. Pursuant to the standard formula, proportionality 
implies that the Union legislator should consider whether the legislative measure is 
appropriate to reach the pursued objective104 and if so, whether the legislative measure is 
indispensable for achieving the pursued objective (the ‘least restrictive measure’ test).105 
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Finally, the principle requires that the Union legislative measure cannot entail excessive 
effects on the individual(s) affected by the legislative act (proportionality stricto sensu).106 
But has proportionally worked before the EU Courts as a ground apt to challenge the exercise 
of EU competences? The case law suggests that proportionality cannot be easily employed to 
challenge Union legislative acts. Apart from the exception of Spain v Council, no general EU 
legislative acts have been struck down on the basis of proportionality. In order to illustrate the 
problems of judicial review we should take a more detailed look on how the Court applies 
proportionality in cases concerned with broad EU policy measures.  
The first case to be discussed is Swedish Match which, as we know from the first section of 
this chapter107, concerned a challenge to the Snuff Directive prohibiting the marketing of 
‘snuff’. In this case, the claimants did not only challenge the Directive on the basis of a ‘lack 
of competence’ but also on the basis of proportionality. They argued that a complete 
prohibition of ‘snuff’ was disproportionate since the Union legislature had failed to take into 
account relevant available scientific information when the prohibition was adopted.108 This 
case is illuminating for two reasons. First, it presents the classic proportionality test that the 
Court applies when it reviews Union legislation. The Court stated, with regard to judicial 
review of proportionality, that the Union legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in the 
area of public health policies, which involves political, economic and social choices on its 
part, and in which it is called on to undertake complex assessments. Only if a measure 
adopted in this field is ‘manifestly inappropriate’ in relation to the objective which the Union 
is seeking to pursue can the legislative measure be invalidated.109 This is the general test 
applied by the EU Courts in relation to proportionality review of broad EU policies.110 But 
Swedish Match also shows another feature of the Court’s application of proportionality. It 
demonstrates how the Court’s review is affected by the difficulty in assessing scientific 
evidence put forward for a legislative measure. When assessing the ‘suitability’ of the 
prohibition, the Court found that the preamble to the Snuff Directive showed that prohibition 
was the only measure that was appropriate to cope with the danger that ‘snuff’ products 
would be used by young people. The Court noted that the scientific information available at 
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the time of the adoption of the Directive allowed for neither the conclusion that consumption 
of ‘snuff’ products presented no danger to human health nor that the harmful effects of 
‘snuff’ products were lesser than those of other tobacco products. The adoption of the 
prohibition did consequently take into account the development of scientific information. The 
Union legislature was also able to consider that a prohibition on the marketing of tobacco 
products for oral use was necessary. Other measures aimed at imposing technical standards 
on manufacturers in order to reduce the harmful effects of the product, or at regulating the 
labelling of packaging of the product and its conditions of sale would not have the same 
preventive effect in terms of the protection of health.111 
Swedish Match shows that the least restrictive measure test is not easy to apply in practice. It 
is not surprising that the measure was considered proportionate given the overriding objective 
of protecting public health. There were no less restrictive measures which could achieve the 
objective of removing all the health risks of ‘snuff products’ to the same extent as a complete 
prohibition. Furthermore, given the fact that the evidence concerning the effects of ‘snuff’ 
products and its comparative health risks to other tobacco products was contested, it seems 
that the Court’s conclusions on the necessity of the prohibition were justified. This case 
illustrates why proportionality, in cases where the Union legislator is faced with conflicting 
evidence and complex policy choices, is not likely to be a serious limit to the exercise of 
Union legislative competences. 
The second case to discuss is Spain v Council. This is potentially an important case since it is 
a rare example of how proportionality can be used to strike down parts of a general EU act. 
Since there is an extensive discussion of this judgment in the next chapter,112 I will only very 
briefly mention the facts and the Court’s reasoning here. Spain v Council was concerned with 
a challenge to a Council Regulation on a new cotton support scheme.113 Spain claimed that 
the Council Regulation was disproportionate because the Commission had failed to take into 
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account relevant empirical evidence on the profitability of cotton grown under the new 
support scheme. 114 
In brief the Court accepted Spain’s arguments and held that the Commission had not provided 
for relevant information because it failed in its determination of the specific aid to include 
direct labour costs and did not perform a socio-economic study on the effects of the reform 
on ginning undertakings. The Commission failed to show that it had exercised its discretion 
as it had not produced and presented clearly the basic facts that had to be taken into account 
as the basis for the contested measure. For this reason the measure fell afoul of the 
proportionality principle.115  
Even though this case is, as argued below116, an excellent example of how the Court should 
pursue credible review, it cannot be interpreted as a strong example of application of the 
proportionality principle. First, this case must be distinguished from other proportionality 
cases regarding review of general legislative measures since the annulment did not endanger 
the pursuit of a general EU policy scheme. Whilst the regulation concerned common rules for 
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and for certain support schemes 
for farmers, the annulment was only concerned with a part of the measure, i.e. Chapter 10A 
of the regulation which concerned the rules on support schemes for cotton production.117 
There were only three Member States which were directly concerned with the application of 
the support scheme for cotton: Portugal, Greece and Spain.118 Secondly, the effects of 
annulment were to be limited in time so the Union would have a chance to adopt a new 
regulation.119 In sum, the annulment of the measure would have limited consequences for the 
implementation of the Union’s agricultural policy. For this reason it appears that this case 
was an exception to the rule that the Court pays deference to the Union legislator’s 
assessment of proportionality in challenges to general Union legislation.120 
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Another case demonstrating the problem of applying proportionality is the recent case of 
Luxembourg v Parliament and Council121, where Luxembourg requested the annulment of a 
directive on airport charges.122 Luxembourg submitted that the Directive infringed 
proportionality by including in its scope airports located in Member States where no airport 
reaches the minimum size laid down in the Directive and which have the highest passenger 
movements per year, regardless of the actual number of such movements.123 The Court 
identified that the ‘manifestly inappropriate’ test applied in the case since the Directive was 
concerned with air transport matters, which is a field where the EU legislature has a broad 
legislative discretion. On the basis of this test, the Court noted that before adopting the 
Directive, the Commission had carried out an impact assessment which had examined various 
options for calculating and regulating airport charges. Given the risk that airport managing 
bodies would find themselves in a dominant position vis-á-vis the airport users and assume 
that position when fixing airport charges, the Court found that a common framework for 
establishing airport charges was an appropriate measure to prevent such a risk occurring. That 
conclusion was also valid as regards airports located in Member States where no airport 
reached the threshold of 5 million passenger movements per year and which had the highest 
number of such movements. The Court then observed that Luxembourg had failed to propose 
any less restrictive measures which would ensure that the stated objective was attained as 
effectively as the common framework. Luxembourg also argued that the Directive was 
disproportionate on the basis that it imposed procedures and administrative burdens that were 
excessive in relation to the size of airports located in Member States where no airport reaches 
the threshold of 5 million passenger movements per year and which had the highest number 
of such movements. The Court did not however find that the charges were ‘manifestly 
inappropriate’ in relation to the benefits which would arise from the system. First, the 
Directive provided only that Member States were to ensure that airport managing bodies 
instituted a procedure for regular consultation between them and airport users without 
stipulating the details of that consultation procedure. Secondly, it did not appear that the costs 
associated with the implementation of the Directive would cause airlines to decide to 
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abandon an airport such as that of Luxembourg-Findel. In sum, there was no breach of the 
proportionality principle.124 
Luxembourg v Parliament and Council shows the difficulty of applying the ‘suitability’ and 
‘necessity test’ in competence litigation. Given the objectives of the measure and the 
divergent interests governing the situation, it is difficult to re-examine the EU legislator’s 
position in relation to the appropriateness of the policy. First, it was clearly very difficult for 
the Union legislator to find a measure that ensured that airport managing bodies did not 
misuse their dominant position and did not infringe the freedom of the airport managing 
bodies unnecessarily. Secondly, the EU legislator also had to ensure that the measure did not 
discriminate between different airports in the Member States. By excluding airports such as 
Luxembourg-Findel, there could have been a claim for discriminatory treatment.125 Given 
these objectives, it appears that the inclusion in the Directive of main airports that had less 
than 5 million in passenger movements per year was an appropriate measure.126 Thirdly, the 
inclusion of those airports was not made in an arbitrary manner but was justified by the 
perceived risk of ensuring that airport management bodies did not abuse their privileged 
position. The claimants had simply failed to show that the measure was ‘manifestly 
inappropriate’ to the pursued objective.127 The case also shows the Court’s restraint in 
applying proportionality when the claimants have not adequately argued the case for the 
disproportionality of the measure. It was clear from the judgment that Luxembourg had not 
suggested any alternative measure which could achieve the pursued objective to the same 
extent.128 Since the standard of proof in proportionality cases requires the applicant to show 
the presence of less restrictive measures, the Court could hardly have reached any conclusion 
other than that the common framework was ‘necessary’.129 Since the Court is under no 
obligation to ex officio ascertain alternative less disproportionate measures, it cannot be 
condemned for having applied proportionality incorrectly.  
While only three cases have been discussed here, the tentative argument suggests that 
proportionality is not a very powerful ground for challenging broad Union policy measures. 
This argument is reinforced by the Court’s rulings in other cases concerned with 
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proportionality challenges to broad EU policy measures. The Union legislature has been 
allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on 
its part, and where it is called on to undertake complex assessments. The Court has adopted a 
‘manifestly inappropriate’ test in relation to areas such as agricultural policy130, transport 
policy131, environmental policy132, social policy133 and health protection.134 The Court has 
clearly limited the intensity of judicial review of proportionality in relation to acts of a 
normative nature. Added to this it seems that the ‘manifestly inappropriate’ test has been 
applied in an even more cursory fashion in competence disputes.135 Given these observations, 
we have to examine whether the Court’s current approach to proportionality is indicative of 
any conceptual or practical problems making this head of review unsuitable as a restraint on 
the exercise of Union powers. 
B Evaluation- is proportionality a ground which can be used to seriously 
challenge EU measures before the Court? 
 
Davies and Kumm have developed arguments for employing proportionality as the primary 
vehicle to restrain the exercise of competences. According to them, proportionality concerns 
the question of whether the loss of Member State autonomy and all disadvantages associated 
with it outweigh the benefits achieved by EU intervention. Given that the desire of Member 
States to preserve autonomy is legitimate, such an analysis is appropriate.136 Kumm takes the 
basis of this argument from the Court’s existing jurisprudence on fundamental rights. He 
submits that it is no more difficult to weigh policies against each other than to weigh policies 
against individual rights. The highly open-ended empirical and normative assessment of 
Member State acts in the Court’s rights jurisprudence is not a qualitatively different enquiry 
from jurisdictional proportionality analysis.137 Davies argues that the Court’s competence to 
engage in jurisdictional proportionality is demonstrated by the fact that the Court regularly 
assesses national measures in some detail to see whether they are justified by the Member 
State’s stated aim. Any desire to avoid balancing policies against each other must therefore 
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be seen as more political than principled. Given the above, and given that there is no other 
principle which can protect important areas of national autonomy falling victim to less 
important Union action, the Court should apply jurisdictional proportionality intensively.138 
Notwithstanding these arguments, proportionality does not seem, given the judicial track-
record and the conceptual problems with the principle, to be a useful ground for delimiting 
the exercise of Union competences. There are several reasons for this. First, if one accepts the 
argument that Spain v Council was not concerned with annulment of a broad Union policy 
scheme, there is no judgment in the history of the Court’s jurisprudence annulling a general 
Union measure on the basis of the proportionality principle. In my view, the case-law is an 
indication that it is either hard to construct a good proportionality argument or that Union 
courts are unwilling to engage in socio-political assessments of the necessity of Union 
measures.139 
Secondly, I concur with Craig’s observation that proportionality is conceptually not well-
placed to be applied in competence disputes. The mere fact that a Member State believes that 
the legislation on which it was outvoted in the Council involves too great an intrusion on its 
values does not mean that the measure infringed the proportionality principle. This is because 
a foundational feature of EU cooperation is premised on collective action in which Member 
States have to make compromises and because the Treaties already balance Member State 
and EU interests. The issue is whether the contested measure could objectively have been 
regarded as disproportionate because it involved too great an interference in the regulatory 
autonomy of Member States. If claimants need to establish that measures in fact interfered 
with the autonomy of Member States as a whole, the next question is of course how such 
intrusions are established. No hard criteria exist in this regard. Therefore, it will be very 
difficult to imagine how a single Member State, or even a minority of Member States, could 
argue that a measure objectively entailed too great an intrusion on Member State values.140 
Thirdly, it appears that there is no foundation in the case-law on proportionality for the Court 
to adopt a more intense review in cases where the EU legislator adopts general normative 
                                              
138
 See Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ (n136) 83; Dashwood, ‘The 
Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union/European Community’ (n 7) 367-68. 
139
 For support of this argument; see Weatherill (n 70)16-17, and Xavier Groussout and Sanja Bogojevic, ‘ 
Subsidiarity as a Procedural Safeguard of Federalism’ in Loïc Azoulai, The Question of Competence in the 
European Union (OUP 2014) 250. For contrasting opinions to my argument; see Kumm, (n 99) 522-24, 528-29; 
Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ (n 136) 81-83.  
140
 See Paul Craig ‘Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis’ (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market Studies 
72, 83; Groussout and Bogojevic (n 139) 249. 
48 
 
acts. It is clear that EU courts have good reasons to apply proportionality strictly in the case 
of the fundamental freedoms. These are cases where a breach of such a freedom has been 
found before we even get to proportionality, and the Member State then raises a defence 
based on the relevant Treaty article. The four freedoms are also central to the very idea of 
market integration that lies at the economic heart of the EU. It is therefore fitting that 
proportionality scrutiny should be intensive in such instances. In contrast, in cases concerning 
challenges to general Union legislative acts on the basis of proportionality, different 
considerations apply. In such cases, it is recognised that the EU political institutions make 
policy choices. The EU courts should not overturn these merely because they believe that a 
different way of doing things or a different balance could have been made. There are 
numerous and complex factors to be balanced and weighed by the EU legislature in the 
context of broad policy schemes. While on the face of it this argument seem to militate 
against judicial review in all situations where the Court is required to assess EU policy 
choices, it is more relevant in the context of proportionality. Proportionality is, more than 
other limits restraining the exercise of EU competences, concerned with the balancing of 
policy choices and the appropriateness of a certain policy. Whether a measure is ‘suitable’ for 
the implementation of a policy or what balance should be struck between different public and 
private interests are not questions the Court is well-equipped to adjudicate upon. For these 
reasons, it is also unlikely that the application of ‘procedural’ proportionality141 will lead to 
successful outcomes.142 Procedural proportionality also requires the Court to enter into open-
ended empirical and political assessments in relation to questions of the effectiveness of EU 
policies as well as complex balancing exercises.143 Nor could the Court impose the Spain v 
Council standard of review of ‘relevant circumstances’ and ‘basic facts’144 in cases of broad 
EU measures without facing the criticism that it would be intruding on the EU legislator’s 
discretion. The standard of showing ‘relevant circumstances’ and ‘stating basic facts’ would 
be too demanding an evidential standard to be placed on the EU legislator in its application of 
the proportionality principle.145  
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Fourthly, if proportionality should work as a serious restraint on the exercise of Union 
competences, this presupposes that the national autonomy feature is integrated into the 
proportionality stricto sensu test. The Court only engages in this scrutiny when the applicant 
presents arguments specifically that address it specifically. The onus is therefore on the 
applicant to raise arguments that an incursion on Member State values is disproportionate 
stricto sensu in the light of the EU objective before the Courts. This is not an easy task to 
discharge. The Union courts will already have decided that the contested measure withstands 
scrutiny under the suitability and necessity limbs of the test.146 
In sum, it seems that that proportionality is not a ground apt for challenging Union measures 
before the Court. For this reason it will not be subject to a specific examination in this thesis.  
IV Principle of subsidiarity 
 
A Theory and judicial review 
 
The principle of subsidiarity is a matter of whether regulations should be adopted at a 
centralized level or at a local level. There are three main arguments for moving decision-
making power to local decision-making bodies. First, in some cases, it is more effective to 
regulate a policy on a lower level. The diversity of collective preferences across Member 
States in conjunction with the benefits of reduced costs of experimentation and greater 
potential for innovation favours deciding policy questions at a lower, rather than a higher 
level. Secondly, subsidiarity is founded on the idea that legitimacy and democracy are 
promoted if regulation is primarily done on a local level. Those values will be enhanced since 
citizens will be more involved and provided with more opportunities to have a meaningful 
say in the political process in such a case. Thirdly, cultural and national identities are more 
protected by moving decision-making power to the lower level. Local decision-makers have 
better knowledge of the local culture, environment and the attitudes of the 
individuals/undertakings affected by the planned legislation.147 
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The principle of subsidiarity is now codified in Article 5(3) of the TEU.148 Apart from the 
codification of the principle, the most important reform of the subsidiarity principle is the 
adoption of the new Protocol no 2. The procedural dimension of subsidiarity, apparent from 
the Protocol, implies that the Union is compelled to follow certain procedures for enacting 
legislation. It also establishes that the Union has the burden of proof for compliance with 
subsidiarity as it must show through qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative evidence 
that a Union objective can be better achieved at Union level.149 
Notwithstanding the legal support and ideological justifications for the principle, it appears 
that subsidiarity has played a very marginal role in the Court’s case-law as a principle 
restraining the exercise of EU competences. There are three concerns relating to the Court’s 
application of subsidiarity. First, it appears that the Court has never annulled a measure on 
the basis of subsidiarity. Although this cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for the claim 
that the principle is not judicially enforceable it does indicate that there is some inherent 
problem with the Court’s current approach to the review of subsidiarity.150 The second part of 
the criticism is related to the fact that the Court’s review does not extend to review of 
material subsidiarity.151 The Court does not apply the Edinburgh Guidelines,152 and 
consequently does not review whether the Union measure at stake had transnational aspects 
which could not be satisfactorily regulated by national measures, whether Member State 
measures would conflict with the requirements of the Treaty or significantly damage the 
interests of Member States or whether action at Union level would provide clear benefits 
compared with action at national level.153 If the Union legislator found that Union action is 
more efficient or if the EU legislator asserts that the aim of the action, because of the 
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dimensions of the intended action or because of its cross-border nature, could better be 
achieved at Union level, the Court will not overturn these judgments. 154  
Thirdly, procedural subsidiarity has not been enforced by the Court. It is clear from the 
Court’s case-law that no discussion of subsidiarity is required to establish compliance with 
the principle. It is sufficient if the recitals of an EU measure affirm that the Union had 
considered the principle of subsidiarity.155 It appears sufficient for the Union legislator to 
simply assert in the preamble a need for Union action without any justification for this need 
or without any enquiry into whether Member State action would be sufficient to achieve the 
objective.156 Nor has the Court sought quantitative benefits of EU legislation but instead 
imposes a weak justificatory standard on the Union legislator.157  
It is almost an understatement to say that subsidiarity has been prudently used by the Court of 
Justice. The Court’s message up to now is that it cannot or does not wish to enforce the 
subsidiarity principle. It is indeed difficult to imagine a case in which the Court could 
conclude that the Union legislature had breached the principle of subsidiarity based on the 
current approach. Subsidiarity is seemingly left to the political safeguards of federalism.158 
Given the weak judicial record, we must examine whether subsidiarity is predestined to be a 
weak principle in restraining the exercise of EU competences. 
B Evaluation- is subsidiarity a ground apt to challenge the exercise of EU 
competences before the Court? 
 
The problem of judicial review of subsidiarity has been related to the lack of firm justiciable 
limits, the complex guidelines in the Edinburgh protocol and the principle’s inherent 
‘political’ nature. 159 
The first critique to subsidiarity explains the Court’s weak approach to subsidiarity on a very 
fundamental basis. Proponents of this criticism submit that subsidiarity is in principle a 
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‘political question’. This attack is central since it challenges the basis on which subsidiarity is 
founded. This argument suggests that the principle’s political-economic nature make it 
inappropriate for judicial enforcement.160 The assessment of subsidiarity is too difficult for 
judges because the issue of whether or not decision-making powers is best exercised at a 
central or at national level is a question of political judgment with powerful arguments on 
both sides and whose correct response will depend on many factors outside the realm of legal 
reasoning.161 Subsidiarity is a principle that enriches the political debate, rather than a 
principle constituting the basis for effective judicial scrutiny. The application of the principle 
involves a considerable margin of discretion for the EU institutions and the monitoring of 
compliance with that principle should be of an essentially political nature.162 
The argument that the monitoring of subsidiarity is an essentially ‘political’ question is 
flawed by legal, principled and conceptual reasons. First, there is an explicit obligation on the 
Union courts to apply subsidiarity. Protocol no 2 specifically mandates the Court to review 
for compliance with subsidiarity.163 A ‘political’ question doctrine164 is contrary to Articles 
5(3) TEU, 263 TFEU and Article 8 of Protocol no 2 which allow the Court to review EU 
legislation for compliance with subsidiarity. That the principle is justiciable is also supported 
by the case-law of the Court of Justice.165 Second, there is an unacceptable ‘moral cost’ in 
allowing a potential legal violation of subsidiarity to go unsanctioned.166 Acceptance of the 
doctrine would be a source of serious concern since it would lead the Union courts to fall 
short of upholding the rule of law167 and absolve the Court from its judicial duty to uphold 
the law pursuant to Article 19 TEU.168 A political question doctrine would also fly in the face 
                                              
160
 See European Convention, CONV 286/02,’ Conclusions of the Working Group I on the Principle of 
Subsidiarity’, Brussels, 23 September 2002, 9 
161
 See Weatherill, ‘Competence creep and competence control’ (n 70) 16. 
162
 See Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, ‘The Court of Justice, Principles of EC Law, Court Reform and 
Constitutional Adjudication’ (2004) 15 European Business Law Review 1115 , 1117-1118; Lord Mackenzie 
Stuart, ’Subsidiarity: A Busted Flush?’, in Deirdre Curtin and David O’Keeffe (eds), Constitutional 
Adjudication in European Community and National Law (Butterworth Ltd 1992)19; Toth (n 151) 282-283. 
163
 See Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Article 8. 
164
 See on the political question doctrine generally: Fritz Scharpf, ‘Judicial Review and the Political Question: A 
Functional Analysis’ (1966) 75 Yale Law Journal 517. 
165
 See Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and others (n36), paras 104-107; 
Case -58/08 Vodafone and Others (n 33), paras 72-79; Case C-176/09 Luxembourg v Parliament and Council (n 
121), paras 72-79. 
166
 See Martin H Redish, ‘Judicial Review and the “Political Question” ’ (1985) 79 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1031, 1060; Bruce V Harris, ‘Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Prerogative of Mercy’ (2003) 
62 Cambridge Law Journal 631, 633. 
167
 See Joined Cases C-402 and 415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v 
Council and Commission (n19), Opinion of AG Maduro, paras 34, 45. 
168
 See Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising (n18), para 84, for the Court of Justices’ recognition of its duty 
under the Treaties to review the exercise of EU competences.  
53 
 
of the foundations of judicial review, which is the need to render public power accountable, 
which means that the Union legislator both complies with conditions laid down in the 
Treaties and with precepts of good governance thereby enhancing its legitimacy. The Court 
could not endorse unprincipled political decisions without violating its own legitimacy.169  
Having put aside the criticism on the principle’s asserted ‘political’ nature; we now move on 
to discuss the most serious attack against subsidiarity. This challenge maintains that the legal 
content of subsidiarity is so weak that it makes judicial review of the principle impossible. 
The evidence for the inherent conceptual problems of subsidiarity comes from the fact that 
subsidiarity has not yet, as mentioned above, been used to strike down EU legislation. Craig 
has questioned the value of this evidence and suggested that the case-law does not provide 
sufficient support for the conclusion that subsidiarity is an inappropriate ground for judicial 
review. According to him, many of the cases would probably, on the facts, have been decided 
in favour of Union action even if the Court took subsidiarity more seriously and had 
examined the measure more in detail on such grounds. It is thus wrong to conclude that the 
result would have been different if judicial review had been more searching.170 
My interpretation of the case-law differs slightly from Craig’s. I do believe that the weak 
response in the case-law for the principle is evidence of the weak legal contours of this 
principle that makes it difficult to assess by a judicial body. The key issue is how subsidiarity 
should be argued in order to be successful in mounting a challenge. This conceptual problem 
is best illustrated by considering the case of the exercise of the functional competences in the 
Treaties. Davies has suggested that subsidiarity, instead of providing a method of balancing 
Member State and Union interests, assumes that the Union goals have absolute priority and 
simply asks who should implement them. Whilst subsidiarity may give Member States a right 
to be used in the service of the Union, it does not give them regulatory powers or a right to 
veto EU legislation. His argument is demonstrated by the Court’s case-law on the scope of 
Article 114 TFEU in relation to EU harmonization measures. In such cases a frequent 
challenge raised by Member States was that the EU harmonization measure regulated areas, 
such as public health, which were and still are primarily a Member State competence.171 The 
subsidiarity argument was for example that the public health objectives of the measure could 
have been just as well achieved by the Member States acting alone. However, defining the 
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EU harmonization measure in terms of public health objectives is incomplete since the aim of 
these EU measures was that of approximation as such, i.e. the removal of the problem arising 
from differences in Member States’ law causing obstacles to the fundamental freedoms or 
distortions of competition. Since Member States acting alone cannot harmonize, there is no 
subsidiarity criticism to be made. Once it is determined that an EU competence to determine 
common rules and pursue an objective through harmonization exists, the political decision to 
exercise that competence is immune from judicial interference. If the sole objective is to 
achieve uniformity in laws, it will always be necessary to provide for Union harmonization 
thus making subsidiarity a ‘paper tiger’. The consequence of this argument, if taken to its 
logical implications, is that subsidiarity challenges will always fail. 172 
Advocate General Maduro responded to this challenge and endeavoured in Vodafone, 
concerned with a Union regulation on price controls on roaming traffic, to show how a 
subsidiarity argument could be made in relation to an envisaged EU harmonization measure 
adopted under Article 114 TFEU. First, he denied that the intent of the legislator, as 
enshrined in the preamble, was decisive for the purposes of assessing compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity. Compliance with subsidiarity requires that there should be a 
reasonable justification for the claim that there is a need for Union action. It would not be 
sufficient to highlight the possible benefits accruing from Union action. The justification 
must also involve a determination of the possible problems involved in leaving the matter to 
be addressed by the Member States. First, he noted that price differences exist in almost any 
domain among Member States and that such differences in prices may or may not entail 
competitive advantages for the economic operators of some Member States. Secondly, he 
observed that the market for roaming charges displayed no clear difference from the market 
for domestic calls in terms of price ceilings. Having made these observations and finding that 
not all competitive advantages could be labelled as distortions, he refuted the Commission’s 
claim that there was a distortion of competition arising from different price controls at the 
retail level of roaming charges. Ultimately however, the Advocate General accepted that 
there was a need for Union action on the basis of the problem’s ‘transnational’ nature. The 
cross-border nature of roaming made it a Union interest which should be protected by Union 
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action in order to safeguard the achievement of the common market. This was because 
Member States could not be trusted to protect cross-border roaming. 173 
Maduro’s final argument summarizes the problem of demonstrating a claim for breach of 
subsidiarity. It seems unlikely that the Union would not be able to construct a link to the 
alleged cross-border nature of the issue or to the potential problems for the common market 
arising in the absence of harmonization.174 
Do these observations mean that subsidiarity is an unfit principle for the task of delimiting 
the exercise of Union powers? I would argue that there is still hope for subsidiarity as a 
ground capable of challenging the exercise of Union competences. I suggest two proposals; 
one for how subsidiarity should be reinforced in a substantive sense and one for how judicial 
enforcement of the principle can be improved 
In a substantive sense, a tightly argued case on subsidiarity must employ the limits imposed 
by the Court in Tobacco Advertising to question the EU’s competence harmonization 
competence.175 A proper subsidiarity argument must seek to deconstruct the internal market 
justification for EU harmonization. This is in contrast to current legislative practice which 
consists of a simple statement from the EU legislator that the EU is, due to divergences in 
Member States’ legislation in relation to a given subject, more suited to achieving the 
objective of removing obstacles to trade or distortions of competition than Member States.176 
Such statements are mere assertions and not supported by any evidence. My proposal 
suggests that the EU legislator must show that there are either large economies of scale, 
‘appreciable’ distortions of competition, genuine obstacles to trade or serious cross-border 
externalities to pass the subsidiarity test. Unless the Union is able to demonstrate that there is 
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an imminent or present market failure and that this failure is of such nature that only EU 
action can remedy it, the issue should be left to the Member States to regulate.177  
From the perspective of judicial review, I suggest that the Court must move to apply 
subsidiarity in a procedural fashion. Procedural review is equally effective as review based on 
subsidiarity as it is in relation to an alleged lack of competence. The concern that the Court 
lacks legitimacy or competence to material subsidiarity can be rebutted through the 
employment of procedural review of subsidiarity.178 The procedural enquiry should, as 
suggested in the next chapter, be implemented through a standard of legality asking the EU 
legislator to show that it has provided for ‘adequate reasoning’ and taken into account all 
‘relevant circumstances’ relating to the subsidiarity question.179 Despite the doubts raised 
against the added value of subsidiarity, there is still hope that subsidiarity can be used to 
successfully challenge the exercise of EU competences. The proposals for how the judicial 




The main objective of the chapter was to analyse which heads of review are capable of 
restraining the exercise of Union competences. This chapter built on the introductory chapter 
and elaborated the problems discussed in that chapter of limiting the exercise of EU 
competences before the Court. This was done by examining the most relevant heads of 
review; ‘lack of competence’, ‘proportionality’ and ‘subsidiarity’.  
A general theme of the chapter was that judicial review on the basis of a lack of competence, 
proportionality and subsidiarity has been feeble and has led to very few successful 
challenges. There were common explanations for this for all the principles considered. First, 
the principles intended to restrain the exercise of EU competences lack hard legal criteria. 
Appeals to the ‘Union objectives’ that are the foundations for the principle of conferral, 
                                              
177
 See Edward T Swaine’ Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice’ (2000) 41 
Harvard International Law Journal 1, 75; Koen Lenaerts ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in 
the European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism’ (1994) 17 Fordham International Law Journal 846, 
875. 
178
 See Kumm (n 99) 525, 528-30; Lenaerts, ‘The European Court of Justice and Process-Oriented Review’ (n 
142), 4. 
179
 See below chapter 3- section IV. 
180
 See below chapter 6- section II. 
57 
 
subsidiarity and proportionality are not a useful way of limiting EU powers since objectives 
can be conceptualised on a very general basis. The problem with this limit is also a structural 
one. The teleological imperative of further integration has, instead of limiting the exercise of 
EU powers, provided the rationale for an expansion of EU powers. Since the structure of the 
EU legal order has these goals, it is not an easy task for the Court to impose strict judicial 
review on the exercise of EU powers. Secondly, the principles restraining the exercise of EU 
competences are worded in a very general manner. This problem is apparent with Article 114, 
with its limit to ‘market making’ and with Article 352 with its limit to ‘Union objective’. It is 
equally present in relation to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality that are 
governed by criteria such as the ‘effectiveness’ of a proposed measure and whether EU action 
infringes ‘national autonomy’ (proportionality). As an example, the Court’s case-law shows 
that the limits in Article 114 TFEU and subsidiarity have been completely unable to restrain 
EU harmonization. It seems that as long as the EU’s objective is to harmonize, the Court has 
no ground to question the exercise of EU competences. 
Despite all these concerns, the chapter found that ‘lack of competences’ and ‘subsidiarity’ 
were still useful grounds to challenge the exercise of EU competences. Nevertheless, both the 
conceptual and practical problems of judicial review have to be tackled to ensure that these 
limits are enforced. First, in substantive terms, the Court must re-assert the limits imposed by 
Tobacco Advertising and Opinion 2/94 and disallow Union measures that are used as 
instruments of ‘general governance’ or that upset the constitutional identity of the Union. For 
EU harmonization measures, the solution for finding limits to Article 114 TFEU and limits to 
subsidiarity was similar. The proposal was to deconstruct the internal market link by asking 
the Court, in cases of proposed harmonization measures, to require the EU legislator show 
that there is an actual or imminent risk of market failure that is of such a nature that only the 
EU can remedy it.  
Secondly, from the perspective of judicial review in relation to enforcing subsidiarity and the 
ground of ‘lack of competence’, the Court must move to apply those limits in a more 
procedural fashion. The evolution of EU law and the Treaties has reinforced the Court’s 
powers and legitimacy to review the exercise of EU competences on the basis of ‘lack of 
competence’ and ‘subsidiarity’. The best way for the Court to enforce a ‘lack of competence’ 
rule is to adopt a procedural enquiry asking for ‘relevant information’ and ‘adequate 
reasoning’. Such a benchmark of legality would enable the Court to review whether the 
exercise of EU competences conforms to the limits of the Treaties.  
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Although, it was argued that ‘lack of competence’ and subsidiarity were meaningful heads of 
review, the judgment on proportionality was more sceptical. Whilst it has been suggested in 
the literature that proportionality is more powerful than subsidiarity and can be employed to 
protect national autonomy, the chapter disagreed with those views. First, since proportionality 
claims can only be successful if a measure can be objectively considered to be too intrusive in 
relation to Member States’ regulatory autonomy, it would be difficult for Member States to 
successfully invoke proportionality before the Court. Secondly, there is no basis in the case-
law on proportionality for the Court to adopt a review of a higher intensity in relation to 
Union legislation. Even if the Court applied ‘procedural’ proportionality, it is implausible that 
the application of the principle would be successful in competence litigation. It would be very 
difficult for the Court to apply the standard of ‘relevant circumstances’ and ‘basic facts’ used 
in Spain v Council in a case concerned with the annulment of a general EU policy scheme. 
Since this standard entails intense scrutiny the Court would risk facing severe criticism that it 
substituted its own policy choice for that the EU legislator if it ventured on this path.








CHAPTER 3- ENHANCING JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE LIMITS TO EU 




The role of the Court of Justice in controlling the exercise of Union legislative powers is a 
long-standing topic in EU legal scholarship. There are two main critiques against the judicial 
enforcement of the limits contained in the Treaties. First, some contend, on the basis of the 
Court’s past decisions, that it has taken a too accommodating approach to the EU legislator’s 
broad interpretation of its legislative powers.1 I endorsed this critique in the introduction and 
chapter 2, where it was observed that the Court has sanctioned the wide usage of Article 114 
and Article 352 TFEU for instances of questionable EU harmonization. It was also explained 
in chapter 2 that, from a legal perspective, the Court’s reluctance to enforce the limits of the 
Treaties and subsidiarity was related to the weak legal content of those limits and their vague 
wording. Due to the lack of hard legal criteria and the fact that the structure of the EU legal 
order strongly promotes the telos of further EU integration, it is not surprising that the Court 
has opted not to impose strict judicial review on the exercise of EU competences.2  
The second attack against the Court’s approach to judicial review is that the Court is 
institutionally ill-equipped to engage in proper substantive judicial review of the exercise of 
broad Treaty powers. Principled analysis of the kind required by the limits of the Treaties and 
by the subsidiarity principle is beyond the institutional capacities of the EU courts. The limits 
of the Treaties do not establish easy rules the application of which produce uncontentious 
conclusions. Instead the required analysis involves complex empirical and normative 
judgment of the effectiveness and appropriateness of different EU policies. It is questionable 
whether the Court has a comparative institutional advantage in second-guessing the EU 
legislator on these complex empirical and normative questions. If the Court would re-
examine the effectiveness or appropriateness of EU policies, the Court would replace the 
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legislative discretion of the EU political institutions with its own views and assume the role 
of the supreme legislature in the European Union.3 
While these well-known observations give an understanding of the problems of the judicial 
review of EU legislation, it does not give insight into how competence review could be 
reinforced. Instead of simply explaining the Court’s current approach, this chapter examines 
and suggests solutions on how to overcome the problems of judicial enforcement of the 
existing limits of the Treaties. The chapter builds on the lessons from the introductory chapter 
and chapter 2. Whilst the introductory chapter and chapter 2 pinpointed and tackled the 
conceptual, structural, political explanations for the Court’s feeble approach to competence 
review, this chapter tackles the institutional challenges of judicial review. 
The argument and structure of the chapter is as follows. The first part of the chapter considers 
the reasons for the Court’s conventional approach to competence review. It considers and 
evaluates the practical and institutional justifications for the Court’s deferential review of 
competences. It particularly examines how the broad and problematic structure and wording 
of the current limits of the Treaties have adversely influenced the Court’s capacity to engage 
in judicial review. I maintain that although the remarks on the Court’s institutional constraints 
are well founded, institutional arguments cannot be given a too broad interpretation as to 
disqualify the Court from the sphere of competence litigation. Contending that concerns for 
legitimacy, expertise or competence are not sufficiently compelling to defend the Court’s 
general approach of deference, I elaborate an argument for more intense judicial review of 
the exercise of EU competence. The second part of the chapter considers how the Court’s 
current approach to the judicial enforcement of the limits of the Treaties could be improved. 
It is argued comprehensively on the basis of the evolution of EU law, institutional 
considerations and concerns for transparency and legitimacy, that procedural review is an 
appropriate paradigm for the review of broad EU policies. Such a method strikes an 
appropriate balance between safeguarding the political prerogatives of the EU political 
institutions and the need to ensure that EU legislation conforms to the precepts of the 
Treaties.  
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Arguing that procedural review is a means of improving judicial review, the final part of the 
chapter develops a standard of review on the basis of the Court’s ruling in Spain v Council 
that the Court can apply to assess the legality of EU legislation. Having found that the 
Court’s current standard of review in relation to the review of broad EU policies are 
inadequate to make competence review credible, I argue for a more demanding approach, 
asking the EU legislator to demonstrate that it has taken into account ‘adequate reasoning’ 
and ‘relevant evidence’. This section also elaborates a test for legality to control whether the 
suggested standard of review has been met. The test of legality maintains that the EU 
legislator must provide, at least, one reason that offers an independent justification for why 
and how EU action conforms to the limits of the Treaties. Each of these reasons must be 
substantiated by adequate and ‘sufficient evidence’.  
II Institutional and practical reasons for the Court’s deferential approach to 
review of the exercise of EU powers 
 
Komesar, looking at the US context, has provided for a general argument that partly explains 
why the EU courts have been engaged with deferential review of the exercise of legislative 
powers. His approach is premised on the link between the relative institutional capacities of 
the courts and the legislator and the court’s choice of standard of review.4 Although 
Komesar’s analysis is based on the US constitution and the US political system, his 
framework can also be applied to the EU law context given its general sphere of application 
for constitutional analysis.5 This is confirmed by European legal scholarship that has 
underlined that institutional factors are relevant when determining the standard and intensity 
of judicial review performed by Court of Justice.6 
Komesar’s point of departure is that very few legislative decisions have any serious potential 
for judicial scrutiny. Courts often lack the necessary competence, expertise or information to 
intervene in a certain area of law. The court should defer to the legislature if it has 
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considerable doubts about its capacity to arrive at correct determination of the facts because it 
lacks access to relevant information or expertise or otherwise doubts its ability to assess the 
quality of the legislative procedure or arrive at responsible decisions.7  
The classical assumption of deference within the context of review of EU legislation is that 
the Court should defer to the Union legislative institutions in cases of normative uncertainty, 
in relation to social-political choices and factual complexity. This is because in such cases the 
Union Courts are operating at the border of judicial legitimacy derived from their authority, 
expertise and competence.8 Institutional concerns militate against the Court entering into 
strict review of Treaty conditions that require that some part of the assessment involves 
judgments of a more political or economic nature and that exceed the proper judicial 
function.9 Similar concerns invite the Court to be cautious when it reviews Treaty conditions 
that, because of their structure and wording, suggest implicitly or explicitly the EU legislator 
enjoys some discretion.10 If the Treaty denies the Court an operationally useful role in 
reviewing the exercise by the EU legislator of its competences, it would endanger its own 
legitimacy if it entered into serious review and encroached upon the EU legislator’s 
discretion.11 
The condition of subsidiarity is a case at point for the general argument. Due to the 
principle’s structure and the Court’s institutional capacities, subsidiarity makes a perfect 
candidate for deferential judicial review. The construction of the principle ultimately forces 
the Court to engage in an assessment of the empirically complex political-economic question 
of whether there is a need for EU action.12 It has been suggested that issues such as the 
complexity of the matter in terms of the value of protecting localism, the consequences of 
Union inaction, heavy reliance on the counter-factuals of Member State alternatives, and the 
underlying socio-economic determinants are matters of political judgment that the Union 
                                              
7 See Komesar (n 4) 697; Daly (n 4) 72-89, 95-96; Fritz Scharpf, ‘Judicial Review and the Political Question: A 
Functional Analysis’ (1966) 75 Yale Law Journal 517, 567-573, 584, 587. 
8 See Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm ‘Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’ 
(2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 565, 569; Daly(n 4) 10-12, 89-101; Patricia Popelier, 
‘Preliminary Comments on the role of Courts as Regulatory Watchdogs’ (2012) 6 Legisprudence 257, 259, 267. 
9 See Lord Mackenzie Stuart, ‘Subsidiarity- A Busted Flush’ in Deirdre Curtin and David O'Keeffe (eds) 
Constitutional adjudication in European Community and national law: essays for the Hon. Mr. Justice T.F. 
O'Higgins (Butterworth 1992) 23; Craig, EU Administrative Law (n 3) 592-593; Fritzche (n 6) 361, 363, 368. 
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 See Case C- 58/08, Vodafone and Others [2010] ECR I-04999, para 35; Case C-176/03, Commission v 
Council [2005] ECR I-07879, paras 48, 50. 
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 See Weatherill, ’The limits of legislative harmonisation’ (n 3) 848; Antonio Estrella, The EU Principle of 
Subsidiarity and Its Critique (OUP 2002)139, 166. 
12 See Toth (n 3), 282-284; Werner Vandenbruwaene, ’Multi-Tiered Political Questions: The ECJ's Mandate in 
Enforcing Subsidiarity’ (2012) 6 Legisprudence 321, 328. 
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legislative institutions are better equipped to evaluate.13 These predictions reflect the reality 
well. The Court’s own perception of its institutional capacity and legitimacy permeates its 
approach to material subsidiarity in relation to the review of EU harmonization measures.14 
The material subsidiarity question is, according to the Court, a matter of political choice. If 
the EU legislator considers that Member States do not have the capacity to achieve the 
objectives of the Directive and for this reason suggest harmonization, the Court must accept 
that choice.15 This perception has adversely affected the Court’s enforcement of subsidiarity 
and entailed a review of the principle that lacks intensity.16 
The conditions in Article 114 TFEU are another example demonstrating the general 
argument. As this provision does not give the Court a useful role in reviewing the exercise of 
EU competences, the Court has not considered it an option to engage in intense judicial 
review. The wording of the provision gives the EU legislator a power to adopt the measures 
‘for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action 
in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market’. This provision suggests that the EU legislator has been conferred with a wide 
margin of discretion in how it pursues and with what means it executes the internal market 
objectives. The wording of Article 114 TFEU also indicate that a complex social, political 
assessment of what is necessary for achieving the objectives of the internal market is called 
for to ascertain compliance with those conditions. The Union legislator may be better suited 
to make that assessment than the Union Courts.17 This argument has been well-demonstrated 
by the Court’s practice. The Court’s marked reluctance to intervene in the EU legislator’s 
sphere of discretion because of its perceived institutional flaws in relation to re-examining the 
policy choices of the EU legislator has pervaded the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court has 
held that where there are obstacles to trade or a risk for obstacles to trade Article 114 TFEU 
authorizes the EU legislature to intervene by adopting ‘appropriate measures’. Those 
appropriate measures may, depending on the circumstances, consist in requiring all Member 
                                              
13 See George A Bermann ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 332, 337, 385-386, 
391-394,400; Estrella (n 11) 139, 147, 165, 176. 
14 See above chapter 2- section IV (A). 
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 See Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-02405, paras 24-28; Case 377/98, Case 
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States to authorize the marketing of a product(s), authorize marketing of a product(s) under 
certain conditions or prohibit the marketing of a product.18 The Court has also stated that the 
authors of the Treaty intended to confer a freedom of choice to the Union legislator under 
Article 114 TFEU, depending on the general context and the specific circumstances of the 
matter to be harmonized, as regards the mode and method of approximation most appropriate 
for achieving the objectives of the internal market.19 In sum, according to the Court Article 
114 TFEU gives the EU legislator discretion to adopt appropriate measures and discretion in 
relation to the mode and method of harmonization as long as the objective is to reinforce the 
internal market. In light of this, it is not difficult to see why the Court reviews EU legislation 
adopted under this provision in a deferential manner.20 This approach from the Court has, as 
in the case of subsidiarity, resulted in an inadequate enforcement of Article 114 TFEU and a 
review of a low intensity.21  
I mentioned above that a lack of competence and expertise has been an important reason for 
deference. As suggested by the discussion on subsidiarity and Article 114 TFEU, it is also 
clear that democratic legitimacy is often used as a rationale to justify deference to the 
legislator in review of the exercise of legislative competences.22 Waldron and Bellamy have 
generally argued that judicial review is contrary to the principles of democracy. Waldron has, 
on the basis of the assumption that the political system at issue is a ‘working democracy’23, 
asserted that judicial review seriously undermines valued principles of representation and 
political equality in the final resolution of legal issues by privileging majority voting among a 
small number of unelected and unaccountable judges.24 Legislators are instead accountable to 
their constituents, they have been elected by citizens based on the egalitarian principle of one 
person one vote and they are themselves bound to resolve their disputes by making decisions 
based on one person one vote and majority decision. The system of legislative elections is 
thus superior as a matter of democracy and democratic values to the limited basis of 
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 See Case C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, paras 33-34. 
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democratic legitimacy for the judiciary.25 Bellamy argues in a similar vein that courts are less 
legitimate than legislatures within working democracies for reasoning on policy choices. 
First, the need for courts to accommodate both existing law and to consider only those parties 
with legal standing in a particular case tends to make them less apt than legislatures to take 
into consideration all the moral and practical considerations relevant for collective decisions. 
Secondly, in contrast to the judicial process, a political procedure embodies an equal concern 
and respect for all individuals, since it treats citizens equally and provides them with sources 
of information enabling them to ensure that the full range of concerns is taken into account 
and appropriately weighed.26 Gerards has developed this argument in the EU context and 
submitted that the EU courts’ weak legitimacy often argues against strong judicial review. 
The primary responsibility for policy making should be placed with the EU political 
institutions. The political procedure is superior to judicial hearings because only the political 
process can ensure that important decisions are taken after a transparent process in which all 
stakeholders can effectively participate and in which real political debate is possible over the 
balance to be struck between conflicting interests. Litigation before the Union courts cannot 
effectively substitute such a process. For this reason, the Court should not substitute the 
policy preferences of the EU legislature with its own.27 
Having given a brief overview of the rationales for judicial deference in relation to review of 
EU legislation, we can contrast the mainstream views to alternative interpretations on this 
issue. First, I endorse the view in the literature that institutional arguments cannot justify the 
Court’s current excessively deferential stance to the exercise of EU legislative powers. 
Although there may be, in certain instances, a justification for the Court to recognise the EU 
legislator’s discretion in relation to the application of certain Treaty condition, a claim for 
general deference cannot be upheld. Discretion to the EU legislator in the context of serious 
engagement with the empirical facts and their normative assessment within the framework 
review of some Treaty conditions of broad Treaty powers does not preclude meaningful 
review.28 Whilst the Court very often refers to complex social and economic evaluations or a 
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lack of expertise for justifying discretion, it seems that these references only serve as self-
explanatory justification for limited judicial review. Those references do not address how 
those institutional factors are connected more specifically to the Court’s ability to exercise 
their review powers in a specific case.29 
Secondly, infusing judicial review of EU legislation with greater force is one way of 
enhancing the accountability and legitimacy of the Court and the EU legislative procedure.30 
The Court was created with the aim of providing an arbitrator to mediate between the 
interests of the EU and the Member States on the assumption that the Court could be trusted 
to take on this responsibility in an unbiased way. The Court’s current approach is however 
inadequate.31 The Court has limited its review powers over the Union’s exercise of 
competences by classifying more and more issues as involving ‘difficult social, technical and 
economic choices’.32 The Court’s weak approach in competence cases has not only failed to 
promote a culture of justification but also devalued Member State rights whose observance 
the Court should ensure. In this way the Court has weakened the institution of judicial review 
and undermined its own legitimacy.33 Credible judicial review is a critical pre-condition to 
the successful survival of the entire experiment of the European Union. If the Court continues 
with low level intensity review of the exercise of EU competences it might face criticism that 
it effectively fails in its task to ensure that the law of the Treaties are observed. Given the 
recent conflict between the policies of further EU integration versus the emphasis on stronger 
state rights, the Court needs to reinforce its role as an objective umpire in competence 
disputes. To do this it must change its current deferential approach and review the exercise of 
EU powers with more vigour than it currently does.34  
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Finally, I will challenge the claim that the undemocratic nature of judicial procedures 
militates against or excludes judicial review. Firstly, I tend to disagree with Gerard’s 
assertion that the EU Courts, because of their lack of representativeness, should be 
submissive in review of policy choices. Even though courts are not as representative as 
traditional political institutions, the political process itself is often an ‘imperfect’ 
alternative.35 Legislators are regularly vulnerable to political pressure of manifold kinds, both 
financial and political, implying that the legislature is not the safest vehicle for protecting the 
rights of Member States. If political pressures provide a distorted picture of the public will 
through a ‘severe majority bias’36 where the minority are disproportionately harmed, the 
political process may be worse than an insulated judicial process.37 Political malfunction in 
terms of significant and systemic failure to represent the interests of a ‘discrete’ and ‘insular’ 
minority38 or disregard or hostility to the rights of such minorities certainly justifies judicial 
intervention.39  
Secondly, in response to Waldron’s and Bellamy’s argument, it is argued that the political 
procedures in the European Union may be less legitimate than the procedure before the 
Court. As suggested by Craig, the present state of the political process, with the Union still 
suffering from a large democratic deficit partly undermines the classic challenge to the Court. 
First, none of the EU institutions can lay claim to a democratic mandate. Neither the Council 
nor the Commission is selected by or accountable to the electorate. Though the parliament is 
popularly elected, its powers are limited. Secondly, there are structural limits to the 
realization of input democracy in the EU. While democratic principles require that the voters 
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can remove the party in power and replace it with another, this basic condition is not met in 
the EU. The fact that the people are represented through the European Parliament and the 
Member States in the Council means that it is not possible under existing arrangements for 
the EU citizens to directly vote out those in power and substitute them with a different party. 
This is because Member State representatives in the Council are not chosen in this manner. 
Since the EU legislators are not directly accountable to the electorate and none of the EU 
institutions can lay claim to a democratic mandate, one of Waldron’s main assumptions on 
‘democratic institutions in a good working order’40 is not met and the core case against 
judicial review cannot be sustained. 41   
Having made the case that broad deference is unwarranted in the context of a review of the 
exercise of EU powers and condemned the Court’s current approach as inadequate, the 
chapter proceeds to consider how review could be strengthened. It is suggested in the 
following section that the Court should adopt a more evidence-based and procedural 
approach to judicial review to enforce the limits of the Treaties. Procedural review is 
proposed as the appropriate remedy for the institutional problems of judicial review identified 
above. 
III Procedural review- sharpening the Court’s deferential review of the 
exercise of EU powers 
 
A Defining procedural review 
 
Because of the numerous terms used in the literature such as ‘evidence-based’ judicial 
reflex42, ‘pure’ substantive review43, ‘semi-procedural’ review44, and ‘pure’ procedural 
review45, this section starts with an account of my definition of procedural review. Procedural 
review is defined here as an approach to judicial review that compels the Court to consider 
whether the EU legislator’s reasoning and evidence is sufficient to justify the exercise of 
                                              
40 See Waldron (n 23) 1361-62. 
41
 See Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Eurocracy and distrust : some questions concerning the role of the European Court of 
Justice in the protection of fundamental human rights within the legal order of the European Communities’, 
(1986) 61 Washington Law Review 1103, 1116-17; Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, politics and Treaty 
reform (OUP 2011) 73-74; Mary L Volcansek, ‘The European Court of Justice: Supranational Policy-Making’, 
(1992) 15 West European Politics 109, 118 . 
42 See Alberto Alemanno ‘The Emergence of Evidence-based Judicial Reflex: A Response to Bar-Siman-Tov’s 
Semiprocedural Review’ (2013) 1 The Theory and Practice of Legislation 327. 
43 See Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov,’ Semiprocedural Judicial Review’ (2012) 6 Legisprudence 271, 279. 
44 ibid 279-282. 
45 ibid 280. 
69 
 
general legislative powers.46 The Court’s examination of the legislator’s evidence and 
reasoning constitutes a part of the Court’s determination of the legality of EU legislation.47 
Procedural review implies that the Court make an instrumental use of the evidence gathered 
during the decision-making process in order to verify the legality of EU acts. It implies that 
the Court monitors the official background documents to EU legislation such as impact 
assessments and explanatory memorandum to see whether such documents contain sufficient 
reasoning and evidence to assess the legality of EU legislation.48  
 
B Why is procedural review an appropriate tool for enhancing judicial 
review of EU legislation? 
 
So far the academic discussion on procedural review has mostly centred on procedural review 
of subsidiarity.49 There are, however, good arguments for making procedural review a 
general device for reviewing the limits of the Treaties.50  
First, procedural review is a serious response to institutional objections to the Court’s 
capacity and legitimacy to enforce the limits of the Treaties. The Court always has a choice if 
it wishes to engage in a more intense judicial review. The Court could either engage in more 
intense substantive review or instead examine the evidential and procedural basis for the 
legislative measure. The reasons based on democratic legitimacy and institutional 
competence would make it difficult for the Court to move to more sustained substantive 
review. Those arguments suggest that substantive review illegitimately intrudes into the 
legislative sphere. Procedural review on the other hand provides that the reasons for limited 
judicial review that were identified above51 are not given too broad an interpretation, which 
would exclude judicial review of EU legislation from the constitutional sphere. Procedural 
review requires the EU legislature to convince the Court that the measure was indeed enacted 
on the basis of its superior expertise or democratic credentials. Such a mode of review 
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empowers the Court to engage in a serious monitoring of the exercise of EU competences 
when the Court’s institutional inadequacies impede it from assessing the substantive merits of 
the case.52 Procedural safeguards do not compel the EU Courts to substitute the EU 
legislator’s choice. Rather they oblige the EU legislator to take the precepts of the Treaties 
seriously.53 Accepting that the EU legislator’s choice of policy may not be reviewable, it is 
argued that the question of whether the EU institution has backed up its legislative choices 
with adequate reasoning and evidence is an issue that the Court is well-equipped to 
examine.54    
Secondly, procedural review improves both the stringency of review and facilitates such 
review. Procedural requirements relating to the adequacy of the evidential basis for decision-
making ensures the availability of sufficient information to permit the Court to engage in a 
meaningful substantive review of the measure. Since procedural review requires 
policymakers to conduct studies, perform cost-benefit analysis, conduct impact assessments 
and collect evidence, the Court will have at its disposal a useful critical mass of materials that 
will help it to determine the legality of a given act. The analyses in legislative background 
documents provide the EU Courts with a framework to assess the socioeconomic findings 
and reasoning underlying the exercise of EU competences. The Court can only perform its 
review function properly if it has appropriate material at its disposal to assess compliance 
with the rules of the Treaties.55 
Thirdly, evidence and justification-based judicial review is also supported by the literature on 
legitimacy. That literature converges around a series of principles: transparency; the rule of 
law and accountability.56 Procedural review is suitable for implementing such principles. 
Evidence suggests that even post-Lisbon the EU suffers from a lack of transparency as 
regards allocation of responsibility. The EU’s specific institutional structure, its complex 
multi-level forms of cooperation, the complicated and opaque EU decision-making procedure 
as well as the complexity of the typology of legal acts obscures appreciation of the vertical 
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allocation of powers and with this the accountability for decisions.57 A recent Eurobarometer 
survey in 2011 revealed that 42% of European citizens are not satisfied with the level of 
transparency in the EU administration, while only 9% are satisfied.58 Procedural review can 
remedy this transparency deficit by requiring the EU institutions show that they were 
informed by an adequate factual foundation when they exercise their discretion.59  
Fourthly, a more evidence-based approach to judicial review is capable of promoting a 
broader culture of evidence and rationality in policymaking.60 It induces the EU legislators to 
rely upon sufficient knowledge and to draw upon studies which address questions that require 
an answer before the EU legislator can credibly claim the proposed legislation conforms to 
the limits of the Treaties. It challenges fixed but unproven assumptions and force the EU 
institutions to consider whether Union action on a given issue is appropriate.61 A procedural 
enquiry has not only a disciplining effect on EU political institutions but it also helps foster 
an attitude of confidence among citizens and Member States towards those institutions, which 
in turn increases the legitimacy of the EU legislative procedure.62 
C The judicial record of procedural review 
 
But is there evidence in the case-law that the Court has successfully applied procedural 
review to challenge the exercise of EU competences? My first point is that whilst there are 
signs in the case law that the Court has engaged in a more ‘process-based review’, we should 
be cautious in characterizing those efforts as a success in judicial practice. The Court did 
admittedly, as discussed above, in Spain v Council63, lay down high informational 
requirements on the Union legislator. We know that the Court quashed the contested 
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regulation on the new cotton support scheme64 on the basis of the proportionality principle, 
because of the Commission’s failure to take into account all relevant information pertaining 
to the situation and its failure to produce and present clearly the basic facts which had to be 
taken into account as the basis of the contested regulation. 65 There are, however, compelling 
indications in the case-law prior and subsequent to Spain v Council that the Court’s threshold 
for compliance with motivational and informational requirements has been fixed at a 
regrettably low level. If we compare the Court’s application of procedural review to my 
proposed definition, it seems that the Court’s procedural enquiry is limited to considering 
whether the EU legislator has stated a justification and not whether this justification is 
plausible or coherent with the grounds for exercising the competence under the relevant 
competence-conferring provision. Neither does the Court examine, as required by my 
proposal, whether the reasoning advanced for exercising the competence is supported by any 
evidence.  
We can take Vodafone as an example to illustrate these observations. In Vodafone, the 
claimants challenged the validity of the EU Roaming Regulation66, adopted on the basis of 
Article 114 TFEU, on the grounds that Article 114 TFEU was not adequate and that the 
measure breached the proportionality principle.67 The Court observed that the Regulation 
introduced a common approach so that users of terrestrial public mobile telephone networks 
do not pay excessive prices for Union-wide roaming services and so that mobile operators 
can operate within a single, coherent regulatory framework. As was clear from the 
explanatory memorandum, the level of retail charges for international roaming services was 
high at the time of adoption of that regulation. The relationship between costs and prices was 
not such as would prevail in fully competitive markets. The existing EU regulatory 
framework had not provided NRAs with sufficient tools to take effective action with regard 
to Union-wide roaming services and failed to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal 
market for those services. The Union legislature referred to the explanatory memorandum 
that pointed to the residual competence of the Member States to adopt consumer protection 
rules. Due to the Member States’ residual competence it followed that the Union legislature 
was confronted with a situation in which it appeared likely that national measures would be 
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adopted to address the problem of the high level of retail charges for Union-wide roaming 
services. Such measures would have been likely, as indicated by the explanatory 
memorandum and the impact assessment, to lead to a divergent development of national 
laws. Accordingly, the EU legislature decided to act in order to forestall measures that would 
probably have been taken by the Member States based on their residual competence as 
regards consumer protection rules. The Court noted that a divergent development of national 
laws seeking to lower retail charges only, without affecting the level of costs for the 
wholesale provision of Union-wide roaming services, would have been liable to cause 
significant distortions of competition. Such a situation justified the Union legislature’s 
seeking to protect the proper functioning of the internal market under Article 114 TFEU.68  
Lenaerts contends that the Court’s procedural review in Vodafone is a positive development 
in the case-law of the Court on the sensitive issue of the vertical allocation of powers. The 
ruling demonstrates that the Court gives, by basing its reasoning on the IAR, important 
incentives to the EU legislator to investigate alternative mechanisms and policies seriously. 
He has drawn broader conclusions based on Vodafone and Spain v Council and argued that 
the Court has by those rulings begun to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the 
way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. The Court’s approach 
has not been to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU 
legislator but rather to examine whether law-makers had done their work properly by 
following the procedural steps mandated by the Treaties when exercising their competence. 
Judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict 
‘process review’.69 Groussout and Bogojevic have endorsed Lenaert’s optimistic view on the 
implications of Vodafone. The judgment is revolutionary as it is the first preliminary ruling 
procedure in which the Court relies on an impact assessment when examining the alleged 
infringement of the principle of proportionality. The broader principle expressed by Vodafone 
is that the Court should not examine whether the policy choices made by the EU institutions 
were correct but analyse whether the EU institutions had shown that they had ‘taken into 
account all relevant circumstances’.70  
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My view is that Vodafone was a step in the right direction. What is promising about the case 
is that the Court went beyond the preamble to control the legality of the measure. It was the 
first case in which the Court relied on the impact assessment and explanatory memorandum 
when examining the compatibility of an EU policy measure with the precepts of the Treaties. 
The Court referred to the impact assessments and explanatory memorandum in no less than 8 
paragraphs and both in relation to its assessment of compatibility with Article 114 TFEU and 
in its proportionality assessment.71 Whilst I endorse this process-based review, I do not think 
that the Court went far enough in its legality review. First, I think the Court applied 
procedural review in a too deferential manner. Even though the Court in this case went 
beyond the Preamble to consider whether Union legislative action was justified with regard to 
Article 114 TFEU and the principle of proportionality, it did not question the legality of the 
Regulation on the basis of the explanatory memorandum and the impact assessment. Instead 
it employed the legislative background documents as mechanical justifications for the 
validity of the Roaming Regulation. They were simply employed to confirm the 
Commission’s unproven assumption that unless the Union intervened, there was a risk that 
divergent national measures would be adopted to address Union-wide roaming services, 
which would in turn lead to a distortion of the EU-wide roaming market. As long as the 
impact assessments make a favourable finding, it seems that the Court will accept those 
reasons on their face value.72  
Secondly, I argue that the Court did not in Vodafone apply the demanding standard it had 
imposed in Spain v Council for the EU legislator to show that it had taken into account 
‘relevant circumstances’.73 My view differs from Lenaerts, who claims that the Court in 
Vodafone applied the principle that the EU legislator must demonstrate that it had taken into 
consideration all the ‘relevant interests at stake’.74 Fundamentally, I do not, in contrast to 
Lenaert’s view, believe that the EU legislator demonstrated that it had taken into account all 
relevant circumstances. The key problem with the Roaming Regulation was the justification 
for harmonization. The EU legislature relied on the risk that national measures to regulate 
charges for roaming would lead to divergent results, thus justifying Union-wide regulation of 
this issue. The important point here is that there were no such clear evidence that such 
measures had been taken or were about to be taken. I argue that pre-emptive harmonization to 
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avoid potential distortions to competition is not acceptable unless those distortions are 
‘likely’ to occur.75 Such pre-emptive harmonization must be justified with some proof that 
price control measures would lead to costs for operators of such a nature that they would 
qualify as competitive disadvantages and lead to distortions of competition. A close reading 
of the impact assessment and the explanatory memorandum did not provide any such 
evidence.76 Even if such measures were imposed discriminatorily on operators only in 
Member States were price control regulation was adopted, it is far from clear that such 
measures would cause such a competitive disadvantage as to create ‘appreciable’ distortions 
to competition.77 Given this, how could the Court have been sure that ‘relevant circumstances 
had been taken into account’ in relation to the risk of distortions to competition? If the Court 
would have followed my proposal and applied its Spain v Council standard, it would have 
reached the conclusion that the EU legislator had failed to show the likelihood of such 
distortions and consequently annulled the measure.  
Secondly, the validity of EU legislation is not, according to the Court’s case-law, dependent 
on compliance with the underlying impact assessment, nor is there any requirement that 
deviation from impact assessments is explained. Afton Chemical is an illustration of the 
Court’s approach. In Afton Chemical, the claimants had argued that Article 1(8) of a directive 
on the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil78 was invalid due to the fact that it limited the 
use of MMT 79 in fuel after 1 January 2011. The claimants submitted that the EU legislator 
had committed a manifest error of assessment and breached the proportionality principle 
when it adopted the provision. The claimant observed that there was no support for the 
imposition of those limits in the impact assessment preceding the adoption of the Directive, 
and that those limits are unworkable and arbitrary.80 The Court stated that the impact 
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assessment carried out by the Commission did not bind the Union legislators because the EU 
legislator was, under the ordinary decision procedure laid down by Article 294 TFEU, 
entitled to make amendments to that proposal.81 It also held, by referring to some studies and 
to the statements of the Parliament and the Council, that those institutions took into account 
the available scientific data during the legislative procedure in order to properly exercise their 
discretion. For this reason there was no manifest error of assessment.82 In relation to the 
proportionality assessment the Court also discarded the results of the impact assessment. The 
Court enquired as to whether, in exercising its discretion, the EU legislature attempted to 
achieve a degree of balance between, on the one hand, the protection of health, environmental 
protection and consumer protection and, on the other hand, the economic interests of traders. 
The Commission’s impact assessment was not binding on either the Parliament or the 
Council in this regard. It was also clear from the evidence that, when the Directive was 
adopted, no public body or independent entity had undertaken a scientific assessment of the 
effects of MMT on health. It followed that the EU legislature was faced with serious doubts 
as to whether MMT was harmless for health and the environment. Even though it was 
impossible, on the basis of the scientific evidence, to determine the extent of the health risks 
associated with MMT, there was a likelihood of real harm to public health if the risk that such 
harms would materialize persists. Based on this the precautionary principle justified the 
adoption of restrictive measures without having to wait for the reality of those risks to be 
fully demonstrated.83  
Afton Chemical showed a feeble application of procedural review. The Court actually 
referred to the test in Spain v Council and that the EU legislator had to show that it had taken 
into account relevant circumstances when it exercised its discretion.84 However, if it had 
applied the Spain v Council standard properly, the Court should have annulled the measure. 
First, the statements from the EU institutions that claimed that it had taken into account 
sufficient information were dubious. Those institutions asserted that they had taken into 
account studies on the health risks of MMT demonstrating that the use of MMT is damaging 
to human health and to the proper functioning of emissions control systems.85 This, however, 
appeared to be a post-construction for defending the setting of the limits. The real issue here 
is whether the Directive, the Proposal or the Impact Assessment contained references to the 
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studies referred to by the EU legislator. One of the recitals stated that many vehicle 
manufacturers advise against the use of fuel containing metallic additives and that the use of 
such fuels may invalidate vehicle warranties.86  
But is this adequate evidence to show that the EU legislator has taken into account all 
‘relevant circumstances’ when setting the limits to MMT? I do not believe it is. The problem 
was, as was explained in the Proposal to the Directive, that there was a clear divergence of 
opinion between different sectors, notably between the vehicle manufacturing industry and 
the oil industry in relation to the risks of metallic additives, the impact of metallic additives 
on emission control systems and the ethanol and vapour pressure limits, and the risks of 
damage to vehicle exhaust control systems. Nor was there any agreed test method for 
verifying whether metallic additives cause damage.87 Because of this, the Impact Assessment 
concluded that no sufficiently compelling evidence has been provided for either a generalized 
ban on metallic additives, or a ban of a specific product.88 Consequently, the original 
Commission proposal had no limit to MMT.89 Given this, it is striking that such limits were 
imposed in the final directive without any clear scientific basis for this limit or any 
explanation for why it had been included in the Directive but not in the original proposal or in 
the impact assessment.90 Even if the EU legislator cannot be precluded from amending a 
proposal, if it does so it should draft a new impact assessment on the proposed amendment91 
or disclose in the final proposal the evidence it relied upon for amending the original 
proposal. In order to conform to the test set by Spain v Council, the EU legislator should have 
inserted references directly in Directive 2009/30/EC or in the proposal to those studies that it 
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subsequently in the hearing claimed to have taken into account. Given the absence of any 
official references in the proposal to Directive 2009/30/EC and the directive itself to the 
studies invoked in litigation, it is hard to understand how the Court could maintain that the 
EU institutions had taken sufficient information into account during the legislative procedure 
when exercising its discretion.92 Had the Court applied the standard of legality of ‘adequate 
reasoning’ and ‘relevant circumstances that I propose below93, it would have annulled the 
measure.94 
Thirdly, it has already been mentioned that the Court does not enforce procedural 
subsidiarity.95 In Germany v Council, Germany challenged the validity of the Deposit 
Guarantee Directive. The basis for Germany’s claim was that the EU legislator had infringed 
the obligations to state reasons by not indicating how the Directive complied with the 
principle of subsidiarity.96 The Court rejected Germany’s claim by referring to the recitals to 
the Directive that, according to the Court, showed that the EU legislator had given 
consideration to the principle of subsidiarity. First, the Court referred to the second recital to 
the Directive that demonstrated that the EU political institutions was concerned regarding the 
situation that might arise if deposits in a credit institution that has branches in other Member 
States would became unavailable. For this reason it was indispensable to ensure a harmonized 
minimum level of deposit protection wherever deposits are located in the Union. This recital 
showed why in the view of the EU legislator, its goal could, because of the dimensions of the 
intended action, be best achieved at Union level. Secondly, the Court mentioned the fifth 
recital where the EU legislator had observed that the action taken by the Member States in 
response to the Commission’s Recommendation had not fully achieved the desired result. 
The EU legislator therefore found that its goal could not be achieved sufficiently by the 
Member States. In view of this, the Court held that the EU legislator had satisfactorily 
explained why they considered that their action was in conformity with the principle of 
subsidiarity. For this reason they also complied with the obligation to state reasons. It 
concluded by stating that an express reference to subsidiarity could not be required for 
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compliance with the obligation to state reasons.97 My approach to procedural review would 
have questioned the legality of the Deposit Guarantee Directive. The legality standard of 
‘adequate reasoning’ and ‘relevant circumstances’ requires, at a minimum, that the EU 
legislator explain expressly how a measure conforms to a legal principle. Given that the EU 
legislator did not do this in the Deposit Guarantee Directive, the Directive would have fallen 
foul of the proposed legality standard.98  
D Why is the timing right to employ procedural review? 
 
While the Court so far has been reluctant to employ ‘procedural’ review in the way I suggest 
below, the evolution of EU law provides the Court with a strong incentive to engage in a 
more demanding and evidence-based judicial review after Lisbon Treaty.99 First, more 
rigorous process-based review is facilitated through the new subsidiarity mechanism which 
confers a right for national parliaments100 to review Union legislation on the basis of 
subsidiarity, a right to object to such legislation and ultimately halt the Union legislative 
procedure.101 The Lisbon Treaty has intentionally broadened the scope for intense procedural 
review of the exercise of EU competence by potentially providing the Court a wealth of 
material and arguments on subsidiarity to adjudicate upon. This material encompasses the 
reasoned opinions submitted by the national Parliaments detailing the substantive objections, 
and the reasoned decision of the Commission which refutes their objections.102 Because of 
the range and wealth of material, the Court will be in a better position to assess whether or 
not the EU institutions have fulfilled the requirements for exercising the competence if asked 
to do so in the context of annulment proceedings. It would also enable the Court to adopt 
more demanding procedural tests for legality requiring the EU political institutions to provide 
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a more substantial record that reflects their engagement with subsidiarity concerns and legal 
bases question.103 In case the objections of numerous national parliaments are dismissed by 
the Commission, or the other EU institutions, with little reasoning, the Court might be 
inclined to find the legislative action did not conform to the Treaties. In this way, the Court 
could shift the burden of proof, meaning that the EU political institutions would need to show 
something similar to a manifest error of appraisal in the objections from national parliaments 
in order to be able to proceed with the proposal. Whether the Commission maintains or 
amends a draft legislative act in response to the national parliaments’ objections, a ‘yellow 
card’ would provide a workable mechanism for judicial scrutiny of compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity.104  
 
Secondly, the potential for procedural review has also been reinforced because of the 
increased use of impact assessments as basis for Union legislation.105 Substantial benefit 
could be gained from the application of the impact assessment as an instrument of evaluation 
to enhance the Court’s control of the limits of the Treaties. Such impact assessments include 
a specific section devoted to verification of the Union’s right of action in terms of legal basis 
and subsidiarity106  and can therefore provide evidence of compliance with the limits 
provided by the Treaties and can act as a benchmark for legality of Union measures.107 Fact 
finding through impact assessments may serve as a framework for the Court to assess the 
rationality of the EU legislator’s trade off of different interests and examine the validity of 
the EU legislator’s socio-economic findings.108 The very fact that there is a framework within 
which these issues are considered facilitates judicial scrutiny as to the adequacy of the 
reasoning and the evidence. The impact assessment’s check of the Union’s right of action 
under Article 5 TEU is likely to intensify the Court’s current review of EU legislation. If the 
Court were to use evidence in the impact assessments in establishing whether an action 
conforms to the Treaties, this would decrease the present difficulty of enforcing the limits of 
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the Treaties. A lack of an impact assessment or deviation from an impact assessment will 
give the Court reasons to view the adopted measure with suspicion. The Court may even 
annul the measure if there are no proper reasons given for why the final proposal deviates 
from the measure.109 In the end, the impact assessments’ check on legal basis and subsidiarity 
has the potential of reinforcing the enforceability of the limits of the Treaties and in doing so 
also raise the low rates of successful competence challenges.110 
Having suggested procedural review as an appropriate solution to the problem of competence 
review and argued that the Court’s current approach to procedural review is inadequate to 
review broad EU measures, the next section develops, on the basis of the procedural review 
framework presented in this section, a more concrete benchmark which the Court should use 
to review the legality of EU legislation. 
IV Setting the framework for a general standard of review and test for legality 
of EU legislation 
 
A Spain v Council- providing the fruits for an appropriate standard for 
judicial review 
 
In order to find a benchmark for legality of EU legislation, it is appropriate to give an 
example from the Court’s case law that illustrates both a proper standard and intensity of 
review. Spain v Council will be used as an instance of a suitable benchmark for judicial 
review. From the description already provided we know that this case was concerned with a 
challenge to the Council Regulation on new support schemes and that Spain had challenged 
this measure on the basis that it infringed the proportionality principle by not taking into 
account relevant information when deciding upon the specific amount of aid granted under 
the scheme. Given this brief recollection of the facts we can now focus on the reasoning of 
the Court and the standard and the intensity it used when reviewing the measure.  
The Court underlined, as regards judicial review of the principle of proportionality, the wide 
discretion enjoyed by the Union legislature in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). Given this discretion, the legality of a measure adopted in the CAP can be affected 
only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate in terms of the objective which the competent 
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institution is seeking to pursue and if the authority has manifestly exceeded the limits of its 
discretion. The main question for the Court was whether the EU legislature, when 
determining the amount of specific aid for cotton under the new aid scheme at 35% of the 
total aid under the previous scheme, had taken into account relevant information regarding 
the profitability of cotton growing under the new scheme.111 Up to this point, the Court 
simply followed its standard case-law on review of proportionality within the sphere of broad 
EU policies. However, the Court dramatically changed this course of reasoning in paragraph 
122 and 123 by imposing a new standard of review and burden of proof on the EU legislator. 
Those paragraphs were crucial for the outcome and the general implications of the judgment 
and are therefore quoted in extenso: 
 ‘However even though [such] judicial review of [proportionality] is of limited scope, it 
requires that the Community institutions which have adopted the act in question must be able 
to show before the Court that in adopting the act they actually exercised their discretion, 
which presupposes the taking into consideration of all the relevant factors and circumstances 
of the situation the act was intended to regulate. It follows that the institutions must at the 
very least be able to produce and set out clearly and unequivocally the basic facts which had 
to be taken into account as the basis of the contested measures of the act and on which the 
exercise of their discretion depended.’112 
Based on this standard of review and this burden of proof, the Court proceeded to annul the 
regulation. The Court noted that the Commission had failed to include certain labour costs in 
the comparative study of the foreseeable profitability of cotton growing under the new 
support scheme, which was the basis for determining the amount of the specific aid for 
cotton.113 Spain submitted evidence, which was not contradicted by the Union institutions, 
showing how labour costs could be calculated, that they were significant and that taking them 
into account created serious doubts as to the profitability of cotton growing under the new 
support scheme.114 The Court emphasised that the relevance of labour costs for the purposes 
of calculating the production costs of cotton and the foreseeable profitability of that crop 
could not be denied. The Court also found that the potential effects of the reform on the 
economic situation of the ginning undertakings were not examined. The Court recognised 
that cotton production is not economically possible without the presence in the vicinity of the 
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production regions of such undertakings operating under sustainable conditions, since cotton 
has little commercial value before being processed and cannot be transported over long 
distances. The potential effects of the reform on the economic viability of the ginning 
undertakings constituted a basic factor to be taken into account when assessing the 
profitability of cotton growing.115 Given that the Commission had been unable to show that it 
actually exercised its discretion when adopting the new support scheme by not taking into 
consideration of all the relevant circumstances of the case, the Court concluded that there was 
a breach of the principle of proportionality.116 
B Analysis- why does this ruling provide a good source for a general standard 
of review and test for legality?  
 
Commentators have argued that Spain v Council marks a clear evolution towards greater 
intensity in the judicial review of facts and in the application of procedural proportionality. It 
has also been suggested that the standard of legality proposed by this case fits well into the 
Court’s earlier jurisprudence in the field of judicial review of administrative decisions.117 
While I think Spain v Council was an important judgment of principle, I do not think that this 
case is sufficient evidence of a transformation from a deferential review of facts to an intense 
review of facts in relation judicial review of EU legislation.118 First, there are no cases of 
review of general EU policy measures, post-Spain v Council, which have followed the 
intensity of review suggested by that judgment. Nor has there been any clear basis in the 
Court’s previous case law prior to Spain v Council under which the Court‘s propositions in 
that judgment could be grounded. Secondly, although the factual review in Spain v Council 
was reminiscent of the strict factual review in Tetra Laval and Pfizer, the last-mentioned 
judgments must be distinguished from Spain v Council. The Court’s extremely searching 
enquiry in Pfizer119 and Tetra Laval120, although like Spain v Council phrased in terms of 
‘manifest error’ and ‘manifestly inappropriate’, was prompted by the fact that both Pfizer and 
Tetra Laval were in principle related to individual decisions. Such decisions are generally 
                                              
115 ibid, paras 131-132. 
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subject to a highly intense review by the EU Courts.121 While the regulation122 in Pfizer was 
formally of a general nature, its effect had the nature of a decision and was thus an act of 
‘direct’ and ‘individual’ concern to Pfizer’.123 By withdrawing Pfizer’s authorisation to 
market virginiamycin it directly concerned Pfizer. Furthermore, as Pfizer was the only 
company having an authorization to market that feeding stuff and was differentiated from all 
other traders concerned by the regulation by a series of factors relating to the circumstances 
under which the contested regulation was adopted, it was individually concerned.124 Tetra 
Laval on the other hand was concerned with a Commission decision prohibiting a prospective 
merger. The fact that this decision immediately affected the rights of Tetra Laval required a 
full judicial review of the Commission’s decision both in relation to law and facts.125 Given 
the distinction in the EU Courts’ case law between the nature of review in situations 
involving administrative decisions and general legislative provisions, it appears that Spain v 
Council was an exception to the rule that general EU legislation is subject to low intensity 
review. 
Notwithstanding this, I argue that the benchmark suggested by Spain v Council provides an 
excellent yardstick for showing what the Court should be doing to ensure that review of EU 
legislation becomes credible. While the Court’s primary standard of review in Spain v 
Council was framed in terms of ‘manifestly inappropriate’126, its nuanced reformulation of 
that standard in paragraph 122 to a benchmark of taking into account all ‘relevant 
circumstances’, its penetrating intensity and the burden of proof it imposed, demonstrated 
how review could be performed by the Court. First, the Court’s standard of review was not 
only a successful way of controlling the exercise of EU competences but also an appropriate 
‘middle-way’ solution between complete surrender to the EU legislator in cases of review of 
policy issues and comprehensive review of facts.127 The Court’s standard of review allowing 
it to control the factual situation in Spain v Council is an appropriate tool of adjudication in 
areas of broad EU policies. While it did not mean that the Court would substitute the 
assessment of the legislatures underpinning the contested regulation, it did mean that the 
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Court required the objectives of the legislation to be clearly set out and substantiated in order 
for the legislative act to be held valid.128  
Secondly, the Court’s burden of proof requiring the EU institutions to show that it had 
exercised its discretion contributed in making the standard of review credible. This was a 
reversal of the burden of proof since it deviated from the main rule that applicants in 
situations involving challenges to broad EU policies must show that the measures of the EU 
institutions were manifestly inappropriate to the objective pursued.129 Finally, it is clear that 
the intensity of the Court’s review was appropriate to implement the legality standard. The 
strict intensity of review entailed that the Court did not simply accept the assertions made by 
the Commission on the relevance of specific factors. Instead, it examined independently 
whether the Commission had taken into account ‘relevant information’ and stated the ‘basic 
facts upon which its discretion’ depended. Since the EU legislator, upon serious judicial 
scrutiny, had failed to meet its burden of proof, the Court found a breach of the 
proportionality principle.130  
C Spain v Council expresses a general standard of review 
 
If we generalize the Court’s propositions from Spain v Council, I contend that this case 
suggests a standard of legality both in relation to reasoning and evidence. The benchmark is 
whether the EU legislator provided for ‘adequate reasoning’ and whether it took into 
account ‘relevant circumstances’ when it exercised its legislative competence. 131 
Even though the reasoning requirement in the proposed benchmark did not follow explicitly 
from Spain v Council, it was implicit in the judgment. The critical adjective of the judgment 
is ‘relevant’ in paragraph 122. This term is not only about whether information has been 
stated but it connotes a requirement in relation to the quality of the reasoning. That Spain v 
Council entailed a general requirement for the EU legislator to provide for ‘adequate 
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reasoning’ became apparent from different parts of the judgment. First, the reasoning 
requirement was implicit in the Court’s examination of whether ‘relevant’ information had 
been taken into account. As stated above, the Court was particularly critical of the fact that 
the Commission had not included labour costs and that it had failed to perform a socio-impact 
study.132 This gave the Court reason to hold that the EU legislator had not taken into account 
‘relevant information’ and had therefore breached the proportionality principle. The 
invalidation of the measure was however also based on the fact that the Commission had 
been unable to explain convincingly why an impact study was not necessary and why labour 
costs were not included in the assessment of profitability. The Commission’s failure to 
explain why such information was not needed for making a calculation on profitability was 
even more striking given the evidence of studies in other fields, the evidence submitted by the 
parties and the critical views of the other EU institutions on the legislative proposal.133 
That the standard of legality contained a requirement of ‘adequate reasoning’ was also 
evident from the Court’s discussion of the factors to be taken into account in the profitability 
assessment. The Council argued that any study of the future profitability of cotton growing 
account should also take into account the income deriving from the single payment 
equivalent to 65% of the existing aid in that sector. Since the sum of the coupled and 
decoupled aid under the new cotton support scheme was equivalent to the total amount of the 
indirect aid granted under the previous support scheme, the future profitability of cotton 
growing could not be doubted. The reform of aid for cotton was based on its budgetary 
neutrality. The Court considered itself competent to decide on the relevance of those 
arguments and held that they were inadequate to justify the profitability assessment. In the 
case of a comparative study of the profitability of alternative crops, the single payment 
should not be taken into account, as it is granted independently of the crop chosen, even if the 
farmer decides not to produce anything. The budgetary neutrality of the reform is of no 
relevance in itself for assessing whether in the future farmers will abandon cotton growing 
and to replace it with other crops.134  
The standard of ‘relevant circumstances’ also entails a requirement with regard to the quality 
of the evidence. The evidence requirement is nicely illustrated by the Court’s ruling. The 
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Court considered itself competent to decide what constituted ‘relevant’ information for 
deciding upon the amount of aid and what ‘relevant information’ was missing in the 
Regulation.135 The Court held that fixed labour costs should have been included in the 
profitability assessment because their inclusion would have created serious doubts as to the 
profitability of cotton growing under the new support scheme.136 The Court also considered 
that the potential effect of the reform of the cotton support scheme on the economic situation 
of the undertakings active in the ginning industry was ‘relevant information’ without which 
the Commission could not exercise its discretion. Because the EU legislator had failed to take 
into account these specific circumstances, it also failed to meet the proposed evidence 
requirement of taking into account ‘relevant information’.137  
D  Test for legality 
 
The enquiry that follows from the benchmark entails a two-step examination of legality of 
EU measures. First, it implies that the Court should look beyond the preamble of the measure 
and examine the adequacy of the reasoning. The Court must consider whether the reasons 
stated by the EU legislator in preparatory documents such as explanatory memorandums and 
impact assessments, consultation documents, documents from other EU institutions 
(‘legislative background documents’) are pertinent for assessing compliance with the relevant 
legal principle of the Treaties. Taking into account ‘relevant’ circumstances means the Court 
should examine whether the proposed justification makes sense given the legal conditions for 
exercising the competence. If the proposed reasons have no credible relationship to the 
underlying legal criteria, the reasoning is inadequate. One example is if the EU legislator 
used an argument based on distortions of competition to justify the ‘essentiality’ of criminal 
sanctions under Article 83(2) TFEU.138 Since the question of ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws 
under this legal basis is only concerned with a comparison of criminal laws with other 
sanctions, it seems clearly incoherent to mingle internal market considerations into this 
assessment.139 Such considerations are, under the Spain v Council formula, not ‘relevant 
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factors’.140 Secondly, the Court should consider whether the evidence in the legislative 
background documents is ‘adequate’ for substantiating the exercise of the legislative 
competence.141 The evidence needs to be of such a nature that it supports the EU legislator’s 
claim of having exercised its competences consistent with the rules of the Treaties. If the EU 
legislator uses evidence concerning ‘distortions of competition’ to justify the ‘essentiality’ of 
criminal sanctions it would also fail to conform to the legality standard of taking into account 
‘relevant circumstances’. This is because the ‘essentiality’ of criminal sanctions can only be 
justified on the basis of criminological evidence showing that criminal sanctions are a greater 
deterrent than other sanctions.142 This test means the Court also may consider annulment 
when relevant material is missing in the accompanying legislative background documents.143 
This general test is still somewhat too vague to actually assess the legality of legislation. I 
will try here to be even more specific. In relation to the ‘reasoning’ requirement the Court 
should only monitor whether the reasons put forward by the Commission are defensible in 
theory. In order to conform to the reasoning requirement at least one justification must have 
been offered, which is by itself sufficiently compelling in abstracto to justify compliance 
with the relevant condition. If the relevant competence norm or legal principle requires that 
more than one condition is conformed to, the EU legislator must offer an appropriate 
justification for each of the relevant conditions. The reference point for whether the reasons 
presented are justified in abstracto is the substantive justification for the exercise of EU 
competences, as has been developed and recognised by the general scientific literature on EU 
law or criminal law and the Court’s case-law. The standard of adequate reasoning does not 
require any references to sources or evidence to support the reasoning.  If the EU legislator’s 
arguments are accepted by the literature or have a basis in the Court’s case-law they are also 
‘adequate’ for our purposes.144 Nor does the criterion ask whether the EU legislator offered 
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the best or most comprehensive reasoning for defending compliance with the precepts of the 
Treaties. The only question here is whether the reasoning is ‘adequate’ to support the claim 
for compliance with the underlying Treaty condition or principle.  
The test of ‘adequate reasoning’ also checks whether the conclusion can be properly arrived 
at on the basis of the submitted reasons. The Court must consider whether the reasoning is 
capable of substantiating the legislative choices.145 Furthermore, this test requires as a 
minimum that the reasons offered in the preamble or in the legislative background documents 
must be expressly linked to the conditions of the legal basis or principle of subsidiarity whose 
observance they should justify.146 This means that the legal basis has to be mentioned by 
every piece of legislation as a condition of its validity. This is quite logical since the legal 
basis indicates not only the procedure but the competence and gives the Court the standard to 
assess whether the EU has indeed a competence to adopt the envisaged measure.147 Unless 
the Union legislator conforms to this requirement, there is no way to monitor compliance 
with the limits of the Treaties.148 
Only in the second stage is it considered whether the reasons are backed up with ‘relevant’ 
evidence. For this there must be a clear standard. In order to pass the evidence requirement, 
the EU legislator needs to first show that one of the reasons, which in itself justified the EU 
legislator’s compliance with the relevant conditions in the legal basis or the relevant EU rule, 
is supported by sufficient and relevant evidence.149 If there are several conditions in the 
relevant legal basis or in the relevant legal principle, the EU legislator must demonstrate the 
compliance of each condition with relevant evidence. From this it follows that it is 
insufficient for the EU legislator to make simple assertions to justify compliance with the 
conditions and rules of the Treaties. There must be ‘relevant’ evidence to support such 
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claims. This standard entails requirements both in relation to the quantity and quality of the 
evidence. First, in order to prove a statement, it is normally necessary to refer to more than 
one source. If, for example, the evidence for a theoretical defensible claim consists of a 
reference to only one study or one scholarly article, this would probably be insufficient. 
Secondly, the evidence needs to be of a reliable nature in order to pass the test. Insignificant 
evidence or evidence of low credibility cannot be used to support a statement. This means 
that the evidence needs to be in the nature of statistical studies, policy studies or scientific 
articles which provide more serious support for an argument. The evidence for a statement 
for example on the effects of criminalization (Article 83(2) TFEU) or a statement of the 
effects of national divergence on the internal market (Article 114 TFEU/subsidiarity) cannot 
therefore be supported by only hearsay evidence but must be supported by either relevant 
literature or relevant scientific studies.150   
Why then did I choose this threshold? Firstly, since it is a predictable and objective test. The 
finding of ‘inadequate reasoning’ and ‘irrelevant’ evidence must be dependent upon some 
criterion for assessing whether the EU legislator has met this standard. In the absence of some 
articulated criterion the conclusion of ‘inadequate reasoning’ or ‘irrelevant’ evidence could 
be used to justify intervention in almost any circumstances.151 The reference point here is 
whether one of the reasons relied upon in a legislative proposal constitutes in itself sufficient 
basis to support that decision and is substantiated by sufficient evidence.152 Secondly, I chose 
this threshold for reasons of transparency. Since the proposed test provides for clear 
guidelines and requires reasons and evidence to always be fully given for the exercise of 
competences so they can be tested before the Court, it is more likely that the Court will be 
able to fulfil its task of monitoring that the law of the Treaties are observed.153 It is simply 
very hard to identify for the Court whether a measure conforms to the conditions of the 
Treaties unless the EU legislator gives proper reasons for its conclusions and substantiate 
them with evidence.154 Since at least one of the justifications advanced by the legislature 
must be supported by solid evidence, the risk that EU legislation is adopted on the basis of 
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fictive justifications, which have not been scrutinized in relation to the underlying facts 
needed to assess their credibility, is avoided.155  
One of the main criticisms against this test of legality is probably that the proposed 
requirement on the EU legislator of offering ‘one cogent reason supported with sufficient 
evidence’ is borrowed from the Court’s case law on fundamental rights156 and that the 
concerns underlying this standard of review may not be applicable in the field of common 
policies. In the context of fundamental rights, the strict interpretation of ‘manifest error’ has 
been driven by on the one hand the continuing limitations on the review of the Security 
Council resolutions that form the basis for EU regulations freezing assets of particular 
individuals and on other hand that those decisions have substantive negative effects for 
individuals.157 In relation to the review of common policies, other considerations are relevant. 
It might be argued that factual scrutiny in the context of broad EU common policies should 
continue to be very deferential because, for example, the facts have been found by the 
legislature, they are based on complex economic projections, the facts cannot be 
distinguished from the discretionary policy choices that the EU legislator undertakes and 
because the EU legislature has to reconcile divergent interests when making such policies.158  
This criticism can be countered. Firstly, in relation to the criticism of the analogy between 
review of administrative decisions and review of broad common policies, we have to make a 
distinction between the test for legality and the ‘intensity’ of the Court’s review of 
legislation. Admittedly, it is true that review of legislation cannot be as searching, for 
institutional reasons, as review of administrative decisions.159 However, I am not asking the 
Court to apply the proposed threshold in an intrusive manner and review with the same 
intensity EU legislation as it does administrative decisions. It is only claimed that the test for 
legality, i.e. whether the EU legislator offered at least one compelling rationale for exercising 
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this competence and whether that reason was supported with ‘sufficient’ and ‘relevant’ 
evidence, should be analogous to the one adopted for review of administrative decisions.   
This being so, it is certainly a legitimate concern that the proposed test for review may 
intrude on the EU legislator’s discretion and entail substitution of judgment. If the Court 
would apply the test as I propose, it would venture into the limits of its ‘authority’ and 
‘legitimacy’ as derived from the Treaties.160 Whether this criticism can be sustained depends 
on ‘how’ the test, if it ever finds its way into the Court’s jurisprudence, is applied by the 
Court. If the Court applies the proposed test with the same intensity as it has done in 
fundamental rights cases and substantively re-examines the EU legislator’s social and 
political choices161 this would entail an encroachment on the EU legislator’s authority. Then, 
the Court should face criticism. I maintain however that the proposed threshold for legality 
will not result in substitution of the EU legislator’s social and political choices. The test is, as 
mentioned above, that one of the reasons, which in itself is sufficient basis for exercising the 
competence, is substantiated by sufficient evidence. This threshold does not ask the Court to 
enter into a substantive review of whether the Union policy was the best or most appropriate 
policy choice.162 If the Court is able to follow the structure of the test and the guidelines 
provided below on how to assess evidence and reasoning, the fundamental concern that the 
test would entail encroachment on the EU legislator’s discretion will be undermined. If the 
EU legislator has submitted sufficient evidence to support the rationale behind the exercise of 
competence, the EU Court has no further role.163 
In my proposal the Court’s enquiry is limited to the decision’s legality, which in this context 
means conformity with the proposed standard of ‘adequate reasoning’ within which the 
legislative action was permissible and the existence of ‘relevant circumstances’ which 
allowed the EU legislator to take the action. If this test allows for two or more solutions, and 
where the EU institutions have chosen one which conforms to that standard, it is beyond the 
Court’s legitimacy and competence to over-rule that choice.164 Nor does the proposed test 
suggest an extensive review of facts or complex empirical-political analysis of the 
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effectiveness of policies. The duty to base laws upon evidence and reasoning does not affect 
political responsibility. The EU legislature still enjoys a certain amount of discretion when 
exercising its legislative powers.165 The proposed test does not ask the Court to assume the 
responsibility for making substantive value and policy decisions. The benchmark only 
requires the Court to evaluate the EU institutions’ justifications as to why a given piece of 
legislation satisfies the proposed legal basis for the measure and only strike down instances of 
EU legislation whose justification is not plausible given the available evidence.166 
Secondly, whilst an evidence criterion in cases of competence review has not yet been fully 
embraced by the scholarship or the Court, there are implicit foundations in the Court’s case-
law to construct such a general evidence requirement. As we saw above, there was clearly a 
requirement imposed in Spain v Council, that compliance with the proportionality principle 
needed to be defended by specific figures and evidence.167 More importantly, I think it is 
clear that the Tobacco Advertising judgment also indicates an evidence criterion for the EU 
legislature to fulfil when they legislate under Article 114 TFEU. First according to the Court 
it is not sufficient to show ‘mere findings of disparities’ or ‘abstract risks’ of obstacles or 
distortions of competition. We can thus assume that the EU legislator must show that 
disparities give rise to real obstacles or that the risk of such obstacles must not be 
hypothetical.168 Secondly, as we understand the judgment the risk for obstacles must be 
concrete in the sense that it must even be ‘likely’ that they will arise.169 Thirdly, the EU 
legislator must show that the distortions of competition which the measure purports to 
eliminate are ‘appreciable’. It is obvious that national laws differ in relation to how activities 
are regulated and that this may impact on the conditions of competition for the undertakings 
concerned. The EU legislature may however not legislate on the bases of small or 
insignificant distortions of competition. The EU needs to show evidence that distortions are 
‘appreciable’ and it is clear that ‘small’ distortions of competition are not sufficient 
evidence.170 Given the foundations for an evidence criterion in Tobacco Advertising and in 
Spain v Council, it would not be such a bold move for the Court to apply the proposed test for 
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legality. I would simply ask the Court to move further, on the basis of those two rulings, and 
employ the existing threshold of legality in Kadi II of one convincing justification sustained 
with sufficient evidence for general use in review of the legality of broad EU policy 
measures.   
E The relationship of the test of legality to the Court’s current approach 
 
While the proposed test for review of the legality of EU legislation has a foundation in Spain 
v Council, it develops the Court’s intensity of review further than the Court’s current 
approach to review of EU legislation. The Court’s current case law does not impose serious 
informational demands on the Union legislator. The Court has never in its previous 
jurisprudence imposed any requirement to submit evidence for compliance with certain 
requirements of the Treaties such as ‘quantitative’ indicators in relation to subsidiarity or 
‘appreciable distortions to competition’ in Article 114 TFEU. The Court accepts a simple 
reference in the preamble of legislative pieces and assertions of the EU institutions on the 
existence of certain factors, effects or problems.171 In fact, it seems that the Court, instead of 
standing outside the legislative procedure, endeavours to support the EU legislator’s case by 
refraining from seriously looking for any evidence and reasoning that can justify compliance 
with the precepts of the Treaties.172 
Contrary to the Court’s approach in Germany v Council173 and Swedish Match174, the 
suggested standard and test for legality does not accept mere reference to preambles as 
justification for legislation but requires references to evidence in legislative background 
documents such as impact assessments and explanatory memorandums. The Court must also 
consider, in contrast to cases such as Vodafone175 and Alliance Health176, whether the 
evidence is ‘relevant’ and fits with the rationale for exercising the competence. While this 
does not mean that a proper impact assessment is a requirement for legality, it implies, as 
                                              
171
 See Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco (n 16) paras 68-73,  84-
87, 124, 134-135; Case C- 210/03 Swedish Match (n 18), para 37; Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and 
Council [2006] ECR I-11573 paras 46-48, 62, 66, 85-86; Case C-301/06 Ireland v Parliament and Council 
[2009] ECR I-00593, paras 66-70, 83. 
172
 See Case C-300/89 Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide) [1991] ECR I-02867, paras 22-24; Case C-
491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco (n 16) , paras 124, 181-184; Case C- 
210/03 Swedish Match (n 18), paras 36-41; Case C-301/06 Ireland v Parliament and Council (n 171), paras 66-
72; Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others (n 10), paras 76-79. 
173 See Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council (n 16) paras 26-28. 
174 See Case C-210/03 Swedish Match (n 18), paras 36-41. 
175 See Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others (n 10) paras 38-47. 
176 See Joined cases C-154/04 and 155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others (n 15), paras 35-40, 105-107. 
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suggested above, that the EU legislator must refer to empirical evidence, whether that be a 
scientific study, scholarly articles or statistics, to support the measure.177 Although the 
proposed test does not suggest that judicial review should be as fact-searching as the intensity 
employed by the Court in Tetra Laval or Kadi II, it entails that the Court must autonomously 
determine whether the legislator has demonstrated the legality of the measure.178 Instead of 
simply clearing the Union legislator by noting that he has not crossed the barrier of 
‘manifestly inappropriate’, the standard forces the EU legislator to support his conclusions by 
adequate evidence. The central distinction from the Court’s current approach is that my 
proposal asks the Court to be more intrusive when considering whether the necessary facts 
have been taken into account and whether relevant reasons has been provided before 
exonerating the EU legislator.179 
Having explained, defended and developed a standard for review and test for legality, the 
following chapters 4-6 will show how this standard and test can be applied in practice by a 
review of discrete examples of EU criminal law legislation and demonstrate how it can 
impose limits on the exercise of EU powers. 
V CONCLUSIONS OF CHAPTER 
 
While the previous chapters identified and analysed the conceptual, structural and political 
problems of monitoring the exercise of EU competences, this chapter examined the problems 
of judicial enforcement of the limits of the Treaties. It also constructed a framework for 
assessing the legality of EU legislation to be used throughout the thesis in cases of review of 
specific pieces of EU legislation.  
The chapter began by situating the debate of judicial review properly in its context and 
identifying the need for a fresh approach to the topic. Two general concerns have been voiced 
against the Court’s approach to review of broad EU policy measures. First, it has been 
generally suggested that the Court has taken an accommodating approach to the Union 
institutions’ expansive interpretation of the Treaties’ provisions. Secondly, commentators 
have identified the Court’s institutional constraints as obstacles to engage in judicial review 
of EU legislation. Whilst these concerns are valid, the scholarship has not yet offered any 
                                              
177 See Alemanno, ‘Regulatory Impact Assessments and European Courts’ (n70) 501; Groussout (n 117) 785; 
Meuwese (n 61) 175, 271-72. 
178 See Young (n4) 562; Craig, EU Administrative Law (n 3) 438-439. 
179 See Weatherill, ’The limits of legislative harmonisation’ (n 3) 859; Renda (n 105) 2; Jovell (n 34) 186. 
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comprehensive proposals of how to deal with the Court’s current unsatisfying approach to 
judicial review of EU legislation. This chapter took a constructive approach and showed how 
judicial review of EU legislation could be improved and intensified whilst taking into account 
the institutional constraints faced by the Court. 
I considered three themes in the chapter. First, I considered the rationales for deferential 
judicial review. Admittedly, it is clear that reasons for deference are often well maintained 
with reference to the Court’s limited institutional legitimacy and competence. Such reasons 
are often present in relation to the Court’s review of the exercise of broad Treaty powers 
because such powers often entail an assessment of questions of an empirical and political 
nature that lie outside the borders of judicial enquiry. This argument has been endorsed by the 
dominant view in the literature that has defended the Court’s deferential approach to the 
review of EU legislation with reference to arguments of democratic legitimacy and 
institutional competence. However, it was shown in the chapter that on closer inspection such 
reasons cannot be given too broad an interpretation such as to disqualify the Court from the 
area of competence review. Since it is not possible to generally demonstrate that the Court 
suffers from more serious institutional flaws than the EU legislator, judicial review should 
not, as a default position, be of a markedly deferential nature.  
The second theme of the chapter was identifying potential solutions to the institutional 
problem of judicial review. I argued that procedural review should be the main focus for 
judicial review of EU legislation. I defined such a review as an approach to judicial review 
which compels the Court to consider whether the EU legislator’s reasoning and evidence is 
adequate to defend the exercise of its legislative powers. Procedural review is an attractive 
choice for a number of reasons. First, it facilitates the Court’s task since it provides the Court 
with sufficient information and adequate reasoning from the legislative institutions. The 
Court thus becomes empowered to review whether the EU legislator has exercised its 
discretion in conformity with the Treaties. Secondly, since such a review is not focussed on 
the appropriateness of legislation it does not intrude on the EU legislator’s sphere of 
discretion. For this reason, the Court is well-equipped to fulfil such a task. Thirdly, the value 
of transparency is likely to be improved by means of procedural review.  
The third general theme of the chapter was to consider a proper standard of review and test 
for judicial intervention. I argued that the current standards of review, phrased in terms of 
‘manifest error’ have not provided the Court with the tools to engage in a more intense 
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scrutiny of the exercise of EU powers. Because of the inadequacy of the current standard of 
review, I developed, on the basis of the procedural review framework, a specific standard of 
review and test for legality for the review of all broad EU policy measures. I took the Court’s 
judgment in Spain v Council as the source for an appropriate benchmark for review of EU 
legislation. The standard distilled from this case is whether the EU institutions took into 
account all ‘relevant circumstances’ and whether the EU legislator provided for ‘adequate 















PART II- LIMITS TO THE EXERCISE OF UNION 
COMPETENCES 
 





This chapter considers the limits of the Union’s competence to adopt EU criminal law under 
the sectorial and functional legal bases of the Treaty. The analysis is based on the general 
findings in chapter 2 on how limits to the exercise of EU competences can be theoretically 
reconstructed. I construct limits through an analysis of how the legislative powers of the 
Treaties should be interpreted. This chapter also builds on chapter 3 by applying the test for 
legality developed in that chapter in reviewing two pieces of EU criminal law legislation. 
This chapter takes stock on the debates in the literature and of the EU institutions following 
the Court’s judgments in Environmental Crimes and Ship-Source Pollution. As noted in the 
introductory chapter, prior to the Lisbon Treaty the Union lacked an express competence to 
enforce its policies by means of criminal law. We also know that while concerns for state 
sovereignty and political inertia long held back the development of EU criminal law, this 
delay in the development of EU criminal law was finally ended by the above-mentioned 
judgments of the Court. In these judgments the Court held that the EU had a power to impose 
criminal sanctions if this was necessary for the effective enforcement of EU environmental 
policies.1 The dominant view in the literature is that the Court’s rulings in Environmental 
Crimes and the Ship-Source Pollution express a general criminal law competence.2 The 
Court’s rulings could thus be used to defend the exercise of a criminal law competence to 
                                              
1 See Case C-176/03 Commission v Council (Environmental Crimes) [2005] ECR I-07879, para 48; Case C-
440/05 Commission v Council (Ship-Source Pollution) [2007] ECR I-09097, para 69. 
2
 See Steve Peers, ‘The Community's Criminal Law Competence: The Plot Thickens’ (2008) 33 European Law 
Review 399, 406-407; Peter Whelan, ‘Contemplating the Future: Personal Criminal Sanctions for Infringement 
of EC Competition Law’ (2008) 19 King’s Law Journal 364, 371; Christa Tobler, ‘Case C-176/03, Commission 
v Council' (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 835, 852-53. 
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enforce all existing EU policies under the Treaties. That competence could be exercised 
under most legal bases of the Treaties.3 If competence to criminalize could not be found in 
the sectorial provisions of the Treaties, e.g. Article 103 TFEU (competition policy), resort 
could always be had to the functional powers in Article 114 and Article 352 TFEU.4 This 
view was defended on the basis of the Court’s ruling that was arguably framed on an 
effectiveness rationale.5 Based on this broad understanding of the judgments, the EU 
legislator adopted two directives, the Ship-Source Pollution Crime Directive6 on the basis of 
Article 100(2) TFEU and the Environmental Crimes Directive7 on the basis of Article 192 
TFEU and proposed another one on the criminalization of intellectual property rules8 to be 
adopted under Article 114 TFEU. The general understanding was that this implied criminal 
law competences had no serious limitations. The choice to impose criminal sanctions was not 
a legal question but a political one to be decided by the EU institutions. As long as a criminal 
sanction was needed to enforce an existing EU policy, the EU legislator could use this 
competence.9 Whilst I agree that there is an inherent general criminal law competence to be 
found in the Treaties, I challenge the view that this competence has no limitations. I contend 
that the competence question is of a much more complex character. Instead of simply 
accepting that the exercise of this competence is a political choice, I argue that the EU 
legislator must prove that the conditions for the exercise of its general criminal law 
competence are satisfied.10 
The structure of the chapter and the arguments are as follows. The first part of the Chapter 
considers the scope of the sectorial powers in Article 103 TFEU and Article 192 TFEU in 
imposing criminal laws. This discussion takes as a departure point the Court’s Environmental 
                                              
3
 See Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 September 2005’ (Case C-176/03 Commission v Council), COM 
2005 (583) final (‘COM 2005/583’), 3, points 6-10.  
4
 See Wouter PJ Wils, ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’ (2005) 28 World Competition 
117, 157; Whelan (n 2) 369; Michael Dougan, ‘From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist: Criminal Sanctions for 
the Enforcement of Union Law’ in Marise Cremona (ed), Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law (OUP 
2012) 103-104. 
5 See Dougan (n 4) 103-104; Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (n 1), Opinion of AG Mazak, paras 89-102; 
Tobler (n 2) 852-53. 
6 Directive 2009/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 amending Directive 
2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements [2009] OJ L 280/52. 
7
 Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection 
of the environment through criminal law [2008] OJ L 328/28 (‘Environmental Crimes Directive’). 
8
 Commission, ‘Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal 
measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights’, Brussels, 26.4.2006, COM(2006) 
168 final (‘Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal’). 
9 See Dougan (n 4) 101-102. 
10See Whelan (n 2) 369. 
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Crimes judgment and considers whether this ruling expresses a general criminal law power. I 
argue that the EU has a general criminal law power to enforce its policies when this is 
‘essential’ for the effective implementation of EU policies. Since both the judgments 
articulated the competence on the basis of the ‘essentiality’ criterion and on the basis of the 
effectiveness criterion, the competence must be understood to be of a general nature. Having 
concluded that such a power exists, it is then examined whether there are any limitations to 
this power. To exercise the EU’s general criminal law competence, two conditions must be 
fulfilled. Primarily, the EU needs to show that criminal laws can contribute to, by achieving 
higher compliance with the underlying EU rules, the implementation of a specific EU policy. 
If that is the case, the EU legislator must show that other alternative sanctions are not as 
effective as criminal law in the implementation of that policy. To show the application of the 
limitations to the EU’s general criminal law competence I examine whether the Union 
legislator correctly exercised its competence to adopt the Environmental Crimes Directive.11 
The chapter then considers whether the principles expressed in the Environmental Crimes 
judgment also can be invoked to confer a competence for the Union under Article 103 TFEU 
to enact criminal law measures in the field of competition law.   
The second part of the chapter considers whether a general criminal law competence can be 
exercised under the general provisions on harmonization, i.e. Article 114 TFEU and Article 
352 TFEU. In particular, it is analysed whether the need to remove obstacles to trade and 
distortions to competition, which justify harmonization under Article 114 TFEU, can be 
invoked to justify criminalization. It is maintained that in order for the EU legislator to 
employ its inherent criminal law competence under Article 114 TFEU, it must demonstrate 
that criminal laws contribute to reducing or removing a market dysfunction. If criminal laws 
do not help to address imminent or current obstacles to trade or distortions to competition, the 
EU cannot exercise the competence under that provision. The limits of Article 114 TFEU are 
illustrated by an enquiry into the Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal. Finally, I consider 
whether there is any limitation to the exercise of a criminal law competence under Article 
352 TFEU. I contend that it is very difficult to prevent the exercise of a criminal law 
competence under this provision. The only possibility of restraining the exercise of such a 
competence under Article 352 TFEU is to claim that there exists another more specific legal 
basis that blocks the use of that provision. 
                                              
11
 See n 7 for complete reference to this directive. 
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I LIMITS TO THE EXERCISE OF SECTORIAL COMPETENCES- 
ARTICLE 103 AND ARTICLE 192 TFEU  
 
A The limits’ to the Union’s competence to adopt criminal laws under Article 
192 TFEU 
 
Account of the Environmental Crimes and the Ship-Source Pollution judgments 
 
The first part of this subsection considers the scope of the EU’s criminal law competence as it 
has been derived from the Court’s rulings in Environmental Crimes and Ship-Source 
Pollution. In order to examine this question, it is appropriate to commence by giving a fuller 
account of the facts of the Environmental Crimes judgment. In this case the Council had 
enacted a framework decision on criminal law measures to protect the environment on the 
basis of the provisions of the (pre-lisbon) Treaty on European Union.12 The Council was 
concerned at the increasing scale and frequent cross-border effects of environmental offences 
and considered that such offences posed a serious threat to the environment. Since this was a 
problem jointly faced by Member States they should take concerted action to protect the 
environment under criminal law.13 The Framework Decision set forth a number of 
environmental offences that Member States were required to enforce by criminal penalties.14 
The Commission challenged this measure, arguing that since its predominant purpose was to 
protect the environment, the act should have been adopted under Article 175 EC (192 
TFEU).15  
The Court held firstly that it had to examine whether the criminal law provisions of the 
Framework Decision should have been adopted under Article 175 EC and thus impinged on 
the Community’s powers.16 The Court opined thereafter that the choice of the legal basis for a 
Community measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review including, in 
particular, the aim and the content of the measure. As regards the aim of the Framework 
                                              
12 See Article 31 and 34(2) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2002] OJ C 325/5 
(‘TEU’ ‘EU Treaty’) and Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on the protection of 
the environment through criminal law [2003] OJ 2003 L 29/55(‘Framework Decision’).  
13 See Framework Decision, recitals 1-3. 
14 See Framework Decision, Articles 2, 3, 5. 
15 See Case C-176/03, Commission v Council (n 1), para. 21. 
16 ibid, paras 40-41. 
103 
 
Decision, the Court found that it was clear both from its title and the recitals that its objective 
was the protection of the environment. As to the content, the Court noted that the Framework 
Decision established a list of particularly serious environmental offences, in respect of which 
the Member States had to impose criminal penalties. The Court admitted that the provisions 
of the Framework Decision entailed partial harmonization of the criminal laws of the 
Member States. Recognising this, the Court referred to its earlier case-law and confirmed that 
as a general rule neither criminal law nor criminal procedure was a Community 
competence.17  
Nevertheless, in the next paragraph of the judgment the Court radically altered its established 
case-law and recognised a Community criminal law competence. Since the Court’s 
proposition is crucial for the rest of the chapter I will quite it in extenso: 
 ‘the last mentioned-finding (i.e. the  absence of a general criminal law competence) 
does not prevent the Community legislature  when the application of effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national authorities is 
an essential measure for combating serious environmental offences, from taking 
measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member States which it considers 
necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it lays down on environmental 
protection are fully effective.’18  
Based on this proposition, the Court went on to annul the Framework Decision. The Court 
underlined that the Council had not disputed that the acts listed in the Framework Decision 
included infringements of a considerable number of Community measures, which were listed 
in the Annex to the proposed directive. The recitals of the Framework Decision further 
showed that the Council took the view that criminal penalties were essential for combating 
serious offences against the environment. Since both the aim and the content of the 
Framework Decision related to the protection of the environment they should have been 
adopted on the basis of Article 175 EC. Given this, the Framework Decision encroached on 
the powers of the Community, infringed Article 47 TEU and had to be annulled.19 
The Court’s judgment was one of the most remarkable judgments delivered during the last 
decade. The finding of a Community criminal law competence was striking, particularly 
                                              
17 ibid, paras 46- 47. 
18 ibid, para 48. 
19 ibid, paras 49-53. 
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given the sensitive nature of criminal law for the Member States’ sovereignty claims and the 
lack of such an express competence in the EC Treaty. However, soon after the Court’s 
judgment in the Environmental Crimes a new inter-institutional battle was triggered. On 23 
November 2005 the Commission decided to challenge a Council framework decision20 on 
criminal law measures in the enforcement of ship-source pollution, i.e. the Ship-Source 
Pollution judgment. The Framework Decision required the Member States to provide for 
criminal sanctions in order to combat ship-source pollution caused with intent or by serious 
negligence.21 The litigation provided a good opportunity for the Court to clarify its previous 
ruling in Environmental Crimes.  
The Court held that since requirements relating to environmental protection must be 
integrated into the definition and implementation of Community policies and activities, such 
protection must be regarded as an objective which also forms part of the common transport 
policy. The Community legislature could therefore promote environmental protection on the 
basis of Article 80(2) EC. The Court then applied the ‘objective legal basis test’ and found 
that both the content and the predominant purpose of the Framework Decision were to ensure 
maritime safety and environmental protection.22 The Court then repeated the above cited 
formula from the Environmental Crimes judgment and opined that when the application of 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties is an essential measure for 
combating serious environmental offences, the Community legislature could require the 
Member States to adopt such penalties. The Court found firstly that the provisions in the 
Framework Decision related to conduct which was likely to cause particularly serious 
environmental damage infringing the Community rules on maritime safety. Secondly, it 
found that the Council had taken view that criminal penalties were necessary to ensure 
compliance with the Community rules on maritime safety. The provisions of the Framework 
Decision should therefore have been adopted on the basis of Article 80(2) EC. The Court 
clarified that determination of the type and level of criminal penalties did not fall within the 
Community’s competence. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the Framework Decision, 
in encroaching on the Community’s powers in Article 80(2) EC, infringed Article 47 EU and 
had to be annulled.23  
                                              
20 See Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the criminal-law framework 
for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution [2005] OJ L 255/ 164 (‘the Framework Decision’) 
21 ibid, Articles 2 and 4.  
22 See Case 440/05, Commission v Council (n1), paras 59-65. 
23 ibid, paras 66-70, 74. 
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Do the Environmental Crimes judgment and the Ship-Source Pollution judgment 
express a general criminal law competence? 
 
Opinion has been divided on the issue of the scope of the EU’s criminal law competence as 
expressed by the Court’s judgments.24 A narrow interpretation of the Court’s judgment in 
Environmental Crimes has been proposed. It has been observed that the Environmental 
Crimes judgment was phrased in relatively cautious terms. The existence of an implied 
criminal competence was intimately connected to the pursuit of an ‘essential’ Community 
objective, environmental policy. This interpretation suggests that EU criminal law measures 
can only be adopted when two conditions are fulfilled. First, the objective of environmental 
protection must be at stake, either due to serious violations of EU environmental rules or 
where the protection of the environment is materially affected by severe violations of other 
Union rules. Secondly, the Union must prove that the measure is essential to enforce EU 
environmental law.25  
Whilst I agree with the second criterion, I believe that it cannot be maintained that the EU’s 
general criminal law competence only applies to environmental law. First, the judicial 
procedure before the Court implies that the Court only needs to respond to the questions 
which have been formulated by the claimants. In Environmental Crimes and the Ship Source-
Pollution judgment, the Court was only compelled to answer the questions that enabled it to 
resolve the dispute and was under no obligation to elaborate a principle of more far-reaching 
consequences.26 Furthermore, in light of the structure of the Treaties it is difficult to accept 
the claim that the ruling was limited to environmental protection. After all, Article 2 EC (3 
TEU) did not establish any hierarchy between the Treaties’ various objectives. Moreover, the 
Treaties contained ‘integration clauses’ for other policy fields analogous to that concerned 
with environmental protection under Article 6 EC (Article 11 TEU)27.28 Instead of a narrow 
                                              
24 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Hart 2009) 73- 75. 
25 
This was the favoured interpretation by United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark; see House of Lords’ 
European Union Committee, 42nd Report, Session 2005–06, ‘The Criminal Law Competence of the European 
Community, Report with Evidence, HL Paper 227 19, paras 44-45;See the statements of Judge Puissochet in 
Sénat, Réunion de la delegation pour l’Union européenne du mercredi 22 février 2006, Institutions européennes, 
La Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, Audition de M. Philippe Léger, avocat général, et de M. 
Jean-Pierre Puissochet, juge à la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes: ‘mon sentiment est que l'arrêt 
est strictement cantonné à la protection de l'environnement et se fonde expressément sur la spécificité de 
cette matière’ < http://www.senat.fr/europe/r22022006_1.html> Accessed 29 April 2014. 
26 See Whelan (n 2) 371. 
27 See Article 3(2) EC; 153(2) EC. 
28 See Dougan (n 4) 102-103. 
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interpretation of the judgment limiting the criminal law competence to the field of 
environmental policy, I contend that the reasoning followed by the Court in Environmental 
Crimes and the Ship-Source Pollution judgment establishes general principles for deciding 
the contours of the Union’s power to impose criminal sanctions. This is due to the fact that 
the rationale for conferring a criminal law competence on the EU was premised on the 
‘effectiveness principle’. Since the rationale for the EU’s dormant29 criminal law competence 
lies with the general principle of effectiveness underlying Union law, this competence must 
also apply in relation to any other EU policy. In addition to environmental protection the 
Court’s reasoning can therefore be applied to all common EU policies (such as e.g. 
competition law, agriculture) and fundamental freedoms that involve binding legislation 
whose effective implementation can be deemed to require criminal penalties. The Court’s 
approach is functional; the EU legislature may provide for measures of criminal law on the 
basis that they are necessary to ensure compliance with EU rules.30 
The limits to the EU’s general criminal law power as derived from the Court’s case-law can 
be stated as follows. First, it entails an examination of whether criminal laws contribute to the 
‘effective implementation’ of a specific EU policy.31 The EU legislator must establish a very 
strong case for criminal sanctions based on their effectiveness in enforcing the EU policy at 
issue. If the EU legislator demonstrates that criminal laws contribute to the ‘effective 
implementation’ of the Union policy, we should in a second stage consider whether other, 
non-criminal, sanctions would contribute in equal measure to the ‘effective implementation’ 
of this specific EU policy.32 These are not abstract criteria accepting the exercise of a criminal 
law competence because of the perceived general effectiveness of criminal law in the 
enforcement of EU policies. The EU legislator must determine, when submitting proposals, 
whether this ‘essentiality’ criterion, is met on a case by case basis.33 
Having shown that the Court’s case-law expresses a general Union criminal law competence, 
the examination moves on to consider whether the Environmental Crime Directive adopted 
on the basis of Article 192 TFEU conforms to the conditions of this competence.  
 
                                              
29 The expression ‘dormant’ comes from Dougan (n 4) 111. 
30 See Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (n 1), Opinion of AG Mazak, paras 97-99; COM 2005/583 (n 3) 3. 
31 See Dougan (n 4) 101-102. 
32 See Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (n1), Opinion of AG Mazak, para 102; COM 2005/583 (n 3) 3, 5. 
33 See COM 2005/583 (n 3) 3. 
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Was the Environmental Crimes Directive validly adopted under Article 192 TFEU? 
 
The Environmental Crimes Directive sets forth a minimum set of serious environmental 
offences that should be considered criminal throughout the Community when committed 
intentionally or with at least serious negligence. These offences should be punishable by 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions.34 Having outlined the content of 
the Directive, we then consider the legality of the Directive on the basis of the test I 
suggested in chapter 3.35 First, there is an examination of whether there is ‘adequate’ 
reasoning to justify resort to Article 192 TFEU. Secondly, there is an enquiry into whether 
the EU legislator has taken into account ‘relevant evidence’ showing that criminal laws are 
‘essential’ for the effective implementation of Union environmental laws. Accepting the 
findings of chapter 2 on the conceptual problems of restraining EU powers, the examination 
shows how we can use my proposed test to construct limits to the exercise of a criminal law 
competence. 
Is the Commission’s reasoning adequate to support the exercise of a dormant criminal 
law competence under Article 192 TFEU?  
 
In its Proposal36 the Commission first proposes the conditions under which the Union 
legislator can adopt the Directive. The Union’s criminal law competence is limited to what is 
necessary for the effective implementation of the Union’s environmental policy.37 It is 
assumed in this context that ‘effective implementation’38 is concerned with whether criminal 
laws contribute to achieving the objective of better protection of the environment throughout 
the Union.39 How does criminal law contribute to the protection of the environment? And 
why is criminal law ‘essential’, i.e. more effective than other non-criminal sanctions? The 
Commission’s main argument is that criminal law is effective because it works as a deterrent 
                                              
34 See Environmental Crimes Directive (n 7), Articles 3 and 5. 
35 See below chapter 3- section IV (D). 
36 
See Commission,’ Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
the environment through criminal law’, Brussels, 9.2.2007, COM (2007) 51 final (‘Environmental Crimes 
Proposal’). 
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 ibid 2; Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal 
law, Impact Assessment’, Brussels, 9.2.2007, SEC (2007) 160, 24. 
38 See below for discussion of this concept in chapter 5- section I (A).  
39 See Michael G Faure, ‘The Implementation of the Environmental Crimes Directives in Europe’ (2011) Ninth 
International Conference on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement 2011, 366-67. 
<http://inece.org/conference/9/proceedings/41_Faure.pdf> Accessed on 29 April 2014. 
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for illegal activities. The Commission assumes that environmental crime is a typical white-
collar crime where the offenders are rational calculators. Offences are carried out with the 
intention of making a profit, either from selling a product or from avoiding certain costs. Due 
to increased costs associated with complying with more stringent environmental legislation, 
there is a large and profitable market for environmental crime. Due to the nature of 
environmental offences, criminal law is the appropriate response. The deterrent effect of 
higher sanctions and a higher level of awareness of environmental crime increases 
compliance. In addition, the Commission suggests that the dual criminality requirement in 
international criminal law and differences in applicable sanctions that cause problems with 
regard to police and judicial cooperation would be remedied through a minimum set of 
common definitions of offences.40 
The Commission further argues that criminal laws have a greater deterrence value than other 
sanctions, and so are ‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU environmental policy. Existing 
Union and Member State measures are insufficient to ensure effective implementation of 
Union environmental policies. The Environmental Liability Directive (ELD)41 only requires 
the operator to bear the costs for the preventive and remedial actions actually taken pursuant 
to that directive. It does not aim at sanctioning the responsible operator.42 Criminal sanctions 
are more effective since they sanction a past illegal behaviour and prevent the repetition of 
the same illegal behaviour in the future.43 Nor will individual administrative fines work since 
Member States set their sanctions at too low a level. As the huge profits offenders enjoy are 
not calculated in the fines applied to their offences, the low fines imposed on offenders are 
simply considered as an insignificant and acceptable cost of doing business, taking into 
account the market prices and the low risk of detection.44Secondly, the Commission appeals 
to criminal law’s social stigma. The imposition of criminal sanctions demonstrates a social 
disapproval of a qualitatively different nature compared to administrative sanctions or a 
compensation mechanism under civil law. Criminal law has a stronger deterrent effect than 
other administrative sanctions because of the moral disapproval connected to a criminal 
penalty and the inclusion of convictions in criminal records.45 Thirdly, the Commission 
                                              
40 See SEC (2007) 160 (n 37), 12, 23-24, 28, 30. 
41 Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage [2004] OJ L 143/ 56 (‘ELD’). 
42 ibid, Article 8(1). 
43 See SEC (2007) 160 (n 37) 24. 
44 ibid 18, 35; Environmental Crimes Proposal (n 36) 2. 
45 See Environmental Crimes Proposal (n36) 2 
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considers that criminal law is more effective than other sanctions due to its strong 
enforcement mechanisms. Criminal proceedings enable use of more powerful methods and 
techniques of investigation than tools of administrative or civil law.46  
Is there ‘adequate reasoning’ in the proposal and the impact assessment to support the 
Directive? To test this we should, according to the test developed in chapter 3, only monitor 
whether the reasons put forward by the Commission are defendable in theory. The test is, as 
stated in chapter 3, that one of the reasons must constitute in itself sufficient basis to support 
the exercise of the competence. The reference point for whether the reasons presented are 
justified is the general criminological and criminal law literature on the effects of 
criminalization. Only, in the second stage is it considered whether the reasons are sustained 
with sufficient evidence.47 
Firstly, it must be admitted that the Commission’s deterrence argument is well-recognised in 
the literature. Commentators have repeatedly suggested that the threat of prison sanctions is 
effective in achieving compliance with environmental law provisions.48 There is also 
evidence to support the assumption that environmental crimes are typical white-collar crimes 
committed by rational individuals suggesting that criminal law is effective in dealing with 
such offences.49 Secondly, it is well-recognised in the literature that alternative sanctions are 
not normally as effective as criminal sanctions. Fines are less of a deterrent than criminal 
sanctions because individuals can be indemnified by the firm if they become subject to fines 
and because fines, in contrast to criminal sanctions such as imprisonment terms can be passed 
onto customers.50 The Commission is also correct to assume that the civil liability regime 
                                              
46 See Environmental Crimes Directive (n 7), recital 4; Environmental Crimes Proposal (n 36) 2; SEC (2007) 
160 (n 37) 18, 28. 
47 See chapter 3- section IV (D). 
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 See Neil Hawke, Environmental Policy: Implementation and Enforcement (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2002) 
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Washington Law Review 916, 922; Martin F McDermott, ‘Occupational Disqualification of Corporate 
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614; Richard Macrory, ‘Regulatory Justice—Making Sanctions Effective’, Macrory Review, Cabinet Office, 
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established by the ELD has a weaker deterrent effect than criminal sanctions. This is firstly 
because the individuals responsible for the offence are unlikely to be punished by the firm 
and cannot therefore be deterred by a liability regime such as that contained in the ELD. In 
addition, such a regime is not likely to be effective since the current Union liability regime is 
directed against the operator who can dispense with liability claims by passing them onto 
consumers.51 It is also well established that criminal sanctions, particularly imprisonment, are 
more effective than other sanctions because of the public condemnation attached to criminal 
sanctions.52 Moreover, it is correct to predict that criminal laws generally will be more 
effective than administrative sanctions because of the more effective tools of investigation 
available in criminal proceedings.53 
However, some of the Commission’s arguments miss the target. The argument regarding 
judicial cooperation is not entirely convincing. Harmonized criminal laws will not necessarily 
improve judicial co-operation in criminal matters. What is probably more important for 
effective judicial cooperation and judicial assistance than harmonized criminal laws is mutual 
trust. This entails that the criminal justice systems in every Member State respect human 
rights and provide rights of due process and fair trial to every Union citizen. It is doubtful 
however whether Member States and their citizens have such mutual trust. The fierce 
opposition to mutual recognition on the part of defense lawyers, human rights organizations 
and many criminal law scholars sends a clear message. Whilst harmonization of hard laws 
may increase contacts, help create common practices or remove the problems of the abolition 
of the double criminality requirement for the environmental offences at issue54, it is not clear 
whether it will create trust.55 In many cases harmonization will create conflicts and problems 
                                                                                                                                            
London, Final Report, November 2006, 47<http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file44593.pdf > Accessed 29 April 
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(1991) 59 George Washington Law Review 781, 789-790; Ricardo Pereira, ‘Environmental Criminal Law in the 
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52 See Gobert and Punch (n 49) 220, 275. Dan M Kahan, ‘What do alternative sanctions mean?’ (1996) 63 
University of Chicago Law Review 591, 593, 650. 
53 See Hayman and Brack (n 48) 24; Gobert (n 49) 222.  
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that are related to the underlying cultural and ideological differences.56 The criticisms against 
the current low level of individual administrative fines in the Member States are not 
sufficiently compelling to dismiss fines generally as a sanctioning mechanism. If optimal 
fines are imposed, fines are likely to deter.57 The same criticism could be made to the 
Commission’s argument that the current ELD regime does not work. First, the ELD does not 
establish a proper civil liability regime against individuals breaching environmental rules. It 
has a limited personal scope as it is only directed against the operator. The ELD also has a 
narrow substantive scope as it only covers certain occupational activities and only srequires 
the operator to bear the costs for remedial and preventive actions taken pursuant to the 
ELD.58 For this reason, it will not deter potential infringers of EU enviromental law 
effectively. If the EU legislator instead prescribed unlimited civil liability against individuals 
for infringements of EU environmental rules, such sanctions are likely to be very 
dissuasive.59It is unconvincing to adopt criminal sanctions merely because current ill-devised 
civil liability and fine regimes in the Member States and the Union have failed to produce 
effective outcomes.  
Despite these shortcomings in the Commission’s reasoning, it is sufficient to pass the 
standard for legality. This is because the Commission has put forward several arguments in 
the proposal which explain why criminal laws would be an ‘effective’ and ‘essential’ 
measure to enforce EU environmental laws. Those arguments are supported by the relevant 
literature and by empirical studies. It seems clear that the Commission’s arguments on 
deterrence, the criminal law’s social stigma and the benefits of criminal procedures are 
sufficient to defend why criminal law would, in theory, contribute to the enforcement of EU 
policies. Whilst the argument on judicial cooperation is not compelling, this failure is not 
sufficient to invalidate the Environmental Crimes Directive.60 Even if that argument is not 
adequate, the proposal contained three separate arguments supporting the ‘effectiveness’ of 
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criminal laws.61 It would have been sufficient to meet the adequacy standard if the EU 
legislator only had only referred to criminal law’s deterrent nature. This is because this 
argument is an independent and sufficient justification for criminalization.  
While the arguments on the insufficiency of national non-criminal sanctioning regimes are 
not convincing, those arguments do not exclude the legality of the Directive. The adequacy 
standard requires that the EU legislator explain why each of the alternative sanctions, or why 
non-criminal sanctions generally, are not as effective as criminal sanctions in the enforcement 
of EU environmental policies. The Commission has suggested one argument that is 
sufficiently compelling to defend the superiority of criminal sanctions over non-criminal 
sanctions. This is the assumption, well-defended in the literature, that the superior moral 
stigma of criminal laws makes it a more effective sanction than non-administrative sanctions. 
The Commission has also suggested that the stronger investigative tools of criminal 
procedure make criminalization a more effective option than administrative sanctions alone. 
Whilst this argument is not probably sufficiently strong in itself to ensure that the EU 
legislator passes the legality standard of ‘adequate’ reasoning, it reinforces the ‘moral stigma’ 
argument and strengthens the case for the adequacy of the reasoning in the proposal. The 
Commission has put forward relevant reasons both to sustain why criminal laws contribute to 
higher environmental protection and why alternative sanctions cannot do this job properly. 
Since this is what is required by the legality standard, the measure passes this part of the test. 
While the arguments are in theory adequate to sustain criminalization, we have to look 
whether they are backed up by relevant evidence.  
Has the Commission taken into account ‘relevant circumstances’ which shows that 
criminal laws are ‘effective’ and ‘essential’ for the enforcement of Union environmental 
policies?  
 
What then is the evidence for the effectiveness and ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws in the 
implementation of Union environmental policies?   
I begin by determining what evidence the Commission invoked to defend its position. First, 
to maintain the claim of the criminal law’s deterrence value, the Commission refers to 
international conventions that show that there is some common understanding that for serious 
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environmental crimes the use of criminal law is effective.62 Secondly, the Commission refers 
to scientific studies in its impact assessment to support the view that environmental crimes 
are typical white collar crimes to which criminal sanctions are the appropriate response.63 
Thirdly, the claim that the use of criminal laws and severe sanctions are a suitable tool for 
enforcement is substantiated by some evidence. The Commission refers to examples in 
Austria, Portugal and Finland, where in order to justify the use of effective investigation 
methods, such as technical surveillance, interception of mail and recording, interception and 
tracing of telecommunications, there needs to be a risk of committing of serious offences 
with high prison penalties. 64 
The Commission has also submitted evidence to substantiate the claim that criminal law is 
‘essential’, i.e. more effective than non-criminal sanctions.65 In relation to the superiority of 
criminal laws over individual administrative fines, the Commission refers to evidence from 
the UK House of Commons. The report from the House of Commons suggests that low fines 
send the wrong message in trying to create a culture where environmental compliance is 
taken seriously by the industry. The report is focused on problems of compliance with 
environmental rules in the UK and suggests that companies often find it more economical to 
pay a fine than to properly address their environmental performance.66 The claim that the 
general level of fines is too low in the Member States to be an effective deterrence for 
environmental infringements is supported by the same report from the House of Commons.67 
The current fines applied in the UK is merely a business cost since many businesses in the 
UK currently see the payment of fines as the cheaper option to full environmental 
compliance. Unless the profit margin of a large firm is seriously compromised by the 
imposition of optimal fines, then such companies are unlikely to take action to stop their 
illegal activity because of the threat of a fine.68 The Commission then relies explicitly upon 
two studies; one by TRAFFIC Europe on the ‘Implementation of Article 16 Council 
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Regulation (EC) No. 338/97’69and one study conducted by Huglo-Lepage & Associés ‘on 
criminal penalties in EU Member States’ environmental law’, to demonstrate the 
insufficiency of existing sanctions.70 The TRAFFIC Europe report shows that some national 
sanctioning regimes are inadequate to deal with the problem of punishing wildlife offences.71 
This is also supported by statements from Marceil Yeater from the CITES secretariat.72 The 
Huglo-Lepage study  only hows that there are national divergences both in terms of the 
nature of penalties imposed, the existence of penalties for certain offences and level of 
penalties imposed.73 
We control the legality of the Environmental Crimes Directive based on the legality test 
proposed in chapter 3. In order to pass the evidence requirement, the EU legislator needs to 
first show that one of the reasons which in itself justified why EU criminalization is 
‘effective’ for the enforcement of EU policies is supported by sufficient and relevant 
evidence (the ‘effectiveness’ criterion). The EU legislator must secondly show that, at least, 
one of the proposed justifications for the ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws is equally supported 
by relevant and sufficient evidence (the ‘essentiality’ criterion).74 
Firstly, there is no reference to literature or studies supporting the claim that criminal laws 
provide for moral stigma or greater moral stigma than administrative sanctions. Such 
evidence exists75 and it is regrettable that the Commission failed to refer to it. Secondly, it is 
unclear whether the international community’s recognition that criminal laws are appropriate 
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in the enforcement of environmental law is sufficient evidence to prove a general thesis of 
criminal law’s effectiveness. Those conventions reveal a political conviction to use criminal 
sanctions to enforce environmental laws. This conviction is not however buttressed by any 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of criminal laws. Thirdly, there is generally a lack of 
proof regarding the deterrent effects of criminal law for the enforcement of environmental 
laws. Ás with the case of moral stigma, while such evidence exists in the literature76, the 
Commission did not refer to it. Fourthly, the evidence from the country examples does not 
prove the thesis that criminal laws are effective. They only demonstrate that severe prison 
sentences render criminal enforcement more effective. General criminalization of 
infringements of EU environmental laws will not necessarily lead to improved enforcement 
of EU environmental policies. The availability of investigation methods is a matter of the 
level of sanctions and not primarily a matter of whether the offence is criminalized. Whilst 
criminalization is probably a necessity for the presence of stronger enforcement instruments, 
those instruments are normally only available to enforcement authorities if the offence in 
question is subject to a severe custodial sentence. If the minimum sentence of the punishment 
for the offence is below, for example, 6 months, the enforcement authorities will most likely 
not be granted with robust powers such as surveillance, interception and recording.77 In 
general, it seems that the Commission has failed to take into account relevant evidence. 
Whilst the Commission spent considerable effort to point out the insufficiency of existing 
national sanctioning regimes, there is no evidence to support the claim that criminal sanctions 
are superior to other, non-criminal sanctions, which is the main point in demonstrating 
compliance with the ‘essentiality’ condition. Although the EU legislator need not prove that 
non-criminal sanctions do not work on Union level, there should at least be references to 
evidence showing the general superiority of criminal sanctions over such sanctions.  
Applying the above reasoning it would appear that Environmental Crimes Directive has 
failed to pass the legality test outlined in chapter 378 for two reasons. First, while the 
Commission proposed three reasons (‘deterrence’, ‘social stigma’ and ‘strong enforcement’) 
which in themselves justify why criminal laws are ‘effective’ for the enforcement of EU 
environmental laws none of these reasons have been suppsorted by sufficient and relevant 
evidence. Secondly, although the Commission submitted two reasons (criminal law’s superior 
social stigma and better enforcement tools) which independently could justify criminal law’s 
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superiority over non-criminal sanctions, neither of those reasons were buttressed by sufficient 
evidence to show how criminal laws are superior to non-criminal sanctions.  
B Can Article 103 TFEU be used as a legal basis for introducing criminal 




This subsection builds further on the preceding section by analysing whether the EU’s 
dormant criminal law competence, as derived from the Environmental Crimes judgment, can 
be exercised to criminalize infringements of EU competition law using the legal basis of 
Article 103 TFEU. The EU’s competence to criminalise competition law enforcement has 
been, and will continue to be, a subject of debate. It has also been suggested that Article 103 
TFEU would provide a sufficient legal basis for introducing criminal sanctions. Whelan has 
developed the argument most comprehensively. First, criminal Union antitrust sanctions are 
not expressly prohibited by the Treaties. Secondly, the Commission has broad legislative 
enforcement powers under Article 103 TFEU to establish ‘the appropriate regulations or 
directives to give effect to the principles set out in [Article] 101’, principles that underline the 
complete undesirability of hard-core cartels. Third, although Article 103 TFEU expressly 
mentions fines and period penalty payments as enforcement measures in the context of EU 
competition law, the use of ‘in particular’ provides scope for alternative non-financial 
enforcement options. Although the founding fathers of the Treaty may not have had the 
intention that competition rules would be enforced with criminal sanctions it would, with a 
functional and teleological interpretation of the Treaty, be possible to establish a Union 
power to introduce criminal sanctions on the basis of Article 103 TFEU. 79 
On one level, this argument is appealing. I certainly agree with Whelan that a teleological 
interpretation of the Treaties favours the recognition of a criminal law competence for the EU 
under Article 103 TFEU. While there is no express criminal law competence, the lack of an 
express conferral of competence cannot be used to deny the exercise of the general criminal 
law competence for the Union. We know from the discussion above that the Union has a 
general dormant power to impose criminal sanctions if it is ‘essential’ for the ‘effective 
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implementation of Union policies’. An evolutionary interpretation of the Treaties supports 
recognising such a criminal law competence under Article 103 TFEU. The Court’s general 
approach to the interpretation of the Treaties is that every provision of Union law must be 
interpreted in the light of the provisions of Union law as a whole, regard being had to the 
objectives thereof and to its ‘state of evolution’ at the date on which the provision in question 
is to be applied.80 If we take this approach it is reasonable to argue that the Member States, 
being aware of recent developments in transnational crime, would have seen a necessity of 
enforcing its competition rules through criminal sanctions.81 Although the principle of 
conferral prohibits the creation of new competences, it does not prohibit the exercise of 
competences that, although not expressed by the Treaties, are implied in the general 
legislative competences.82 A Union competence to approximate national criminal laws can be 
implied from the Union’s general power to regulate human behaviour.83  
If we apply the above-mentioned test for exercising the EU’s dormant criminal law 
competence, it is possible to maintain that criminal sanctions are both ‘effective’ and 
‘essential’ for the achievement of the objective of safeguarding fair and undistorted 
competition.84 The effectiveness of EU competition law enforcement has been an issue of 
concern for some time. Despite the problems of assessing the deterrence of criminal laws, it 
seems likely that criminal laws have a deterrent effect, at least in relation to the average 
compliant individual who pursues corporate gain and is free to make rational decisions based 
on reliable information regarding detection levels and conviction levels.85 Furthermore, it has 
been seriously questioned whether the current system, based on administrative fines, has a 
sufficient deterrence value to assure compliance with the legal rules. Competition law 
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enforcement through measures other than criminal laws such as administrative fines, trading 
prohibitions and individual fines do not seem sufficient to ensure the effective enforcement of 
Union competition law. The corporate fine provided for under Regulation No. 1/2003 does 
not deter ‘rogue directors’. The prospect of facing an individual criminal sanction and public 
condemnation would appreciably reinforce the message of the unacceptable nature of price-
fixing.86 Given this, criminal sanctions may be the only way to ensure effective enforcement 
and compliance with Union competition rules.87 The conditions for exercising the dormant 
criminal law competence requires nothing more than proof of the ‘essentiality’ of criminal 
laws for the effective implementation of Union law. If we accept the presupposition that 
criminal law is more effective than other sanctioning mechanisms in enforcing Union 
competition policies, it seems that the general conditions for exercising a criminal law 
competences under Article 103 TFEU are met.88  
Criminal laws may also be ‘essential’ for the objectives of EU antitrust enforcement. 
Antitrust enforcement pursues two objectives. The first one is prohibitive, i.e. to bring the 
infringement of the law to an end, and entails positive measures to ensure that that conduct 
ceases in the future. The second one is punitive, i.e. to punish the perpetrator of the illegal 
acts in question and also to deter him and others from future transgressions.89 If these goals 
are related to the general goal of Union competition law, i.e. the public interest in 
safeguarding effective competition in the common market90, it can be assumed that criminal 
laws will be beneficial for the implementation of those objectives. Given the above, it is clear 
that a teleological interpretation suggests that a criminal law competence can be exercised 
under Article 103 TFEU. However, when we turn to a textual and systematic interpretation of 
Article 103 TFEU, the case for a criminal law competence under Article 103 TFEU is 
substantially weakened. 
Textual and systematic interpretation of Article 103 TFEU 
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A combined textual and systematic interpretation of Article 103 TFEU suggests that the 
general dormant criminal law competence cannot be exercised under these provisions. Whilst 
Article 103(2) (B) mention [administrative] fines91 and periodic penalty payments as means 
of sanctioning EU competition rules, this provision does not mention criminal sanctions. In 
fact, Article 103(2) (a) TFEU does not, as suggested by the dominant view in the literature92, 
constitute examples of the means of sanctions which are available for the Commission.  The 
words ‘in particular’ do not refer to the means of sanctions but to the general purpose of 
‘ensuring compliance with the prohibitions in Article 101(1) and Article 102’. It only means 
that regulations and directives in the field of competition law may have purposes other than 
those listed in Article 103 TFEU. The list of purposes is consequently only examples. 
Nevertheless, if the Commission decides to enforce the prohibitions in Article 101 and 102 
TFEU by laying down regulations or directives they can only do so by providing for ‘fines 
and periodic penalty payments’.93 
At this stage it is apparent for the reader that a textual and systematic interpretation that 
argues against the exercise of a criminal law competence under Article 103 TFEU does not fit 
well with the above proposed teleological interpretation. Here we can recollect the lessons 
from chapter 2 on the political and pragmatic reasons for why it has been difficult for the 
Court to impose limits on the exercise of EU competences. The Court has certainly taken the 
position that a teleological interpretation of the Treaties fits well with the political objectives 
of further integration.94 However, the Court and other observers are also aware that the telos 
of further EU integration cannot be taken too far95 and interfere with the explicit wording of 
the Treaties. The claim for criminalization under Article 103 TFEU on the basis of 
effectiveness is justified only if it fits the textual framework of this provision.96 On this point, 
it appears that the exercise of the general dormant criminal law competence under this 
provision stretches the principle of ‘effective implementation ‘of Union policies too far.  
                                              
91 That the fines mentioned in Article 103 (2) (B) are not of a criminal nature is clear from Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1, Article 15(3). 
92 See Whelan (n 2) 368; Wils (n 4) 157-158.  
93 See, however, Case 70/88 Parliament v Council (Chernobyl) [1990] ECR I-2041, paras 16-31, where the 
Court did not consider that the fact that the parliament was not enumerated in Article 264 TFEU as conclusive 
for deciding on its right to bring action for annulment. 
94 See above chapter 2- section II (B) for an elaboration of this point. 
95 
See Loïc Azoulai, ‘Introduction: the Question of Competence’ in Loïc Azoulai (ed), The Question of 
Competence in the European Union (OUP 2014), 10. 
96 See Trevor C Hartley, The Constitutional Problems of the European Union (Hart 1999) 48. 
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The existence of an implicit power, which constitutes a derogation from the principle of 
conferred powers, should be interpreted strictly. Such implicit powers should only be 
recognised in exceptional cases and in order to be so recognised, they must be necessary to 
ensure the practical effect of the provisions of the Treaty.97 In contrast to the analysis in 
relation to Article 192 TFEU, the textual and systematic arguments raised above argue 
against the exercise of the dormant criminal law competence under Article 103 TFEU. The 
insertion of ‘fines and administrative sanctions’ in Article 103 TFEU, support the conclusion 
that the Member States had the intention of excluding criminal law as a sanctioning 
mechanism under this provision. It is difficult to imagine that the purpose of this provision 
could have been anything other than to regulate in an exclusive manner the range of sanctions 
available for the Union legislator under said provision. Moreover, the conclusion that the 
Union cannot exercise its dormant criminal law power under Article 103 TFEU is not 
contrary to the principle of effective implementation of Union policies. Article 103 TFEU 
would not lose its practical meaning if the Union did not employ its latent criminal law 
power.98 This is because the Union already has a power under Article 103 (2) (B) to enforce 
the competition rules by means of fines and administrative sanctions. Thirdly, criminalization 
contrary to the text of Article 103 TFEU would be tantamount to an ‘amendment’ of the 
Treaties99. This would undermine the formal conception of the rule of law and the principle of 
legal certainty to the detriment of the individual. This would finally be an infringement of the 
principle of good faith towards the Member States and the citizens of Europe.100 In striking a 
balance between competing principles and also taking into account the formal structure of 
Article 103 TFEU, there is greater support for the conclusion that the dormant criminal law 
power cannot be exercised under Article 103 TFEU.  
                                              
97 See Case T-143/06 MTZ Polyfilms v Council [2009] ECR II-4133, para 47; Case T- 240/04 France v 
Commission [2007] ECR II-4035, para 37; Hartley (n 96) 38-39. 
98 This is one of the justifications for recognizing an implied legislative power; joined cases 281, 283-285, 
287/85 Germany and Others v Commission [1987] ECR 3203, para 28: ‘it must be emphasized that where an 
article of the EEC Treaty …….confers a specific task on the Commission it must be accepted, if that provision 
is not to be rendered wholly ineffective, that it confers on the Commission necessarily and per se the powers 
which are indispensable in order to carry out that task.’ I added emphasis to underline the justification for 
conferring an implied power on the Commission. See also Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law- Text, 
Cases, and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2011)77. 
99 See Hartley (n 96) 50-51. 
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II GENERAL LEGAL BASES WHICH CAN BE EMPLOYED TO 
EXERCISE A DORMANT CRIMINAL LAW COMPETENCE  
 
This subsection considers the limitations to the exercise of a Union criminal law competence 
under the general legal bases, Article 114 and Article 352 TFEU. The analysis of these 
provisions is central for the thesis since commentators and EU institutions have argued that 
criminal law powers can be exercised under these legal bases and because of the fact that they 
are generally the most frequently used provisions for Union legislative harmonization.101  
 
A Is there any limitations to the exercise of a Union criminal law competence 
under Article 114 TFEU? 
 
Scope of Article 114 TFEU 
 
Pursuant to the Tobacco Advertising judgment there are two justifications for harmonization 
under Article 114 TFEU. Harmonization may either have the object of removing differences 
between national legislations that hinder the freedom of movement or it may have the object 
and effect of removing disparities between national rules which are liable to distort 
conditions for competition.102 It was however concluded in chapter 2 that the Court, 
subsequent to the Tobacco Advertising Case, has given a broad interpretation of this 
provision allowing for measures that have a weak link to the internal market. The question 
here is whether the limitations imposed by Tobacco Advertising, the need to prove that EU 
measures contribute to remove obstacles to trade or removes ‘appreciable’ distortions to 
competitions, can act as a check on the exercise of Union criminal law competences under 
Article 114 TFEU.103 We firstly analyse whether the recent case-law on Article 114 TFEU 
has offered any further understanding of those limitations. 
                                              
101
 See Whelan (n2) 369; Hanna G Sevenster, ‘Criminal Law and EC Law’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law 
Review 29, 67-68; Wils (n 4) 157-158. 
102 See Case C- 376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] ECR I-08419, paras 
83-84, 106-107. 
103 
See Ester Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (Hart 2012) 87-108, on 
Article 114 TFEU and its potential for criminalization. 
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Does the Court’s recent case-law provide any check against harmonization of criminal 
laws under Article 114 TFEU? 
 
There is only one case, post-Tobacco, which is directly concerned with the appropriateness of 
using Article 114 TFEU to adopt criminal laws.104 This case is Ireland v Parliament and 
Council. This case demonstrated that harmonization of national measures aiming to support 
law enforcement need have only a very weak link to the internal market in order to justify the 
exercise of the competence under Article 114 TFEU.105 In this case, the Data Retention 
Directive106 was challenged on the basis that it was adopted on the incorrect legal basis of 
Article 114 TFEU. The basis for this argument was that it was mainly concerned with the 
fight against crime and therefore should have been adopted on the basis of the (pre-Lisbon) 
Treaty on European Union. In light of the content of the directive, the Court held that it 
related predominantly to the functioning of the internal market. The provisions of the Data 
Retention Directive were limited to the activities of service providers and did not govern 
access to data or the use thereof by the police or judicial authorities of the Member States. 
This was clear from the fact that service providers were to retain only data that was generated 
or processed in the course of their commercial activities. The Court rejected the argument 
that the contested directive was predominantly concerned with the prosecution and fighting of 
crime. Even though a close study of the Data Retention Directive showed that the main 
objective of the data retention provisions was to combat crime, the Court held that the aim 
and the content of the measure in this case was, in contrast to the PNR case, predominantly 
directed to the activities of the service providers and therefore predominantly concerned with 
the functioning of the internal market. Since both the objective and content of the measure 
were related to the functioning of the internal market, the Court upheld the Data Retention 
Directive as falling within the EU’s competence under Article 114 TFEU.107 
                                              
104 Joined cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-04721 was also arguably concerned 
with whether Article 114 TFEU could be used indirectly to adopt provisions for the benefit of criminal law 
enforcement. In this case, the Court annulled the ‘adequacy decision’ because it did not fall within the scope of 
Directive 95/46 EC and thus outside Article 114 TFEU. However, the case is not important enough to warrant 
space in the thesis. First, it was not concerned with annulment of a large legislative scheme. Secondly, the Court 
did not expound on the substantive limits of Article 114 TFEU. It merely stated that since the directive 
contained provisions on collection of data for public security purposes it fell outside the Data Protection 
Directive (Joined cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 Parliament v Council, paras 54-60, 67-70). 
105 
See Ester Herlin-Karnell ‘Is There More to it than the Fight Against 'Dirty Money'? Article 95 EC and the 
Criminal Law’ (2008) 19 European Business Law Review 557, 567. 
106 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L 105/54. 
107 See Case C-301/06 Ireland v Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I-00593, paras 68-93 
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A more sober reading of the case questions the Court’s acceptance of the argument that the 
measure was predominantly concerned with the internal market. It was quite obvious from a 
study of the Data Retention Directive, the preambles and its history that the directive had one 
central purpose: the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime. It was not 
intended mainly to address defects in the internal market. Recitals 5-11, 25 and Article 1 of 
the directive all mentioned the fight against serious crime and terrorism as the main reason 
for the adoption of the Data Retention Directive. For these reasons it would have been more 
appropriate to adopt it on the basis of the provisions in Title VI of the (pre-Lisbon) Treaty on 
European Union. The market element in the Data Retention Directive was also fragile since a 
mere reference to service providers was sufficient to establish and economic link. Prevention 
in terms of future disparities leads to a very low threshold for justifying EU action. It is also 
hard to see why the objective of preventing serious organized crime could become an 
objective of the Community under Article 114 TFEU, when it was an objective of the third 
pillar. As argued by Herlin-Karnell after Ireland v Parliament and Council it does not seem 
to matter under Article 114 TFEU how much non-market purposes or non-first pillar purpose 
there is, as long as there is some market purpose and market effects.108 This case seems to 
have strongly undermined the limits of the powers under Article 114 TFEU to impose 
criminal laws.  
Having found that the limits imposed by recent case-law on Article 114 TFEU are not 
sufficient to restrain the exercise of Union competences, we turn to consider whether the 
objectives of the Treaties can act as a limit to the exercise of Union competences. 
Can the objectives of the Treaties act as a limit to the exercise of Union criminal law 
competences under Article 114 TFEU? 
 
In chapter 2 it was demonstrated that Article 5 TEU has had a limited influence on the 
Court’s interpretation of Article 114 TFEU and worked as a weak restraint on the exercise of 
EU competences.109 Herlin-Karnell has suggested that the paradoxical nature of competence 
allocation in the EU lies precisely in that it is limited by the principle of conferred powers yet 
these are very difficult to define. There is a tension between the message of Article 5(1) TEU, 
which requires the legality of EU action on the one hand, and the broad scope of Articles 2 
                                              
108 See Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (n 103)104-105. 
109 See above chapter 2-section II (A). 
124 
 
and 3 TEU and 26 TFEU which state the goals of the EU, including the elimination of 
obstacles to trade on the other hand.110 
Whilst it seems difficult at first sight to square the principle of conferral with the broad scope 
of the EU’s objectives, a more comprehensive understanding of Article 5 relaxes the 
purported tension. This is because Article 5 TEU primarily limits the Union’s action to its 
objectives. Admittedly, pure criminal law harmonisation of a certain offence that entails 
harmonization of general rules of criminal law requires a specific legal basis due to the fact 
that such harmonization could not be brought within the objective of the Treaties. However, 
Article 5 TEU does not impede the exercise of criminal law powers if the adopted EU 
measure is related to the pursuit of another Union objective such as the reinforcement of the 
internal market.111 We saw above that Article 103 TFEU would not allow for criminalization 
of EU competition law because of the textual limitations of this provision. There are no such 
limitations in Article 114 TFEU. The principle of conferral cannot however restrain 
criminalization that furthers the objectives of the internal market. If the criminalization of 
market abuse rules and competition rules helps to remove distortions of competition and 
obstacles to trade arising from different sanctioning regimes, the choice of Article 114 TFEU 
for such measures is justified.112 
Under the new Lisbon Treaty, it is even more untenable to suggest that the limitation of 
‘Union objectives ‘can restrain the exercise of a Union criminal law competences under 
Article 114 TFEU. This is because the objective of approximation of criminal law is an 
objective of the Treaties.113 The exercise of a dormant criminal law competence does not 
create a new objective, since the exercise of this competence is always conditional on it 
supporting an existing Union objective. This is so since the exercise of this competence 
requires that criminal law is only adopted to support the effective implementation of existing 
Union rules.114 In sum, the exercise of a criminal law power under Article 114 TFEU cannot 
be limited by reference to the argument that the measure does not pursue a Union objective. 
Proposal for constructing limits which can act as a check on the exercise of EU 
legislative powers under Article 114 TFEU  
 
                                              
110 See Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (n 103) 90. 
111 See COM 2005/583 (n 3), point 11. 
112 See Sevenster (n 101) 53-59. 
113 See Article 3(2) and Article 67 TFEU. 
114 See Case C-176/03 Commission v Council (n 1), para 48; Dougan (n 4) 101-102. 
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While the case-law analysed in chapter 2 and in this chapter paints a slightly depressing 
picture of the potential of finding limits to the exercise of Union competences under Article 
114 TFEU, it is argued that there is still hope to make competence review of this provision 
credible. I have two suggestions to construct limits to the exercise of the powers in Article 
114 TFEU. First, from a substantive view, one can construct limits to this provision by 
challenging the basis of the oft-repeated internal market justification.  
Herlin-Karnell has observed that a market element has to be present to activate the use of 
Article 114 TFEU. However, measuring this ‘market element’ is difficult since it boils down 
to a very abstract test. She also maintains that the market element has been shown to be weak 
in judicial and legislative practice. Actions from the EU legislator on the basis of confidence 
in the market are often based on speculation that is difficult to reconcile with the principle of 
conferred powers. She particularly queries whether criminal law fits into the EU pattern of 
market creation.115 
Herlin-Karnell’s critique is justified. As seen in chapter 2, neither the EU legislator nor the 
Court has been able to concretise the market element and substantiate the limits of Article 
114 TFEU. There is however a means of making the ‘market element’ in question concrete 
for the purposes of interpreting Article 114 TFEU.116 My main idea is that the EU should 
have a proper economic justification for criminal law harmonization under this provision. 
The justification for having an EU power to regulate the internal market comes down to the 
necessity of resolving market failures that Member States are not able to deal with 
themselves. It is hard to see any other legitimate justification for EU action. For this reason 
one could easily exclude several reasons for harmonization under Article 114 TFEU. A strict 
application of the market failure requirement as a justification for Article 114 TFEU excludes 
reasons based on ‘confidence in the market’117, expressive reasons or reasoning based on the 
‘full effectiveness’ of EU law.118 The EU legislator needs to show the presence or imminent 
risk for market failure, arising from either obstacles to trade or distortions to competition, in 
order to regulate under Article 114 TFEU. This understanding of Article 114 TFEU can be 
                                              
115 See Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (n 103) 106-107. 
116 I will make a short summary of my argument here which will be developed in length in chapter 6. My 
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117 See Herlin- Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (n103) 106-107, for a 
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defended on the basis of the Court’s case-law and the economic rationales for 
harmonization.119 Although the limits imposed by Tobacco Advertising may have been 
diluted by subsequent cases, it is not too late for the Court to re-assert those limits to ensure 
credible competence review.120 The Court should take the competence-restricting paragraphs 
of Tobacco Advertising and apply them to other pieces of legislation.121 If those limits are to 
have any serious meaning122, the Court needs to abandon or use less frequently the 
competence-expansive elements of that judgment. The Court must, for example, limit the 
application of the justification for pre-emptive harmonization123 and limit the use of the 
rationale for harmonization of policy fields which, according to the Treaties, belong to the 
Member States’ retained powers.124  
Building on the findings in chapter 3, the second proposal to construct limits to Article 114 
TFEU is to have the Court develop yardsticks for legality. A means to deal with the Court’s 
existing problems of reviewing the exercise of the competence under Article 114 TFEU is to 
implement the procedural standard outlined in chapter 3. The Court must apply the standard 
of review of ‘adequate reasoning’ and ‘relevant circumstances’ and the test for legality 
requiring that the proposed justification, which in itself offers a sufficient basis, is supported 
with sufficient evidence. The Court’s monitoring of conformity with the standard of review is 
directly related to the substantive interpretation of Article 114 TFEU. In applying the first 
part of the standard of ‘adequate reasoning’ the Court should focus on the issue of whether 
the Commission’s reasoning supports the conclusion that there is a market failure in the form 
of a barrier to trade or ‘appreciable’ distortions to competition.125 The EU legislator must be 
able to offer at least one justification which in theory is sufficiently compelling to support the 
exercise of the EU’s competence under Article 114 TFEU. Criminal law should not be held to 
contribute to market creation absent a compelling rationale for harmonization which is 
sustained by the EU law literature or the Court’s case-law. If such a justification is wanting in 
                                              
119 See below chapter 6- section I (B). 
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the impact assessment or in the explanatory memorandum the Court should invalidate the 
legislation.126  
The first part of the test would however only impede EU legislation under Article 114 TFEU 
that is based on justifications having no credible relationship to the internal market. As is 
evidenced by the Court’s case-law, this part of the test would not act as a restraint for many 
EU measures. The measures that were at stake in Ireland v Parliament and Council,127 
Vodafone128 and Kadi129 would probably all have passed this test. This is because the EU 
legislator in these cases had pointed to the recitals and stated that there was a distortion to 
competition justifying resort to Article 114 and Article 352 TFEU. However, such 
justifications would not in themselves be sufficient to pass the second part of the test, which 
demands that justifications are supported by evidence.  
Weatherill has expressed scepticism with the idea that a request from the Court for more 
evidence for a legislative measure will help correct the inherent constitutional problems of 
limiting the use of Article 114 TFEU. If qualitative and quantitative indicators favouring EU 
action would be recited in a legislative act then, absent manifest miscalculation or illogicality, 
it is hard to see how a court could or should intervene.130 His views are nevertheless overly 
sceptical since he downplays the important role of transparency and legitimacy in adopting a 
procedural review approach.131 I also believe that his view, in contrast to my argument, is 
based on the idea that any evidence would justify resort to Article 114 TFEU. As I suggested 
above in chapter 3, the evidence submitted need be of a certain quality and quantity to 
substantiate the rationales for exercising the competence.132 What is needed is a concrete 
investigation of what effects divergences in criminalization regimes have on the internal 
market.133 If the EU legislator has in the preparatory documents produced sufficient evidence 
to show that a divergent enforcement regime creates obstacles to trade or distortions to 
competition, the second part of the test is fulfilled and the measure can be adopted under 
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Article 114 TFEU. However, if the Commission’s evidence only suggests that the measure 
has a remote effect on inter-state trade or does not contribute to remove ‘appreciable 
distortions’ to competition, it should not be possible to exercise the competence under Article 
114 TFEU.134 A mere finding of disparities between national criminalisation regimes or the 
abstract risk of obstacles or distortions of competition arising from different national 
sanctioning regimes are not sufficient to justify the use of Article 114 TFEU.135 While Union 
intervention is appropriate in cases where decentralized law-making leads to extreme 
coordination failures, and inter-state competition completely fails, it is not appropriate if such 
failures cannot be established.136The evidence must demonstrate that disparities in criminal 
law legislation effectively restrict cross-border activity or create appreciable distortions to be 
sufficient to support the argument for exercising the competence under Article 114 TFEU.137  
In order to understand how the limits of Article 114 TFEU can be constructed we will in the 
end of this section discuss the Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal. Before entering into a 
practical assessment of that piece of legislation we should first consider in abstracto whether 
different or weak enforcement regimes constitute ‘barriers to trade’ or ‘appreciable 
distortions’ to competition.  
Herlin-Karnell has observed that obstacles to trade can constitute a justification for 
harmonization of national criminal laws. She has expressed the concern that there is a risk 
that any diversity, such as the levels of punishment in the various Member States, could be 
argued as constituting barriers to trade. From the perspective of Article 114 TFEU, anything 
could be harmonized if it contributes to market creation. She takes the example of organized 
crime and enlargement as an example. Observing that organized crime is a problem for the 
EU and for new Member States she queries whether the enlargement of the EU would justify 
criminalization under Article 114 TFEU. If we accept the consequences of enlargement of the 
EU and the risk for divergent national approaches to organized crimes as future obstacles to 
trade, this is a very low threshold to be met when justifying legislative action in EU criminal 
law.138 
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For two reasons, I do not think it is even plausible, as Herlin-Karnell suggests, that different 
or weak enforcement regimes in the Member States could constitute ‘barriers to trade’. First, 
there is, apart from Herlin-Karnell’s hypothetical examples, no evidence in the literature or 
the case-law that the criminal enforcement regime plays is a major consideration of traders or 
market participants when considering entering into cross-border trade.139 The assumption 
must be that differences in criminalisation regimes or disparities in sentencing levels do not 
per se constitute barriers to trade which effectively restrict cross-border activities.140 
Secondly, there are no practical examples from legislative practice suggesting that criminal 
law harmonization can be justified on the basis that different sanctioning regimes constitute 
barriers to trade. Instead the Union legislator has used the risk for distortions of competition 
as rationales for criminal law harmonization.141 Also for this reason it makes a lot of sense to 
focus the analysis on this justification. 
Can different enforcement regimes in theory constitute appreciable distortion to 
competition? 
 
As suggested above, the first part of the legality test devised in chapter 3 suggests that the 
Union legislature must, firstly, give at least one justification which in abstracto that is 
sufficiently compelling to explain how different sanctioning regimes give rise to 
‘appreciable’ distortions of competition. In theory, different criminal laws in the Member 
States enforcement regimes can constitute ‘appreciable’ distortions to competition. Sevenster 
has developed this argument in the most compelling way in the literature. She first recognises 
that one of the over-arching aims of the Union is to avoid distortion of competition as much 
as possible by creating equal conditions of competition for firms. Initial differences between 
Member States in the price of goods, for instance, would in this scenario be corrected by the 
market mechanism through parallel imports. She doubts however that market-solutions are 
the best ones. The Member State with the most lenient penal system would attract most 
production and establish a precedent. The cause of the failings in enforcement of Union law 
by Member States is the Member States’ fear of placing one’s own companies at a 
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disadvantage. It is assumed that firms and individuals, in accordance with the Delaware 
effect, would take advantage of the fact that certain Member States have a lax enforcement or 
criminal sanctioning systems and relocate their business to that Member State.142 The 
Commission has cogently explained how differences in sanctioning regimes can create 
distortions to competition. It has maintained that firms situated in a Member State where, for 
example, infringements of Union competition rules or Union market abuse rules are 
penalised, find themselves at a competitive disadvantage in relation to firms situated in 
Member States which do not have a criminalisation regime for such offences. Firms, which 
have the possibility of profiting from cartel cooperation due to a lenient enforcement regime, 
will indirectly be in a better position than firms pursuing business in a state with a strong 
antitrust enforcement regime. In terms of financial regulations, it can be envisaged that if 
sanctions applied in different Member States for similar infringements are vary considerably, 
financial institutions could be tempted to engage in regulatory competition when deciding on 
their place of location.143  
Whereas the Union has a competence in the field of the internal market and the objective of 
legislative harmonization is to achieve a highly competitive social market economy144 and 
ensure that competition is not distorted in the internal market, it is submitted that the latter 
Union objectives may not be attainable without criminal sanctions. If the Member States have 
decided that they wish for a strong and competitive internal market and confer the Union with 
legislative powers to this effect, they must necessarily accept that the Union enjoys such 
powers that enable it to effectively secure the achievement of that objective. There is 
consequently a justification for the exercise of such a competence under Article 114 TFEU.145 
However, there are some objections to the use of the distortion of competition rationale for 
criminal law harmonization under Article 114 TFEU. First, there is evidence in the literature 
suggesting that the existence of strong or weak enforcement regimes is a negligible 
competitive parameter, compared with several other and more important competitive 
parameters like wage costs, infrastructure, tax and duty rules, proximity to primary producer, 
                                              
142 See Sevenster (n 101) 54-55; Herlin Karnell, Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (n 103) 
98. 
143 
See Commission, ‘ Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the Financial Services 
Sector, Brussels, 8.12.2010 SEC(2010) 1496 final, 10.  
144 See Article 3(3) TEU; Protocol (No 27) on the Internal Market and Competition. 
145 
See René Barents,’ The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of Community 
Legislation’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law Review 85, 97-98. 
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well-developed industrial base, access to markets, etc.146 Secondly, the evidence for 
distortions of competition in the form of envisaged or ‘safe havens’ scenarios are not entirely 
convincing. Evidence from different policy areas does not corroborate the claim that 
regulations are a major factor affecting firms’ choice of location. Given there is no evidence 
that there would be a European Delaware effect with weak environmental, market abuse or 
competition legislation where perpetrators would decide to engage in illegal dealings, the 
case for Union action based on ‘competitive spill-overs’ is not per se a strong one.147  
Despite these objections to harmonization, there is at least a plausible theoretical case for 
harmonization of EU criminal laws. The criticism raised above does not entirely undermine 
this case. The objections raised instead show that we cannot automatically assume that 
divergent criminal laws would lead to ‘appreciable’ distortions to competition. The second 
step of the legality test requires relevant and sufficient evidence to support the theoretical 
justification for harmonization. It is necessary that the Union legislator is able to demonstrate 
by such evidence that there exists distortions and that these distortions can only be remedied 
by Union action.148 
In order to show how limits to Article 114 TFEU can be created by means of the proposed 
legality test, the next section enters into a concrete discussion of the first and so far only 
legislative proposal adopted on this legal basis149 that includes criminal law provisions, the 
Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal.150 
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 See Thomas Elholm, ‘Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?’ (2009) 17 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 191, 221; Nuotio (n 56) 92. See also David 
Vogel, ‘Trading up and governing across: transnational governance and environmental protection’ (1997) 4 
Journal of European Public Policy 556, 558-560, for this argument in the context of environmental law and 
regulatory dynamics. 
147 See Claudio M Radaelli, ‘The Puzzle of Regulatory Competition’ (2004) 24 Journal of Public Policy 1, 8. 
148 See Wyatt (n 122) 129-130. 
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Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing [2005] OJ L 309/15, adopted on the 
basis of Article 114 TFEU, did not expressly provide for an obligation on Member States to impose criminal 
sanctions for the offences in the directive. 
150 See above n 8 in the present chapter for full reference to the Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal. The 
Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal is, however, not the first proposal on intellectual property crimes. 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures and procedures to ensure 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights, Brussels, 30.1.2003, COM (2003) 46 final, Article 20 provided 
that: ‘….Member States shall ensure that all serious infringements of an intellectual property right……….. are 
treated as a criminal offence. An infringement is considered serious if it is intentional and committed for 
commercial purposes. 2. Where natural persons are concerned, Member States shall provide for criminal 
sanctions, including imprisonment.’ This proposal was however amended by the European Parliament which 
excluded the criminal law part from the final directive; see Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L 157/45. For 






Application of the proposed legality test on the proposal for criminal sanctions in the 
field of intellectual property 
 
The Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal lays down the criminal measures necessary to 
ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights.151 The Proposal states that all 
intentional infringements of an intellectual property right on a commercial scale, and that 
attempting, aiding or abetting and inciting such infringements shall be treated as criminal 
offences.152 It further provides that offences referred to in the Proposal should be punishable 
by a maximum sentence of at least four years’ imprisonment when committed under the aegis 
of a criminal organisation or where they carry a health or safety risk.153 The Commission’s 
argument for employing Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis for this measure is that the 
considerable disparities between the national systems of penalties, apart from hampering the 
proper functioning of the internal market, make it difficult to combat counterfeiting and 
piracy effectively and do not allow the holders of intellectual property rights to benefit from 
an equivalent level of protection throughout the Community.154 
To control the legality of the proposal I use the test proposed in chapter 3. We should only 
monitor whether the reasons put forward by the Commission are capable of being defended in 
theory. The reference point for whether the reasons presented are justified in abstracto is the 
substantive justifications for harmonization under Article 114 TFEU as they have been 
codified in the case-law of the Court.155 The Commission should thus articulate and explain 
the imminent risk for obstacles to trade or ‘appreciable’ distortions of competition. Since the 
Commission, when suggesting this form of EU action, was under no obligation to elaborate 
an impact assessment I will only judge the legality of the measure on the basis of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Proposal; see Johanna Gibson, ‘The Directive Proposal on Criminal Sanctions’ (2011), 1 January 2011, 3-6 < 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1857174>. Accessed 30 April 2014. I do not discuss COM 
(2003) 46 final in further detail as this proposal was always on a pre-mature negotiation stage. Also, the 
Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal is more interesting since it was the direct consequence of the Court’s 
ruling in the Environmental Crimes judgment; see Gibson, 6-8; Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal, 2. 
151 See Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal (n 8), Article 1.  
152 ibid, Article 3. 
153 ibid, Article 4. 
154 ibid 2-3. 
155 See above section II (A), text to n115-124, in the present chapter for an account of the legitimate justification 
for harmonization under Article 114 TFEU. 
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explanatory memorandum, the recitals and the text of the Proposal. The test of adequate 
reasoning neither requires any references to sources or evidence to support the reasoning. The 
only relevant matter at this stage is whether the reasons submitted in the Proposal can 
theoretically be used as justifications for legislation under Article 114 TFEU.156 
Even from a very broad interpretation of the scope of the Union’s powers, it appears that the 
justification for pursuing this measure under Article 114 TFEU is both insufficient and 
unconvincing. The only legitimate reason in the Proposal for using Article 114 TFEU is that 
there are disparities between Member States’ enforcement regimes in relation to intellectual 
property infringements. It was however established above that disparities alone cannot justify 
recourse to Article 114 TFEU.157 In this regard, it is striking that there is no explanation in the 
Proposal why disparities in Member States’ enforcement regimes in relation to intellectual 
property infringements would cause barriers to trade or distortions to competition.158 In fact, 
the Commission does not even claim that the differences in sanctioning regimes would give 
rise to ‘distortions of competition’ or ‘barriers to trade’. Nor does the Commission’s 
reasoning explain why the approximation of penalties would contribute to the functioning of 
the internal market. Unless it is possible to ascertain why the Proposal contributes to the 
internal market, it is not possible to assess whether it falls within the limits of Article 114 
TFEU. Nor does the need of intellectual property holders for equal protection throughout the 
Union explain how distortions of competition may arise. Although the Commission referred 
to the Court’s ruling in the Environmental Crimes and to the ‘essentiality’ of criminal 
sanctions for the enforcement of national and Union intellectual property rules159, this kind of 
justification has no relevance for Article 114 TFEU.160 In order to be invoked as a legal basis 
Article 114 TFEU requires that a credible relationship to the internal market be established. It 
is clear however that, based on the reasoning in the proposal, there is no such relationship 
between the proposal and the legal basis of Article 114 TFEU. Since the Commission has not 
been able to offer at least one justification which in itself offers sufficient basis for exercising 
the competence, the measure fails the first limb of the legality test and must thus be held as 
falling outside the scope of Article 114 TFEU. If this assessment would later turn out to have 
                                              
156 See above chapter 3- section IV (D).  
157 See above section II (A), text to n 133-135, in the present chapter.  
158 See criticism of the proposal: Monika Ermert, ‘EU IP Enforcement Directive Questioned On Procedure ‘, 
Intellectual Property Watch (11 July 2006). < http://www.ip-watch.org/2006/07/11/eu-ip-enforcement-directive-
questioned-on-procedure/?res=1024_ff&print=0>. Accessed 30 April 2014.  
159 See Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal (n 8) 1.  
160 See Gibson, (n 150) 247-263, for the criticism of the proposal. 
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been mistaken, I would then consider  the second limb of the test and examine whether the 
evidence is ‘relevant’ for substantiaing the justifications proposed by the EU legislator.161 
Having looked at the limits to the exercise of the competence in Article 114 TFEU, we now 
turn to considering the limits to the exercise of the broad flexibility competence in Article 
352 TFEU. 
B Can Article 352 TFEU be used as a legal basis for introducing criminal 
sanctions to enforce EU policies? 
 
The scope of the Article- identifying the potential limits  
 
This section analyses whether there are any limitations that can impede the exercise of a 
dormant criminal law power under the broad flexibility provision, Article 352 TFEU. While 
Article 352 TFEU was slightly changed by the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty162 with the 
purpose of making competence creep more difficult163, it still is a very powerful competence 
for the pursuit of harmonization. What then are the limits of this power? It is worth 
repeating164 that, according to settled case law, Article 352 TFEU cannot serve as a basis for 
widening the scope of Union powers beyond the general framework created by the provisions 
of the Treaties as a whole and by those provisions that define the tasks and the activities of 
the Union. Nor can Article 352 TFEU be used as a basis for the adoption of provisions whose 
effect would be tantamount to a Treaty amendment. Measures that have fundamental 
institutional implications for the Union and for the Member States and are of constitutional 
significance thus go beyond the scope of Article 352 TFEU.165  
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 As things are now, this measure has fortunately been repealed due to the Court’s judgment in Case C-440/05 
Commission v Council (n 1), which prohibited the Union to prescribe the type and level of penalties and there is 
no new proposals yet on this subject; see Lassi Jyrkkiö, ‘Smooth Criminal Harmonisation: ACTA, EU and IPR 
Enforcement’, Intellectual Property Watch (Apr. 8, 2010),< http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/04/08/smooth-
criminal-harmonisation-acta-eu-and-ipr-enforcement/ > Accessed 30 April 2014. See, however, for a more 
optimistic approach to the proposal; Marius Schneider and Olivier Vrins,’The EU offensive against IP offences: 
should right-holders be offended?’ (2006) 1 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2006) 173. 
162 Article 352(1) TFEU now provides that:’ If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the 
framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the 
Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.’ 
163 See Weatherill (n 122) 855-57. 
164 The paragraphs from Opinion 2/94 are also mentioned above in chapter 2- section II (A).  
165 See Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (n82), paras 30, 35; Joined Cases C-402 and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission(n 129), para 224. Paragraph 30 of 
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Constitutional Courts have held that Article 352 TFEU cannot be interpreted as a procedural 
device to expand the Union’s competence as this would be contrary to the very structure of 
Article 352 TFEU and the principle of conferral.166 Commentators have also suggested that 
Article 352 TFEU stands in direct conflict with the principle of conferral.167 It has been 
submitted that a view of Article 352 TFEU as an inherent expansion of power implies a 
disregard of the legitimate advantages of Treaty revisions and constitutional conversations 
which is the dominant feature of the Union’s state of evolution. In order to preserve the 
legitimacy of the Union, an expansion of power shall take place primarily by means of Treaty 
amendment and not through illegitimate use of Article 352 TFEU.168 It has also been 
suggested that the new prohibition on using Article 352 TFEU for the harmonization of 
policy fields that are considered retained Member States competences169 would reduce 
competence creep through this provision.170 
The concerns raised in the previous paragraph require a few comments. First, the limit 
imposed by the Court in Opinion 2/94, i.e. the ‘general framework of the Treaties’, is not a 
serious constraint on the use of Article 352 TFEU, since the objectives of the Treaties and the 
policies of the Treaties can be conceptualised on a very general level.171 Prior to Lisbon the 
criterion for applying Article 308 EC was that the legislative measure shall be concerned with 
the ‘common market’ and the objectives of the EC Treaty for which legislative competence is 
not already provided. The link to the common market has been removed, and the ‘framework 
of the policies defined in the Treaties’ now constitutes the limit. This is an even broader 
notion than the common market and the wording itself does not suggest any outer limit to the 
exercise of Union competences. The ‘policies defined in the Treaties’ encompasses all Union 
                                                                                                                                            
Opinion 2/94 has been codified in Declaration 42 to the Lisbon Treaty. See also Robert Schütze, From Dual to 
Cooperative Federalism (OUP 2009) 152-156, for a discussion of the limits imposed by Article 352 TFEU and 
Opinion 2/94. 
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 See Judgment of Czech Constitutional Court of 26 November 2008, Treaty of Lisbon I, Pl. ÚS 19/08 (2008), 
paras 148-153; Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 12 October 1993, Manfred Brunner 
and Others v. The European Union Treaty, Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, paras 64, 70, 99; Judgment of 
German Federal Constitutional Court of 30 June 2009,  Lisbon Judgment, Case 2 BvE 2/08, 5/08, 2 BvR 
1010/08, 1022/08, 1259/08, 182/09 (2009), paras 326–328. 
167 See Joseph H H Weiler,’The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 The Yale Law Journal 2403, 2433-34, 
2445, 2451-52; Theodore Konstadinides, Division of Powers in European Union Law: The Delimitation of 
Internal Competence between the EU and the Member States (Kluwer Law International 2009) 203. 
168 See Robert Schütze, ‘Dynamic Integration – Article 308 and Legislation in the course of the Common 
Market: A review essay’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 333, 341-342. 
169 Pursuant to Article 352(3) TFEU it follows that: ‘Measures based on this Article shall not entail 
harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations in cases where the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.’ 
170 See Lucia Serena Rossi’ Does the Lisbon Treaty Provide a Clearer Separation of Competences between EU 
and Member States?’ in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley, EU Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012) 
103-105. 
171 See Schütze, ‘Dynamic Integration’ (n 168) 337. 
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policies.172 The ‘framework of the policies defined in the Treaties’ cannot for example be 
considered to be an effective impediment to the exercise of Union criminal law powers. It is 
obvious that through Title V the Union has created a policy framework for the harmonisation 
of criminal law when this is necessary to achieve an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.  
For the same reason, nor does the criterion ‘the objectives of the Treaties’ work as a check on 
the exercise of a Union criminal law competence under Article 352 TFEU. First, it is not 
correct to claim that the use of implied powers for giving enforcement powers to the Union 
under Article 352 TFEU circumvents Article 5 TEU.173 Secondly, it is not even necessary to 
use any creative interpretation of the Treaties to justify the conclusion that harmonization of 
criminal laws may be essential for the achievement of Union objectives. One of the Union’s 
objectives is to create an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice through measures to prevent 
and combat crime.174 While Article 352 TFEU cannot be used to provide for new Treaty 
objectives,175 it is clear that this is not a novel objective of the Treaties. It is equally clear that 
the condition in Article 352(3) TFEU that ‘measures based on this Article shall not entail 
harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations in cases where the Treaties exclude 
such harmonisation’ would not provide a limit to harmonization of EU criminal law. This is 
because harmonization of EU criminal law is envisaged by the Treaties.176 
Having dismissed the potential of most of the limits contained in Article 352 TFEU on the 
exercise of the power177, there seems to remain only one serious limitation to the exercise of 
Union competences under Article 352 TFEU i.e. that it can only be used if no other power in 
the Treaty provides the Union with the competence to impose criminal sanctions.178We will 
consider this issue from a more general perspective in the next Chapter and discuss whether 
the nature of the new Article 83(2) TFEU is a lex specialis in relation other legal bases of the 
                                              
172 See Craig, EU Administrative Law (n 125) 387. 
173 That the implied powers doctrine do not come into conflict with the principle of conferral is well-established 
case-law: see Case 22/70 Commission v Council (n 82) para 16; Accession by the Community to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (n 82), paras 25-26. 
174 See Article 3(2) TFEU, 67 TFEU and Title V of the TFEU. 
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177 I will not discuss the limit in Article 352(2) TFEU since a discussion of this limit will add little to the 
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Circumvention and Gap-Filling: An Exploration of the Conceptual Limits of the Treaty’s Flexibility Clause’ 
(2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 227, 256-261. 
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In this chapter, it has been considered whether there are any limitations to the exercise of the 
sectorial and functional competence of the Union.  
Four themes were subject to closer scrutiny. First, I considered the scope of the EU’s criminal 
law competence as it is derived from the Court’s judgments in Environmental Crimes and 
Ship-Source Pollution. I argued that these judgments express a general criminal law 
competence. Because the scope of the EU’s criminal law competence in the Court’s rulings 
was based on the ‘effectiveness’ principle and the condition that criminal sanctions must be 
‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU policies, that competence could not reasonably be 
limited to environmental policy. Instead it must apply to all EU policies whose enforcement 
requires the use of criminal sanctions. The limits to this competence were then considered. I 
challenged the dominant view in the literature that has seen the question of whether criminal 
law is ‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU policies as a political question. I argued that 
there were two limits in relation to the EU’s general criminal law competence. First, unless 
criminal laws are proven by criminological evidence as an ‘effective’ means for enforcing 
Union law, it is not possible to exercise said power. If, it is established that criminal laws 
contribute to the ‘effective implementation of Union law’, it is then necessary in the second 
stage to consider whether alternative sanctions contribute to an equal extent to the effective 
implementation of Union environmental law. The potential of those limits were demonstrated 
by a consideration of the legality of Directive 2008/99/EC on the basis of the standard of 
review and legality test proposed in chapter 3. The detailed examination of the Proposal 
showed that whilst the Commission had provided compelling theoretical justifications for its 
choice to criminalize and thus conformed to the first limb of the test of ‘adequate’ reasoning, 
those justifications were not however defended with ‘sufficient’ and ‘relevant evidence’. This 
was particularly because there was no empirical evidence or studies referred to in the 
proposal showing how criminal laws were superior over ‘administrative and financial 
sanctions’. Since the justifications, which in themselves offered a sufficient basis for 
exercising the competence, were not supported by relevant evidence, the proposal did not 
pass the second limb of the test and thus failed to conform to the limits of the EU’s general 
criminal law competence.  
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The second theme of the chapter was the tension between the principle of ‘effectiveness’, as a 
trigger for the exercise of EU criminal law competence and the principle of conferral, as a 
principle limiting the exercise of EU competences. I illustrated this tension by considering the 
case for criminalization of infringements of EU competition rules under Article 103 TFEU. 
Based on the findings of chapter 2 on how to construct substantive limits to the exercise of 
EU powers, I argued that a proper interpretation of Article 103 TFEU requires a proper 
balance between teleological concerns and textual and systematic elements. I challenged the 
dominant view that a functional, teleological interpretation of Article 103 TFEU on its own 
could justify EU criminalization. Instead I maintained that an expansive functional 
interpretation could only be justified if such an interpretation fits the textual framework of the 
Treaties. The textual enumeration of ‘fines and administrative sanctions’ in Article 103 
TFEU was conceptualised as an ‘exclusionary’ condition, implying that this enumeration 
excluded the use of sanctions other than ‘fines and administrative sanctions’. In contrast to 
the analysis in relation to Article 192 TFEU, the textual argument favoured the conclusion 
that the Union could not criminalize competition law infringements under Article 103 TFEU. 
The third subject of the chapter was the limits to the internal market justification. I illustrated 
those limits by examining how criminalization contributes to the internal market. It was 
argued that there are two ways to construct limits to the power contained in Article 114 
TFEU. Based on the findings in chapter 2 of the conceptual limits to Article 114 TFEU, I 
argued that EU harmonization in a substantive sense is only justified if it contributes to 
correct imminent or existing market failures. The only legitimate justifications under Article 
114 TFEU are therefore that the measure either removes obstacles to trade or eliminate 
‘appreciable’ distortions to competition. There are no other legitimate justifications for EU 
harmonization under this provision. The EU legislator could thus not use reasons of 
‘effectiveness’ and ‘confidence in the market’ to legislate under this provision. This 
interpretation of Article 114 TFEU is well-supported by the Court’s case-law and by the 
economic rationales for harmonization. Secondly, from the perspective of judicial review, the 
Court could construct limits by adopting the standard of review and test for legality proposed 
in chapter 3. It was demonstrated by a review of the Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal 
how this legality standard could be used to construct limits to the exercise of the competence 
in Article 114 TFEU. The examination of the proposal showed that the EU legislator had 
failed to pass the test of providing at least one reason that was independently sufficiently 
compelling to justify the exercise of the power in Article 114 TFEU. This was because the 
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Commission had failed entirely to link its reasoning in the Proposal to the recognized 
justifications for EU harmonization: i) barriers to trade and ii) ‘appreciable’ distortions to 
competition. For this reason the proposal did not respect the limits of Article 114 TFEU.  
The fourth task of the chapter was to consider the objectives of Union law as a limit to the 
exercise of EU competences. This theme was illustrated by an examination of Article 352 
TFEU. The analysis showed that it was very difficult to construct limits to the scope of this 
power. I disagreed with the view in the literature and among constitutional courts that the 
objectives of the Treaties could limit the exercise of the power in this provision. First, it is 
apparent from the Court’s case-law that the use of implied powers for giving enforcement 
powers to the Union under Article 352 TFEU does not circumvent Article 5 TEU. Secondly, 
criminal law harmonization was already envisaged by the Treaties in Articles 3(2), 67 and 83 
TFEU and by the construction of a policy framework of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. The only limit to harmonization under this provision is that Article 352 TFEU can 
only be used for harmonization if no other legal basis is available for the measure. This limit 












CHAPTER 5- LIMITS TO THE EXERCISE OF SPECIFIC UNION CRIMINAL LAW 




We saw in the introduction and previous chapters that while for a long time concerns for state 
sovereignty and the sensitive nature of criminal law led national criminal law to fall outside 
the EU’s sphere of powers, recent developments mean that the EU now has, on the basis of 
Article 83(2) TFEU and the Court’s rulings in Environmental Crimes and Ship-Source 
Pollution, a potentially far-reaching competence to harmonize national criminal law.1 Despite 
the fact that a competence to enforce substantive Union polices through criminal sanctions 
has been expressly recognised in Article 83(2) TFEU, the question of the proper role for 
criminal sanctions in the enforcement of Union substantive policies remains largely 
unresolved.2 While it was commonly agreed amongst Member States that the Union needed 
the competence in Article 83(1) TFEU to combat particularly serious crime, in contrast, it has 
been argued that Article 83(2) TFEU is one of the most controversial provisions of the new 
Treaty. It is contested because, firstly, in contrast to the rulings of the Court, which were 
arguably limited to environmental policy3, the Union has been given a general power to 
impose criminal sanctions in the field of substantive Union policies.4 Secondly, since the 
Union has been given a power to adopt criminal sanctions that is in sharp contrast to the 
Court’s judgments in Environmental Crimes5 and Ship-Source Pollution.6 Thirdly, because 
                                              
1 See above chapter 1- section I; chapter 4- section I (A).  
2 See Ester Herlin-Karnell,’ EU Competence in Criminal Law after Lisbon’, in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout 
and Stefanie Ripley (eds) EU Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012) 334, 338-339; Michael Dougan, ‘From the Velvet 
Glove to the Iron Fist: Criminal Sanctions for the Enforcement of Union Law’ in Marise Cremona (ed), 
Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law (OUP 2012)100-106, 110-112. 
3 See above chapter 4 n 25, for references to Member States and a judge of the Court of Justice having the view 
that the Court’s ruling was limited to environmental policy. I contest this view above in chapter 4 section I (A), 
and argue that the EU’s criminal law competence, derived from the Court’s judgments is of a general nature and 
applies to all EU substantive policies. 
4 See Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (OUP 2011) 774; Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, 
politics and Treaty reform (OUP 2011) 365. 
5 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council (Environmental Crimes) [2005] ECR I-07879. 
6 Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (Ship-Source Pollution) [2007] ECR I-09097, para 70; See Peers, EU 
Justice and Home Affairs Law (n 4) 764. 
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some national courts have expressed their reservations in relation to an excessive use of the 
Union’s new criminal law powers.7  
This chapter considers the debates that have followed after the introduction of the new 
provision in Article 83(2) TFEU in the Lisbon Treaty. The central question in the literature 
and among the EU institutions has been how the competence in Article 83(2) TFEU should 
be exercised8 and it is this question that the chapter addresses. More particularly, it is 
examined if there are any legal limits to the scope of the Union’s new competence under 
Article 83(2) TFEU. On the basis of the findings of chapter 2 on the conceptual limits to the 
exercise of EU competences, the present chapter suggests, on the basis of textual, policy-
based and contextual reasons, innovative interpretations to the conditions in this provision. 
The chapter also shows, by means of enquiring into the legality of the Market Abuse Crimes 
Directive, how the standard of review and test for legality proposed in chapter 3 should be 
applied. 
In order to articulate the core issue of this chapter, i.e. the scope of Article 83(2) TFEU, it is 
appropriate to begin the analysis with a close examination of the wording of the provision: 
‘If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves essential 
to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to 
harmonisation measures, directives may establish minimum rules with regard to the definition 
of criminal offences and sanctions in the area concerned. Such directives shall be adopted by 
the same ordinary or special legislative procedure as was followed for the adoption of the 
harmonisation measures in question…’  
 
As can be seen there are three requirements which have to be satisfied for the adoption of a 
criminal law directive under this provision; two procedural and one substantive. These 
requirements are fundamental in the structure and in the outline of the arguments of this 
chapter. The first section of the chapter comprehensively analyses the substantial requirement 
that criminal sanctions shall be ‘essential’ for the ‘effective implementation of Union 
                                              
7 See Judgment of German Federal Constitutional Court of 30 June 2009,  Lisbon Judgment, Case 2 BvE 2/08, 
be 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, BvR1022/08, BvR1259/08, BvR182/09 (2009), para 226; Dougan, ‘From the Velvet 
Glove to the Iron Fist’ (n2) 112-113.  
8 See Herlin-Karnell,’ EU Competence in Criminal Law after Lisbon’ (n2) 338-339, 346; Dougan, ‘From the 
Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist’ (n 2) 100-102, 108-113; Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions- Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through 
criminal law’, COM 2011(573) final (‘COM 2011/573’) 6, 9-11. 
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policies’. First, there is an analysis of the requirement that criminal laws should only be used 
where it contributes to the ‘effective implementation of Union policies’. There then follows 
an analysis of the substantive limitation that the Union legislator can only adopt criminal law 
if this is ‘essential’ for the ‘effective implementation’ of Union policies. I argue that the 
‘essentiality’ criterion provides for one of the most important limits to the competence in 
Article 83(2) TFEU. It is argued that the ‘essentiality’ condition requires the EU legislator to 
show that criminal law is appropriate and more effective than other non-criminal sanctions in 
enforcing the specific EU policy at stake. The limits of the ‘essentiality’ requirement TFEU is 
illustrated by an examination of the novel Market Abuse Crimes Directive.9 
The procedural requirements of Article 83(2) TFEU are discussed in the second section of the 
chapter. The first procedural requirement is that there must be previous harmonisation 
measures in the policy field which the Union legislator intends to criminalise. This 
requirement means that the criminal law competence in Article 83(2) TFEU could only be 
triggered if the EU legislator had adopted substantive harmonization measures by means of 
regulations and directives prior to the criminal law measure. Those previous harmonization 
measures would have to be adopted through the ordinary or special legislative procedure 
prescribed for in Article 294 TFEU. The argument is illustrated with case-studies of EU 
competition law and EU market abuse rules. 
The second procedural requirement to consider is whether the nature of Article 83(2) TFEU 
could act as a restraint on EU criminal law legislation being adopted under other legal bases 
of the Treaties. I argue that Article 83(2) TFEU provides a lex specialis for criminal law 
measures falling within its scope. However, in areas such as competition law, for which 
harmonization is excluded under Article 83(2) TFEU, and in relation to criminal law 
measures that, by providing for decriminalization in the form of ‘regulations’, fall outside the 
scope of that provision, other Treaty articles such as Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU 
could be used.  
Having explained the subject-matter of this chapter and explained the structure of the chapter, 
the analysis now considers the substantive conditions of Article 83(2) TFEU. 
                                              
9 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions 
for market abuse ( market abuse directive) [2014] OJ L 173/79. This is the first directive adopted on the basis of 
Article 83(2) TFEU. It was published in the official journal on 12 June 2014 see Commission Press Release:  
‘Daily News – 12.06.2014’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/midday-express-12-06-2014.htm?locale=en>Accessed 18 
June 2014.  
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I SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF UNION 
COMPETENCES UNDER ARTICLE 83(2) 
 
A Effective implementation of a Union policy 
 
Even though Article 83(2) TFEU presumes that criminal sanctions contribute to the ‘effective 
implementation’ of Union policies10 we should examine what is actually meant by this 
concept. A general starting point for the discussion is the general concept of ‘effectiveness’ in 
EU law. It has been suggested in the literature that ‘effectiveness’ implies that law matters, 
that it has effects on economic, political and social life outside the law.11 It therefore includes 
compliance, enforcement, impact and implementation. In addition to this, we have the 
concept of ‘effective enforcement’. This is a well-known concept in EU law and has been 
used to describe developments in the enforcement of EU law.12 However since the focus of 
the analysis in Article 83(2) TFEU is not concerned with the ‘general effectiveness’ of law or 
its ‘effective enforcement’ but rather the ‘effectiveness of criminal law’ in relation to the 
enforcement of EU policies we should dig deeper for a more appropriate concept.13 
Advocate General Kokott’s definition in the Berlusconi case of what is an ‘effective’ criminal 
sanction is a more precise point of departure for the discussion. In her Opinion AG Kokott 
sought to provide some substance in elaborating an understanding of when criminal sanctions 
are ‘effective’. She argued, within the context of ascertaining what the term ‘appropriate 
penalties’ means in relation to the publication of false company documents, that rules laying 
down penalties are ‘effective’ where they are framed in such a way that they do not make it 
practically impossible or excessively difficult to impose the penalty provided for and to attain 
the ‘objectives’ pursued by Union law. Furthermore, a penalty is ‘dissuasive’ when it 
prevents an individual from infringing the objectives pursued and rules laid down by Union 
law.14 Kokott’s reasoning on ‘dissuasiveness’ is analytically sound. It is firmly based within 
the classical deterrence discourse that suggests that the effectiveness of criminal penalties 
                                              
10 See Ester Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (Hart 2012) 57. 
11 See Francis Snyder ‘Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 19, 19; Phedon Nicolaïdes, ‘The Problem of Effective 
Implementation of EU Rules: an Institutional Solution’ (2001) 36 Interecononomics 14, 16-17. 
12 See Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (n 10) 44-53. 
13 See Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (n 6), paras 68-69. 
14 
See Joined cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 Berlusconi and Others [2005] ECR I-03565, Opinion of 
AG Kokott, paras 88-89. 
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depends on the severity of the penalty.15 Even more pertinent is Kokott’s definition of 
appropriate criminal penalties, which envisage that criminal sanctions in order to be 
‘effective’ must be appropriate to achieve a certain EU objective or EU policy.16  
This is arguably a correct definition of effectiveness in the field of criminal penalties. 
Furthermore, this definition is consistent with the practice of the Court and the Commission’s 
official approach to criminal sanctions. The Commission has stated that sanctions can be 
considered ‘effective’ when they are capable of ensuring compliance with EU law.17 This 
notion of ‘effective implementation’ is also similar to the concept that emanates from the 
Court’s recent case-law. From the Ship-Source Pollution judgment it can be inferred that 
‘effectiveness’ refers to the capacity of criminal penalties to achieve ‘compliance’ with Union 
rules and the extent to which rules are applied in practice and whether they are complied with 
in practice.18  
The definition proposed is therefore that ‘effective implementation of Union policies’ is 
concerned with to what extent criminal laws can contribute to achieve the Union objectives in 
the policy area concerned and contribute to the enforcement of the underlying Union rules.19 
Criminal laws may contribute to the realization of the Union policy at issue by achieving, 
through deterrence20, a high degree of compliance with the substantive EU rules. The first 
part of the Article 83(2) TFEU test is therefore that the Union legislator must prove that 
criminal sanctions contribute towards the realization of the Union objective in question. If 
not, the Union cannot exercise its competence under Article 83(2) TFEU. Having clarified 
the meaning of ‘effective implementation’ of Union policies we now turn to consider the 
second part of the test of Article 83(2) TFEU; the ‘essentiality’ condition.  
 
 
                                              
15 See Gary Becker, ’Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 
169, 207-209; Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment (Robert Heward 1830) 19-20. 
16 See Case 326/88 Hansen [1990] ECR I-02911, Opinion of AG Van Gerven, para 8. 
17 See COM 2011/ 573 (n 8) 9. 
18 See Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (n 6) paras 68-69. 
19 For further support of this interpretation: Michael G, Faure ‘The Implementation of the Environmental Crimes 
Directives in Europe’ (2011) Ninth International Conference on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement 
2011. <http://inece.org/conference/9/proceedings/41_Faure.pdf> Accessed 30 April 2014; Commission, 
‘Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the Financial Services Sector’, Brussels, 
8.12.2010 SEC(2010) 1496 final, 11. 
20 See Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (n 10) 59. 
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B The ‘essentiality’ condition 
 
This subsection considers the meaning of the ‘essentiality’ condition in Article 83(2) TFEU 
from a linguistic, systematic, contextual and functional perspective. What I propose in this 
section concerning  the construction of and nature of judicial review of this condition in 
relation to Article 83(2) TFEU applies a fortiori to the interpretation and judicial enforcement 
of the ‘essentiality’ condition within the framework of the EU’s general criminal law 
competence. 21 
We begin with a linguistic perspective. The ordinary meaning of ‘essentiality’ in the English 
language suggests that ‘essential’ means ‘without factor x result y cannot take place’. It 
means something that is indispensable or an absolute necessity for the attainment of a given 
objective.22 To take a very simple example, one can imagine a situation where a lower court 
shall, as a matter of procedure, consider both res judicata (i.e. law x) and litispendens (law y) 
to make a valid decision.23 If either of these legal principles is disregarded, the judgment is 
not valid. Consequently, it is ‘essential’ that both res judicata and litispendens are considered 
to make a valid decision. Does the normal linguistic legal usage of ‘essentiality’ fit with the 
different language versions of Article 83(2) TFEU?24 If we first examine the Swedish 
language version of the Treaty, the expression ‘nödvändig’ is used, which translates as 
‘necessary’. The use of the expression ‘absolut nødvendig’, which is employed in the Danish 
language version of the Treaty to describe the Union’s competence to resort to criminal 
sanctions, translates roughly as ‘absolutely necessary’ in the English language. The Italian 
language version of the Treaty, which use the term ‘indispensabile’, corresponds to the 
French language version of the Treaty, which employs ‘indispensable’ in relation to the 
Union’s competence to impose criminal sanctions. Both the Italian and the French version of 
the relevant condition seem to be identical to the English term ‘indispensable’. In the Spanish 
language version of the Treaty the word ‘imprescindible’, which translates roughly as 
‘absolutely necessary’, is used to describe when the Union can resort to criminal penalties. In 
the German language version the word ‘unerlässlich’ is used to illustrate when the EU can 
use criminal sanctions, which translates as ‘indispensable’ in the English language.  
                                              
21 See chapter 4- section I (A) for discussion of the conditions of the EU’s general criminal law competence. 
22 See Black’s Law Dictionary (6th edn, West Publishing co 1990) 546, 1029-1030 for the definition of 
‘necessary’ and ‘necessity’ which in some contexts have a similar meaning to ‘essential’. 
23 See Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure of 1942 (SFS 1942:740), English Translation DS 1998:000, Chapter 
13, Section 6 and Chapter 17, Section 11.  
24 See Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministero della Sanità [1982] ECR 3415, paras 18-19. 
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Even if the linguistic comparison is limited to only seven language versions, it is possible to 
draw some tentative conclusions, particularly since the language versions of the most 
influential Member States have been analysed. 25All the language versions analysed apart 
from the Swedish language version, which uses the term ‘necessary’, suggest that the relevant 
condition is ‘indispensable’ or ‘absolutely necessary’ as these terms are understood in the 
English language. It follows that ‘essential’ in the sense of Article 83(2) TFEU implies 
semantically that ‘without criminal sanctions (X) the effective implementation of Union 
policy (Y) cannot take place’.26 It is only when it is ‘absolutely necessary/indispensable’ for 
the effective implementation of a Union policy that the Union should resort to criminal 
sanctions.27 The linguistic interpretation of the ‘essentiality’ condition therefore suggests that 
the Union legislator will have a substantial burden when making the case for criminal law 
harmonization under Article 83(2) TFEU.  
The analysis continues with a systematic and principled construction of the ‘essentiality’ 
condition.  
 First, we should consider the relationship between the ‘effectiveness’ criterion discussed 
above and the ‘essentiality’ requirement. It transpires that the literature has generally merged 
these two criteria into the principle of ‘effectiveness’. The focus in the literature has been on 
the principle of ‘effectiveness’ as a rationale for the expansion of EU competences and not on 
the ‘essentiality’ condition as a limit to the exercise of EU competences.28 Most notably 
Herlin-Karnell has claimed that Article 83(2) TFEU provides for an ambiguous, ill-defined 
and overly broad competence since the all-embracing ‘effectiveness’ criterion gives the 
Union a carte blanche to legislate. According to Herlin-Karnell ‘effectiveness’ cannot be a 
proper constitutional limit to criminalisation since it has a huge constitutional slipperiness to 
it; it is far too easy to assume that criminal law is effective in the enforcement of Union law. 
The ‘effectiveness’ concept fails to take into account other enforcement mechanisms under 
                                              
25 This selection of Member States is based on their absolute population and voting rights in the Council of the 
European Union. This approach is supported by the Court’s case-law; Case 55/87 Moksel v BALM [1988] ECR 
3845, para 16; Case C-64/95 Konservenfabrik Lubella v Hauptzollamt Cottbus [1996] ECR I-5105, para 18. The 
selection of Sweden and Denmark is based on my language skills.  
26 That ‘indispensable’ has a nearly identical meaning as ‘essential’ is clear from Black’s law Dictionary (n 22) 
546, 773.  
27 For support of this position: Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law (2nd 
edn, CUP 2010) 617; Petter Asp, The Substantive Criminal Law Competence of the EU—Towards an Area of 
Freedom, Security & Justice—Part 1 (Jure 2013)130. 
28 See Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (n 4) 762-766, 774-777; Dougan, ‘From the Velvet Glove to the 
Iron Fist’ (n2)108-113; Christa Tobler, ‘Case C-176/03, Commission v Council’ (2006) 43 Common Market 
Law Review 835, 847-49. 
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Union law and national law. This is regrettable since administrative penalties are often more 
effective than criminal penalties.29 
Herlin-Karnell’s criticism is justified given the available criminological evidence.30 However, 
even though it may generally be questioned whether criminal law is effective in the 
enforcement of Union law31, this criticism does not provide a proper understanding of the 
constitutional limits of Article 83(2) TFEU. First, we need to distinguish between the 
‘effectiveness’ criterion and the ‘essentiality’ condition. The ‘effectiveness’ principle is a 
different rule than the ‘essentiality’ condition. Whilst the ‘effectiveness’ test is a simple one 
of establishing whether criminal laws contribute positively to the implementation of EU 
policies in some way, the ‘essentiality’ test examines whether criminal laws are more 
effective than non-criminal laws in enforcing the EU policy at issue in terms of dissuasion 
and achievement of the objectives of the EU policy at issue. I agree with Herlin-Karnell’s 
concern that the ‘effectiveness’ criterion may not in itself be a restraint to the exercise of EU 
competences. However, I argue that the requirement that the Commission prove that criminal 
laws are ‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU policies is a check on EU criminal law 
harmonization under Article 83(2) TFEU. In order to exercise its competence under Article 
83(2) TFEU, the Union must not only prove by criminological evidence that criminal 
sanctions are ‘effective’ for the implementation of Union policies but also demonstrate that 
other sanctions cannot achieve ‘effective implementation’ of a specific Union policy to the 
same extent. 32 
Having defended the importance of the ‘essentiality’ condition the examination moves on to 
consider whether the strict linguistic interpretation of the ‘essentiality’ requirement proposed 
above fit with the Court’s existing case-law. We know from chapter 2 that whilst the Court is 
prepared to review whether the Union’s legislator has exceeded the limits of its competence, 
                                              
29 See Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (n 10) 57-60, 65; Herlin-
Karnell,’ EU Competence in Criminal Law after Lisbon’ (n 2) 338-344. 
30 See Robert A Kagan and John T Scholz, ‘The Criminology of the Corporation and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies’ in Keith Hawkins and John M Thomas (eds), Enforcing Regulation (Kluwer-Nijhoff 1984) 71; John 
T Scholz and Neil Pinney, ‘Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior’ 
(1995) 39 American Journal of Political Science  490, 508-509. 
31 See Dougan, ‘From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist’ (n 2)101; Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘The Third Wave of 
Third Pillar Law: Which Direction for EU Criminal Justice?’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 523, 533, 536-
537. 
32 See Anthony Dawes and Orla Lynskey, ‘The Ever-longer Arm of EC Law: The Extension of Community 




its overall practice demonstrates a deferential review of broad Union measures.33 The Court 
has, as previously discussed in the present work34, explicitly conferred a broad discretion to 
the EU legislative institutions in relation to the legislative choices made in the field of broad 
Union policies and adopted a ‘manifestly inappropriate’ test when examining the 
compatibility of general normative acts with the proportionality principle.35 Based on the 
case-law on broad Union policies, the general normative character of criminal law directives 
and the difficult social-political choices involved, it is arguable that the Court should apply a 
similar standard of legality under Article 83(2) TFEU as the proportionality test. This test 
implies that intensity of review would be light and that the lawfulness of a criminal law 
measure adopted under Article 83(2) TFEU can only be affected if it is ‘manifestly 
inappropriate’ in relation to the objective which the Union institutions are hoping to 
achieve.36  
Given the principles established by the Court in Environmental Crimes and Ship-Source 
Pollution are presumably of interpretative value for determining the scope the EU’s criminal 
law competence, these rulings should be taken into account in the analysis. In this respect, it 
is argued that the Court’s previous approach to judicial review in those cases was even more 
deferential than its current approach in competence and proportionality litigation. In the 
Environmental Crimes and the Ship-Source Pollution judgments, the Court merely accepted 
the Council’s assessment that criminal sanctions were ‘essential’ in those cases for the 
effective implementation of Union environmental law.37 Under the Court’s judgments, it 
seems to be sufficient that the Union institutions consider criminal measures ‘essential’ for 
the purposes of the effectiveness of Union law, not that they prove it to be ‘essential’. 38 
Advocate General Mazák and Dougan have both defended this cautious approach from the 
Court on the basis of a functional perspective. Advocate General Mazák argued that the 
question of whether criminal measures are in a particular case ‘essential’ in order to ensure 
that rules are ‘effective’ require an objective consideration of the substantive legal basis or 
policy area in question, but also a degree of judgment. With this in mind, the Advocate 
                                              
33 See examples of deferential judicial review of EU legislation adopted under Article 114 TFEU: Case C-
210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, paras 36-45; Joined cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 Parliament v 
Council [2006] ECR I-04721, paras 56, 57, 60, 67-69. 
34 See above chapter 2- section III A; chapter 3- section II. 
35 See Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP 2012) 592-602, with references to the relevant case-law 
36 See Case C-210/03 Swedish Match (n 32), para 48. 
37 See Case C-176/03 Commission v Council (n 5), para 50; Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (n 6), para 
68. 
38 See Tobler (n 28) 847-848; André Klip European Criminal Law (Intersentia 2012) 164. 
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General endorsed as appropriate the Court’s approach, when it found that the Council’s view 
that criminal law was ‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU environmental policy constituted 
sufficient evidence to meet this criterion.39 Dougan supports this view and has argued that the 
issue of whether criminal sanctions are ‘essential’ is in the first instance a political question 
not suitable for judicial review. The basic political choice as to the appropriate role and scope 
of the Union’s criminal law powers and its impact on national criminal justice systems is not, 
and should not be, open to second-guessing by the Courts.40 
While Advocate General Mazák’s and Dougan’s arguments can be defended on functional 
grounds, their contention does not fit well with the Court’s case-law on judicial review of EU 
legislation in the field of broad EU policies, nor is it consistent with the foundations of 
judicial review. The Court’s test in the Environmental Crimes and the Ship-Source Pollution 
judgments is an even weaker test than the ‘manifestly inappropriate’ test, which the Court 
employs when reviewing EU legislation in the field of common policies. For this reason the 
Court’s approach could be criticised as incoherent. One could reasonably expect the Court to 
adopt a similar approach in the review of EU legislation in the field of criminal law as it has 
when reviewing EU legislation in the field of the internal market or in other the common 
policies. At the very least one would not envision the Court to adopt a lighter test than 
‘manifestly inappropriate’ in a field such as criminal law which is sensitive for political 
reasons and fundamental rights concerns and where such concerns militate against turning the 
‘essentiality’ condition to a political question.41 Under the test in the Environmental Crimes 
judgment the Court would be unable to question the Union legislator’s choice even when it 
appears on the face of it to be patently unreasonable. In the Court’s standard case-law on 
proportionality and the common policies, the Court would at least be able to perform this 
task.42 Secondly, from a more principled perspective it is questionable whether the 
interpretation favoured by Dougan and Mazak is tenable. There are strong political and moral 
reasons to contest the Court’s de facto slippery essentiality test. Accepting such a test would 
exclude criminal law legislation from judicial review and would in principle prevent the 
Court from discharging its judicial review function.43 
                                              
39 See Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (n 6), Opinion of AG Mazák, paras 119, 121. 
40 See Dougan, ‘From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist’ (n 2) 102.  
41 See Asp (n 27) 131. 
42 See Case C-210/03 Swedish Match (n 33), para 48.  
43 See above chapter 2- section IV (B), for an elaboration of this argument.  
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Does this mean that the analysis ends here and we should settle for the Court’s current 
application of the ‘manifestly inappropriate’ standard for the review of legislation adopted 
under Article 83(2) TFEU? I do not believe so. Although the Court may be less suited to 
judge the ‘essentiality’ of criminal law measures for the enforcement of a specific Union 
policy, I would argue that the Court should involve itself in a more intense review of 
‘essentiality’ than what follows from the its current application of the ‘manifestly 
inappropriate’ standard. This is because the intensity with which the ‘manifestly 
inappropriate’ standard is applied in relation to review of broad EU policies is ill-suited to 
police the exercise of the competence in Article 83(2) TFEU.44 
First, even if criminal law is delicate from a policy perspective, this sensitivity does not 
exclude criminal law from the domain of judicial review. From the perspective of judicial 
policy it is rather the case that the nature of criminal law favours a more demanding enquiry 
of the legality of broad EU criminal law measures. First, criminal penalties severely restrict 
the freedoms of individuals and are liable to infringe their fundamental right to freedom of 
movement and property. Imprisonment constitutes breaches of personal liberty and the right 
to property. Secondly, the imposition of criminal sanctions has serious socio-ethical 
implications and entails severe stigmatization of the offender. The moral and social blame 
inherent in every criminal sanction remains firmly attached to the convicted criminal long 
after the sentence has been served.45 A more far-reaching application of ‘essentiality’ than the 
Court’s current application of the ‘manifestly inappropriate’ standard is therefore justified by 
the fact that criminal sanctions are inextricably linked to individual fundamental rights and 
substantial social costs.  
Thirdly, more serious judicial enquiry of legislation adopted under Article 83(2) TFEU is also 
justified because of the ‘essentiality’ requirement’s appeal to the principle of ultima ratio.46 
Like the ‘essentiality requirement, the ultima ratio principle requires that criminalization 
                                              
44 For support of this argument: see above chapter 2- section III (A); chapter 2- section IV (A); chapter 3- 
section II. 
45 See the European Convention of Human Rights, Article 5; Gráinne de Búrca ‘The Principle of Proportionality 
and its Application in EC Law’ (1993) 13 Yearbook of European Law 105, 113, 147; Maria Kaiafa-Gbandi, 
‘The Importance of Core Principles of Substantive Criminal Law for a European Criminal Policy Respecting 
Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law’ (2011) 1 European Criminal Law Review 7, 17-21; Sakari Melander, 
‘Ultima Ratio in European Criminal Law’ (2013) 3 European Criminal Law Review 45, 52. 
46 
That the ‘essentiality’ condition should be considered in the light of the principle of ultima ratio is clear from 
a number of important policy documents; COM 2011/573 (n 8) 6-8, 12; European Council,’ The Stockholm 
Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens’, (2010) OJ C 115/1, 4. 5. 2010, C 
115/15; CONV 426/02, ‘Final report of Working Group X "Freedom, Security and Justice" ‘, Brussels, 2 
December 2002, 10.  
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should only be used to address problems arising during the implementation of an EU policy 
and only be directed to seriously harmful acts which cannot be addressed through any other 
means.47 The Commission itself has recognized that the ultima ratio principle should be a 
guiding principle for the EU legislator when it exercises the competence in Article 83(2) 
TFEU.48 This principle, demands that criminal law is only used in situations of necessity, 
when something needs to be done because there has been a serious infringement of the 
interests of society and only when it has been established empirically that other less coercive 
measures are insufficient.49 Adopting milder means as a matter of priority, as well as 
justifying criminal suppression as a last resort based on empirical data are the necessary 
prerequisites to ensuring respect for the ultima ratio principle.50 If the ‘essentiality’ condition 
is interpreted in the light of the ultima ratio principle, we should expect two things. First, that 
it be demonstrated that the EU legislator considered other intrusive means before it adopted 
legislation. Second, as I argued above, that the EU legislator show by empirical evidence that 
non-criminal sanctions were not effective in the enforcement of EU policy. While the ultima 
ratio principle is primarily directed to the EU legislator51, we should expect the Court, given 
the emphasis placed by the literature and the official EU documents on the ultima ratio 
principle, to apply the ‘essentiality’ condition in the light of this principle.52 Such an 
application suggests a strict review of EU criminal law legislation and that the Court 
abandons its current weak application of the ‘manifestly inappropriate’ standard for broad EU 
policies.  
Fourthly, from a contextual perspective, a more searching judicial enquiry is also supported 
by political statements of the Union institutions, which acknowledge the need to take the 
‘essentiality’ requirement seriously. Both the Parliament and the Commission have 
underlined that the ‘essentiality criterion’ implies a need to analyse whether measures other 
than criminal law measures could not sufficiently ensure the policy implementation. The 
application of this criterion requires a thorough analysis in the impact assessments preceding 
any legislative proposal, including an assessment of whether Member States’ sanctions have 
                                              
47 See Melander (n 45) 50; Kaiafa-Gbandi (n 45) 19. 
48 See COM 2011/573 (n 8) 7-10. 
49 See Melander (n 45) 45-46. 
50 See Kaiafa-Gbandi (n 45) 17-19. 
51 See Melander (n 45) 51-53. 
52 ibid 50-51. 
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achieved the desired result and an assessment of the difficulties faced by national authorities 
implementing EU law.53 
Having argued for an intense review of the ‘essentiality’ requirement and contrasted the 
suggested approach with the Court’s previous case-law and the literature, we must consider 
how this condition should be enforced before the EU courts. Admittedly, it must be accepted 
that the Court, from a comparative institutional perspective54, has a limited capacity to 
reassess factual evidence for a particular criminal law measure and limited legitimacy in 
performing the balancing exercise that the Union legislator must perform when it adopts 
criminal sanctions. The solution to addressing these concerns is for the Court to apply the test 
and standard of legality developed in chapter 3 to implement the ‘essentiality’ condition. This 
test of legality, requiring that the EU legislator offer reasons for the ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘essentiality’ of criminal laws that are compelling in theory and supported by sufficient and 
relevant evidence, provide for more intensity than the Court’s conventional ‘manifestly 
inappropriate’ test, which is inadequate to enforce the ‘essentiality’ condition.  
In order to complete the analysis of the substantive conditions of Article 83(2) TFEU, in the 
following sub-section I will consider whether the new Market Abuse Crimes Directive, 
adopted on under Article 83(2) TFEU, conforms to the ‘effectiveness’ and ‘essentiality’ 
condition. I will return in the second part of the chapter to consider this proposal from the 
perspective of the ‘harmonization’ requirement. Although the ‘essentiality’ condition and the 
‘harmonization’ requirement are connected55, I wish to separate their analysis here to enable a 
better understanding of their meaning. This division of the analysis is appropriate since the 
‘effectiveness’ and ‘essentiality’ conditions are substantive whereas the harmonization 
requirement is procedural in nature. The Market Abuse Crimes Directive is assessed on the 
basis of the standard and test for legality developed in chapter 3. 
C Application of the ‘essentiality’ requirement in Article 83(2) TFEU to the 
Market Abuse Crimes Directive  
 
                                              
53 See Parliament,’ Report on Legal Bases and Compliance with Community Law’, (2001/2151(INI), Final A5-
0180/2003, 22 May 2003, Explanatory Statement, point II, 8-10; COM 2011/573 (n8) 5-7, 11. 
54 See above chapter 3- section II, for a discussion of institutional arguments for judicial deference. 
55 They are connected because unless there is previous harmonization in place, criminal sanctions would not be 
‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU policies. Logically criminal laws cannot be necessary if there is no policy 





As a part of its regulatory enforcement reform package in the financial services sector, the 
Commission decided to propose a directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse which was 
later endorsed as a directive.56 The Directive defines three offences; insider dealing, unlawful 
disclosure of information and market manipulation, which should be regarded by Member 
States as criminal offences if committed intentionally57 and punishable by criminal sanctions 
which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.58 Given that the Market Abuse Crimes 
Directive is the first directive based on Article 83(2) TFEU, it is an illuminating example of 
the legal assessment of the ‘essentiality’ requirement.  
I now turn to a legal enquiry of whether the EU legislator correctly exercised its competence 
in conformity with the ‘essentiality’ requirement when it adopted the Directive. The first 
question to examine is whether the Commission’s reasoning in the legislative background 
documents is adequate to support the claim that criminalization is ‘effective’ and ‘essential’ 
for the enforcement of EU market abuse policies. 
Is the Commission’s reasoning ‘adequate’ to sustain that criminal laws are ‘effective’ 
and ‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU market abuse policies?  
 
The Commission advances one general argument for criminalization. Criminal laws are 
‘effective’ and ‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU market abuse policies because of their 
deterrence value. This argument is defended on three grounds. First, the social stigma 
associated with criminal laws and the expressive function of criminal sanctions give it a 
dissuasive value. The Commission claims that criminal sanctions demonstrate a particularly 
strong social disapproval towards individual offenders. This contention is also used to explain 
why criminal sanctions are more effective than non-criminal sanctions. According to the 
Commission criminal sanctions are of a qualitatively different nature as compared with 
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Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions 
for market abuse (market abuse directive) [2014] OJ L 173/79 (‘Market Abuse Crimes Directive’ ‘Directive’); 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing 
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57 See Market Abuse Crimes Directive (n 56), Articles 3- 5. 
58 ibid, Article 7 (1), Article 9. 
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administrative penalties and entail are more dissuasive than non-criminal penalties.59 This 
argument has strong support in the literature.60 Secondly, the deterrent nature of criminal 
laws is explained with reference to the ‘educative function’ of criminal laws. The 
Commission suggests that establishing criminal offences for the most serious forms of market 
abuse improves deterrence since it sets clear boundaries in law that emphasize that such 
behaviour is regarded as unacceptable. Criminalization sends a message to the public and 
potential offenders that these offences are taken very seriously by competent authorities. 
Thirdly, the ‘communicative’ function of criminal law also contributes to the deterrent 
function of criminal laws according to the Commission. It is contended that successful 
convictions for market abuse offences under criminal law often results in extensive media 
coverage, which helps to deter potential offenders, as it draws public attention to the 
commitment of competent authorities to tackling market abuse.61 The second and the third 
arguments are well-defended by criminological literature.62 The Commission also employs 
those two arguments to explain why other non-criminal sanctions are inferior to criminal 
sanctions. Non-criminal sanctions are insufficient for enforcing compliance with the EU rules 
on market abuse. This is because the current framework, built upon Member State autonomy 
in the enforcement of EU financial regulations, is ineffective. The vague criteria that Member 
States shall impose ‘proportionate, effective and dissuasive’ sanctions give too much room 
for interpretation and thus become difficult to enforce through infringement procedures.63 
The Commission distrusts the effectiveness of civil liability regimes and administrative fines. 
It claims that the deterrence effect of civil sanctions is limited as firstly they do not cover all 
possible violations of EU financial services rules and secondly they cannot always be 
imposed due to difficulties in quantifying damages. In addition, compensation of losses is not 
                                              
59 See speech by Margaret Cole, ‘How Enforcement Makes a Difference’ 18 June 2008. 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2008/0618_mc.shtml>. Accessed 1 May 2014.   
60 See above chapter 4 n 52 for references to the relevant literature. 
61 See Market Abuse Crimes Proposal (n 56), recitals 2, 6 and 7 in the proposed directive; Commission, 
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Expressive Function of Punishment’, in Joel Feinberg, Doing & deserving; essays in the theory of responsibility 
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63 See Market Abuse Crimes Proposal (n 56) 2; SEC (2010) 1496 (n 19) 12-14, 18, 26. 
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a deterrent in cases where the profit derived from the violation is higher than the damages 
awarded.64 Nor, according to the Commission, are individual administrative fines or 
corporate fines the solution to the enforcement problem. Violations of insider dealing can 
lead to gains of several million euro, well in excess of the maximum levels of fines provided 
for in several Member States. In this context a fine of few thousand euro does not seem to be 
sufficiently dissuasive.65 That non-criminal fines and civil liability sanctions generally are 
inferior to criminal sanctions is also well-supported by the scholarship.66 
As we know from chapter 3, the test of legality for passing the standard of ‘adequate 
reasoning’ is whether one of the reasons submitted is sufficient in itself to justify 
criminalization. The reference point for whether the reasons presented are justified is the 
general criminological and criminal law literature on the effects of criminalization.67 First, we 
check whether the Proposal is ‘adequately’ reasoned in terms of the effectiveness of criminal 
laws. This seems to be the case. The Commission’s general claim that criminal laws act as a 
‘deterrent’ is supported by three sub-arguments; the ‘social stigma’ of criminal laws, the 
‘educative’ and ‘communicative’ function of criminal laws. It is argued that the general claim 
as well as the three sub-arguments are sufficiently compelling to justify why criminal laws 
are appropriate for the enforcement of EU market abuse policies. As shown above, both the 
general claim and the three sub-arguments have considerable support in the relevant literature 
and offer a proper justification per se for criminal sanctions. Secondly, we control whether 
the Commission has proposed adequate reasoning for the contention that criminal laws are 
‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU market abuse policies. In this regard, it is more difficult 
to assess whether the standard has been passed. First, what is required by the ‘essentiality’ 
condition is a concrete discussion as to why criminal sanctions are more effective than 
administrative sanctions in the enforcement of EU policies. This is lacking in the 
Commission’s proposal. The Commission’s analysis is flawed since it fails to distinguish 
between the Member States’ current lack of sufficient administrative sanctions and the 
current lack of strong administrative sanctions on a Union level.68 It is the Union’s own 
sanctioning power which should be the reference point subject in terms of Article 83(2) 
                                              
64 See SEC (2010) 1496 (n 19), 19. 
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 ibid 12-14, 25- 26; SEC (2011) 1217 (n 60) 26; FSA Market Watch newsletter, ‘Our strategy and key 
objectives for tackling market abuse’, issue 26, April 2008, 7. 
<http://hb.betterregulation.com/external/mw_newsletter26.pdf>. Accessed 1 May 2014. 
66 See above chapter 4, n50-53, for references to the relevant literature supporting this point. 
67 See chapter 3- section IV (D). 
68 See SEC (2010) 1496 (n 19) 11-17. 
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TFEU, not the Member States’ sanctioning powers.69Another flaw in the Commission’s 
reasoning is that the Commission has not properly considered whether a harmonization of 
administrative sanctions would have been sufficient to achieve compliance with Union 
market abuse rules.70The Commission has particularly failed to reflect upon why 
criminalisation is ‘essential’ in light of the fact that the EU legislator has decided to 
simultaneously adopt a battery of severe administrative sanctions through the new Market 
Abuse Regulation (MAR).71 The MAR for example includes serious sanctions such as 
disqualification orders72 and high individual administrative fines.73 Given the assumption that 
the battery of sanctions prescribed by said regulation is, in conjunction, equally deterrent as 
criminal laws, it is striking that the Commission has failed to compare the effectiveness of 
criminal laws with the sanctions provided for by that regulation.74  
Despite these criticisms, I believe that the Market Abuse Crimes Directive should pass the 
test for ‘adequate’ reasoning. The Commission has suggested one argument which in itself 
supports why criminal laws are superior to non-criminal sanctions. This is the moral stigma 
argument. The general capacity of criminal sanctions to express public censure and the 
special moral condemnation of insider dealing offences contributes strongly in reinforcing the 
deterrence associated with such sanctions. Since this argument is strongly supported by the 
relevant literature it offers an independent justification for the ‘essentiality’ of criminal 
laws.75 In the best of worlds, we could of course have expected the EU legislator to engage in 
a more general discussion of why criminal laws are more appropriate than non–criminal 
sanctions and why the MAR is not sufficient for the enforcement of EU market abuse 
policies. However, it is not the Court’s job to assess whether the EU legislator could have 
justified the Market Abuse Crimes Directive in a more comprehensive, convincing and 
                                              
69 See SEC (2011) 1217 (n 61) 124-125. 
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sophisticated way than it did. The threshold for legality is whether one reason was submitted 
which could demonstrate the ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws. Since the Commission has 
successfully done so it is not possible to condemn the Directive for inadequate reasoning. We 
therefore move on to evaluate whether the evidence submitted supports the claims and 
conclusions made regarding the need for criminal sanctions. 
Is the Commission’s evidence sufficient and relevant to support the conclusion that 
criminal laws are ‘effective’ and ‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU market abuse 
policies?  
 
The evidence criterion suggests that the rationale for exercising a criminal law competence 
under Article 83(2) TFEU must be backed up by evidence showing that criminal laws are 
‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU policies. It cannot, however, be given a too demanding 
an interpretation. If the evidence for a legislative measure is mixed, where some evidence 
supports the ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws and there is equally strong evidence supporting 
the position that non-criminal sanctions are as effective as criminal sanctions, the legality of 
the measure cannot be contested. Nor can one neither require hard empirical data supporting 
the assertion that criminal law measures are ‘essential’ or that criminal sanctions have 
substantial effects on compliance, since such data will seldom be available. Notwithstanding 
this, the ‘evidence’ criterion requires a serious attempt to justify the conclusion by means of 
reference to empirical data in combination with adequate arguments.76 This suggests that it is 
insufficient for the Commission to make simple assertions that ‘criminal sanctions’ are 
‘effective’ and ‘essential’ in the enforcement of the Union policy at stake. Each of the 
justifications that are considered sufficiently compelling to defend the ‘effectiveness’ of 
criminal sanctions and the ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws must, as we know from chapter 3, 
be backed up by ‘relevant’ and ‘sufficient evidence’.77 
Are any of the Commission’s compelling justifications for the appropriateness of criminal 
laws supported by relevant and sufficient evidence? The Commission relies on the statements 
of Margaret Cole, a former director of enforcement and financial crime of the UK Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) to prove the effectiveness of criminal law in this area. Cole 
asserted that criminal laws are effective in enforcing market abuse rules since they provide 
for strong deterrence and since action against individuals has a much greater impact in terms 
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of achieving credible deterrence than action against firms. Her statement is also invoked to 
support the ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws. According to her, criminal sanctions and in 
particular custodial sentences have a stronger deterrent effect on potential market abuse 
offenders than that of administrative sanctions.78 Those statements are also used to claim that 
some national regulators consider criminal sanctions to have a deterrent value.79 The 
Commission, however, clearly misrepresents the reality since ‘some national regulators’ 
refers only to the views of the director of one national regulator. Moreover, the evidentiary 
value of hearsay statements is questionable given the risk of bias. The director has a strong 
personal interest in promoting trust in the enforcement activities of the FSA and to assure the 
regulatory community and the public that enforcement of market abuse regulation is 
effective.80In sum, this evidence is certainly not sufficient to prove the claims of the deterrent 
nature of criminal laws. 
Secondly, the Commission refers to market cleanliness surveys from the FSA to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of criminal laws. By referring to those surveys, which demonstrate a 
reduction of pre-announcement price movements from 30.6% (in 2009) to 21.2% in 2010, the 
FSA claims that increased criminal enforcement had a positive effect on compliance. This 
evidence does not however, as recognized by the FSA itself, prove any causal link between 
increased enforcement and the reduction in the indicator.81 Many factors other than insider 
trading, such as media speculation or strategic leaks of information, could cause such 
movements.82  
Thirdly, the Commission points to one company survey from the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) suggesting that criminal sanctions and in particular incarceration is the strongest 
possible deterrent for a potential infringer.83 The OFT report refers to an earlier OFT 
company survey84 highlighting the importance of sanctions that operate at the individual, as 
opposed to corporate, level. The earlier OFT survey lists the average ranking by companies of 
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the factors that promote compliance and indicates that criminal penalties are highly ranked.85 
While this study gives some support for the statement that criminal laws are superior over 
non-criminal sanctions, I believe it is insufficient as evidence for the general superiority of 
criminal laws. First, this study is not included in the Commission’s impact assessment from 
2011. For this reason it is questionable whether it can be counted as evidence for the 
increased effectiveness of criminal laws over non-criminal sanctions. Secondly, even if it 
would count as evidence for the greater effectiveness of criminal laws, this survey is limited 
to the assessment of penalties in the field of competition law.86  
The additional evidence for the ‘effectiveness’ of criminal sanctions arises from an article by 
Michael Levi on the use of stigma and shaming within the context of corporate fraud. He 
cautiously suggests that criminal sanctions may, under certain conditions, contribute to the 
objective of increasing deterrence due to the stigma attached to criminal conduct.87 Although 
the argument gives some support for the effectiveness of criminal law, it is debateable 
whether it amounts to evidence of the ‘essentiality’ of criminal sanctions. First, Levi’s 
shaming argument only relates to the fraud offence and the Commission does not explain 
how this has any relevance for market abuse or could be used to justify criminal sanctions in 
the field of market abuse.88 Secondly, the Commission’s representation of the article is 
misleading. Levi’s article does not say that ‘criminal sanctions contribute strongly to the 
objective of increasing deterrence due to the stigma attached to criminal conduct’.89 On the 
contrary, Levi is very cautious in expressing the view that the shaming function of criminal 
sanctions is effective in achieving compliance with the rules of society.90 
In addition, the Commission refers to 6 scientific articles91 and studies for support of the 
statement that fines must be optimal to be an effective sanction and to support the contention 
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that existing fine levels in Member States are too low.92 Having reviewed all those articles 
and studies submitted by the Commission it is striking that none of them support the 
conclusion that criminal sanctions generally are superior to non-criminal fines. As mentioned 
above, they only support the view that current fine levels in the Member States are ineffective 
and that fines must be optimal in order to be effective. Moreover, as to the comparison 
between criminal laws and civil liability sanctions, there is no evidence referred to in the 
impact assessments preceding the Market Abuse Crimes Directive supporting the contention 
that such sanctions are less effective than criminal sanctions.93Finally, there is no reference in 
the legislative background documents to any study or literature supporting the view that 
criminal laws are more effective than disqualification orders.94 
Does the evidence nevertheless pass the test of legality? As we know from above, the 
Commission was able to invoke one general claim for the effectiveness of criminal laws, i.e. 
that criminal laws have a greater deterrence value. This general claim was supported by three 
sub-arguments for criminalization; moral stigma, the educative function of criminal laws and 
the communicative function of criminal laws. Both the general claim and the three sub-
arguments were sufficiently compelling in themselves to offer independent justification for 
the appropriateness of criminalization. The first point is that while Levi’s article, the market 
cleanliness survey and the OFT study are not in themselves sufficient evidence to support 
these arguments, that evidence would probably, if considered together, be sufficient to 
demonstrate the ‘effectiveness’ of criminal laws for the enforcement of EU market abuse 
rules. The difficulty here is to decide whether those studies were invoked to support the 
stigma, communicative or educative function of criminal laws. Indeed, it seems that only one 
of these studies, Levi’s article, was intended to support the argument based on the stigma of 
criminal laws.95 The market cleanliness survey was intended to show that criminal laws 
contribute to market integrity while the OFT survey was intended to demonstrate the 
                                                                                                                                            
1/2008, 13 ff; Wouter PJ Wils, ‘Optimal Antitrust fines – theory and practice’ (2006) 29 World Competition 
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particularly deterrent effect of criminal laws.96 That being so, we must acknowledge that all 
the sub-arguments for criminalization, the stigma argument, the ‘educative function’ 
argument and the ‘communicative function’ argument contribute to demonstrate the deterrent 
nature of criminal laws. This is clear from the preamble of the Directive97, from the wording 
of the preceding proposal98 and from the accompanying impact assessment.99 There only 
needs to be sufficient and relevant evidence to support one of the reasons, which constitutes 
an independent justification for criminalization, to pass the standard of legality. Since the 
Commission has been able to refer to three separate studies to support the notion that criminal 
laws have a deterrent effect, it has passed the test of legality in demonstrating that criminal 
laws are ‘effective’ for the enforcement of EU market abuse rules. 
But is the evidence sufficient to show that criminal sanctions are more effective than non-
criminal sanctions for the enforcement of EU market abuse policies (‘essentiality’ condition)? 
Having dismissed above100 the statements by Margaret Cole, the market cleanliness study 
from FSA, the OFT study on discretionary penalty regimes, Levi’s article, the scientific 
studies on the impact of different level of fines, as inadequate or irrelevant there is only one 
piece of evidence which supports the ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws. This is the OFT survey 
invoked by the Commission in its impact assessment. As accounted for above, while relevant 
this piece of evidence is not sufficient in itself to show that criminal laws are more effective 
than non-criminal sanctions. The problem here goes to the quantity of the evidence. Although 
this study goes in the right direction, more evidence than a single study would need to be 
produced in order to make a compelling case. One could of course argue that Levi’s article on 
the stigmatising nature of criminal laws could be used as support for the conclusion that 
criminal sanctions are more effective than non-criminal sanctions. The problem is that the 
Commission has not clearly referred to this article explicitly to make the case that criminal 
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laws are more effective than non-criminal sanctions.101 Even if the Commission had 
explicitly referred to Levi’s article as evidence for criminal law’s superiority over non-
criminal sanctions for the purposes of deterrence, this would not be sufficient evidence. The 
problem with such an argument is that Levi does not claim that criminal laws are more 
effective than non-criminal sanctions. It could also be argued that the reference to the Levi 
article at least implicitly indicates that criminal laws are superior to non-criminal sanctions 
because of their social stigma. This is not however a logical conclusion. That a particular 
sanction communicates stigma does not make it automatically more effective than other 
sanctions. A criminal sanction could arguably be more effective than other non-criminal 
sanctions because it communicates in a more unequivocal manner moral social stigma.102 
This point is nevertheless not argued by the Commission. As the Commission has failed to 
make this argument based on Levi’s article, one can see why the reference is insufficient as 
evidence for the ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws. From above it is also clear that the 
Commission’s evidence for the inadequacy of civil liability sanctions and individual 
administrative fines is both insufficient and irrelevant. Even if we interpret the Commission’s 
argument for the ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws as a general claim that criminal laws have a 
greater deterrence value than non-criminal sanctions, it is not possible to support this thesis 
with sufficient evidence. This is because this claim can only be supported with one relevant 
piece of evidence, i.e. the OFT study.103  
What then is the result of this examination? It is a tight case. The Market Abuse Crimes 
Directive was ‘adequately reasoned’ and supported with sufficient evidence for the thesis that 
criminal laws are ‘effective’. However, I would cautiously suggest that the Directive falls 
foul of the ‘essentiality’ condition. This is because the evidence in the legislative background 
documents preceding the Directive does not fully substantiate the conclusions regarding the 
greater effectiveness of criminal sanctions over non-criminal sanctions. The Commission has 
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failed to show, as required by the proposed test of legality, that the reasons offered as 
justifications for the ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws are supported by sufficient evidence. The 
Commission has only been able to invoke one study as relevant evidence for the ‘essentiality’ 
of criminal laws. Because of this, the Market Abuse Crimes Directive should be annulled.  
Having examined the ‘essentiality’ conditions as a limit to the exercise of the competence 
under Article 83(2), the chapter moves on to consider whether there are any procedural 
requirement that can act as a check on the exercise of Union competences under this 
provision. 
II ARE THERE ANY PROCEDURAL CHECKS ON THE EXERCISE OF 
UNION COMPETENCES UNDER ARTICLE 83(2) TFEU? 
 
This second part of the chapter considers whether there are any procedural limitations on the 
exercise of Union competences under Article 83(2) TFEU. The analysis begins by 
considering the definition of ‘harmonization’ measures under Article 83(2) TFEU, followed 
by a discussion of how much harmonization is required before Article 83(2) TFEU can be 
invoked. Finally, the applications of the general discussion are illustrated by means of two 
case studies; EU market abuse rules and EU competition law. 
A What is the meaning of ‘harmonisation measures’ in Article 83(2) TFEU? 
 
When examining the meaning of ‘harmonization measures’ in Article 83(2) TFEU it is 
appropriate to consider first when harmonisation must have taken place. Peers has argued that 
criminal law measure cannot be adopted before the harmonization measure due to the lack of 
a Union policy to implement. He claims however that it should be possible to adopt the 
harmonisation measure simultaneously with the criminal law measure given that Article 
83(2) TFEU is guided by the ‘effectiveness’ criterion.104 While it seems reasonable, as Peers 
suggest, to take into account the effectiveness principle when interpreting this provision I 
would challenge the view that ‘effectiveness’ can be used to circumvent the textual 
constraints of Article 83(2) TFEU. As argued above, a functional interpretation must fit with 
the design and wording of the Treaties to be justified.105 
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In contrast to Peers’ interpretation, it is claimed here that there can be no simultaneous 
adoption of the harmonization measure and the criminal law directive. My argument is 
supported by the wording that ‘such directives shall be adopted by the same ordinary or 
special legislative procedure as was followed for the adoption of the harmonisation measures 
in question’. The wording ‘as was followed’ points to past legislative activity and suggest 
that the underlying harmonisation measure must already have been adopted before the 
criminal law measure is adopted. This linguistic temporal interpretation is, in addition to the 
English version, supported by the Swedish106, French107, Italian108 versions of the Treaties, 
which all use the past tense to indicate that harmonization measures must have been adopted 
prior to the adoption of the criminal law measure. Finally, if harmonisation measures are not 
in place, the adoption of criminal law measures cannot logically prove to be ‘essential to 
ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy’, since such a policy would not exist. 
To use Article 83(2) TFEU, it would not be enough for the Union to have the theoretical 
ability to implement a policy, even if it had not yet exercised its competences. The offences 
in question must be linked to harmonization measures already adopted by the Union. 
Additionally, this strict temporal interpretation meets the concern that the provision should 
not lead to excessive and hasty recourse to criminal sanctions.109 In sum, it appears that there 
must be a previous harmonisation measure before one can take resort to Article 83(2) TFEU 
and adopt a criminal law directive.110 
The second issue is what kind of harmonisation is necessary in order to justify the use of 
Article 83(2) TFEU. A textual and systematic analysis of Article 83(2) TFEU and the other 
relevant provisions of the Treaties suggest that harmonisation must have taken place through 
secondary law in the form of regulations, directives or decisions111 and through procedures 
designated as the ‘ordinary’ or ‘special’ legislative procedures.112 To understand the 
argument, it is crucial to understand the meaning of ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ legislative 
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procedure and the meaning of ‘legislative acts’113 as they are defined in the Treaties. A quick 
glance at Article 289 TFEU shows that there is a definition of which type of legislation is 
subject to the ‘ordinary’ or ‘special’ legislative procedures and which type of legislative 
procedures constitute the ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ legislative procedures.114 First, it appears 
that regulations, directives and decisions are the only types of legislative acts that can be 
subject to the ‘ordinary’ or ‘special’ legislative procedures. Since directives and regulations 
are the main legislative instruments of the Treaties employed for harmonization115, it appears 
that ‘harmonisation measures’ in Article 83(2) TFEU mainly refers to such instruments. 
Secondly, it follows from Article 289 TFEU and the general scheme of the Treaties that 
legislative procedures in the Treaties can only be defined as ‘special’ or ‘ordinary’ legislative 
procedures if they are specifically designated as such by the specific legal basis, providing 
the Union with the competence to act.116 Legislative acts are therefore, according to Article 
289(3) TFEU, defined formally by the procedure in which they are adopted.117 Union 
measures adopted through procedures that are not designated as ‘special’ or ‘ordinary’ 
legislative procedures are therefore not by definition ‘legislative acts’ but designated as non-
legislative acts pursuant to Article 289(3) TFEU and Article 297(2) TFEU.118 Harmonisation 
that has taken place through Treaty amendments or other secondary measures that have been 
designated as non-legislative in character cannot therefore constitute the basis for 
‘harmonization’ under Article 83(2) TFEU.119  
                                              
113 See Alexander Türk, ‘Law-Making After Lisbon’ in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley, EU 
Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012) 66-74. 
114 Pursuant to Article 289 (1) TFEU it follows that: ‘The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the 
joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal 
from the Commission.’ It further follows from Article 289 (2) TFEU that: ‘In the specific cases provided for by 
the Treaties, the adoption of a regulation, directive or decision by the European Parliament with the participation 
of the Council, or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament, shall constitute a special 
legislative procedure.’ I added emphasis to underline the definitions of ordinary and special legislative 
procedure. 
115 See Article 288(1) and Article 289(1) TFEU. 
116 See Türk (n 113) 70. 
117
 ibid 67-68; Michael Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’ (2008) 45 Common 
Market Law Review 617, 638. 
118 Article 289(3) TFEU provides that ‘Legal acts adopted by legislative procedure shall constitute legislative 
acts.’ It further follows from Article 297 (1) TFEU that ‘Legislative acts adopted under the ordinary legislative 
procedure shall be signed by the President of the European Parliament and by the President of the Council. 
Legislative acts adopted under a special legislative procedure shall be signed by the President of the institution 
which adopted them….‘. From Article 297 (2) TFEU it follows that ‘Non-legislative acts adopted in the form of 
regulations, directives or decisions………….shall be signed by the President of the institution which adopted 
them.’ I added emphasis to pinpoint the definitions of legislative acts and non-legislative acts and the distinction 
between them. 
119 This interpretation is supported by Dougan, ‘From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist’ (n 2) 109, and Türk (n 
113) 69-70.  
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The next issue to consider is what degree and nature of harmonization must have taken place 
in order to trigger the competence in Article 83(2) TFEU. 
B What is the nature of harmonization required in order to exercise the 
competence under Article 83(2) TFEU? 
 
Another other important question about Article 83(2) TFEU is the ‘nature’ of harmonisation 
which must be in place in order for the Union to exercise its competence under said article.120 
Herlin-Karnell suggests that there is not much in contemporary EU law that has not already 
been the subject of some kind of harmonisation by the European Union and that could not be 
linked to the effectiveness criteria as stipulated in Article 83(2) TFEU. The ‘harmonization’ 
requirement does not therefore seem to constitute an obstacle to the exercise of Union 
competences under Article 83(2) TFEU.121 In slight contrast to Herlin-Kernell, the argument 
here is that the ‘harmonisation’ requirement could act as a check on the exercise of the power 
contained in Article 83(2) TFEU since it first, as argued above, requires harmonization 
through the ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ legislative procedure and secondly because it demands 
harmonization of a certain quality. 
In order to determine the nature of harmonization necessary to trigger Article 83(2) TFEU, 
we must dig deeper into the meaning of the term ‘harmonization’ measures found in Article 
83(2) TFEU. A natural starting point for this enquiry is to examine how ‘harmonization’ is 
defined elsewhere in the Treaties. We therefore approach the question by examining Title 
VII, Chapter 3 of the TFEU, entitled ‘Approximation of Laws’.122 It follows from Articles 
114 (1), 115 (1) and 116 (1) TFEU that ‘harmonization’ refers to the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by Member States’ laws and regulations which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market and to Union measures which have the 
aim of removing distortions to competition.123 Applying these general definitions to Article 
83(2) TFEU we can therefore assume that the underlying harmonization measures must have 
as its object the removal of disparities between national laws or remove distortions of 
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 See Herlin-Karnell, ‘White-collar crime and European financial crises’ (n 74) 485. 
122 See Walter Van Gerven ‘ Harmonization of Private Law: Do we need it?’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law 
Review 505, 505- 506. 
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competition. Harmonization entails a modification of the substance of internal laws by 
providing for common substantive EU laws in relation to certain policy fields. Such 
substantive provisions could for example relate to prohibited conduct and to conditions of 
liability.124 
From this brief examination of the definition of harmonization in the Treaties it seems to 
follow, that the precondition for employing Article 83(2) TFEU is ‘substantive 
harmonisation’.125 The requirement for ‘substantive’ harmonization means that the 
underlying harmonisation cannot concern marginal questions or merely superficial 
harmonisation.126 Underlying harmonisation measures must either contain the substantive 
content of the rule whose infringements entail criminal sanctions, be a substantive definition 
describing the prohibited activity and/or a measure prescribing certain administrative/civil 
liability sanctions for certain defined behaviour. If the underlying legislative measure is only 
concerned with procedural issues there is no substantive harmonisation.127 Underlying 
harmonization measures can for example be expressed in terms of a prohibition, i.e. a 
prohibition for individuals or undertakings to engage in a specific activity.128 Furthermore, if 
the previous harmonisation measure prescribes that certain Union sanctions would be 
imposed for certain behaviours it defines129, the harmonization requirement would be 
fulfilled. 
This textual and conceptual interpretation of ’harmonization’ is also sensitive from a criminal 
policy perspective. It makes little sense to implement criminal sanctions unless there is a 
compliance deficit relating to an existing EU policy. There should at least have been an 
attempt to secure compliance of an EU policy by means other than via criminal law before 
criminal law measures are adopted.130 If one demands substantive harmonisation prior to the 
introduction of criminal sanctions, it is reasonable to require that the prior harmonisation 
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See Anne Weyembergh, L'harmonisation des legislations penales: condition de l'espace pinal europeen et 
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measure approximating non-criminal sanctions for the prohibited activity has failed to ensure 
an effective enforcement of the law. It would appear premature to introduce criminal 
sanctions without specific evidence that a basic approximation of non-criminal sanctions was 
insufficient to ensure compliance with the substantive EU rules.131  
Having defined what is meant by harmonization measures, it is now time to contrast the 
suggested concept with two case studies on EU competition law and EU market abuse rules. I 
have chosen these case studies for two reasons. First, in these areas there are either envisaged 
or already adopted EU criminal law legislation. EU competition law has been suggested as a 
candidate for criminalization by the scholarship132 whilst EU market abuse rules recently 
were criminalized by means of the Market Abuse Crimes Directive.133 Secondly, these case 
studies illustrate how the ‘harmonization’ requirement can act as check on the exercise of the 
EU’s competence in Article 83(2) TFEU.  
C Application of the ‘harmonization’ requirement to the field of EU 
competition law 
 
It is no understatement that EU Competition law is one of the most harmonized and 
integrated areas of EU law. It has been stated that ‘after agriculture, competition policy is 
perhaps the most highly developed of the Community’s common policies, with the greatest 
impact on undertakings situated both inside and outside the common market.’134 Broadly 
speaking, the material rules on what constitutes anti-competitive behaviour are similar in all 
Member States due to the high degree of harmonisation in this policy field.135 However, even 
though there is substantive harmonization in the field of EU competition law, there are no 
specific harmonization measures adopted in the field of EU competition law that provide the 
necessary foundation for criminal law harmonization under Article 83(2) TFEU.  
As stated above, Article 83(2) TFEU requires that prior harmonisation must have taken place 
through an ‘ordinary’ or ‘special’ legislative procedure. The problem is that harmonization of 
EU competition law has taken place primarily through the codification of substantive 
                                              
131 See Kaiafa- Gbandi (n 45) 17-19; SEC (2011) 1217 (n 61) 55, 168.  
132 See Wouter PJ Wils, ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’ (2005) 28 World Competition 
117, 156-159; Peter Whelan, Contemplating the Future: Personal Criminal Sanctions for Infringement of EC 
Competition Law’ (2008) 19 King’s Law Journal 364, 368-375. 
133 See n 56 for full reference to this directive. 
134 See Steiner, Twigg- Flesner and Woods (n 120) 571. 
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prohibitions contained in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Given that substantive harmonization 
of the EU competition rules has taken place by the Treaties136, and not by means of a 
‘legislative procedure’ within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU, the Union legislator cannot 
rely on this harmonization to trigger the competence in Article 83(2) TFEU.137 
It is clear however that some approximation of EU competition law has also taken place 
through secondary legislation, particularly based on the sectorial provision in Article 103 
TFEU. In this regard it is appropriate to look more closely at Regulation 1/2003138, adopted 
on the basis of Article 103 TFEU, and consider whether this measure constitutes a 
‘harmonization’ measure within the meaning of Article 83(2) TFEU. As it was adopted on 
the basis of Article 103 TFEU, it is arguable that Regulation 1/2003 is such a ‘harmonisation’ 
measure. A directive criminalising infringements of the EU competition rules could therefore 
be adopted on the basis of Regulation 1/2003 as an underlying harmonization measure. Such 
a criminal law directive could be adopted simply though the consultation procedure contained 
in Article 103 TFEU, which was the procedure used for the adoption of Regulation 1/2003.  
This solution is nevertheless, inappropriate both from a principled and legal perspective.  
Firstly, as argued above, it seems inappropriate given the above-mentioned principle of 
ultima ratio that would be violated if criminal sanctions were adopted in the field of Union 
competition law prior to harmonisation of individual, non-criminal sanctions such as civil 
liability and administrative fines. As suggested above, the Union legislator should first adopt 
individual non-penal sanctions and monitor whether they can achieve effective 
implementation of Union competition rules prior to adopting criminal sanctions.139 Secondly, 
I argue that Regulation 1/2003 is not a ‘substantive’ harmonization measure in the sense 
required to trigger the use of Article 83(2) TFEU. On the contrary, it is principally a 
procedural measure that provides for certain supervision, investigative and enforcement 
powers for the Commission and national courts in the implementation and application of 
Union competition rules. This Regulation does not provide for harmonisation of national 
                                              
136 The substantive prohibitions on competition policy were enshrined in Article 85 and Article 86 of the Treaty 
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137 See Dougan, ‘From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist’ (n 2) 109. 
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rules on individual non-criminal liability in cases of breaches of the EU competition rules.140 
Nor does it substantiate or elaborate on the underlying prohibitions on restrictive agreements 
and market abuse contained in Article 101 TFEU and Article 102 TFEU. Thirdly, since 
Regulation 1/2003 was adopted on the basis of Article 103 TFEU and this legal basis does 
not prescribe the use of the ‘ordinary’ or ‘special’ legislative procedure for adoption of 
legislation, Regulation 1/2003 cannot be used as a ‘harmonization’ measure for the purposes 
of Article 83(2) TFEU. While it could be argued that Article 103 TFEU in substantive terms 
must be considered a ‘special’ legislative procedure, as explained above141, the construction 
of the Treaties’ definitions of ‘legislative acts’ simply does not admit, such a conclusion.142 
For all these reasons, Regulation 1/2003 cannot be used to justify criminal law 
harmonization. 
If the EU legislator still wished to criminalize EU competition rules, the best solution from a 
criminal policy perspective and from the structure of Article 83(2) TFEU is to adopt two 
different directives. The first harmonisation measure should then contain the substantive 
prohibitions for a specific activity and a Union-wide harmonised regime of non-criminal 
sanctions against individuals, including personal fines and trading prohibitions. This directive 
could and should be based on Article 114 TFEU. As we know from above, Article 114 TFEU 
constitutes a broad power for the Union to enact measures for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.143 It seems clear that the Union legislature under Article 
114 TFEU, given its broad discretionary power to choose the method most appropriate for 
harmonization, has a competence to harmonize national laws concerning the type and level of 
administrative sanctions to be imposed.144 This power arguably encompasses serious non-
criminal sanctions such as disqualification orders or individual fines.145  
In theory, the criminal law directive could follow immediately upon the adoption of the first 
harmonization measure since Article 83(2) TFEU does not require any waiting period before 
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the first harmonization measure and the second criminal law directive.146 However, from a 
criminal policy perspective, it is preferable to wait for a certain period of time to examine 
whether the first measure establishing individual non-criminal liability was sufficient for the 
enforcement of the EU competition rules. If it was subsequently shown that harmonised 
individual non-criminal sanctions were not a sufficient deterrent, the Union legislator could 
proceed to adopt criminal sanctions. The second directive which would provide for the 
determination of the criminal offence and the criminal penalties to be imposed in case of 
infringements of the Union competition rules could then be adopted on the basis of Article 
83(2) TFEU. This directive would have a firm basis on the previous harmonisation measure 
adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU and also be justified in the light of the ultima ratio 
principle, requiring that criminal law be the last resort.147 
Having discussed the application of the ‘harmonization’ requirement to the field of EU 
competition law, we move on to consider whether this requirement could limit 
criminalization in the field of EU market abuse law.  
D Application of the ‘harmonization’ requirement to EU market abuse 
legislation 
 
This subsection considers whether the Market Abuse Crimes Directive, proposed under 
Article 83(2) TFEU, complies with the ‘harmonization’ requirement. This implies querying 
whether the Market Abuse Crimes Directive was based on a ‘harmonization’ measure within 
the meaning of Article 83(2) TFEU. 
In the current circumstances, the Commission could refer to either the Market Abuse 
Directive from 2003 (MAD)148 or the recently adopted Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)149 
as the underlying ‘harmonisation’ measures given that references to both of these measures 
have been made in the Market Abuse Crimes Directive.150  
                                              
146 See Asp (n 27) 134; Steve Peers ‘EU Criminal Law and the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2008) 33 European Law 
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The EU legislator should, however, rely on the MAR rather than the MAD as a 
‘harmonization’ measure for the Market Abuse Crimes Directive. Firstly, the MAR amends 
and replaces all of the provisions of the MAD. The MAD will consequently be repealed from 
3 July 2016.151 Even though the MAD will formally remain in force until this date, it seems 
moot to examine, given the existence of the MAR, whether the MAD could constitute an 
‘underlying’ harmonization measure.152Secondly, given the wide substantive scope of the 
MAR, the case for qualifying this measure as a ’substantive’ harmonization measure is more 
compelling than sustaining this with respect to the MAD. The MAR, which establishes a 
common regulatory framework on market abuse, is far more ambitious than the MAD. The 
latter was not able to foresee the legal, financial, technological and market evolutions that 
have taken place during the last 10 years.153 For example, whilst the MAD focused on 
financial instruments admitted to trading on a regulated market154, the MAR covers not only 
those but also instruments traded on a multilateral trading facility or an organised trading 
facility irrespective of whether the trading takes place on a trading venue.155 Moreover, while 
the MAD did not cover the regulation of commodities and commodity derivatives, the MAR 
has also extended the prohibitions on insider trading and market manipulations to trade in 
’spot commodity contracts’.156 Finally, while the MAD lacks proper sanctioning measures157 
or investigative powers for the authorities of the Member States,158 the MAR grants Member 
State authorities far-reaching investigative powers,159 as well as wide-ranging powers to 
impose sanctions on natural and legal persons.160  
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electronic communications or data traffic records held by investment firms, credit institutions or financial 
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Having argued that the MAR is the relevant measure it must be examined whether it 
constitutes a ‘substantive’ harmonization measure within the meaning of Article 83(2) TFEU.  
It is apparent that the EU legislator intended the MAR to be a ‘substantive’ harmonisation 
measure. The preamble of the MAR confirms that it was envisaged to approximate national 
laws as well as to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by reducing 
regulatory complexity and the compliance costs of undertakings. In particular, the MAR 
intends to remove problems arising from divergences by national laws by removing 
remaining obstacles to trade and significant distortions of competition and by preventing 
further obstacles to trade and distortions of competition from arising.161 Furthermore, fact that 
the MAR was adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU162, which is one of the general 
harmonization provisions of the Treaties, supports the conclusion that the MAR is, indeed to 
be regarded as a ‘substantive’ harmonization measure,163 as well as the fact that both the 
preamble and the articles of the Market Abuse Crimes Directive refer to the MAR.164 
The MAR was not only intended to be a ‘substantive’ harmonisation measure but is one also 
de facto. The key harmonising feature of the MAR is that it lays down material prohibitions 
against insider dealing, unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulation. 
Also, to a large extent, those prohibitions are reproduced in the criminalisation provisions of 
the Market Abuse Crimes Directive.  
First, the prohibition of insider trading found in Articles 8 and 14 of the MAR conform, in 
essence, to Article 3(2) of the Market Abuse Crimes Directive. While the MAR prohibits 
behaviours where a person possesses inside information and uses that information by 
acquiring or disposing of, for its own account or for the account of a third party, directly or 
indirectly, financial instruments to which that information relates, the Market Abuse Crimes 
Directive mirrors the MAR and criminalises the same actions.  
Secondly, the prohibition against unlawful disclosure of inside information in Articles 10(1) 
and 14 of the MAR is consistent with the criminal offence in Article 4(2) of the Market 
                                                                                                                                            
freezing or sequestration of assets, powers to suspend trading of the financial instrument concerned; see MAR (n 
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Abuse Crimes Directive. The MAR prohibits disclosing inside information to any other 
person, unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of the exercise of his 
employment, profession or duties. The Market Abuse Crimes Directive mirrors this provision 
and criminalizes the same conduct.  
Thirdly, in terms of market manipulation and dissemination offences, it seems that the 
criminalization in the Market Abuse Crimes Directive165 is derived directly from the 
prohibitions in the MAR.166 While the MAR prohibits entering into a transaction, placing an 
order to trade or any other behaviour which: i) ‘gives false or misleading signals as to the 
supply of, demand for, or price of, a financial instrument related spot commodity contract’, ii) 
’secures the price of one or several financial instruments or a related spot commodity contract 
at an abnormal or artificial level’ and iii) ’… behaviour which affects the price of one or 
several financial instruments or a related spot commodity contract, which employs a fictitious 
device or any other form of deception or contrivance’, iv) ‘transmitting false or misleading 
information or providing false or misleading inputs or any other behaviour which manipulates 
the calculation of a benchmark,’ the Market Abuse Crimes Directive perfectly complements 
the MAR by criminalizing those behaviours.  
There are also some differences between the MAR and the Market Abuse Crimes Directive. 
By way of example, the offences in the Market Abuse Crimes Directive are generally more 
restricted, by encompassing fewer activities and behaviours.167 The offences in the Market 
Abuse Crimes Directive also impose more demanding liability requirements by only 
criminalizing ‘intentional’ behaviours.168 Furthermore, the market manipulation offence in 
the Market Abuse Crimes Directive imposes an additional condition for criminalization. It 
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requires that the behaviours have a certain effect which is not required for the application of 
the corresponding prohibitions of the MAR. For example the market manipulation offence in 
the Market Abuse Crimes Directive only criminalizes behaviours which ’give’ false or 
misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for, or price of a financial instrument or a 
related spot commodity contract’,169 behaviours ‘securing’ the price of a financial instrument 
or a related spot commodity contract at an abnormal or artificial level,170  behaviours which 
‘affect’ the price of a financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract including 
dissemination of information,171 or which ’give’ false or misleading signals.172 These 
differences are, however, minor and do not negate the fact that that the description of the 
offences in the Market Abuse Crimes Directive is directly derived from and mirrors the 
substantive prohibitions in the MAR. 
Since the MAR provides for ‘substantive’ harmonisation regarding the prohibitions of insider 
dealing, unlawful disclosure of insider information and market manipulation, it should, 
therefore, also be considered a de facto ‘substantive’ harmonization measure. As a 
conclusion, the MAR can be considered a ‘harmonisation measure’ within the meaning of 
Article 83(2) TFEU.  
 
III CAN THE NATURE OF ARTICLE 83(2) TFEU ACT AS A RESTRAINT 
TO THE EXERCISE OF A GENERAL UNION CRIMINAL LAW 
POWER UNDER ARTICLE 114 AND ARTICLE 352 TFEU  
. 
The final part of the chapter builds on the discussion in chapter 4 of the possibility of 
employing Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU to adopt criminalization measures. The 
chapter considers whether the nature of Article 83(2) TFEU could impede the exercise of a 
general Union criminal law power under these legal bases and under other legal basis of the 
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Treaties. This question has indeed been controversial both among commentators and Member 
States since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. It is contentious primarily because the 
Member States’ safeguards in Title V do not apply if another legal basis in the Treaties can 
be used for the adoption of criminal law measures.173 The use of Article 83(2) TFEU is 
preferable from a Member State perspective since it grants the possibility for the Member 
States to pull an emergency brake if a proposed measure affects the fundamental aspects of 
that Member States’ criminal justice system. Use of other legal bases outside Title V would 
also mean that the United Kingdom and Ireland would not be able to employ the possibility 
of using their opt-outs that apply to in relation to legislation within the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ). Furthermore, subsidiarity control by national parliaments 
requires more votes under legislation adopted under for example Article 114 TFEU and 
Article 352 TFEU than under the AFSJ.174 In addition, if criminal law legislation can be 
adopted under Article 114 TFEU future acts may be proposed in the form of directly 
applicable regulations.175  
In order to assess whether Article 83(2) TFEU is really of a lex specialis nature we will 
analyse whether it can act as a check on the exercise of a criminal law competence under the 
two broad functional provisions of Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU. We will begin 
by considering whether Article 83(2) TFEU is a lex specialis in relation to Article 352 TFEU. 
A Can the existence of Article 83(2) act as a check on the exercise of the 
Union’s general criminal law competence under Article 352 TFEU? 
 
In order to hold that Article 83(2) TFEU has priority as a legal basis over Article 352 TFEU, 
it must be established that Article 352 TFEU is a subsidiary legal basis to Article 83(2) TFEU 
in terms of criminal law harmonization. This seems on the face of it to be a simple exercise. 
In fact, the wording of Article 352 TFEU suggests that this provision can only be used if ‘the 
Treaties have not provided the necessary powers’ (the ‘necessity’ requirement). This 
unequivocal phrasing suggests that Article 352 TFEU cannot in any circumstance be a lex 
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specialis. Rather, it is a subsidiary legal basis only to be used exceptionally when no other 
legal basis in the Treaties confers the requisite competence for Union action.176 
It has also been acknowledged that the Court of Justice sees Article 352 TFEU as a subsidiary 
legal basis. It is true that the Court in Massey Ferguson took a lenient view of the ‘necessity’ 
requirement and accepted that Article 352 TFEU could be used despite the existence of other 
potentially applicable legal bases in the Treaties due to the concern for legal certainty.177 It 
did, however, subsequently in the Tariff Preferences case seriously sharpen the interpretation 
of this limit.178 It first demonstrated that the Court would not allow the use of Article 352 
TFEU if the use another power for the envisaged legislative measure is more suitable.179 
Secondly, the Court did not in Tariff Preferences exclude the use of a more specific legal 
basis if some of the components of the envisaged Union measure were not explicitly included 
in the scope of that legal basis. The Court admitted a measure under Article 207 TFEU that 
pursued both the common commercial policy and development aid policies even though the 
latter was not explicitly included within the scope of Article 207 TFEU. Since the measure 
had a stronger relationship to the specific legal basis, Article 207 TFEU, the Court held that 
this legal basis should be used a sole legal basis instead of Article 352 TFEU.180 Subsequent 
case-law also confirms that it would be difficult to adopt a legislative measure under Article 
352 TFEU if another specific legal basis is more appropriate for the envisaged measure.181  
Secondly, there is a systemic and teleological argument based on the new structure of the 
Treaties supporting the view that Article 83(2) TFEU is a lex specialis in relation to Article 
352 TFEU. Such an argument would assume that Article 83(2) TFEU should be considered 
as a negative competence, similar to the constitutional saving clauses in the Treaties 
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discussed above182, implying that it excludes the possibility of criminal measures being 
pursued under other provisions. The argument has been developed by the Houses of Lords’ 
European Union Committee. The Committee has argued that Article 83(2) TFEU is framed 
and apt to subsume and supersede any competence which would otherwise exist under 
articles outside Title V. Article 83(2) TFEU is explicitly concerned with ‘criminal offences’ 
and ‘criminal sanctions’ which means that this provision is more specific concerning criminal 
law harmonization in relation to other legal bases in the Treaties. Since the competence 
recognised in the Court’s case-law did not extend to the power to set minimum sanctions, 
Article 83(2) suggests not only the procedure but also confers a substantive competence. It 
would be implausible to suggest that the Treaty drafters intended there to be several 
overlapping articles conferring differing degrees of criminal competence, on the basis of 
which was chosen as legal basis.183 
Asp has refined the European Union Committee’s argument further. He has convincingly 
argued that there is no general implied criminal law competence outside Article 83(2) TFEU. 
He submits that the new institutional setting, with special rules and arrangements for the 
criminal law cooperation, militates against interpreting articles outside Title V of the TFEU 
as entailing criminal law competence. The Member States have, by introducing Title V, via 
the Treaty expressed their will to take control over the development of EU criminal law and 
have taken a step towards a limited supranational criminal law competence. First, the 
cooperation is equipped with an emergency brake and is subject to opt-out arrangements for 
some Member States. Secondly, the cooperation as regards harmonisation of substantive 
criminal law is limited to directives. He particularly queries as to why the Member States 
would bother to arrange for a specific institutional framework for criminal law if they still 
leave the door open for EU involvement via other articles. This argument is reinforced by the 
fact that the general competence, Article 83(2) TFEU allows for criminal law competence in 
relation to almost all areas of the Treaties, including transport, competition and agriculture. It 
would be inconsistent and make Article 83(2) TFEU superfluous if express provision is made 
in the Treaty for national safeguards and then those safeguards could be immediately 
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circumvented by resorting to previous jurisprudence by the Court184 to give a general 
criminal law competence under all substantive legal bases of the Treaties.185 
Miettinen draws further support from the drafting process of the Lisbon Treaty for the 
argument that Article 83(2) TFEU is a lex specialis. The drafting process of the Lisbon 
Treaty proceeded on the basis that substantive EU criminal competence would be exhausted 
by those express provisions now in Articles 83(1) and 83(2) TFEU. This was reinforced by 
the fact that directive was finally chosen as the only instrument for criminalization in Article 
83(2) TFEU. The choice of directives was material in agreeing to extend the EU’s 
competence in this way.186 The Final Report of Working Group X stated that the Treaty could 
provide that approximation of substantive criminal laws should be carried out in the form of 
directives or their successor only.187 All this suggested that the Convention was convinced of 
the exclusivity of the express criminal competence in Article 83 TFEU, and that it should 
only be exercised through the adoption of directives.188  
While these are convincing arguments, they are not sufficient to exclude altogether the 
possibility of the Union exercising criminal law powers under Article 352 TFEU or the 
exercise of a general criminal law competence under the Treaties. First, there is case-law 
suggesting that the ‘necessity’ criterion in Article 352 TFEU does not impede the use of this 
legal basis in the case where the envisaged measure cannot, even with a broad and reasonable 
interpretation, be brought within the more specific legal basis. The Court does not necessarily 
adopt a broad reading of a specific legal base if there is a more appropriate broad legal basis, 
such as Article 352 TFEU, under which the envisaged measure can be adopted. In European 
Parliament v Council
189
, which was concerned with the adoption of a Regulation on the 
statute for a European Cooperative Society190, the Parliament disputed that Article 352 TFEU 
was the correct legal basis. The Parliament argued that the Regulation should have been 
adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU since it was concerned with the harmonization of 
national laws relating to cooperative societies. The Court, however, defended the choice of 
Article 352 TFEU. First, the Regulation introduced a new legal form in addition to the 
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national forms of cooperative societies. Secondly, the Regulation did not aim at harmonizing 
the national laws applicable to cooperative societies, but left different national laws already in 
existence. Since the Regulation did not fall squarely within the scope of Article 114 TFEU, 
recourse to Article 352 TFEU was justified. 191  
Secondly, there is also case-law from the Court, suggesting that an express specific 
competence in one area of the Treaties does not preclude the exercise of an implied more 
general competence elsewhere in the Treaties. When an instrument claims particular acts are 
‘necessary’, then the ancillary competence follows that necessity. The trigger for implied 
general competence is, as in the case of the general criminal law competence, the ‘necessity’ 
of the measures. Given this, it is hard to see how criminal law could be excluded from an 
implied general competence where it is necessary for some other policy. 192European 
Parliament v Council
193
 illustrates these observations. In this case, the Court had to assess 
what was the right legal basis for a measure concerned with collection of information for the 
EU’s energy policy.194 The Court held that the general legal basis on energy in Article 194 
TFEU195 had priority over the specific legal basis in Article 337 TFEU in the area of 
information collection. The Court found that that the content of the contested regulation 
revealed that it related essentially to the implementation of a system for the collection of 
information relating to investment projects in energy infrastructure.196 This system was held 
to be a prerequisite to allow the EU to take the appropriate measures to achieve the objectives 
laid down in the energy sector as provided by Article 194(1) TFEU, in particular as regards 
the functioning of the internal energy market, the security of the European Union’s energy 
supply, the promotion of energy efficiency and the development of new and renewable 
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energies. In those circumstances, the collection of information established by the contested 
regulation may be considered to be contributing directly to the achievement of the objectives 
of the European Union policy on energy, as defined in Article 194(1) TFEU, and, 
consequently, as constituting, a ‘necessary’ instrument for the achievement of the objectives 
within the meaning of Article 194(2) TFEU. An implied general competence to collect 
information could, since it was ‘necessary’, be attached to the energy competence in Article 
194 TFEU even though an express competence to collect information was available 
elsewhere in the Treaties.197 
Based on the Court’s case-law the following observations can be made. Although the 
‘necessity’ criterion in Article 352 TFEU is a limitation on the exercise of a criminal law 
competence under that provision, it has an important qualification. It is qualified by the fact 
that the envisaged criminal law measure must have a credible relationship to Article 83(2) 
TFEU. If there is a choice between Article 83(2) TFEU and Article 352 TFEU and if the aim 
and the content of the envisaged measure cannot easily be fitted within the scope of Article 
83(2) TFEU, it is likely that Article 352 TFEU will be considered as the appropriate legal 
basis. This is despite the Court’s rulings in Commission v Council to the effect that all other 
legal bases take precedence over Article 352 TFEU.198 The ‘necessity’ criterion in Article 
352 TFEU only applies where the aim and the content of the envisaged measure suggests that 
the proposed measure can reasonably be contained within the scope of the specific legal 
basis.199 
In this regard, it is clear that the legal basis of Article 83(2) TFEU has a limited scope in the 
field of criminal law. Let us assume that the Union considered adopting a ‘regulation’ which 
both ‘criminalized’ and ‘de-criminalized’ certain activities and also imposed ‘maximum’ 
sanctions. The fictive reason for adopting a regulation is that the Commission considers that 
criminal laws enforced by means of directives leads to a divergent and fragmented 
application of Union law since directives give too much scope in the implementation phase to 
Member States. The Union concludes therefore that the only effective way of enforcing the 
specific Union policy is through a ‘regulation’. The reason for including de-criminalization 
provisions in the Regulation is to restrain the over-penalization trend currently present in the 
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Member States. Even though one could stretch the interpretation of Article 83(2) TFEU very 
far, it is difficult to argue that such a measure falls within the textual framework of said 
provision. Given that the Union only has a power to adopt ‘directives’ pursuant to Article 
83(2) TFEU and given that can only ‘criminalize’ under that provision, a cogent argument 
could be made that the Treaty has not provided the ‘necessary powers’ within the meaning of 
Article 352(1) TFEU for the envisaged measures. Even though it is generally correct to argue 
that Article 83(2) is a lex specialis in relation to Article 352 TFEU, the latter legal basis can 
be used as a legal basis for adopting a part of the hypothetical regulation for the simple 
reason that Article 83(2) does not provide the ‘necessary powers’ for certain criminal law 
measures.200 
The last point should be developed. Since the hypothetical regulation would be concerned 
specifically with ‘criminal law’ one would also, consistent with the ruling in European 
Parliament v Council of the European Union
201
, need to use Article 83(2) TFEU for the 
substantive criminal law part regarding for example the definition of offences, rules of 
liability and so forth. Article 352 TFEU could not be used for the whole measure since it is 
only a procedural power and does not provide substantive criminal law competence. The 
objections to such a hypothetical piece of legislation is that the different institutions have 
different influence under Article 83(2) TFEU and Article 352 TFEU, that the decision-
making procedures are slightly inconsistent in these provisions since Article 83(2) TFEU uses 
qualified majority and Article 352 TFEU requires unanimity in the Council and since there 
are special procedures that apply in Article 83 TFEU with emergency brakes and opt outs.202 
These objections are not entirely convincing. First, the special procedures are not a serious 
problem since the safeguards of Article 83 TFEU of state sovereignty are fulfilled by the veto 
of Article 352 TFEU. The use of Article 352 TFEU would therefore not entail a 
circumvention of the safeguards of Article 83 TFEU.203 Secondly, it should be possible to 
combine the decision-making procedures contained in Article 83(2) and Article 352 TFEU 
and ensure a similar level of influence for the institutions if the Union legislator complies 
with the ordinary decision- procedure referred to in Article 294 TFEU and the requirement 
that the Council should act unanimously.204 
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In sum, we can make the following observations. It has been shown that the ‘necessity’ 
criterion in Article 352 TFEU, stating that this legal basis can be used only if no other 
appropriate legal basis is available, is a serious limitation to the exercise of Union powers. 
Most proposals in the field of criminal law, which will, as envisaged by Title V of the 
Treaties, be concerned with ‘directives’, ‘minimum’ sanctions and ‘criminalization’, could 
thus not be adopted under Article 352 TFEU due to the existence of the specific legal basis in 
Article 83 TFEU.205 The exercise of ‘partial’ Union criminal law competences cannot, 
however, be excluded under Article 352 TFEU in the scenario where the envisaged measure 
does not fall within the textual confines of Article 83(2) TFEU. If Article 352 TFEU is to be 
employed for criminal law harmonization, it can, however, only be used in conjunction with 
Article 83 TFEU, which provides the ‘material’ criminal law competence.  
Now we move on the examination by considering whether the existence of Article 83(2) 
TFEU could act as a check on the exercise of a criminal law competence under Article 114 
TFEU. 
B Does the nature of Article 83(2) TFEU act as a limitation of the exercise of 
a criminal law competence under Article 114 TFEU? 
 
When analysing the question of whether Article 83(2) TFEU is a lex specialis in relation to 
Article 114 TFEU within the context of criminalization measures, it is appropriate to first 
briefly examine the wording of the latter provision. The expression ‘save where otherwise 
provided in the Treaties’ in Article 114 TFEU (‘lex specialis limitation’) seem at first sight to 
suggest that this provision is a subsidiary legal basis to other more specific provisions of the 
Treaties when it comes to achieving the internal market objectives in Article 26 TFEU. So 
perhaps we can end the discussion here and be satisfied with the conclusion that Article 83(2) 
TFEU always takes precedence over Article 114 TFEU? For the knowledgeable observer of 
the law on competences and the Court’s case-law, the answer is not that simple.  
The early case-law on conflicting legal bases suggested that the only criterion which was 
necessary to give priority to Article 114 TFEU over other more specific legal bases in the 
Treaties is that the conditions for recourse to this provision be met. If the measure had a 
credible link to the internal market by either removing obstacles to trade or appreciable 
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distortions of competition, Article 114 TFEU took precedence over other legal bases. This 
case-law also suggested that Article 114 TFEU should, in legal basis litigation, be given a 
broad meaning. All legislation which in one way or another was relevant for the competitive 
position of enterprises fell within the ambit of Article 114 TFEU.206  
Titanium Oxide is a good example to illustrate these points. In this case, concerned with an 
action for annulment of the Waste Directive207, the Commission contended that the directive, 
which was adopted under Article 192 TFEU, should have been adopted under Article 114 
TFEU since it was an internal market measure.208 The Court, who endeavoured to find the 
appropriate legal basis pursuant to its standard ‘centre of gravity’ test, came to the conclusion 
that the Waste Directive was equally concerned with environmental protection and the 
internal market and thus there was no predominant legal basis for the directive.209 While the 
normal solution to the problem would be to adopt the Directive under a dual legal basis, this 
solution was not available in this case since Article 114 TFEU and Article 192 TFEU 
provided for different decision-making procedures, providing for a different role for the 
Parliament.210 The Court then, having again reviewed the aim and the content of the measure, 
found that since environmental protection could and should be integrated in legislation under 
Article 114 TFEU and since different environmental legislation in Member States could 
distort competition to an ‘appreciable’ extent, Article 114 TFEU was the more appropriate 
legal basis.211 
The Court’s ruling is actually somewhat perplexing. How can a measure be equally 
concerned with two legal bases and then in the end be found to have a stronger relationship to 
one of these two legal bases? The answer to this is that the environmental law component in 
the measure in fact was weaker than the internal market component. Since the measure 
harmonized the programmes for the reduction and elimination of pollution caused by waste 
from existing establishments and harmonized obligations concerning the treatment of waste 
from the titanium dioxide production process, the measure primarily intended to equalize 
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competitive conditions for firms in the titanium oxide business.212 The Court’s final textual 
argument was persuasive. Given the fact that the Treaties had provided that environmental 
protection should be integrated into the policies of the internal market and given the broad 
scope of Article 114 TFEU, it was logical that the measure was brought into the framework 
of that legal basis.213  
Herlin-Karnell has, on the basis of the Court’s case-law on the scope of Article 114 TFEU, 
constructed a compelling argument for why Article 114 TFEU should take precedence over 
Article 83(2) TFEU. Her specific claim is that the Market Abuse Crimes Proposal, proposed 
under Article 83(2) TFEU, should instead have been adopted under Article 114 TFEU, 
notwithstanding that the latter legal basis is residual to other specific legal bases. First, she is 
concerned that if it is accepted that the Market Abuse Crimes Proposal could be adopted 
under Article 83(2) TFEU this would further undermine the limits to Union harmonization of 
national criminal laws. This is because Article 83(2) TFEU does not have any threshold in 
terms of ‘market creation’, which is what is required by Article 114 TFEU. Secondly, she 
submits that Article 114 TFEU is more suitable than Article 83(2) TFEU because the Market 
Abuse Crimes Proposal is in fact an ‘internal market’ measure and based on the same 
rationales as legislation that is normally adopted under Article 114 TFEU. The rationale for 
the Market Abuse Crimes Proposal is to prevent market failures in the form of manipulative 
practices that lead to an inefficient allocation of resources and damages the marketplace in 
capital allocation and to control new integration risks. The monitoring of such risks and the 
prevention of market dysfunctions should be accommodated within Article 114 TFEU since 
manipulative practices undermines trust in the internal market. Moreover, the case-law on 
legal basis supports the use of Article 114 TFEU for the Market Abuse Crimes Proposal. 
While typically, a dispute of conflicting legal basis has been resolved by recourse to the 
‘centre of gravity’ test, there is according to her no real centre of gravity test available under 
Article 114 TFEU pursuant to the Tobacco Advertising II judgment.214 The only relevant 
issue under Article 114 TFEU is if the measure at issue contributes to ‘market creation’. 
Since the Market Abuse Crimes Proposal has a strong link to the internal market due to the 
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fact that the fight against market abuse is about regulating market failures, the proposal 
should have been adopted under Article 114 TFEU.215 
Although Herlin-Karnell’s argument of the broad scope of Article 114 TFEU in legal basis 
litigation is compelling, it does not entirely capture the complex reality of this provision’s 
status in relation to other legal bases. First, it is questionable whether Tobacco Advertising II 
can be used as evidence to demonstrate the priority of Article 114 TFEU in relation to other 
specific legal bases. In fact, no one suggested any appropriate legal basis for the contested 
directive in Tobacco Advertising II other than Article 114 TFEU. This case was indeed about 
the scope of Article 114 TFEU and whether the Union had a competence at all to adopt the 
measure under the Treaties.216 Secondly, subsequent case-law after Titanium Oxide shows 
that the lex specialis limitation should be taken seriously.  
Particularly illustrating for the subsidiary nature of Article 114 TFEU is Commission v 
Council (recovery of indirect taxes).217 In this case the Commission argued that the directive 
on recovery of indirect taxes218, adopted on the basis of Article 113 TFEU and Article 115 
TFEU, was adopted on the wrong legal bases and should have been adopted on the basis of 
Article 114 TFEU because it was primarily an internal market measure.219 The Court first 
restated the ‘predominant purpose’ rule, holding that a sole legal basis should be used as a 
main rule and then went on to consider if, by way of exception, a dual legal basis could be 
used.220 The Court noted that the different decision-making procedures in Article 113 TFEU 
and Article 115 TFEU on the one hand and Article 114 TFEU on the other hand made it 
impossible to employ Article 114 TFEU conjointly with the first-mentioned legal bases. The 
Court then emphasised that the very wording of Article 114 TFEU provided that that article 
only be applied if the Treaty does not provide otherwise. If the Treaty contains a more 
specific provision that is capable of constituting the legal basis for the Directive, it must be 
founded on such a provision. That was particularly the case with regard to Article 113 TFEU 
so far as concerned the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties 
and other forms of indirect taxation. The Court also pointed to the fact that Article 114 (2) 
                                              
215 See Herlin-Karnell, ‘White-collar crime and European financial crises’ (n 74) 485-87. 
216 See Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council (n 214) paras. 15-24, 45-65, 70-88. 
217 See Case C-338/01 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I-04829. 
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TFEU expressly excludes ‘fiscal provisions’ whose harmonization therefore cannot take 
place on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. Since the concept of ‘fiscal provisions’ also covers 
measures relating to arrangements for the collection of indirect and direct taxes and given the 
fact that an examination of the purpose and the aim of the Directive suggested that it was 
concerned with ‘fiscal provisions’ within the meaning of Article 114(2) TFEU, the Court 
concluded that Article 114 TFEU was not the appropriate legal basis for the directive. 221 
This case reinforces three lessons learned from earlier and subsequent case-law222 about the 
subsidiary nature of Article 114(1) TFEU in relation to other legal bases. First, if the 
proposed measure fits better under a specific legal basis, Article 114 TFEU cannot be used 
for the measure.223 The second lesson from Commission v Council is that the exclusion of 
harmonization of certain areas enumerated in Article 114 (2) TFEU should be taken seriously 
by the EU legislator.224 Thirdly, the mere fact that a measure has an indirect effect on the 
internal market is not sufficient for Article 114 TFEU to apply. Recourse to Article 114 
TFEU is not justified where the proposed measure has only incidental or ancillary effects on 
trade or the competitive conditions of firms within the Union.225 
Herlin-Karnell’s argument, suggesting that Article 114 TFEU can be used as a plein pouvoir 
for imposing criminal laws, must thus be qualified. Article 114 TFEU is only to be used as a 
subsidiary legal basis when other specific legal bases, such as Article 83(2) TFEU, cannot be 
employed for the adoption of criminal laws. Similar considerations as those discussed above 
in relation to Article 352 TFEU apply here.226 If the envisaged criminal law measure does not 
fall within the scope of Article 83(2) TFEU, because the proposed measure is a ‘regulation’ 
                                              
221 ibid, paras 59-62, 67, 70-76. 
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 See Case C-155/91 Commission v Council [1993] ECR I-00939. In this case, the Court upheld Council 
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and it requires the ‘de-criminalization’ of certain offences, there could be a case for 
employing Article 114 TFEU, as long as the conditions of this legal basis are met. 
C The nature of Article 83(2) TFEU cannot limit the use of Article 114 TFEU 
and Article 352 TFEU for criminalizing infringements of the EU 
competition rules 
 
As argued above227, Article 83(2) TFEU does not provide the necessary powers to adopt 
criminal law harmonization of certain fields of EU law, such as EU competition law, where 
there is a lack of previous ‘harmonization measures’ within the meaning of Article 83(2) 
TFEU. It therefore seems possible to use other legal bases of the Treaties such as Article 114 
TFEU and Article 352 TFEU for such criminalization measures. The limitations of Article 
114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU stating that those provisions can only be used if the Treaty 
does not otherwise provide the necessary powers are no obstacles for the criminalization of 
EU competition rules.228 This is for the simple reason that no other power in the Treaties exist 
for harmonizing national criminal laws in relation to competition law infringements.229  
What about the fact that competition policy is an exclusive Union policy according to Article 
3 (b) TFEU?230  
This could lead to the quite remarkable consequence that neither the Member States nor the 
Union could adopt criminal sanctions to enforce Union competition rules. However, it 
appears questionable whether the expression ‘competition rules’ in Article 3(b) TFEU should 
be interpreted as also encompassing the criminal law provisions ‘necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market’.231 There would be some force in the argument that 
criminal law provisions are not ‘competition rules’ within the meaning of Article 3(b) TFEU. 
This is because ‘criminal law’ necessarily does not belong to the sphere of ‘competition law’. 
Criminal law provisions, regardless of the substantive rules they intend to enforce, are 
arguably more concerned with the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) than the 
                                              
227 See above section II (C) in the present chapter. 
228 See above chapter 4- section II A for an outline of the argument why criminalization of competition law 
would be possible under Article 114 (and Article 352 TFEU).  
229 See Dougan, ‘From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist’ (n 2) 111. 
230 Article 3 (b) TEU provides that the Union has exclusive competence in providing ‘the establishing of the 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market’. 
231 See, however, for a different opinion: Giorgio Monti,’ Legislative and Executive Competences in 
Competition Law’ in Loïc Azoulai, The Question of Competence in the European Union (OUP 2014) 107. 
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substantive exclusive Union competence on competition policy. This is so because the AFSJ 
concerns ‘the approximation of criminal laws’ according to Article 67(3) TFEU and Article 
83 TFEU. The specificity and sensitivity of criminal law reinforce the assumption that the 
Union’s implicit criminal law power in the field of competition law cannot be an exclusive 
competence of the Union.232 It would not make sense if the EU had an exclusive competence 
to enforce the EU competition rules by criminal sanctions but a general shared competence 
for other criminal law measures within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.233 It seems 
inconsistent if the nature of the EU’s criminal law competence would differ depending on 
whether criminalization is employed for supporting exclusive EU policies or whether it is 
used to enforce rules adopted in fields of shared competences. It seems unlikely that the 
Member States, given their general unwillingness to transfer sovereignty in criminal law234, 
would have agreed to confer exclusive competences on the EU in the criminal enforcement of 
EU competition policy. The Court’s case-law also supports the view that the EU’s power to 
criminalize its competition rules must be a shared competence. The EU’s general criminal 
law competence in the Environmental Crimes judgment was derived from Article 192 TFEU 
and the environmental policy field, which is a shared competence between the Member States 
and the EU.235 
What about the final objection then that the telos of Article 83 TFEU and Title V of the 
Treaties exclude the possibility that criminal law competences can be exercised under other 
legal basis of the Treaties?  
I do not think this objection can challenge the exercise of a criminal law competence under 
other legal bases of the Treaties in the situation where the envisaged measure cannot be 
validly adopted under Article 83 TFEU. First, it seems unreasonable that the Treaty drafters 
would have had the intention of removing the previously held competence under the Court’s 
jurisprudence if they were aware of the fact that Article 83(2) TFEU does not cover 
criminalization in fields such as competition policy. Secondly, there is no clear textual 
indication in the Treaties that the harmonization of criminal law would be prohibited under 
other provisions of the Treaties other than those in Title V. Although criminal law is sensitive 
and the drafters of the Treaties may have intended to expressly reserve criminal law 
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harmonization to Title V of the Treaties, this objective has not been realized by the current 
structure of the Treaties. If the drafters of the Treaties would have had such an intention, they 
should have expressed this by means of more unambiguous wording. Given this, it is not 
reasonable to argue that Title V excludes the use of other legislative powers in the Treaties 
for criminal law.236 Thirdly, the EU’s general implied competence to criminalize, derived 
from the Court’s jurisprudence, is a broad one. It also clearly applies to EU competition law. 
It was shown in chapter 4 that this power is only limited to the objectives and to the structure 
of the Treaties.237 The structure of the Treaties is not built on a formal distinction between 
areas of civil, administrative and criminal law. Instead the catalogue of Union powers is 
based on ‘policies’, i.e. on substantive matters, with regard to the purposes and objectives in 
Articles 2 and 3 TEU. Criminal law is neither an independent policy in the Treaties nor a self-
standing framework in the Treaties. The Union’s implied criminal law powers are of a 
horizontal nature and used as an enforcement tool, ‘a means to an end’238, to the benefit of all 
or nearly all forms of Union regulatory policies and objectives.239  
Having shown that the nature of Article 83(2) TFEU cannot prevent the adoption of criminal 
law measures sanctioning breaches of EU competition law under Article 114 TFEU or Article 
352 TFEU, it is time to wrap up the findings of the chapter. 
IV CONCLUSIONS 
 
Building on the findings in chapter 2 on the conceptual limits to the exercise of EU 
competences and the findings in chapter 3 on the scope of judicial review in setting limits to 
EU competences, the chapter’s purpose was to consider the limits to the Union’s express 
criminal law under Article 83(2) TFEU.  
 
The chapter had three themes. 
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This position is supported by recent legislative practice from the Commission which has suggested that there 
is a criminal law competence under Article 325 TFEU; ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
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The first theme I considered was how criminal law contributes to the enforcement of existing 
EU policies. This theme was illuminated and explored within the framework of the EU’s 
express criminal law competence in Article 83(2) TFEU whose exercise is dependent upon 
the effectiveness of criminal laws and its superiority over other sanctions. A strict systematic, 
linguistic and contextual interpretation of this provision unravelled the limits to the exercise 
of a criminal law competence. I argued, in contrast to the predominant view of the literature, 
that the ‘essentiality’ condition is a check on the exercise of the powers in Article 83(2) 
TFEU. It was proposed that the ‘essentiality’ condition in Article 83(2) TFEU should be 
subject to a two-part test. First, the Union legislator must show that criminal laws are 
‘effective’ for the implementation of Union policies. If criminal sanctions are ‘effective’, the 
Union legislator must secondly show that other non-criminal sanctions are not equally 
effective as criminal sanctions in implementing Union policies. I then challenged the general 
view in the literature that review of the ‘essentiality’ condition is mainly a question for the 
EU political institutions. I argued instead that there needs to be a strict judicial enquiry, on 
the basis of the proposed test in chapter 3, to control conformity with this condition. The 
Union legislator would have to prove, through empirical evidence, that criminal sanctions are 
‘essential’ for the effective implementation of Union policies.    
 
I then examined closely whether specific instances of criminalization really contribute to the 
implementation of a specific EU policy. I analysed this question by reviewing the Market 
Abuse Crimes Directive adopted on the basis of Article 83(2) TFEU. It was demonstrated 
that this directive did not meet the proposed legality test in chapter 3 that the Commission 
must show that at least one of the reasons, which are considered to offer an independent 
justification for criminalization, is supported by sufficient and relevant evidence. This was 
particularly because the Commission in the legislative background documents had only been 
able to invoke one study as relevant evidence for the ‘essentiality’ of criminal laws. The 
cautious conclusion from this review was that the EU legislator, by adopting the Market 
Abuse Crimes Directive, endeavoured to harmonise national laws under the guise of Article 
83(2) TFEU without considering available non-criminal sanctions and without any clear idea 
why this is a necessary option. This approach from the EU legislator must be condemned 
both as a matter of policy and from a legal perspective. 
 
The second consideration of the chapter was the relationship between criminalization and 
existing EU harmonization measures. It was maintained that one of the general limitations to 
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the exercise of an EU criminal law competence under Article 83(2) TFEU is that there must 
be previous harmonization measures in place before the criminal law proposal is adopted. 
This view challenged the general understanding in the literature that has not interpreted the 
‘harmonization’ requirement as a limit to criminalization under Article 83(2) TFEU. Based 
on the structure of the Treaties and the new division between ‘legislative’ acts and ‘non-
legislative’ acts, I suggested that it is only secondary legislation adopted through the 
‘ordinary’ or ‘special’ legislative procedure adopted prior to the criminal law directive that 
can constitute a ‘harmonisation’ measures for the purposes of Article 83(2) TFEU. 
Harmonisation through Treaty amendments, recommendations or international agreements 
would not be considered as ‘harmonisation’ measures under Article 83(2) TFEU since such 
harmonisation has not taken place through the ‘special’ or ‘ordinary’ legislative procedure as 
required by this legal basis. Because the EU’s express criminal law competence is ancillary 
and connected to the underlying EU policy, I also maintained that the EU needs to have 
adopted ‘substantive’ harmonisation measures prior to the adoption of the criminal law 
directive. Such ‘substantive’ harmonisation measures could for example be the 
approximation of the relevant prohibitions for an activity or approximation of conditions of 
non-criminal liability which describe the prohibited types of behaviour in detail.  
 
I then examined the practical application of the harmonization requirement. EU competition 
law was the first example. It was found that this field of law could not be harmonized under 
Article 83(2) TFEU. First, harmonization through the founding Treaties in Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU could not constitute ‘harmonization’ measures since such harmonization was not 
adopted through the ‘ordinary’ and the ‘special’ legislative procedures. Secondly, it would 
not be possible to use Regulation 1/2003 as an underlying ‘harmonisation’ measure to trigger 
Article 83(2) TFEU. This was because this regulation does not provide for ‘substantive’ 
harmonization of the material rules on competition and because it was adopted on the basis of 
Article 103 TFEU, which is not a ‘special’ or ‘ordinary’ legislative procedure. In the case of 
EU financial regulations, it was conversely shown that the recently adopted Market Abuse 
Regulation (MAR) provides for sufficient ‘harmonisation’ to be used as a basis for the 
recently adopted Market Abuse Crimes Directive. This is firstly because the MAR was 
intended to constitute a ‘substantive’ harmonisation measure. It was adopted on the legal 
basis of Article 114 TFEU, which is the general harmonization provision of the Treaties, and 
aims to remove distortions of competition and obstacles to trade arising from divergent 
national laws on the regulation of market abuse. It was found that the MAR is not only 
194 
 
intended to be a substantive ‘harmonization measure’ but that it is a de facto harmonisation 
measure. The crucial harmonising features of the MAR is that it lays down the material 
prohibitions against insider dealing and market manipulation, which is then directly linked to 
the description of the offences in the Market Abuse Crimes Directive.  
  
The third theme of the chapter was the question of legal basis for criminalization after Lisbon 
Treaty. I argued that whilst Article 83(2) TFEU may have been intended by the Treaty 
drafters to be a lex specialis for criminalization, the structure and the wording of the Treaties 
has not been able to unequivocally exclude the use of other legal basis for criminalization. I 
thereby contested the prevailing opinion in the literature that the nature of Article 83(2) 
TFEU would altogether exclude the exercise of criminal law competence under other legal 
bases of the Treaties. In the scenario where the envisaged measure does not fall within the 
scope of Article 83(2) TFEU, because the proposed measure is a ‘regulation’ and provides for 
the ‘de-criminalization’ of certain offences, there could be a case for employing other legal 
bases such as Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU for the measure. Furthermore, given 
that there is no underlying ‘harmonisation measures’ in the field of EU competition law 
necessary to trigger the competence in Article 83(2) TFEU, I proposed that other legal bases, 
such as Article 114 TFEU or Article 352 TFEU could be used for criminal law harmonization 
in this field of EU law. 








CHAPTER 6- CAN SUBSIDIARITY ACT AS A CHECK ON THE EXERCISE OF 




This chapter examines the potential of subsidiarity as a ground to challenge EU legislation. In 
a substantive sense, the chapter builds on and develops the argument from chapter 2 that 
subsidiarity must be constructed as a principle challenging the internal market justification. 
From the perspective of judicial enforcement it takes the argument of procedural review from 
chapter 3 further to show how the subsidiarity principle can help the Court to construct limits 
on the exercise of EU competence. 
The principle of subsidiarity is one of the most contested issues in European Law scholarship. 
While the debate of subsidiarity was initially focussed on its impact on EU law and whether it 
was judicially enforceable1, the discussion on whether subsidiarity is justiciable has now 
come to an end.2 Subsidiarity is justiciable and to suggest anything else would run counter to 
the whole institution of judicial review and fly in the face of the new Protocol No 2 on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality (‘Protocol no 2’) which 
explicitly requires the Court to hear actions on the basis of subsidiarity.3 The subsidiarity 
debate has also for a long time revolved around the issue on how subsidiarity can be made 
operational. It has been generally alleged that subsidiarity’s vague character and weak 
conceptual contours has made it unworkable as a legal principle that restricts the exercise of 
Union competences.4 Those allegations are well-defended and supported by a judicial record 
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demonstrating that the Court has so far been unable to develop criteria with which 
subsidiarity can be applied to limit the exercise of EU competences. Observers have with 
good reason denounced the Court for not taking subsidiarity seriously. Those observers have 
not, however, yet proposed any conceptual tools that the Court could use in order to credibly 
review on the basis of subsidiarity. Nor has the scholarship developed comprehensive 
objective criteria against which subsidiarity can be measured.5 The debate on the weaknesses 
of subsidiarity must move on and it is now necessary to consider how subsidiarity can be 
made operational.  
The discussion on subsidiarity has also at times suffered from conceptual confusion. For 
example, while some commentators have conceptualised subsidiarity as ‘federal 
proportionality’6 and as a ‘matter of competence’7 others have focussed on subsidiarity’s 
meaning as a ‘democratic principle’8 and as a tool to strengthen ‘legal diversity’ and ‘national 
self-determination’.9 Admittedly, subsidiarity concerns may potentially be related to matters 
of competence and proportionality.10 I suggest however that the problems of delineating 
subsidiarity from ‘competence’ and ‘proportionality’ have undermined the effectiveness of 
the principle as a limit to the exercise of EU competences. Conceptually, subsidiarity cannot 
be transformed into a proportionality mechanism. It provides neither substantive protection 
for national autonomy nor a balancing mechanism between the interests of the Member States 
and the interests of the EU.11 Subsidiarity’s aim is to ensure economic efficiency and 
democratic legitimacy.12 Subsidiarity is not a matter of competence nor is it a matter of 
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proportionality. Subsidiarity asks ‘who’ should implement the EU’s regulatory objective. 
This is a strict question of whether a specific measure, in a field in which Member States and 
the Union share competence, should, given its objective, the nature and the geographical 
scope of the problem, be adopted by the Member States or the Union.13 I believe that the 
values of subsidiarity such as ‘legal diversity’, ‘democratic values’ or ‘national self-
determination’ must be protected. Such values can and should influence the interpretation of 
the subsidiarity concept. However, I argue that in order to implement these values we must 
first construct proper legal criteria that can structure the subsidiarity analysis. 
Having shown that the current conceptual understanding of subsidiarity is inadequate and that 
judicial enforcement of the principle must be improved, we can move on to present the 
outline and the arguments of the chapter. Building on the lessons from chapter 2 regarding 
the problems of finding a meaningful definition of subsidiarity, the first section of the chapter 
tries to respond to the conceptual challenges of subsidiarity. It develops a theory of how 
subsidiarity can be reconceptualised as a principle that challenges the paradigmatic internal 
market justification for exercise of Union competences. The argument here, building on the 
Edinburgh Guidelines and the Court’s jurisprudence ruling, is to require the Union to make 
its case for harmonization by demonstrating the risk or the existence of a serious ‘market 
failure’14 which requires EU action.15 Although the internal market justification is not without 
merit, it rest on questionable assumptions regarding alleged dysfunctions in the internal 
market. Such assumptions need to be substantiated by the Union legislator in order to make 
the case for harmonization.16  
In the second part of the chapter, the challenge of judicial enforcement is tackled. On the 
basis of the general argument on procedural review presented in chapter 3 this part examines 
the potential of a procedural review of subsidiarity as a solution for the problems of judicial 
review. On the basis of the general literature of judicial review and the literature on judicial 
review of subsidiarity17, I argue that a procedural perspective is the way forward to 
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operationalize subsidiarity. The concern that the Court has no legitimacy or competence to 
assess material subsidiarity can be rebutted through the employment of a procedural review 
of subsidiarity.18 By applying the standard of legality developed in chapter 3 on ‘adequate 
reasoning’ and ‘relevant evidence’ it is shown how subsidiarity can be judicially enforced.  
In the third part of the chapter, the subsidiarity concept developed in the chapter is applied to 
one case study in the field of EU criminal policy, the recently adopted Market Abuse Crimes 
Directive19. This case study is chosen for two reasons. First, the example demonstrates clearly 
how subsidiarity is applied in the field of EU criminal law. It shows how the need for EU 
action in the field of EU criminal law is primarily defended on the basis that differences in 
national criminal laws create distortions of competition through regulatory arbitrage.20 
Secondly, because the Market Abuse Crimes Directive and the accompanying proposal21 and 
impact assessment22 encompass a subsidiarity justification it is possible to test the theories 
developed in the chapter. The examination shows that the Directive, whilst being adequately 
reasoned, does not conform to the legality test of providing for ‘relevant’ evidence. This is 
because the proposal and the impact assessment accompanying the Directive do not contain 
any evidence to support the Commission’s allegations of the risk for distortions of 
competition arising from different criminalization regimes.  
I  MATERIAL SUBSIDIARITY AND THE INTERNAL MARKET 
JUSTIFICATION 
 
A Pragmatic concern about the subsidiarity criterion justifies a shift of focus 
from ‘national insufficiency’ to ‘comparative efficiency’? 
 
                                              
18 See Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutionalizing Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco Regulation 
in the European Union’ 12 (2006) European Law Journal 503, 528-30. 
19 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions 
for market abuse (market abuse directive) [2014] OJ L 173/79 (‘Market Abuse Crimes Directive’ ‘Directive’). 
20
 Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, Accompanying the document Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing market manipulation (market 
abuse) and the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions for 
insider dealing and market manipulation’, Brussels, 20.10.2011, SEC(2011) 1217 final, 33, 125; Commission, 
‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider 
dealing and market manipulation’, Brussels, 20.10.2011, COM (2011) 654 final (‘Market Abuse Crimes 
Proposal’), 5. 
21 See Market Abuse Crimes Proposal (n 20) 5. 
22 See SEC (2011) 1217 (n 20) 33. 
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This section examines the conceptual basis of the subsidiarity concept. The analysis begins 
with a consideration of the relevance of the ‘national insufficiency’ criterion for giving 
meaning to the subsidiarity concept. To understand the relevance of the ‘national 
insufficiency’ criterion, it is appropriate first to consider the textual expression of the 
subsidiarity principle in the relevant legal sources. A linguistic interpretation of Article 5 
TEU and Protocol no 2 suggests the following subsidiarity test. First, the Union must show 
that the Union objective at stake cannot sufficiently be achieved by the Member States acting 
alone or in conjunction (‘national insufficiency’ test). Then, it must be demonstrated that 
Union action is better at achieving those objectives by reason of the scale or effects of the 
measure (‘comparative surplus’ test).23 Those two limbs must be supported by an adequate 
justification and qualitative and quantitative indicators.24 
One important interpretive issue is whether the two limbs are alternative. Here there is room 
for different interpretations. First, there is a ‘narrow’ construction of subsidiarity which, in a 
simplified version, provides that unless the Union is able to show that Member State action is 
insufficient to achieve the objectives at stake, the exercise of the competence remains with 
the Member States. Thus, even if the Union would be more ‘efficient’ in achieving the 
outcome, Union action would be precluded if Member State action ‘sufficiently’ achieves the 
envisaged outcome of the proposed action.25 Secondly, there is a ‘functional’ interpretation 
that is concentrated on the ‘comparative surplus’ test. This construction implies that if Union 
action is significantly better at achieving the objectives in terms of scale and effects, there is a 
case for Union action based on subsidiarity regardless if Member States actions are sufficient 
to achieve the EU objectives.26 
It is difficult to square the criteria of ‘national insufficiency’ and the ‘comparative surplus’ 
criterion. As we know, the first part of Article 5 TEU provides that the Union ‘shall act only 
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States’ while the second part states that the Union shall only act if ’….by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action’, the objectives of the proposed action would’ be 
better achieved at Union level’. It can be argued that the wording of Article 5 TEU provides 
some support for the ‘narrow interpretation’ because the provision first mentions the ‘national 
                                              
23 See Christoph Ritzer, Marc Ruttloff and Karin Linhart, ‘How to Sharpen a Dull Sword - The Principle of 
Subsidiarity and its Control’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 733, 739. 
24 See Protocol no 2, Article 5. 
25
 See Lenaerts (n 1) 875-877; Edward T Swaine,’ Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European 
Court of Justice’ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 52.   
26 See Estrella (n 4) 94-96. 
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insufficiency’ test and only then emphasizes, by a double conditional marker ‘only if’ and ‘in 
so far as’, that the national insufficiency test should be fulfilled before one can consider the 
‘comparative surplus’ test. The ‘narrow interpretation’ is, however, contradicted by the 
second part of Article 5 TEU which suggests that Union action must take place if either 
Member States cannot achieve the objectives at stake or if Union action can better achieve 
those objectives, which is indicated by the phrase ‘but can rather…be better achieved at 
Union level’. Subsidiarity compliance could thus in this scenario be justified on either the 
fact that Member State action was ‘insufficient’ or on the basis that the Union had a 
‘comparative surplus’. In sum there is neither robust support for the ‘narrow’ nor the ‘broad’ 
interpretation.  
Since it is nearly impossible, by a textual interpretation, to determine whether a ‘narrow’ or 
‘functional’ interpretation is the most appropriate, we should take into account other 
considerations to select the correct interpretation. In this regard, there are both 
‘systemic/genetic’ and ‘dynamic criteria’.27 On the basis of a genetic method of 
interpretation28 it is not possible to determine whether a narrow or ‘functional’ interpretation 
was preferred. Given the drafting history of the Maastricht Treaty we can see that some 
preferred a narrow interpretation and some preferred a functional one. While the German, 
Dutch, and French Governments preferred a version of subsidiarity in which the Union would 
be entitled to act whenever it had a comparative advantage, the British argued for an 
interpretation under which Union action would be permissible only when necessary. In the 
end, these two concepts were cobbled together into what is now Article 5 TEU.29 Given the 
fact that the ‘genetic’30 interpretation is just as inconclusive as a textual interpretation, we 
should take into account dynamic criteria to determine the correct interpretation of Article 5 
TEU. 
It is argued that ‘functional’ and ‘consequentialist’ considerations31 favour a ‘broad’ 
interpretation focussing on the ‘comparative efficiency’ test. A functional interpretation 
                                              
27 See Giulio Itzcovich, ‘The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of Justice’ (2009) 10 
German Law Journal 537, 549-557, for the use of this terminology. See also Gunnar Beck, The Legal Reasoning 
of the Court of Justice of the EU (Hart 2012) 210-219, for a similar use of terminology. 
28
 See Niall Fennelly, ‘Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice’ (1996) 20 Fordham International 
Law Journal 656, 664-668, 670-676, on the ‘teleological method’.  
29See Swaine (n 25) 52, at n 246; Paul Green, ‘Subsidiarity and European Union: Beyond the Ideological 
Impasse? An Analysis of the Origins and Impact of the Principle of Subsidiarity Within the Politics of the 
European Community’ (1994) 22 Policy & Politics 287, 290- 293. 
30 See Itzcovich (n 27) 553-555; Beck (n 27) 217-219. 
31 See Beck, (n 27) 132, who sees them as evaluative or teleological considerations. 
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assumes that a legal provision must be interpreted in a way that ensures its capacity to 
function in an effective way while a consequentialist method suggests that one should take 
into account the foreseeable legal-economic consequences of an interpretation.32 In order for 
subsidiarity to maintain its capacity to function in an efficient way and to not overburden the 
Court in its task of applying the principle, the interpretation of subsidiarity must focus on the 
‘comparative efficiency’ test. First, it would always be difficult for claimants to argue, based 
on competing scenarios that Member States’ actions could have reached the same objective. 
Secondly, it is very difficult for the Court to evaluate the Commission’s assertion that 
Member State action had been or would be insufficient to achieve the objectives at stake of 
the action.33 Thirdly, the Commission could always frame the objective so narrowly as to 
‘disintegrate’ the ‘national insufficiency’ test to a test of ‘comparative efficiency’. If the 
Commission defines the objectives to be achieved by the measure very narrowly so as to 
indicate that the objectives include optimum attainment, and since such objectives are the 
touchstone for subsidiarity, they may circumvent the distinction between the ‘national 
insufficiency’ and ‘comparative efficiency’ tests.34 Finally, there are principled reasons why 
the focus should move away from national insufficiency to ‘comparative efficiency’. By 
focusing on Member State alternatives, we would miss the essential question of subsidiarity 
which is whether there is a market failure and whether Union action would provide for strong 
added value in correcting the problem.35 It seems very plausible that the real battle in 
subsidiarity cases will be fought over the issue of whether Union action provides for 
‘comparative surplus’. 
Having dismissed the significance of the national insufficiency test, we now move on to 
consider in more detail the comparative surplus test. 
B Comparative surplus and the internal market justification 
 
In order to understand the concrete content of the ‘comparative surplus’ test we should 
closely review the Edinburgh Guidelines36, which provide substantive guidelines on how 
                                              
32 These are well-recognized method of interpretation of EU Law; Itzcovich (n 27) 549- 555; Beck (n 27) 210-
215.  
33 See Bermann (n 1) 391-92.  
34 See Swaine (n 25) 52, at n 250; Bermann (n 1) 383. 
35 See Swaine (n 25) 53-55. 
36 See European Council, ’Conclusions adopted at Edinburgh European Council, Annex 1 to Part A: Overall 
Approach to the Application by the Council of the Subsidiarity Principle and Article 3b of the Treaty on 
European Union’ Bulletin of the European Communities 12-1992, 11-12 December 1992, 18-19. 
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subsidiarity should be conceptualised.37 These guidelines list three criteria that must be taken 
into account in assessing the need for Union action: i) the ‘cross-border’ criterion; ii) the 
‘internal market criterion’; and iii) the ‘clear benefits’ criterion.38  
The first criterion asks whether the transnational nature of the envisaged measure makes the 
Union a better regulatory body. The scope of Union competences both in the field of Union 
legislative action and in the field of application of the free movement rules, have always 
depended on the need for the Union to show a cross-border aspect.39 The cross-border nature 
of an issue is the conventional justification for the Union in its harmonization efforts under 
the Treaties, in particular under Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU.40 The Commission 
usually defends its proposal in terms of the scale of action, affirming that an action of the EU 
is necessary because the proposed measure has cross-border effects and therefore the 
adoption of national measures could not attain the same result.41 The rationale for Union 
action is based on ‘collective action problems’ arising from situations in which, for example, 
certain behaviours or problems affect more than one Member State at the same time and 
independent actions by the Member States fail to secure citizens’ welfare because the 
Member States’ cost of regulating the problem on their own is higher than the cost of taking 
                                              
37 Even though there has been no conclusive ruling on the Edinburgh Guidelines, the Court assumes that the 
guidelines, as they were codified by the Amsterdam Protocol (no 30) on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality [1997] OJ C 321/308, provide for an authoritative definition of subsidiarity. For 
this reason, they are a relevant source of interpretation; Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) 
and Imperial Tobacco (n 10), para 178; Joined cases C-154/04 and 155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and 
others [2005] ECR I-06451, para. 102; Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others (n 16), paras 72-74. 
38 The Edinburgh Guidelines (n 36), 18-19, state that the Union should consider the following criteria to decide 
whether a matter requires Union action under the subsidiarity principle: 
 ‘ - the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by action by 
Member States; 
- actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict with the requirements of the 
Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion of competition or avoid disguised restrictions on trade or 
strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would otherwise significantly damage Member States’ interests; 
- action at Community level would produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or effects compared with action 
at the level of the Member States.’ 
39 
See regarding scope of application of the fundamental freedoms: Koen Lenaerts, ‘ ‘Civis europaeus sum’: 
from the cross-border link to the status of citizen of the Union’ (2011) 3 FMW Online journal of free movement 
of workers 6, 6-7. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=737&langId=sv&pubId=6193&type=1&furtherPubs=no>. Accessed 
7 May 2014. Regarding the scope of EU legislative competence; see René Barents, ’The Internal Market 
Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of Community Legislation’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law 
Review 85, 106-109. 
40 See Swaine (n 25), 53. 
41 See Lucia Serena Rossi, ’ Does the Lisbon Treaty Provide a Clearer Separation of Competences between EU 




‘collective’ action.42 Weatherill has explained this rationale. In some circumstances, made 
more common by transnational economic integration, a decision taken by one bloc of citizens 
may have serious negative consequences for another politically more remote bloc of citizens. 
In short, national-level decision-making may be flawed in its assumption that there exist a 
stable set of consumers of those decisions, whose preferences will be fully satisfied by the 
national polity and who are not joined by other ‘external’ affected parties. EU law needs to 
correct these malfunctions.43 There is a case for common Union action since such actions 
may reap efficiency benefits by reducing the costs associated with these spill-overs and prove 
mutually beneficial for the Member States.44 The ‘cross-border’ criterion is the least 
controversial of the three listed in the guidelines. If there is a truly transnational problem and 
Member States cannot resolve that problem, the legitimacy for Union to act in the matter does 
not seem to be disputed.45  
Whilst it is true that the ‘cross-border’ nature of the regulated problem certainly may support 
Union action under the subsidiarity problem, I maintain that there are limits to the use of this 
justification. If the matter and the nature of the problem have a national dimension without 
any externalities or affect only incidentally more than one Member State, I maintain that we 
should be very suspicious of the Union’s right to act in the matter.46 Incidental or theoretical 
cross-border effects cannot, as the Court stated in the Tobacco Advertising judgment, be used 
as a reason for exercising the EU’s internal market competence under Article 114 TFEU.47 It 
only arises where the cross-border nature and effect of an activity is such that the EU is 
substantially better equipped than the Member States to regulate that activity.48 The cross-
border criterion should thus be considered in conjunction with the ‘clear benefits’ criterion, 
which entails that Union action must entail concrete benefits in terms of dealing with the 
cross-border problem.  
                                              
42 See Swaine (n 25) 107; Frederick J Lee, ‘Global Institutional Choice’ (2010) 85 New York University Law 
Review 328, 329-336. 
43 See Stephen Weatherill, ‘Competence creep and competence control’ (2004) 23 Yearbook of European Law 
1, 34-35; Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others (n16), Opinion of AG Maduro, para 34. 
44 See Richard B Stewart: ‘Environmental Law in the United States and the European Community: Spillovers, 
Cooperation, Rivalry, Institutions’ (1992) University of Chicago Legal Forum 41, 44. 
45 See Bermann (n 1) 370; De Búrca,‘Re-appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam’ (n 4) 25; Lee 
(n 42) 330. 
46 See Kiiver (n 7) 93; Josephine Van Zeben,’ Regulatory Competence Allocation: The Missing Link in 
Theories of Federalism’ (2012) Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre Workshop, Paris, France, 11 
December  2012,  30 <http://economix.fr/pdf/seminaires/lien/Van-Zeben.pdf> Accessed 7 May 2014. 
47 See Case C- 376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] ECR I-08419, paras 
83-84. 
48 See Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others (n 16), Opinion of AG Maduro, para 34. 
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The second criterion - the ‘internal market’ one - repeats the standard claim for why Union 
harmonization is necessary. When the Union’s commitment to maintain and create an internal 
market requires action or when Member State action would jeopardize the achievement of the 
internal market, Union action is preferable.49 The internal market justification is a wide one. 
It can theoretically be employed to justify Union intervention in all national policy fields. 
This appears from the fact that potentially any difference in the laws of the different Member 
States can be construed as a distortion to competition or as a barrier to trade. When the Court 
defines an obstacle in the context of free movement law and the Treaty prohibitions, it also 
defines the kind of things that may be harmonized. This reading of the internal market is 
supported by the use of Article 114 TFEU by the Union legislative institutions whose 
legislative practice suggests that there are no constraints on Union action under the internal 
market paradigm. The idea is that since the integration of states and peoples are 
unequivocally affected by matters such as language, culture and identity, as well as 
infrastructure, wealth differences and education, all these matters can be harmonized. If there 
are to be genuinely no obstacles to the fundamental freedoms and a level playing field for 
competition, then almost any aspect of life can be harmonized.50 
By contrast, I maintain that limits must be constructed to the use of the internal market 
paradigm in order to avoid an indefinite expansion of Union competences and to protect 
localism and national diversity.51 The most effective technique of providing for some limits 
to the internal market rationale is to subject this justification to the above-mentioned ‘clear 
benefits’ criterion. Consistently with the ‘clear benefits’ criterion and the ‘internal market’ 
criterion, the Union must show that only Member State action will lead to or has led to a 
market failure and that the failure is of such a nature that only Union action can provide a 
remedy.52 The claim that the EU action benefits the internal market must be substantiated by 
proper evidence that Union action provides added value.53 
The Court’s ruling in Tobacco Advertising supports the application of such a test to the 
internal market justification. This point is nicely elaborated by Horsley. He notes that the 
Court’s core subsidiarity test has not developed under the subsidiarity heading, but under the 
                                              
49 See Swaine (n 25) 53. 
50 See De Búrca, ‘Re-appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam’ (n 4) 25-27; Gareth Davies,’ 
‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’ (2013) European Law Journal, 7, 17. 
Doi: 10.1111/eulj.12079.  
51 See Bermann (n 1) 370; Kumm (n 18) 509-510.  
52 See Kumm (n 18) 524. 
53 See Bermann (n 1) 370, 383-84; Swaine (n 25) 54. 
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Court’s case-law on Article 114 TFEU. In Horsley’s analysis, it appears that Tobacco 
Advertising was not so much about setting limits to the competence contained in Article 114 
TFEU, but rather about operationalizing the subsidiarity principle.54 The Court has 
consistently held that the Union does not enjoy a general power to regulate the internal 
market, and that it has to show either ‘appreciable distortions to competition’ and ‘genuine 
obstacles to trade’.55 Even if national differences may impact indirectly or incidentally on the 
conditions of competition for the undertakings concerned, this is not evidence of 
‘appreciable’ distortions of competition and cannot justify action under Article 114 TFEU.56  
By distilling some important lessons from Tobacco Advertising, it is shown how the 
subsidiarity principle can be strengthened and limits placed on the use of the internal market 
paradigm. On the basis of the Court’s ruling, I argue that the ‘clear benefits’ criterion in the 
Edinburgh Guidelines demand that it is necessary for the EU legislator to show that a 
measure ‘objectively’ and/or ‘appreciably’ contributes to the internal market.57 This test is 
not satisfied by merely showing an ‘abstract’ case that the measure might serve internal 
market purposes but by showing concretely through evidence that the measure actually will 
serve such purposes. Market analysis, economic impacts, actual and predicted economic 
consequences of measures and different scenarios, as evidenced by impact assessments, 
should be the benchmarks to decide whether the EU should regulate under Article 114 TFEU. 
From a constitutional perspective this approach is the most appropriate one. It takes the limits 
of competence to a significant extent outside questions of political preference, and brings 
them within the realm of what can be concretely defined and reviewed.58 Conformity with the 
subsidiarity principle must, as argued by Advocate General Maduro, be supported by more 
than simply highlighting the possible benefits accruing from Union action. It also involves a 
determination of the possible problems or costs involved in leaving the matter to be addressed 
by the Member States.59 The balance ought to be tipped in favour of EU action only when the 
transnational dimension of a problem and the actual failures of the national regulatory 
process substantially increase the beneficial effects of a common supranational intervention.60  
                                              
54 See Horsley (n 15) 269-270. 
55 See Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising (n 47), para 84. 
56 ibid, paras 106-107. 
57 See Kumm (n 18) 515. 
58 See Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’ (n 50) 17-18. 
59 See Case C- 58/08 Vodafone and others (n 16), Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, paras 31, 34. 
60 See Federico Fabbrini and Kasia Granat, ‘“Yellow card, but no foul”: The role of the national parliaments 
under the subsidiarity protocol and the Commission proposal for an EU regulation on the right to strike’ (2013) 
50 Common Market Law Review 115, 124. 
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Kumm supports this approach. Although he conceives ‘collective action’ problems as a 
trigger for Union action, whilst I consider market failures as a reason for Union action, both 
positions are equally sceptical of the internal market rationale for EU harmonization. He 
contends that the subsidiarity requirement establishes that the EU may act only if the action 
of Member States is structurally tainted by collective action problems. An important outcome 
of this is that, since the only legitimate reason for EU action is to correct collective action 
problems, all other reasons are excluded as irrelevant when justifying Union intervention. I 
therefore agree with Kumm that EU harmonization cannot be justified on the basis of the effet 
utile of furthering integration. The EU legislator is also precluded from substituting its own 
substantive judgment of the wisdom of Member States policy choices with regard to market 
regulation. Moreover, it cannot employ expressive reasons as reasons justifying European 
legislation. This means, for example as Kumm suggests, that a comprehensive common 
European civil code may not be enacted in Europe on the legal basis of Article 114 TFEU, if 
its purpose is to serve as a prestige project for a European legal science, and it cannot 
successfully be justified on other terms.61  
The question of whether subsidiarity always requires that the proposed Union measure 
provide for ‘clear benefits’ is, however, a contested issue. Apart from my proposed narrow 
‘decentralised’62 interpretation of subsidiarity, there is a ‘centralising’ interpretation of the 
Edinburgh guidelines. The ‘centralising’ interpretation means that Member States must 
surrender their regulatory powers whenever a problem can be better tackled at the collective 
level. Any problem that has a cross-border dimension should therefore be subject to Union 
intervention. Factors such as the effect or the scale of the operation, trans-frontier problems, 
the cost of inaction, Member States’ lack of capacity, including cases of potential market 
distortions where some Member States were able to act and others were not able to do so and 
the necessity to ensure that competition is not distorted within the common market, can 
justify Union action.63 
Lenaerts is an advocate of this interpretation. He argues, within the context of EU 
environmental law, that the Edinburgh Guidelines contain an extremely low threshold with 
regard to the need for Union action and submits that that ‘any kind of’ of cross-border spill-
                                              
61 See Kumm (n 18) 520. 
62 See Cass (n 1) 1124. 
63
 See Commission,’ Communication on the Principle of Subsidiarity for Transmission to the Council and 
Parliament,’ 25 European Communities Bulletin, SEC (92) 1990 final, Brussels, 27 October 1992, 2; Weatherill, 
‘Competence creep and competence control’ (n 42) 9-11. 
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over effects justify Union action under those guidelines.64 First, he observes that spill-overs 
in the field of environmental law arise from the fact that Member States might fear that the 
imposition of strict environmental standards and their enforcement could discourage industry 
and put the national economy at a competitive disadvantage relative to other Member States. 
Such a ‘regulatory race to the bottom’ could be avoided by Union action and is therefore 
justified under the second guideline and ‘the need to correct distortion of competition’.65 
Since Union action is more efficient, individual Member States will be ineffective in their 
efforts to sufficiently achieve the objectives of proposed Union action relating to cross-border 
spill-overs. He then employs the third guideline to support Union action. Even if Member 
States may be capable of producing the required outcome, Union action is more ‘efficient’ 
than the individual Member States in achieving the objectives of the proposed action. The 
three guidelines thus normally combine to support the need for Union action in 
environmental matters.66 
Lenaert’s interpretation of the Edinburgh Guidelines is at variance with the narrow 
interpretation proposed above. Whilst Lenaerts argues that any cross-border problem will do 
to justify EU action or that Union actions are justified if it is simply more efficient67, I argue 
that it is not sufficient for Union action to be simply more efficient. The Edinburgh 
Guidelines requires ‘clear benefits’ in order to justify Union intervention. The only tasks 
which should be assigned to the Union are those whose effects clearly extend beyond national 
frontiers. Such an interpretation would be compatible with the ‘decentralizing’ aim of 
subsidiarity.68 The central distinction between the ‘centralising’ interpretation and the 
‘narrow’ interpretation is related to the role of evidence. We can easily show this by 
examining Lenaert’s previous example on environmental spill-overs. Under the narrow 
interpretation it is not sufficient to refer to a potential spill-over/theoretical risk of distortions 
to competition to make the case for EU harmonization. There must be concrete evidence that 
the existence of ‘spill-overs’ gives rise to or risks giving rise to a ‘regulatory race’ where 
states compete with each other by ever more lenient environmental laws. The risk must be 
concrete in the sense that the EU legislator must show it to be ‘likely’ to arise; hypothetical 
                                              
64
 I am here only referring to ‘competitive spillover, while Lenaerts, (n 1) 880-881, also mentions’ product 
spillovers, pollution spillovers, and preservation spillovers’ which are derived from the classification provided 
by Stewart, (n 44) 41, 48-49. 
65 See Lenaerts (n 1) 880-881; Stewart (n 44) 46. 
66 See Lenaerts (n 1) 879, 880. 
67 ibid 865, 895. 
68 See Swaine (n 25) 53-54; Cass (n 1) 1124. 
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and abstract distortions will not be acceptable as evidence.69 Conversely, the ‘centralising’ 
interpretation accepts the risk of potential spill-overs as a justification for Union action.  
By extracting limits from the Court’s jurisprudence we have begun to construct an argument 
to contest the internal market justification. Further evidence from the economic and 
regulatory literature is, however, needed to make a convincing argument.  
The limits imposed by Tobacco Advertising, such as the need to show ‘appreciable 
distortions’ of competition, as well as the limits in the Edinburgh Guidelines requiring the 
Union to show ‘clear benefits’ of Union harmonization, are not only legal inventions but can 
also be defended on more principled and economic foundations.70 If we consider the 
economic rationales of harmonization, it can be argued that harmonization should, put 
simply, only take place if two conditions are fulfilled. First, it must be shown that national 
disparities give rise or risk giving rise to market failures in need of correction and that extend 
beyond national borders.71 Secondly, Union action must be more efficient than Member State 
action in avoiding or remedying those failures by increasing social welfare, taking into 
account the costs of the new rules.72 
The Commission often relies on ‘distortions of competition’ and ‘race to the bottom’ 
reasoning to justify the introduction of common European standards. Its recent proposals to 
harmonize national criminal laws in relation to infringements of EU regulatory schemes are 
cases in point. In these proposals, the Commission assumes that differences in Member 
States’ sanctioning regimes may create a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ in order to attract 
investment and firms. Firms in this scenario are subject to different costs for compliance 
because of different regulatory standards, putting firms in a jurisdiction with stringent 
regimes under a competitive disadvantage, giving rise to inefficient outcomes and 
competitive distortions.73 Without giving a judgment on the validity of the Commission’ 
                                              
69 See Case C- 376/98 Tobacco Advertising (n 47), paras 84-86, 106-107. 
70 See Biondi (n 2) 215-216; Van Zeben (n 46) 15. 
71 See Moloney (n 15) 7, 27. 
72 See Luca Enriques and Matteo Gatti, ‘The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law Harmonization in the 
European Union’ (2006) 27 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 939, 953; Van 
Zeben (n 46) 15, 23. 
73 See Commission’ Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal 
law, Impact Assessment’, Brussels, 9.2.2007, SEC (2007) 160, 24; Commission, ‘Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector’, Brussels, 
8.12.2010, COM(2010) 716 final, 10. 
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reasoning in these proposals I argue that the available evidence does not always support the 
case for harmonization based on ‘distortions of competition’. 
Enriques and Gatti illustrate generally why, in the context of European company law 
harmonization, arguments of ‘distortions of competition’ and ‘regulatory race to the bottom’ 
are not persuasive. First, they criticise the justification based on distortions of competition as 
not substantiated in the case of European company law harmonization. With no European 
‘Delaware’ in sight, rules to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ are unwarranted. Secondly, there 
are no other efficiency gains from EU harmonization. Far from lowering transaction costs, 
Union harmonization has raised them and can hardly be expected to do otherwise in the 
future.74 Enriques and Gatti’s example of EU company law harmonization supports the 
general argument made here. The assumption that differences in legislation give rise to 
distortions of competition and a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ is rarely justified on an 
empirical basis. Although their example is concerned with company law harmonization, there 
is no reason why their findings should not be generally applicable to EU harmonization 
measures.  
There is also an abundance of regulatory and legal literature questioning the logic of ‘race to 
the bottom’ and ‘safe haven’ scenarios. First, governments do not show a high propensity to 
engage in prolonged races towards the bottom. There is no reason to suppose that an EU-wide 
competition for comparative advantage will lead to Member States adopting inappropriately 
weak standards. In the absence of evidence that there is a race to the bottom and that Union 
intervention will improve outcomes, the competitive outcome should prevail. Secondly, 
evidence from different policy areas suggest that ‘safe haven’ scenarios have overestimated 
the role played by regulation in market behaviour.75 
The criminal law scholarship has also showed scepticism towards the use of ‘safe havens’ 
scenarios as a justification for harmonization of criminal laws. The competitive parameter of 
sanctioning regimes has little significance in relation to factors such as wage costs, tax rules, 
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labour costs, access to markets, a well-developed industrial base, infrastructure and other 
non-regulatory variables. Not much criminological evidence supports the proposition that 
offenders will learn to exploit differences between legal orders. Criminal activities are 
seldom likely to be strategically planned and to follow such clear cost/profit calculations. For 
deterrence purposes the risk of being caught is generally of greater importance than the 
severity of penalties. Rather than trying to deter potential offenders with harsh punishments, 
it may be much more effective to ensure that enough resources are available for the 
investigation and clearance of crime, particularly if there is a low risk of detection and 
apprehension. In the absence of a European Delaware with weak enforcement standards 
where criminals would decide to engage in white-collar offences, the case for Union action in 
criminal law is, in principle, a weak case.76 
Summing up the argument, I maintain that the subsidiarity principle contains a presumption77 
in favour of Member State action which can be rebutted only if the legal conditions for 
harmonization are fulfilled. First, the Union must show that there are national divergences 
which give rise to a market failure or a risk for a failure in the form of distortions to 
competition or obstacles to trade.78 Secondly, the EU legislator must show that the failure is 
of such a serious nature that only EU action is able to remedy it.79 Having accounted for the 
substance of subsidiarity and given some objective criteria in how to assess compliance with 
the principle, the next section considers how judicial review of subsidiarity can be enhanced 
and competence review made effective.  
II PROCEDURAL SUBSIDIARITY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
A The problems of judicial enforcement of subsidiarity 
 
While the previous section drew the contours of the subsidiarity concept in substantive terms, 
this section deals with procedural subsidiarity and judicial review. This section endeavours to 
respond to the challenge, discussed in chapter 2, that subsidiarity is bound to be subject to 
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inadequate judicial enforcement. I have already accounted above for the Court’s deferential 
review of subsidiarity.80 The reasons behind the Court’s cautious stance to subsidiarity can be 
traced to two sources. First, the problem of judicial review of subsidiarity has been related to 
the principle’s lack of firm justiciable limits, the complex Edinburgh guidelines and the 
principle’s inherent ‘political’ nature.81 Secondly, because of the principle’s weak legal 
content and the Court’s relative institutional disadvantage in relation to the Union institutions 
in terms of legitimacy and competence, a firm judicial analysis of the need for Union action, 
as required by the subsidiarity principle, has not been seen by the Court as a serious option.82 
As was demonstrated previously in the thesis,83 there are good reasons to assume that these 
standard accounts are correct and that these two challenges must be tackled in order to ensure 
that subsidiarity can act as a check on the exercise of EU competences. The challenge of 
providing tangible limits to material subsidiarity was thoroughly examined in the previous 
section. The remaining question is how to square judicial review of subsidiarity with the 
Court’s relative institutional constraints in assessing the appropriateness of Union action. In 
particular, we must examine how the Court can move from a light touch review to a more 
demanding and evidence-based review of subsidiarity. I suggest that the main way for the 
Court to overcome its institutional disadvantage is, as indicated previously in the thesis84, to 
maintain ‘legality’ review but review material subsidiarity indirectly through implementing 
procedural subsidiarity. The next section confronts the challenges of judicial enforcement of 
subsidiarity.  
B The main challenges in making judicial review of subsidiarity effective 
 
It was already concluded in chapter 3 that a more intense judicial enquiry of the enforcement 
of the limits of the Treaties is justified given the increased emphasis on competence control 
in the Lisbon Treaty and the increased use of impact assessments and other background 
documents to control the EU legislator. That Lisbon has improved the chances of stronger 
judicial enforcement is particularly clear in relation to the subsidiarity principle because of 
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the new early warning system (EWS) instituted by Protocol no 2.85 As the Court, armed with 
the opinions of the national parliaments and the objections from the Commission provided 
through the EWS, will be provided with more material to assess subsidiarity compliance this 
would strengthen the judicial enforcement of subsidiarity.86 Moreover, the Court has been 
conferred a specific role in Article 8 of Protocol no 2 to review actions on subsidiarity. These 
changes make it more feasible for the Court to employ subsidiarity to examine the legality of 
the exercise of Union competences.87 Notwithstanding this, there are some serious challenges 
left to deal with in order to make the prospect of more intense judicial enforcement of 
subsidiarity plausible. 
The main objections to stronger judicial enforcement of subsidiarity are related to the Court’s 
comparative disadvantage in relation to the Union institutions in assessing subsidiarity both 
in terms of legitimacy, resources and competence.88 This argument assumes that any review 
of subsidiarity, whether procedural or substantive, is detrimental to the Court’s legitimacy.89 
Bermann argues that the degree of judicial scrutiny should reflect subsidiarity’s highly 
problematic character. The Court’s institutional constraints impede it from reviewing material 
subsidiarity. There are also limits to the resources that the Court can invest in verifying 
whether the political branches actually inquired into subsidiarity.90 Vandenbruwaene 
observes that subsidiarity involves a complex empirical investigation by the legislator, who 
may then legitimately rely on a degree of epistemic superiority in relation to the Court. The 
Court faces a difficult task in assessing the trade-off between democratic legitimacy and 
efficiency as required by subsidiarity. Either the Court abstains de facto from subsidiarity 
review and relinquishes its role as a neutral arbiter, or it undertakes a comprehensive, 
subjective and non-legal assessment of social, economic, or political factors, which it is ill-
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equipped to assess. The Court also lacks according to Vandenbruwaene, the democratic 
credentials to be involved in subsidiarity review because subsidiarity involves evaluations of 
‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’. 91  
  
I consider that all these challenges can be met. First, the way of dealing with concerns of 
competence and legitimacy is to limit substantive review of subsidiarity and focus on 
procedural requirements for subsidiarity compliance. Even though the test for material 
subsidiarity proposed above, requiring the Union legislator to demonstrate the existence of a 
‘market failure’ that is of such a nature that it requires EU action, is outside the Court’s 
legitimacy and competence to examine; the Court is institutionally well-equipped to engage 
in a procedural enquiry of subsidiarity. By engaging in such an enquiry the Court would 
simply reinforce a procedural demand upon the Union institution that it must take subsidiarity 
seriously and adequately reason and submit proof of the need for Union harmonization.92 
Such a review does not intrude upon the EU legislator’s discretion and the axiom that the 
Court can only engage in ‘legality’ review.93 The objection as to the Court’s competence is 
also slightly overstated. It is surely true that the Court might, faced with an uncertain 
construction of Union legislation, in following procedural subsidiarity review be led to a 
different mode of analysis to which it may not be accustomed. This problem is, however, not 
unique to subsidiarity. The Court is normally engaged in open-ended empirical and normative 
assessments of acts of public authorities in its fundamental rights jurisprudence. The Court 
would not be engaging in a qualitatively different inquiry when applying subsidiarity. The 
lack of judicially enforceable standards to assess substantive subsidiarity does not constitute a 
compelling normative rejection of jurisdiction. While subsidiarity cannot be easily validated 
by operational criteria, this does not mean that the Court should refrain from procedural 
review because it lacks a certain epistemic ability to deal with findings of fact. Rather, it is a 
function of the Court within its procedural review to devise a judicially manageable standard 
against which subsidiarity can be assessed.94Secondly, the concern that the Court would 
suffer from an alleged legitimacy problem is misdirected. While procedural review partly 
empowers the Court, a non-representative institution, at the expense of Union institutions 
serving majoritarian interests, it should be recognized that those other Union institutions may 
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serve democracy imperfectly.95 The other Union institutions also suffer, as already mentioned 
in chapter 396, from a ‘democracy deficit,’ one that may not be remedied in the near future.97 
The historical record suggests that the efficacy of particular political and institutional checks 
fluctuate over time. It is risky to rely exclusively on a system of political checks that is 
contingent and mutable over the course of time.98 It is difficult, even for a conscientious EU 
legislator, confronted with a regulatory concern that seems highly pressing or attractive on its 
own merits, not to convince herself that the subject falls within her jurisdiction. Given this, it 
is not illegitimate to entrust subsidiarity review to the Court if such a review is confined to 
procedural demands.99 Finally, even if procedural subsidiarity review ultimately imposes 
substantive limits to the exercise of Union competences, which I think it does, there are good 
reasons for the Court to enforce those substantive limits. The Court has indeed an important 
role as guarantor of the values of subsidiarity, national diversity and localism, in cases where 
the Union legislator fails to adhere to such values. It is evident that the Union political 
institutions take indications from the Court as to what subsidiarity values should be 
safeguarded. If the Court were to announce that subsidiarity values are entirely subject to the 
caprices of politics, the Union political branches would not take these values seriously in 
their own deliberations.100 While taking subsidiarity seriously is a difficult constitutional 
choice and implies that the Court must develop a stricter standard in its subsidiarity review 
and become involved in fundamental social and political questions, it is argued that such a 
review is both necessary and legitimate to maintain the safeguards of federalism.101 
Having shown that the challenges brought against judicial review of subsidiarity were not 
able to seriously undermine the case for stronger judicial enforcement of the principle, we 
move on to consider the test for legality for subsidiarity compliance. 
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C A test for legality of ‘adequate reasoning’ and ‘relevant evidence’ 
 
Having argued that procedural review is the way forward to make review of subsidiarity 
effective, we must examine in detail how the Court should go about such a review. Bermann 
and Swaine have argued that the Court’s main task in enforcing procedural subsidiarity is to 
analyse whether the Union institutions, before adopting legislation, meaningfully enquired 
into the capacity of the Member States to attain the objectives of the proposed measure and 
examine whether the Union institutions properly explained why they concluded that action at 
the Union level was necessary. The Union institutions must examine the possibility of 
alternative remedies at, or below, the Member State level.102 The test for intervention must 
however take into account the Court’s institutional constraints in assessing subsidiarity. 
Bermann has suggested framing the subsidiarity standard of review in terms of ‘manifest 
error’. Substitution of judgment cannot take place, but at the very most the Court can decide 
whether the Union institutions’ decision to act, based on the information available to them, 
was egregiously mistaken.103 De Búrca conceives the demands of procedural subsidiarity as a 
requirement on the EU institutions to provide a structured and reasoned assessment of 
subsidiarity compliance. It is a matter of showing that the Union legislator articulated the 
choices at hand, listed the arguments for and against Union harmonization and explained how 
the balancing exercise between different values was made and reasoned its choices openly. 
The Union legislator must explain how it has taken into account national diversity when 
proposing Union legislation and articulate the kinds of competitive distortions and barriers to 
trade created by disparities in national laws.104 She also proposes a more demanding test for 
judicial intervention and suggests that the Union legislator should ultimately be condemned 
for its failure to justify proposals. Inadequate reasoning may provide evidence of the failure 
to take the subsidiarity questions seriously and would thus provide a sufficient basis for a 
challenge to the measure.105  
These are interesting proposals. Building on Bermann’s suggestion of framing the test in 
terms of ‘manifest error’, I argue that the Court must adopt a slightly more demanding 
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standard of review and test of legality in accordance with what I proposed in chapter 3.106 
While the Court, if it abandoned the ‘manifest error’ test and more intensively assessed 
subsidiarity, would ultimately impose substantive limits on EU harmonization and become 
involved in substantive political and economic questions, this is something desirable since 
such a more searching mode of review is necessary to enforce the subsidiarity principle.107 
De Búrca’s proposal is commendable since it shows how the Court can intervene to police 
subsidiarity. Based on her general idea I suggest a more concrete test for judicial intervention. 
Stated in general terms the procedural subsidiarity review requires a test for legality of Union 
legislation in two steps; i) an examination of whether the reasoning provided is ‘adequate’ to 
justify compliance with subsidiarity, ii) an enquiry into whether the Union legislator has 
submitted ‘relevant’ evidence to demonstrate conformity to the subsidiarity criterion. Whilst 
these criteria were already articulated above in chapter 3, section IV (D), I would like to 
explain a bit further their meaning within the context of subsidiarity. 
‘Adequate reasoning’ for subsidiarity compliance 
 
What does the standard of review of ‘adequate reasoning’ mean in the context of 
subsidiarity? First in terms of formal aspects, we know that the EU legislator should 
articulate the reasons for subsidiarity compliance in recitals, explanatory memorandums and 
impact assessments.108 Pursuant to the Court’s case-law on Article 296 TFEU, the statement 
of reasons must show unequivocally the reasoning of the Union legislator. The EU legislator 
must disclose the essential factual and legal considerations on which a measure is based and 
the essential objective pursued by the measure. The reasoning must enable the Court to 
exercise its power of review.109 
Nevertheless, the reason-giving requirement in Article 296 TFEU seems in light of case-law 
to be of a merely formal nature and requires very little to demonstrate show compliance with 
the principle of subsidiarity.110 I however maintain here that the justification for subsidiarity 
compliance cannot be a purely formal, one accepting any kind of reason regardless of its 
merit. While Article 296 TFEU is triggered only if no reasons at all were given for 
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legislation111, I argue that procedural subsidiarity requires not only that reasons be given for 
subsidiarity compliance but that these reasons are ‘relevant’. ‘Relevance’ implies that the 
reasoning must be related to the material subsidiarity criterion proposed above, meaning that 
the Union legislator in the legislative background documents must articulate what kind of 
market failure is at stake and explain why the failure requires Union action. The source of 
this benchmark is whether the proposed justification for EU action makes sense given the 
economic and legal rationales for harmonization of the internal market as this has been 
expressed by the relevant literature and the Court’ s case-law. If the proposed reasons have no 
logical relationship to the material subsidiarity criterion the reasoning is inadequate.112 The 
test proposed in chapter 3 requires the EU legislator to show that at least one of the reasons 
proposed by the Commission is capable of, on the basis of the pertinent literature and the 
Court’s case-law, independently constituting a justification for subsidiarity compliance.113 
We can take one example from the Court’s case-law, Germany v Council, to illustrate what 
kind of reasoning would not meet the proposed procedural subsidiarity test. The problem in 
this case was that the Commission had failed to mention subsidiarity in the contested Deposit 
Guarantee Directive. Despite this, the Court ascertained the reasons for subsidiarity 
compliance in the form of the cross-border effects of different deposit protection schemes in 
the Member States. The Court mentioned the recital where the Commission pointed to a 
scenario where ‘deposits in a credit institution that has branches in other Member States 
become unavailable’ and that it was ‘indispensable to ensure a harmonized minimum level of 
deposit protection wherever deposits are located in the Community’. The Court also pointed 
to the preamble where the Commission had asserted that ‘a decision regarding the guarantee 
scheme which is competent in the event of the insolvency of a branch situated in a Member 
State other than that in which the credit institution has its head office has repercussions which 
are felt outside the borders of each Member State.’ According to the Court this showed that, 
in the Union legislature’s view, the aim of its action could, because of the cross-border 
dimensions of the intended action, be best achieved at Union level.114  
The Commission’s statement of reasons was not acceptable in this case due to the fact that 
the EU legislator had failed to offer one reason which was sufficient to independently justify 
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compliance with the subsidiarity criterion. In fact, none of the recitals in the Directive 
mentioned expressly the subsidiarity criterion. In this case it would have been logical to 
assert subsidiarity compliance by pointing to the fact that divergent depositor schemes gave 
rise to ‘obstacles to the freedom of the establishment’ or ‘distortions of competition’ and that 
such problems could only be remedied by EU action. Such reasons were also mentioned in 
the preamble to the directive.115 The problem was that the EU legislator did not try to make a 
link between those reasons and the subsidiarity criterion. Those reasons were instead offered 
to demonstrate why the measure was consistent with the designated legal basis of Article 57 
(2) EC.116 Whilst the reasons offered in the preamble were from a theoretical perspective 
cogent to defend subsidiarity compliance, we must condemn this reasoning as inadequate 
since they were not expressly linked to the subsidiarity principle.117 
 ‘Relevant evidence’ for subsidiarity compliance 
 
Having looked at the content of the reasoning requirement, we move on to look to the second 
part of the test for legality proposed in chapter 3; the requirement of ‘relevant evidence’. This 
requirement implies that the relevant facts of the case must support the reasoning and the 
conclusions in the legislative measure.118 The Court is entitled pursuant to Protocol no 2 to 
require the Union legislator to expound on the qualitative and quantitative evidence upon 
which it based its legislative choice.119 What is required for legality is, as argued in chapter 3, 
that one of the stated reasons, which was compelling enough to justify compliance with one 
of the substantive subsidiarity criterions, can be defended with sufficient and relevant 
evidence. Each justification considered sufficient for demonstrating subsidiarity compliance 
must be supported by such evidence.120 By linking the evidence criterion to the material 
subsidiarity test above, it follows that the Union must show with ‘quantitative’ and 
‘qualitative’ indicators that there is a market failure and that Union action provides for ‘clear 
benefits’ over Member States action in correcting such a failure.121 For the Court this implies 
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that it must, in contrast to its previous case-law122, enforce the rule that the burden of proof 
for compliance with subsidiarity lies with the Union legislator.123  
The evidence also needs to be of a certain quality. In order to assess the type of evidence 
required for subsidiarity compliance, we should dig deeper into the meaning of ‘qualitative’ 
and ‘quantitative’ indicators. Such indicators provide a means to reflect the changes 
connected to a legislative intervention and used in establishing baselines, monitoring and 
evaluation. Quantitative evidence is factual evidence such as measures of quantities or 
amounts that rely on objective estimates while qualitative evidence is concerned with more 
subjective predictions such as the judgments of individuals or perceptions about a subject.124 
Quantitative indicators in the framework of internal market legislation are for example 
concerned with trade statistics and market research. Such indicators are often necessary to 
assess the potential impact of harmonization or the envisaged scenario of non-Union action. 
Subject matters such as transnational effects, distortions of competition, and restrictions on 
trade, are particularly susceptible to quantitative analysis.125 Even though it is nearly always 
the case that the Commission’s judgments about subsidiarity are founded upon qualitative 
indicators, such evidence is not sufficient if quantitative indicators are available. A rhetorical 
assertion from the Union legislator that differences in legislation give rise to obstacles to 
trade or distortions to competition is not sufficient to guarantee compliance with subsidiarity 
since such subjective judgments are not evidence of a market failure.126  
The evidence need not be comprehensive in order to support one of the reasons advanced for 
‘subsidiarity compliance’. What is required is that some relevant empirical evidence, 
qualitative or quantitative, is provided in the legislative background documents supporting 
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the existence or risk of a market failure as well as supporting the need for Union action. Such 
sources could for example be national or comparative studies on legal diversity and risks for 
distortions to competition. It is sufficient for subsidiarity compliance if the Commission in 
the explanatory memorandum or the impact assessment refers to the relevant background 
studies where it is demonstrated that Union action is preferable to Member State action. It 
would also be sufficient for the Commission to point to complaints received by private 
parties, if they reach a certain quantity, about national obstacles to fundamental freedoms or 
distortions of competition to justify subsidiarity compliance.127 The evidence cannot, 
however, be too insignificant. If the evidence invoked does not in itself support the EU 
legislator’s claim, more evidence is needed to pass the legality standard. If the evidence 
invoked is relevant but not significant enough to maintain that there is a market failure, the 
EU legislator may however rely on other evidence to support this claim.  
The Environmental Crimes Directive128 is a good example of a piece of legislation where the 
Union legislator relied on relevant evidence to support subsidiarity compliance. The proposal 
to this directive referred to an impact assessment which restated and referred to studies made 
by consultancy firms on the extent and nature of sanctions for infringement of Union 
environmental law. First, the legislative background documents reported appreciable 
differences in terms of the definition of the offences and in terms of the nature of sanctions 
imposed for committing the offences.129 Secondly, there was also substantial evidence in the 
background documents supporting the contention that environmental crimes have a cross-
border dimension. The evidence suggested that environmental pollution knows no borders 
and that many well-known and significant catastrophes have had a cross-border nature. 
Thirdly, there was proof suggesting that differences in legislation would be exploited by 
organized criminals and firms intending to reduce their business cost by not complying with 
environmental rules. In order to comply with the legality standard above, one of the reasons 
stated, which is sufficiently compelling to justify compliance with one of the substantive 
                                              
127 See Joined cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and others (n 37), paras 36-37. 
128 Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection 
of the environment through criminal law [2008] OJ L 328/28; Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal law’, Brussels, 9.2.2007, 
COM (2007) 51 final.  
129 See Study by The Law Firm HUGLO LEPAGE & Partners , ‘ Study on environmental crime in the 27 
Member States ‘ For European Commission, Study JLS/D3/2006/05 , Final Report, Brussels, 5 April 2007, 7; 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/pdf/report_environmental_crime.pdf> Accessed 8 May 2014; 
Study by The Law Firm HUGLO LEPAGE & Partners , ‘ Study on environmental crime in the 27 Member 
States ‘ For European Commission, Study JLS/D3/2006/05 , Annex III-table per offence , Brussels, 5 April 
2007  < http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/pdf/crime_annex3.pdf>. Accessed 8 May 2014. 
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subsidiarity criterions, must be supported with sufficient and relevant evidence. Without 
discussing this in detail it seems that the distortion of competition rationale invoked by the 
Commission to demonstrate subsidiarity compliance was both theoretically defendable and 
justified by relevant and sufficient evidence. The evidence invoked130 supported the 
contention that distortions to competition can arise because of differences in the definition of 
offences and that only EU action can remedy this problem.131 
The 2006 Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal is conversely illustrative of a lack of 
‘relevant’ evidence.132 The Commission claims in the proposal that intellectual property 
infringements are of a global scale and linked to organized crime thereby requiring Union 
action. It also suggests that the major disparities between the national systems of penalties do 
not allow the holders of intellectual property rights to benefit from an equivalent level of 
protection throughout the Union and hampers the proper functioning of the internal market. 
The Proposal also, while approximating legislation, respects the different legal traditions and 
systems of the Member States. The direct objective of this initiative which is to protect 
intellectual property can be better achieved at a Union level. For all these reasons the 
proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity.133In terms of evidence, the Proposal 
must be condemned. The Commission has failed to offer any evidence to support the 
statement, offered as a justification for subsidiarity compliance, that considerable disparities 
in national laws on the protection of intellectual property holders give rise to obstacles to 
trade. It is not shown how different levels of protection of intellectual property rights give 
rise to market failure or how the nature of the problem gives rise to a need for Union action. 
The key problem with the Proposal is that the Commission makes a number of assertions 
about the cross-border nature of the problem, divergences and its relationship with organized 
crimes, without referring to any empirical sources. The Commission seems to presume that 
its arguments are in no need of evidence. That is not however the case. The evidence 
requirement requires that the Commission, at the very least, refers to some credible sources 
when it seeks to demonstrate the need for Union action. Since there is no evidence to support 
                                              
130 See SEC (2007) 160 (n 73) 12-19, at n 29-38, for references in the impact assessment to ‘relevant’ and 
‘sufficient’ evidence.  
131 ibid 37-38. 
132 Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal measures 
aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights’, Brussels, 26.4.2006, COM(2006) 168 final 
(‘Proposal’, ‘Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal’). 
133 ibid 1-3, 9.  
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the Commission’s assertions, the Proposal falls foul of the evidence requirement.134 Having 
explained in detail the meaning of the requirement of ‘adequate reasoning’ and ‘relevant 
evidence’ in the subsidiarity context we examine how this benchmark fits into the Court’s 
existing jurisprudence. 
D How does the standard of legality fit into the Court’s current case-law? 
 
We already know from chapter 2135 that the Court’s current approach to judicial review of 
subsidiarity is unsatisfying since it does not impose any serious informational demands on the 
Union legislator but accepts very meagre evidence and reasoning for a proposal.136 The 
Court’s cautious review of subsidiarity is rejected and my proposal entails a departure from 
the Court’s previous case-law on the review of subsidiarity. My proposal does not accept a 
mere reference in a preamble as justification for legislation nor does it accept insufficient or 
inconsistent evidence for establishing compliance with subsidiarity.137 The Court must 
reverse its extreme light test for judicial intervention evidenced by previous case-law138 and 
actually strike down legislation which contains assertions that are not justified in light of the 
individual facts of the case. The test for legality I propose imposes stricter informational and 
evidential requirements than those that follow from the Court’s current approach. This is 
because my approach not only requires that a justification is given for subsidiarity 
compliance139 but that this justification is ‘adequate’ given the economic and legal rationales 
for harmonization and is supported by ‘relevant’ and ‘sufficient’ evidence.140 Given the 
reinforcement of judicial review after the Lisbon Treaty, given the new subsidiarity Protocol 
no 2 and given the Court’s power under Article 263 TFEU and Article 296 TFEU to ask for 
                                              
134 See Reto Hilty, Annette Kur and Alexander Peukert, ‘Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property, Competition and Tax Law on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Criminal Measures Aimed at Ensuring the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights’, IIC 436 
22.9.2006, 1-3. <http://www.ip.mpg.de/files/pdf2/Comments-EnforcementOfIP-Rights.pdf>. Accessed 8 May 
2014. 
135 See above chapter 2- section IV (A). 
136 See Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council (n 122) paras 47, 74-77, 81; Case C- 233/94 Germany v 
Parliament and Council (n 109), paras 26-28; Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others (n 16), paras 76-78; Case 
68/86 United Kingdom v Council (n 114), paras 27-35; Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) 
and Imperial Tobacco (n 10), paras 181-183. 
137 See De Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’ (n 5) 225; 
Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (n 4) 254- 255. 
138 See above n 136 in the present chapter for references to this case-law.  
139 See joined cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and others (n 37), para 133. 
140 See Case C- 310/04 Spain v Council (n 118), paras 122-123; Case T-183/07 Poland v Commission [2009] 
ECR II-03395 paras 133-153; Alberto Alemanno,‘Regulatory Impact Assessment and European Courts: When 
Ex Ante Evaluation Meets Ex Post Judicial Control’ (2011) 17 European Public Law 485, 492-502. 
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extended reasoning141, this modified stricter approach to the review of subsidiarity does not 
seem an exceptional move for the Court. Having developed an argument for procedural 
review of subsidiarity and argued for how such review should be carried out by the Court, the 
next section analyse the practical application of the proposed subsidiarity concept to a 
discretely selected piece of EU legislation: the Market Abuse Crimes Directive. 
III PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF SUBSIDIARITY TO THE MARKET 
ABUSE CRIMES DIRECTIVE 
 
While it was already demonstrated above142, by examining a couple of examples of 
legislation, how the legality standard proposed in chapter 3 should be applied to check 
conformity with the subsidiarity principle, it seems appropriate to provide for a more in-depth 
analysis of a piece of legislation to show the limits of the subsidiarity principle. The very 
recently adopted Market Abuse Crimes Directive143 is a useful example to clarify the 
meaning of the subsidiarity concept. This directive harmonizes national criminal laws by 
defining three market abuse offences, insider dealing, unlawful disclosure of inside 
information and market manipulation, which if committed intentionally must be regarded by 
Member States as criminal offences and by imposing a requirement on Member States to 
ensure that those offences are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
sanctions.144 
The purpose here is to enquire whether the EU legislator, on the basis of the proposed test of 
legality, correctly exercised its competence in conformity with the subsidiarity principle 
when it adopted the Market Abuse Crimes Directive. First, it is discussed whether the 
proposal to the Directive is adequately reasoned from a subsidiarity perspective. Secondly, it 
is analysed whether there is ‘relevant’ evidence in the legislative background documents to 
sustain that the Market Abuse Crimes Directive was adopted in conformity with the 
subsidiarity criterion.  
                                              
141 See Shapiro (n 110) 203. 
142 See above section II (C) in the present chapter. 
143 See above chapter 5- section I (C) for a previous discussion of this proposal within the framework of Article 
83(2) TFEU and the ‘essentiality’ criterion. 
144 See Market Abuse Crimes Directive (n 19), Articles 3-5, 7, 9. 
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A Is the Commission’s reasoning adequate to justify compliance with 
subsidiarity? 
 
When examining the legality of the Marker Abuse Crimes Directive I will examine the 
legislative background documents to this directive including the proposal and the impact 
assessment. I suggest that the EU legislator when adopting the Market Abuse Crimes 
Directive met the demands of ‘adequate reasoning’ because it has offered, in accordance with 
the proposed test of legality145, one justification, which on the basis of the relevant legal and 
economic literature and the Court’s case-law, can, consistent with the substantive subsidiarity 
test146, demonstrate subsidiarity compliance. The substantive subsidiarity criterion demands 
that a market failure is identified and that EU action gives ‘clear benefits’ through the 
planned legislative measure to correct this problem. 
How then do divergences in the definitions and sanctions for violations of EU market abuse 
rules give rise to market failures according to the EU legislator? The Commission has 
identified one market failure, namely potential distortions to competition, in the proposal and 
in the impact assessment that justifies harmonized definitions of market abuse. The 
Commission’s logic is based on the fear of ‘safe havens’ and a ‘race to the bottom’. Unless 
there are common Union-wide definitions of the relevant offences and in the absence of a 
common criminalization requirement throughout the Union, perpetrators of market abuse 
would choose to commit their violations in the jurisdiction that has the most lenient 
sanctioning regime.147 Legal diversity in sanctioning cannot be justified since such diversity 
results in different costs for the undertakings engaged in financial services activities, leading 
to unequal treatment and competitive disadvantages for undertakings from certain Member 
States.148 This concern is well-defended by the relevant scholarship, which recognizes that 
far-reaching deregulation of commercial law, including extensive exemption for economic 
offences like fraud, insider and money-laundering, may result in unfair competitive 
                                              
145 See above chapter 3- section IV (D). 
146 See above section I (B) in the present chapter for an account of this test. 
147Whether such races occur often is according to the Commission unclear. The Commission consider there to 
be a certain scope for forum-shopping in the proposal from 2011; see SEC (2011) 1217 (n 20), 53-54, 125,166, 
171; Market Abuse Crimes Proposal (n 20) 3, 5, recital 7. This phenomenon, however, only occur in ‘extreme 
circumstances’ according to the Commission in the impact assessment from 2010; see Commission,’ 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the Financial Services Sector’, Brussels, 
8.12.2010 SEC (2010) 1496 final, 14-15.  
148 See SEC (2010) 1496 (n 147) 22. 
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advantages.149Furthermore, the Commission that unless harmonized criminal law measures 
for the enforcement of market abuse offences is adopted, Member States would compete with 
each other to attract undertakings in relation to the severity of the sanctioning regime, giving 
rise to a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’.150 This assumption is also accepted by the pertinent 
literature in the field on the basis of the so called ‘Delaware effect’.151 It has been suggested 
by some authors that, in the absence of common rules, Member States could enter into a 
deregulatory race with reduced sanctions in order to attract business and capital to their own 
jurisdiction. Such a race can arise if simply one or two jurisdictions adopt more lenient 
sanctioning regimes for firms and individuals.152 There is also a theoretical foundation for the 
occurrence of such races on the basis of ‘prisoners’ dilemma scenarios. When Member States 
compete under such a scenario, national rules will produce a worse result than a harmonized 
standard. Member States trying to attract business through regulatory laxness will only attract 
increased business when other Member States do not act in the same way. However, if all the 
other Member States follow, only businesses will gain. The results of this game are sub-
optimal from the point of view of the Member States.153 
We should also check whether the Commission in the legislative background documents has 
provided for one reason, which, independently, can explain why EU action has ‘clear 
benefits’ in relation to Member State action. In this regard, it seems that the Commission has 
met the standard of ‘adequate’ reasoning. It argues that the EU has a comparative advantage 
in regulating market abuse because the problem of market abuse has a ‘transnational’ 
dimension. Market abuse is characterized by cross-border elements since the relevant conduct 
can occur in one or more Member States different from that where the market concerned is 
localized and because the relevant actors might operate in different countries. Although the 
                                              
149 For a forceful argument in favor of this justification to harmonize EU criminal law: Hanna G Sevenster 
‘Criminal Law and EC Law’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 10, 53-56. See also Joachim Vogel ‘Why 
is the harmonisation of penal law necessary? A comment’ in André Klip and Harmen van der Wilt (eds), 
Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in Criminal Law (Royal Netherlands Academy of Science 2002) 61; 
Niamh Moloney, ‘EU Financial Market Regulation after the Global Financial Crisis: “More Europe” or more 
Risks?’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1317, 1356-1357. 
150 See Market Abuse Crimes Proposal (n 20) 3, 5; SEC (2010) 1496 (n 147) 15.  
151 See William L Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware’ (1974) 83 Yale Law 
Journal 663, 668, 701-705; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on 
State Competition in Corporate Law’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 1435, 1443-44. 
152 See Kumm (n 18) 510; Sevenster (n 149) 54, 61; Simon Deakin’ Legal Diversity and Regulatory 
Competition: Which Model for Europe?’ (2006) Centre for Business Research, University Of Cambridge 
Working Paper No. 323, March 2006, 4-5 <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP323.pdf>. Accessed 30 April 
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153 See Roger Van den Bergh, ‘The subsidiarity principle in European Community law: some insights from law 
and economics’ (1994) 1 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 337, 345, 355-56. 
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problems of market abuse have important implications for each individual Member State, its 
overall impact and the risk of regulatory arbitrage can only be fully perceived and dealt with 
in a cross-border context.154 
The scholarship generally supports the assumption that the cross-border dimension of a 
problem is a valid reason for the EU, rather than the Member States, to regulate an issue.155 It 
has been suggested in the literature that market abuse has an important transnational 
dimension. To this end, one should consider that market abuse can be carried out across 
borders and takes place on a financial market that is increasingly integrated. First, market 
abuse offences can occur in one or more Member States different from that where the market 
concerned is localized. Secondly, the relevant actors, e.g. the insider and the tippee, might 
operate in different countries. Consequently, the market failure caused by either insider 
dealing or manipulation has a transnational dimension that requires a coordinated reaction 
from the Member States’ authorities.156 It can be legitimately argued that the Union 
policymaker should specify in more detail how divergences among national definitions of 
market abuse offences and divergences in sanctions would give rise to distortions to 
competition. It can also be queried why the EU legislator did not explain in more detail why 
EU action provides for ‘clear benefits’ in relation to Member State action. It could for 
example have been argued that there is, at least, a risk that disparities in national sanctioning 
regimes create ‘regulatory races’ to the bottom, which the Member States do not have 
incentives to correct.157 However, the point of the legality enquiry is not to assess whether the 
Commission could have offered more reasons and provide for a more comprehensive 
justification. The only question here is whether the reasoning is ‘inadequate’ to support the 
claim for harmonization. The Commission has proposed two separate justifications for why 
there is a risk for a market failure, i.e. risk for ‘safe havens’ and ‘regulatory races’ and also 
offered one reason, the ‘cross-border dimension’ of market abuse to justify why EU action 
provide for ‘clear benefits’. All those justifications are supported by the relevant literature as 
constituting compelling justifications for EU harmonization. Because the Commission has 
offered at least one reason for compliance with the ‘market failure criterion’ and the ‘clear 
                                              
154 See Market Abuse Crimes Proposal (n 20) 3, 5; SEC (2010) 1496 (n 147) 15; SEC (2011) 1217 (n 20) 33. 
155 Van Zeben (n 46) 30; Jacques Pelkmans, ‘The Economics of Single Market Regulation’, Bruges European 
Economic Policy Briefings 25/2012, 10-11. <http://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-
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benefits’ criterion158, it must be concluded that the Commission/EU legislator has met the test 
of ‘adequate reasoning’.  
B Has the Commission submitted sufficient evidence to justify compliance 
with the subsidiarity principle? 
 
This section consider whether the Commission had submitted sufficient evidence in the 
legislative background documents to justify that the Market Abuse Crimes Directive 
conformed to the subsidiarity principle. 
  
First, let us look at the Commission’s claim that harmonization of the Member States’ 
criminal law rules in relation to market abuse offences is necessary to avoid a market failure 
in the form of distortion of competition. This claim is substantiated by the fact that there is 
divergence in the Member States’ definitions of market abuse offences and divergence in the 
Member States’ legislation in terms of the nature of sanctions imposed for market abuse 
offences. The Commission specifically points to the report published by the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR) on administrative measures and sanctions as well as 
criminal sanctions available in Member States under the market abuse directive (MAD).159 
The CESR’s report and the summary of this report in the Impact Assessment160 show the 
following. First, neither of the offences of insider dealing or market manipulation is subject to 
criminal sanctions in all EU Member States. The report demonstrates that two out of 27 
Member States do not impose imprisonment (BG-SI) for infringements of Article 2 of the 
MAD 2003/6/EC providing for insider dealing by a primary insider whereas five Member 
States (BG-CZ-EE-FI-SI) do not impose criminal sanctions for the offence of disclosure of 
inside information by a primary insider in Article 3(a). Moreover, it appears that only two 
Member States (BG-SI) lack criminal sanctions for the offence of ‘tipping’ by primary 
insiders contained in Article 3b MAD whilst four Member States (BG-IT-SI-ES) do not 
provide for criminal sanctions for insider dealing by secondary insiders (Article 4 MAD). It 
                                              
158 See above section I (B) in the present chapter for a discussion of the ‘market failure’ criterion and the ‘clear 
benefits’ criterion. 
159
 Committee of European Securities Regulators, ’ Executive Summary to the Report on Administrative 
Measures and Sanctions as well as the Criminal Sanctions Available in Member States Under the Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD)’, CESR/08-099, 28 February 2008. The report was drafted as the legal situation looked 17 Oct 
2007. 
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also emerges that eight Member States (BG; CZ; ET; FI; DE; IT; SI; ES) lack criminal 
sanctions for improper disclosure of insider information by secondary insiders pursuant to 
Article 4 in MAD whereas six Member States (BG; CZ; DE; IT; SI; ES) lack criminal 
sanctions for ‘tipping’ by secondary insiders (Article 4 MAD). Finally, it is clear that four 
Member States (BG-SK-SI-AT) do not criminalize infringements of Article 5 of the MAD 
providing for market manipulation cases.161The Commission argues that these divergences, as 
shown by the CESR report, give rise to safe havens and a race to the bottom thus creating a 
risk for distortions of competition.  
The threshold for legality is divided into two parts. The Commission satisfied the first limb, 
as demonstrated above, by articulating two reasons, the distortion of competition rationale 
and the cross-border nature of market abuse offences, which were compelling enough in 
theory, to demonstrate subsidiarity compliance. The second part of the test considers whether 
those rationales are substantiated with ‘sufficient’ and ‘relevant evidence’. I argue that the 
Commission’s reasoning does not pass this test. This is because the Commission’s only 
evidence, i.e. the CESR report, does not validate the far-reaching conclusion that these 
divergences give rise to or imply an imminent risk of distortions of competition. Whilst the 
EU legislator can use Article 114 TFEU for pre-emptive harmonization to avoid the 
emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting from multifarious development of national 
laws in relation to the criminalization of market abuse, the emergence of such obstacles must 
be likely. This means that there cannot be an abstract or remote risk of distortions of 
competition but proof that the risk is going to be realised in the immediate future.162 The EU 
legislator has failed to show that it is ‘likely’ that distortions of competition would arise from 
divergences in the Member States’ sanctioning of market abuse offences.163 
Whilst the report is able to support the conclusion that there are divergences in Member 
States’ legislation and the assumption that these divergences potentially give rise to 
distortions of competition, it does not prove that these potential distortions are imminent or 
concrete.164 ‘Simple disparities’, as shown by the CESR report, are not sufficient to show the 
                                              
161 See CESR Report (n 159) 2-3, 5; SEC (2011) 1217 (n 20) 124-125; Market Abuse Crimes Proposal (n 20) 3 
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presence of distortions of competition justifying legislation under Article 114 TFEU.165 Nor is 
it possible to invoke, as the Commission does, an ‘abstract’ or a ‘hypothetical’ risk for 
distortions of competition as a justification for EU legislation under Article 114 TFEU.166 
Subsidiarity compliance can only be justified if there is some proof of an imminent risk for a 
‘race to the bottom’.167 The ‘race-to-the-bottom’ hypothesis is based on several theoretical 
assumptions which must be demonstrated. First, there must be conditions of economic 
interdependence in which a Member State unilaterally lowers regulatory standards in order to 
attract mobile factors of production, typically capital and highly skilled labour. Secondly, it is 
assumed that other Member States would lose business, revenue, and human capital and that 
they would therefore react by lowering their own standards. In the final stage it is predicted 
that jurisdictional competition would create a cycle of regulatory moves that ends up with all 
countries in a position that is worse than the one they could have secured by coordinating 
their policies.168  
The CESR report does not provide support for these assumptions. Whilst it can be assumed 
that there is sufficient economic interdependence in the EU, the report does not demonstrate 
that divergences in criminalization of market abuse and criminal sanctions for such offences 
have caused any Member State to unilaterally lower their enforcement standards. The report 
definitely does not demonstrate that the divergence in criminalization and the type of 
sanctions in relation to market abuse offences has created any general regulatory move to 
lower enforcement standards. Given the absence of evidence for a European Delaware with 
lenient market abuse sanctioning regimes where market abuse perpetrators would decide to 
engage in insider dealing transactions, the case for Union action based on a hypothetical ‘race 
to the bottom’ is a weak case.169 Furthermore, because asymmetrical information, costs of 
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See Case C- 376/98 Tobacco Advertising (n 47), para 84. There is an abundance of economic literature 
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information and the lack of transparency make it difficult for insider fraudsters to calculate 
and predict where legislation is most friendly and effective for them to commit insider 
dealing offences, there is no imminent risk of such safe havens arising.170 In addition, while a 
claim can be made for the existence of a potential market failure in the form of safe havens 
for insider fraudsters, there is no specific or general evidence in the proposal and the impact 
assessments from 2010 and 2011 to support the presence of an imminent risk that such 
failures will occur. The only thing we can ascertain from these documents is an 
unsubstantiated claim that divergence undermines the internal market and leaves a certain 
scope for perpetrators of market abuse to carry out such abuse in jurisdictions which do not 
provide for criminal sanctions for a particular offence. It would have been perfectly feasible 
for the Commission to refer to academic articles171, national studies, company surveys or 
other sources to establish the risk for distortions of competition arising from different 
sanctioning regimes. The Commission has, however, failed to refer even to such general 
evidence.  
In sum, since the race to the bottom and safe haven assumptions suggested in the proposal 
and the impact assessments to show compliance with the subsidiarity criterion have not been 
substantiated by sufficient evidence, the Market Abuse Crimes Directive fails to meet the 
standard of ‘relevant evidence’. Even though background studies and the impact assessments 
refer to some evidence for the existence of divergences in Member States’ laws in relation to 
the definitions of market abuse offences, this cannot justify a wide harmonization on the basis 
of a risk of ‘market failure’. There is no causal relationship between divergences and 
problems of ‘safe havens’ or regulatory ‘races to the bottom’. Since the Commission has been 
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2012), No:20121005STO53037  <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
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unable to submit ‘sufficient’ evidence in the legislative background documents to sustain the 
distortion of competition argument, the Market Abuse Crimes Directive must consequently 




This chapter’s purpose was to consider the potential of subsidiarity as a limit on the exercise 
of Union powers. Building on the lessons from chapter 2 and 3 on the problems of 
constructing limits to EU competences and judicially enforcing those limits, the chapter 
examined three themes.   
The first theme concerned the substantive construction of the subsidiarity principle and the 
rationales for EU harmonization. The literature has generally suggested that the weak legal 
content of subsidiarity makes it impossible to give any serious meaning to the principle. It has 
even been maintained that the subsidiarity principle is essentially a political principle and not 
a legal principle. Building on the criticism of the principle’s weak legal content I showed how 
the legal content of the principle could be reconstructed. I illustrated the potential for 
subsidiarity by examining closely the case for EU harmonization. It was demonstrated that 
EU harmonization is often justified on the basis of the EU’s commitment to protect the 
internal market and on the basis of the regulated problems’ cross-border nature and effect. I 
however, contended that the EU legislator’s justification for approximation on the basis of 
alleged market failures are often either exaggerated or not supported by the facts of the 
individual case. The key role of subsidiarity is to challenge the internal market rationale for 
EU harmonization. It was argued, on the basis of a cumulative reading of Article 5 TEU, the 
Court’s jurisprudence on the scope of Article 114 TFEU and the Edinburgh Guidelines that 
the subsidiarity principle demands that the EU legislator show the presence of or a risk of 
market failure of such a nature that only the EU could deal with it. This substantive criterion 
involves two sub-conditions. First, the Union legislator must establish that there is a risk of or 
an existing market failure. Secondly, the Union must show that that EU action provides for 
‘clear benefits’ in removing that failure.  
The second theme of the chapter was judicial review of subsidiarity. As shown by chapter 2, 
it is clear that the Court’s current approach so far has led to inadequate enforcement of the 
subsidiarity principle. Because the Court’s existing approach is based on its institutional 
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constraints and the principle’s weak legal content, the proposed solution sought to tackle 
these problems. By applying procedural review, the Court could avoid criticism that it would 
intrude on the EU legislator’s discretion by engaging in substantive policy judgments and 
economic assessments, which it would be less equipped to perform than the EU legislator. 
Building on the previous lessons in the scholarship on the problems of enforcing subsidiarity 
and recent proposal on enforcing subsidiarity with procedural means, I developed a 
comprehensive argument for procedural review of subsidiarity. I suggested, on the basis of 
the lessons of chapter 3, that the Court apply the standard of ‘adequate reasoning’ and 
‘relevant evidence’ to implement the subsidiarity principle before the Court. Diverging from 
the prevailing approach in the literature advocating a deferential approach to subsidiarity 
review, I argued that the Court needs to move to a more intense and fact-based review of 
subsidiarity. To do this, I maintained that the Court should rely on the legality threshold 
developed in chapter 3 that the EU legislator must first offer at least one reason, which is 
compelling enough to independently justify compliance with each of the relevant subsidiarity 
conditions, the ‘market failure’ criterion and the ‘clear benefits’ criterion. The second part of 
the test requires that this/these reason/s be supported by ‘sufficient’ and ‘relevant’ evidence. 
The Court’s procedural enquiry would depart significantly from the Court’s previous case-
law of subsidiarity, e.g. Germany v Council, Alliance Health and Vodafone, which only 
requires that reasons for subsidiarity be mentioned in the preamble to legislation and not that 
those reasons be linked to subsidiarity. It was argued that the time was ripe for the Court to 
move from a light touch approach to subsidiarity to a more intense and fact-demanding 
review. This was because of the introduction of the new Protocol (no 2) attached to the 
Lisbon Treaty, which firstly grants the Court an explicit power to review subsidiarity, 
secondly introduces a demanding reasoning and evidence requirement on the Union legislator 
and finally gives power to national parliaments to review subsidiarity.  
The final theme of the chapter considered the application of subsidiarity. I examined the 
implementation of subsidiarity by examining the legality of the Market Abuse Crimes 
Directive. By applying the standard of review and test of legality in chapter 3 it was found 
that the Market Abuse Crimes Directive failed to conform to the subsidiarity criterion. Based 
on the standard of ‘adequate reasoning’ and ‘relevant evidence’ it was shown that the 
subsidiarity principle imposes serious limits on the exercise of EU competences. It was found 
that the Directive conformed to the requirement of ‘adequate reasoning’. This was because 
the proposal and the impact assessment preceding the Directive had offered two justifications 
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for compliance with the ‘market failure’ criterion and one justification for compliance with 
the ‘clear benefits’ criterion. Those justifications had support in the relevant literature and 
were thus considered sufficiently compelling to demonstrate compliance with the subsidiarity 
principle. The Market Abuse Crimes Directive, however, failed to meet the ‘evidence’ 
requirement. This was because none of the Commission’s justifications, which were 
considered adequate for the purpose of the reasoning requirement, was supported by 
‘sufficient’ and ‘relevant evidence’. The invoked evidence, the CESR report and the impact 
assessment, was only able to show the existence of divergences in relation to sanctioning and 
criminalization of market abuse in Member States, not that those divergences led to ‘safe 
havens’ and a ‘race to the bottom’. Nor was there was any other general or specific evidence 
which demonstrated a risk of ‘safe havens’ or a risk of ‘regulatory races’. The Commission’s 
broad assertions that divergences in national sanctioning regimes would give rise to 
distortions of competition were thus entirely unsubstantiated. Because the evidence submitted 
in the proposal and the accompanying impact assessment to sustain EU intervention on the 
basis of alleged distortions of competition and on the basis of the clear benefits of EU action 








7 CONCLUDING CHAPTER 
 
 
This thesis set out to answer the question of how limits can be constructed to the exercise of 
Union competences. This concluding chapter seeks to give a final response to this question. 
The first part of the chapter examines the relevance of the research question. The second part 
of the chapter discusses the main findings of the thesis while the final part indicates directions 
for future research.  
I THE RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
The thesis’ departure point was to identify the central question in the current debate on EU 
competences. It was shown that the evolution of EU law and the development of EU 
competences mirror a change of focus from the ‘existence’ of competence to a focus on the 
‘exercise’ of EU competences.1 While for a long time it was discussed whether the Union 
should have powers in sensitive fields such as criminal law and asylum, this question no 
longer exists after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. After Lisbon, the important question is 
what the limits to the exercise of Union powers are.2 It was also demonstrated that the 
mechanisms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to divide powers between the Member States 
and the EU such as the competence catalogue and the description of the nature of EU powers 
has not been successful in limiting the expansion of EU powers under the functional powers in 
Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU. Nor has an obsession with retaining important 
national competences been fruitful in limiting the scope for competence creep.3 Instead of 
focussing on the formal delimitation of competences between the EU and the Member States 
we should examine how the powers are exercised. This is what in fact determines the division 
of powers between the EU and the Member States.  
I further questioned whether thinking in terms of the ‘existence’ of competences makes sense 
in practical terms. This is because the issue of whether the EU acts within the scope of the 
limits of the Treaties actually depends on ‘how’ the EU legislates. If the EU proposes a 
measure outside the scope of a designated legislative power of the Treaties, the measure will 
                                              
1 See Article 5 TEU for the distinction between the ‘existence’ and the ‘exercise’ of EU competences. 
2 See above chapter 1-section I. 
3 See above chapter 1- section II; chapter 2- section II (A). 
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be declared invalid, not necessarily because the EU does not have the power to act at all in that 
particular area but because the EU has exercised its competence incorrectly.4  
In addition, it was shown by numerous examples that the limits to the exercise of EU 
competences are more important than limits to the existence of EU powers.5 The thesis 
demonstrated the existence of a number of procedural and substantive limits to the exercise of 
EU powers. In this regard, the requirement of the EU to act on the correct legal basis is a good 
illustration of the importance of focussing on the exercise of powers rather than whether the 
EU has a power to act at all.6 There are abundant examples in the Court’s recent case-law 
showing how this condition is enforced by the Court. In those cases there has been no question 
of whether the EU would be competent to act at all but whether it should be done on a specific 
legal basis.7 The legal basis requirement matters greatly in practice because it dictates the 
rationale for exercising the competence and because it determines the decision-making to be 
followed and therefore the relative importance of each EU institution as well as, indirectly, the 
role of the Member States within the Union’s system.8 In addition to the requirement of legal 
basis, the thesis showed several other important limits to the exercise of EU powers. These 
included the limitation on the use of competences contained in by Article 114 TFEU9, the 
subsidiarity principle10, which limits harmonization of national laws to where it is necessary to 
remedy a market failure (such as the limits to harmonization in Article 83(2) TFEU according 
to which ‘harmonization’ must be in place prior to the adoption of criminal law measures)11 
and the requirement to show that criminal law is essential for the enforcement of a specific EU 
policy when exercising its implied12 and express13 criminal law competence.  
                                              
4 See above chapter 1- section I. 
5 See Loïc Azoulai, ‘Introduction: the Question of Competence’ in Loïc Azoulai (ed), The Question of 
Competence in the European Union (OUP 2014) 14; Armin Von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast, ‘The Federal Order 
of Competences’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law 
(Hart 2009) 285. 
6 See above chapter 5-section III. 
7 See above chapter 2, n 88, for references to this jurisprudence. 
8
 See René Barents’ The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of Community 
Legislation’ (1993) Common Market Law Review 85, 90-94. 
9 See above chapter 4- section II A. 
10 See above chapter 6- section I. 
11 See above chapter 5- section II. 
12 See above chapter 4- section I A. 
13 See above chapter 5- section I. 
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The thesis thus reinforced, on the basis of numerous examples of important limits to the 
exercise of EU competences, that we must shift the focus from the question of the ‘existence’ 
to the question of the ‘exercise of competences’. 
II MAIN FINDINGS OF THESIS  
 
In this section I will briefly summarize the main findings of the thesis and make some 
observations regarding their broader implications. 
The thesis contained two main arguments that ran throughout the thesis. First, by reviewing 
specific EU criminalization measures adopted under the legal bases of the Treaties such as the 
Market Abuse Crimes Directive14, the Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal15 and the 
Environmental Crimes Directive16 and by generally examining the scope of the EU’s power 
under the legal bases of the Treaties to impose criminal sanctions17 and the scope of the 
subsidiarity principle in setting limits to the exercise of EU competences18, the thesis 
demonstrated the constraints faced by the EU legislator when exercising its legislative powers. 
It was suggested that the main way to establish limits is to develop the existing limits in the 
Treaties with appropriate criteria under which the legality of EU legislation can be assessed. 
This can be done on the basis of textual, policy-based and contextual reasons and 
criminological and economic evidence. Secondly, noting that a reconstruction of the limits of 
the Treaties also must tackle the institutional challenges of judicial review, the thesis 
developed an argument for a more intense and evidence-based judicial review. It proposed a 
procedural standard of legality which requires the EU legislator to show that it has adequately 
reasoned its decisions and has taken into account relevant evidence. I will begin by discussing 
the second argument. 
A Judicial enforcement of the limits of the Treaties 
 
Part I of the thesis examined the problems of the judicial review of the exercise of EU 
competences and in particular in reviewing their limits. It also endeavoured to build a 
framework for the review of EU legislation to be applied in Part II of the thesis. Part II then 
                                              
14 See above chapter 5- section I (C); chapter 5- section II (D); chapter 6 III. 
15 See above chapter 4- section II (A); chapter 6-section II (C). 
16
 See above chapter 4- section I (A); chapter 6- section II (C). 
17 See above chapter 4; chapter 5. 
18 See above chapter 6. 
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applied this framework and illustrated the limits of EU competences by analysing specific 
pieces of EU criminal law legislation and by examining the scope of the EU’s competence to 
impose criminalization measures under different legal bases of the Treaties. I will now 
summarize and reflect upon the main findings of Part I of the thesis. 
More objective criteria and external checks on the Court is needed to overcome 
conceptual and structural problems of the exercise of EU competences 
 
Part I of the thesis, including the introduction and chapters 2 and 3, showed that while there 
are limits to the exercise of EU legislative competences, it is clear that these limits suffer from 
conceptual, structural and practical problems. Chapter 2 demonstrated these problems by 
analysing the three most important grounds of review; ‘lack of competence’, ‘subsidiarity’ and 
‘proportionality’. By examining the impact of these grounds of review before the Court, it was 
shown that judicial enforcement of all three grounds has been inadequate. The chapter 
reinforced the general recognition in the scholarship that the theoretical limits to EU 
competences do not coincide with practice.19 It was maintained that the Court’s problem of 
enforcing the limits is both conceptual and structural. First, the Court has not been provided 
with objective criteria to enforce the limits of the Treaties. The weak legal content of the 
principles and the vague wording of the limits force the Court to engage in empirical and 
political questions to determine the remit of EU competences. This is not a task that the Court 
is willing to assume given its fragile legitimacy in re-assessing the EU legislator’s political 
choices. Secondly, given the overarching telos of further European integration, the Court has 
not been structurally well-placed to engage in a strict review of EU competences.20 While 
recognizing these problems, I argued that there was still hope for stronger judicial enforcement 
of the limits of the Treaties.  
First, I tentatively suggested that EU scholars must offer the conceptual basis for controlling 
the exercise of EU competences to enable stronger judicial review of the limits of the Treaties. 
I devoted Part II of the thesis and chapters 4-6 to demonstrating how both substantive and 
procedural limits can be constructed to the exercise of EU competences. Secondly, I dismissed 
the concern that the Court is not well-placed to review the exercise of EU competences. The 
evolution of EU law gives the Court good reasons to take a more serious stance in competence 
                                              
19 See above chapter 2- section II (A): chapter 2- section III (A); chapter 2- section IV (A). 
20 See above chapter 2- section II B; chapter 2- section III (B); chapter 2-section IV(B);chapter 3- section II. 
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litigation. The increased emphasis in the Lisbon Treaty on the limitation of competences and 
the adoption of new protocols and actors in the monitoring of EU competences demonstrate 
this point. In addition, the pressure from national courts will prompt the Court to become a 
credible arbiter in competence disputes. The Court cannot continue with low-level review 
without endangering its own legitimacy. The increased emphasis on the limitation of 
competences in the Lisbon Treaty, the recent conflicts on jurisdictional boundaries and the 
concern that the Court is not an objective arbiter in competence disputes, gives the Court 
strong reasons to move to a more intense form of judicial review in order to maintain its 
credibility.21  
Procedural review is the key solution to improve judicial review of EU legislation  
 
Even though the Court may be well-placed to review EU legislation and even if there is a 
conceptual basis for challenging the exercise of EU competences, it was argued that the Court 
needs a judicial mechanism to become a credible arbiter in competence disputes. Chapter 3 
was devoted to the institutional and practical problem of judicial review. One of the key 
problems for the Court in enforcing the limits of the Treaties is the institutional constraints it 
faces in terms of legitimacy and competence in relation to the EU legislator. While those 
constraints must be recognised and while such constraints have permeated the Court’s practice 
in relation to its review of the exercise of broad Treaty powers, I argued that such reasons 
cannot be given a too broad interpretation such as to disqualify the Court from the area of 
competence review.22 But how should the Court then develop a more intense form of judicial 
review? 
There are different options for the Court. The Court could engage in more intense substantive 
review or develop new heads of review.23 The reasons based on institutional legitimacy and 
competence makes it difficult for the Court to move to more intense substantive review.24 The 
main proposal for remedying the institutional problems of the judicial enforcement of existing 
EU limits was for the Court to examine the evidential and procedural basis for the legislative 
measure and to change the focus from ‘substantive review’ to ‘procedural review’. I defined 
procedural review as an approach to judicial review that requires the Court to consider 
                                              
21 This thought was further developed above in chapter 3- section II; chapter 3- section III (D). 
22 See above chapter 3- section II. 
23 See Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 439-440. 
24
 See Ittai Bar- Siman-Tov,’ Semiprocedural Judicial Review’ (2012) 6 Legisprudence 271, 287-288. 
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whether the EU legislator’s reasoning and evidence is adequate to support the exercise of its 
legislative powers.25  
Procedural review was found to be attractive for several reasons. First, such a review requires 
the EU political institutions to provide the Court with adequate justifications and evidence. 
The Court therefore becomes empowered to review whether EU legislation conforms to the 
Treaties. Secondly, because such review is not focussed on the appropriateness of legislation it 
does not intrude on the EU legislator’s sphere of discretion. For this reason, the Court is well-
equipped to fulfil this task. Thirdly, because procedural review forces the EU legislator to 
openly justify its legislative choices in legislative background documents; transparency is 
likely to be improved by means of procedural review. 26 
A test of legality, which demands the EU legislator to articulate, at least, one compelling 
rationale for EU action that is substantiated with ‘relevant’ evidence, is appropriate to 
enforce the limits of the Treaties 
 
What then should be the proper standard of review and test for judicial review? While reasons 
of competence and legitimacy often favoured a deferential standard of ‘manifestly 
inappropriate’ in relation to the review of broad EU policies and a very high threshold for 
judicial intervention, it seems that this approach to judicial review has fell short of achieving 
credible judicial enforcement of the limits of the Treaties.27 In addition, while there are some 
indications in the Court’s jurisprudence of a more procedural approach to judicial review, this 
type of procedural review has not so far been successful in restraining the exercise of EU 
competences.28 Due to the inadequacy of the Court’s current approach to judicial review, I 
developed, on the basis of the procedural review framework, a specific standard of review and 
test for legality for review of all broad EU policy measures. I distilled the standard of review 
from the Court’s judgment in Spain v Council29, which provided an appropriate benchmark. 
The proposed standard of review suggested that the EU legislator must offer ‘adequate 
reasoning’ and ‘relevant evidence’ to maintain that a proposed legislative measure conforms to 
the limits of the Treaties.30 
                                              
25 See above chapter 3- section III (A). 
26 See above chapter 3- section III (B). 
27 See above chapter 2- section II (A); chapter 2-section III (A); chapter 2- section IV (A); chapter 3- section II. 
28 See above chapter 3-section III (C). 
29 See Case C-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-07285, paras 122-123. 
30 See above chapter 3- section IV (A) - (C). 
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But what test of legality should be chosen to control the legality of EU legislation? There are 
important considerations involved in choosing a proper test for legality. A high threshold for 
legality will give leeway to the EU institutions in its effort to pursue further EU integration 
and not stretch the Court’s institutional capacities by forcing it to become involved in difficult 
political and constitutional choices. A more demanding test for legality will, however, push 
the EU legislator to prepare more evidence-based legislation and also increase the legitimacy 
of the Court and the EU’s legislative procedure.31 I considered the latter considerations more 
important when designing the test. I therefore suggested, on the basis of the Court’s ruling in 
Kadi II
32, an intrusive test to control whether the proposed standard of ‘adequate reasoning’ 
and ‘relevant evidence’ has met. First, the EU legislator must articulate at least one 
justification, which in theory is sufficient as a basis for exercising the competence. If there are 
several conditions to be met in the relevant EU rule, the legislator must offer one compelling 
rationale for each of these conditions. The benchmark when examining whether the 
justifications are ‘adequate’ is the relevant literature and the Court’s case-law. If the proposed 
justifications are considered adequate, the second limb of the test considers whether these 
justifications are supported by ‘relevant’ evidence. The evidence criterion requires that the 
evidence is of a certain quantity and quality. To support the theoretical reasons for exercising 
the competence, there needs to be references in the legislative background documents to, at 
least, two different sources. In order to be reliable and adequate, the evidence submitted must 
be in the form of statistical studies, policy studies and/or scientific articles.33 
Having summarized the main argument of the first part of the thesis, i.e. that more intense and 
evidence-based judicial review and a clear test for legality are key mechanisms in constructing 
checks to the exercise of EU competences, it is now time to reflect on the practical application 
of this argument in the second part of the thesis.  
B Reconstructing the limits of the Treaties 
 
This subsection summarizes and reflects on the main findings of Part II of the thesis. Part II of 
the thesis used the EU’s competence to impose criminal sanctions as an example on how 
                                              
31 See Craig, EU Administrative Law (n23) 396; Dorota Leczykiewicz, ‘‘Constitutional Justice’ and Judicial 
Review of EU Legislative Acts’ Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 95/2013 (November 17, 2013), 12-13. 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2355961>. Accessed 9 May 2104. 
32 See Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission and others v Kadi (Court of Justice, 18 
July 2013), paras 118-119, 124. 
33 See above chapter 3- section IV (D). 
242 
 
limits can be constructed to the EU’s competences. The limits of EU competences were 
reconstructed by employing the framework developed in Part I. In particular, the practical 
analysis of specific criminal law measures in chapters 4-6 was done on the basis of standard of 
legality and test of legality developed in chapter 3.   
The EU legislator and the Court must move towards a more evidence-based test of 
legality of EU legislation 
 
It is well-known that the real scope of Union competences can only be determined by a 
comprehensive and detailed review of actual pieces of legislation and the relevant Treaty 
provisions.34 
The thesis reinforced this proposal. It demonstrated, by a review of concrete examples of EU 
criminal law legislation, the limits to the exercise of EU competences. The outcome of the 
examination was that few pieces of EU legislation seem to hold up to the standard of legality 
proposed of ‘adequate reasoning’ and ‘relevant evidence’.35 In some cases, such as the 
Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal36 or the Directive on Deposit Guarantees37, the EU 
legislator had failed to offer ‘one’ compelling justification for why the measure conformed to 
the relevant conditions of the Treaties. These examples illustrated that, while the requirement 
placed on the EU legislator, pursuant to the first limb of the test, to provide for at least one 
substantive justification for the exercise of a competence is not a high threshold to pass, this 
limb of the test is apt to exclude reasoning that is both insufficient and logically incoherent. 
Nevertheless, it often seems that the EU legislator is able to meet the criterion of ‘adequate’ 
reasoning when justifying EU legislation.38 
The difficult question, as shown from the review of selected EU criminal law measures, is for 
the EU legislator to provide relevant information for conformity with the evidence condition. 
The outcome of the enquiry is that while the EU legislator is surely able to invoke some 
                                              
34 See Robert Schütze ‘The Morphology of Legislative Power in the European Community: Legal Instruments 
and the Federal Division of Powers’ (2006) 25 Yearbook of European Law 91, 146; Craig, EU Administrative 
Law (n 23) 368-371. 
35 See above for practical analysis of legislation: chapter 4- section I (A); chapter 4- section II (A); chapter 5- 
section I (C); chapter 5- section II (D); chapter 6- section II (C); chapter 6- section III. 
36 See above chapter 4- section II (A). 
37 See above chapter 6- section II (C). 
38 See above chapter 4- section I (A); chapter 4- section II (A); chapter 5- section I (C); chapter 6- section III (A). 
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evidence to justify its actions, the evidence presented is not generally39 of such quality and 
quantity to match the EU legislator’s broad claims of compliance with the relevant legal 
basis.40 This suggests that what is really missing in the EU legislator’s current legal analysis of 
the exercise of EU competences is a lack of ‘relevant’ evidence. It is equally true that the 
analysis of ‘relevant’ evidence is what is lacking in the Court’s jurisprudence. In general 
terms, it seems that the Court’s current test only requires that reasoning is provided for 
compliance with competence-conferring conditions, not that the reasoning is substantiated 
with evidence.41 The Court’s current test for judicial review in competence litigation has 
adversely affected the procedure for drafting of EU legislation. As suggested by Weatherill, 
the Court’s case-law on Article 114 TFEU has indirectly worked as a ‘drafting guide’ for the 
EU legislator when designing legislation.42 The Court’s current approach is, as shown in this 
thesis, inadequate. The Court must, I believe, be more intrusive when considering whether the 
necessary facts have been established before declaring the legality of the proposed measure.  
The outcome of the examination of concrete examples of EU legislation suggest that the 
current way of drafting EU legislation, which is supported and confirmed by the Court of 
Justice, is based on hypothetical scenarios and unproven assumptions regarding the existence 
of certain problems and the predicted positive consequences of EU action.43 However, if the 
EU legislator wishes to improve its legitimacy44 and if the Court wishes to become a credible 
arbiter between Member States and the EU in competence disputes45, it may not be sufficient 
for the Court to control the EU legislator’s reasoning. It can be legitimately argued that the EU 
legislator needs to provide both more and better support for its actions and that the Court must 
enforce these ‘evidentiary’ obligations. Otherwise, it is difficult to ascertain whether the EU 
legislator has exercised its discretion correctly. 46 
 
                                              
39 The exception is the Environmental Crimes Directive, which was considered to conform to the standard of 
‘relevant’ evidence when examined in the light of the subsidiarity principle; see above chapter 6- section II(C).  
40 See above chapter 4- section I (A); chapter 5- section I (C); chapter 6- section II (C); chapter 6- section III (B). 
41 See above chapter 3- section IV (E). 
42 See Stephen Weatherill, ’The limits of legislative harmonisation ten years after Tobacco Advertising: how the 
Court’s case law has become a “drafting guide” ’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827, 844. 
43 See above chapter 4- section I (A); chapter 5- section I (C); chapter 6- section II (C); chapter 6-section III (B) 
for evidence of this point. 
44 See above chapter 3- section II. 
45 See above chapter 2- section II (B). 
46 See Case C-310/04 Spain v Council (n 29), paras 122-135. 
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The ‘essentiality’ condition is a substantive limitation apt to act as a check to the exercise 
of the EU’s implied and express criminal law competence  
 
Chapter 4 and chapter 5 examined the scope of the EU’s implied and express criminal law 
competence. The examination demonstrated several important substantive and procedural 
limits to the exercise of EU powers in this field.  
One of the central limits to the exercise of EU criminal law competences is the need to 
establish the ‘essentiality’ of criminal law for the effective implementation of EU policies. 
This requirement applies both to the EU’s general criminal law power as derived from the 
Court’s jurisprudence and to the new power contained in Article 83(2) TFEU. Due to the 
Court’s weak legitimacy in assessing the appropriateness of criminal law measures47 and a 
belief that ‘essentiality’ condition will be or should be interpreted in light of the effectiveness 
principle,48 the role of this limit has been underestimated in EU scholarship, which has argued 
that it has no role to play in limiting the exercise of EU competences.  
Instead, the thesis demonstrated by examining some recently adopted EU criminal law 
measures49 that this requirement can act as check on the exercise of the EU’s criminal law 
competences. The thesis showed that the light ‘essentiality’ test, evidenced by the Court’s 
previous judgments in Environmental Crimes and Ship-Source Pollution, was flawed. 
Assuming that the function of judicial review is to ensure that the Union institutions do not 
disregard the constitutional limits of the Treaty, a stricter standard of review was shown to be 
desirable. The enquiry used legal, moral, political and criminological arguments to challenge 
the rationale for the exercise of EU criminal law competences and to develop a test for judicial 
review.50 I suggested that criminological evidence is needed to establish the legality of the 
exercise of EU criminal law competences. It was demonstrated that in order to be able to 
exercise its criminal law competence under Article 83(2) TFEU and Article 192 TFEU the 
Union must prove on a case by case basis, by reference to empirical evidence, that criminal 
sanctions are ‘essential’ for the ‘effective’ implementation of Union policies.51 
                                              
47 See Michael Dougan, ‘From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist: Criminal Sanctions for the Enforcement of 
Union Law’ in Marise Cremona (ed), Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law (OUP 2012)102. 
48
 See Ester Herlin Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (Hart 2012) 57-60, 65. 
49 See above chapter 4- section I (A); chapter 5- section I (C). 
50 See above chapter 5- section I (B). 
51 See above chapter 4- section I A; chapter 5- section I (B). 
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The case study of EU criminal law placed the nature of the issues that shape judicial review in 
sharp relief. It was shown how respect for fundamental rights and principles of judicial 
protection should sharpen judicial review of EU criminal law legislation and the thesis argued 
for a strict test of judicial review under Article 83(2) TFEU. It is the fact that the EU 
potentially has a power to impose imprisonment sanctions which ultimately give a reason for 
more intense judicial review of the exercise of this power. Because criminal penalties severely 
restrict the freedoms of individuals and are liable to infringe their fundamental right to 
freedom of movement and property and because the imposition of criminal sanctions entails 
severe stigmatization of the offender and substantial social costs, intense judicial review of 
criminal law measures are justified.52  
The potential of the ‘essentiality’ condition was illustrated by its application to the Market 
Abuse Crimes Directive and to the Environmental Crimes Directive. This analysis was done 
on the basis of the legality standard of ‘adequate reasoning’ and ‘relevant evidence’.53 
The result of these enquiries was similar. They showed that the EU legislator in both cases had 
properly explained compliance with the ‘essentiality’ condition on the basis of convincing 
deterrence logic.54 It was also, however, shown in these two case studies that the EU legislator 
was unable to fulfil the requirement of ‘relevant’ evidence. In both the cases, the 
Commission’s only compelling justification, the ‘deterrence’ argument, was not supported by 
sufficient evidence that could support the superiority of criminal over non-criminal 
sanctions.55  
The examination of both the Environmental Crimes Directive and the Market Abuse Crimes 
Directive showed how powerful the limits to the exercise of the EU’s criminal law 
competence are. If we apply the test of legality, requiring that the substantive justifications for 
exercising this competence, i.e. the ‘deterrence’ rationale, must be supported by ‘sufficient’ 
and ‘relevant’ evidence, it can be ascertained that the EU legislator justifies criminal law 
legislation on questionable assumptions, which are not backed by proven facts. The 
examination of these examples also regrettably shows that the EU legislator currently employs 
its criminal law competence without considering available non-criminal sanctions and without 
                                              
52 See above chapter 5- section I (B). 





any clear idea of why criminal sanctions are necessary.56 This approach from the EU legislator 
must be condemned both as a matter of policy and from a legal perspective. If the conditions 
for exercising the EU’s express and implied criminal law competence had been different, and 
only required that criminal laws be suitable for the ‘effective enforcement’ of EU policies, the 
Environmental Crimes Directive and the Market Abuse Crimes Directive would surely have 
passed the suggested legality standard. However, the EU legislator intended that criminal laws 
should only be used in exceptional situations when other non-criminal measures were shown 
to be deficient.57 The conditions for exercising the competence requires the EU legislator to 
prove on a case-by case basis that criminal sanctions are ‘essential’ to ensure the effective 
implementation of a specific Union policy.58 These example showed that the EU legislator 
needs to seek out and refer to more substantial and reliable evidence to convince the general 
public that EU criminalization is ‘essential’ for the enforcement of EU rules. These examples 
also indicate that the EU legislator, despite the Commission’s assurance that it will rely on 
clear factual evidence and use criminal law as a ‘last resort’59, cannot yet be trusted as a 
conscientious legislator observing the limits of its legislative powers in the field of criminal 
law. 
If the EU legislator did not have sufficient evidence at its disposal for criminalization what 
could then have been the rationale for pursuing these initiatives? It is difficult to speculate but 
it is plausible to argue that there are expressive reasons behind these initiatives. The thesis 
shows that the EU has decided to take a stand against certain conduct in the field of 
environmental law, insider dealing and intellectual property, even if the evidence to support 
these legislative initiatives was insufficien to sustain the claim that criminal law is the most 
effective measure for the enforcement of these policies. The EU’s action in such cases could 
potentially be explained with reference to the Union’s need to reaffirm its core values and to 
strengthen its political identity. This is the expressive dimension of EU criminal law.60 This 
expressive dimension has not only, as suggested by Turner, saturated the EU’s initiatives 
                                              
56 ibid. 
57 See CONV 426/02, ‘Final report of Working Group X “Freedom, Security and Justice” ‘, Brussels, 2 
December 2002, 10; Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions- Towards an EU 
Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law’, COM 2011 (573) 
final (‘COM 2011/573’), 7, 8, 10. 
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 See CONV 727/03, ‘Draft sections of Part Three with comments’, Brussels, 27 May 2003, 32. 
59 See COM 2011/ 573 (n 57) 7-8.  
60 See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, ‘The Expressive Dimension of EU Criminal Law’, (2012) 60 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 555, 557. 
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under Article 83(1) TFEU.61 It is also argued that they may, by reference to the proposals 
examined in this thesis, explain the EU’s recent criminal law initiatives under the EC Treaties 
and under Article 83(2) TFEU.  
What are those reasons then? The expressive/symbolic dimension is to communicate a 
common sense of justice and to express that ‘certain forms of conduct are unacceptable’62. 
This observation is well-supported by the Commission’s Green Paper on criminal sanctions.63 
In this document, the Commission stated that by defining common offences and penalties in 
relation to certain forms of crime, the Union would be putting out a symbolic message. The 
approximation of penalties would help give the general public a shared sense of justice, which 
is one of the conditions for establishing the area of freedom, security and justice. This would 
send a clear signal that certain forms of conduct are unacceptable and punished on an equal 
basis.64  
Nevertheless, the current Treaties provide no clear authorization for harmonizing criminal law 
on expressive grounds.65 I maintain that the EU will endanger its legitimacy if it keeps 
enforcing its policies through criminal sanctions on such grounds. The EU should adopt a 
conservative approach and refrain from harmonizing criminal laws in the absence of a real 
practical need and firm legal basis for harmonization. This means that the EU should limit 
itself to harmonize national criminal laws to instances where criminalization is ‘essential’ to 
implementing existing EU rules.66 
An important substantive limitations to the exercise of EU harmonization powers is the 
need to show the presence of ‘serious’ ‘market failures’ 
 
Chapter 4 and chapter 6 of the thesis furthermore examined the relationship between criminal 
law and the internal market. The problems of employing the internal market rationale for 
criminalization was analysed within the framework of Article 114 TFEU and the subsidiarity 
                                              
61 ibid 564-574. 
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See Commission,’ Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal 
sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation’, Brussels, 20.10.2011, COM (2011) 654 final, recital 7. 
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65 See Turner (n 60) 558. 
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principle. It was maintained that the main way to challenge the rationale of the exercise of EU 
competences is to examine the validity of the assumptions underlying EU harmonization. The 
thesis demonstrated how legal, functional and economic arguments can be employed to 
challenge the exercise of competence under Article 114 TFEU and how those arguments can 
construct a robust subsidiarity principle. My key argument was that EU harmonization can 
only be pursued on the basis of proof of a risk for ‘market failures’. Unless such a risk is 
demonstrated, there is no case for EU harmonization.67 This approach to subsidiarity and 
Article 114 TFEU was not only supported by comprehensive research on regulatory policies 
and economic arguments but firmly supported by the Court’s judgment in Tobacco 
Advertising.68  
EU criminal law was a case in point for challenging the internal market justification. It was 
first shown that that the EU legislator’s general theoretical assumption that national 
divergences in relation to the definition of offences or divergences between Member States’ 
sanctioning regimes laws leads to distortions of competition in the form of safe havens and a 
race to the bottom is misplaced. The existences of such divergences cannot in themselves 
justify a broad harmonization of criminal laws.69 This is because there is no logical 
relationship between divergences of laws and distortions of competition.70 The empirical 
research instead suggests that differences in sanctioning regimes or differences in 
criminalization have very little impact on the choice of location for firms or on the tendency of 
Member States to engage in regulatory races to the bottom. Because of this, the use of the 
general distortion of competition rationale to justify harmonization of criminal law at an EU 
level was questioned.71  
Secondly, I showed, by examining two concrete examples of EU criminal law measures, that 
this argument was also flawed in practice. On the basis of the threshold developed in chapter 3 
that at least one compelling justification for compliance must be submitted for compliance 
with the ‘market failure’ criterion and the ‘clear benefits’ criterion, and that those justifications 
must be supported with sufficient and relevant evidence, I showed that neither the Intellectual 
                                              
67 See above chapter 4- section II (A); chapter 6- section I (B). 
68 See above chapter 6- section I (B). 
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Property Crimes Proposal72 nor the Market Abuse Crimes Directive73 conformed to the 
proposed limits to harmonization. From a broader perspective, the examination of the Market 
Abuse Crimes Directive and the Intellectual Property Crimes Proposal demonstrated the 
strong potential of the subsidiarity principle and the limits in Article 114 TFEU in restraining 
the exercise of the EU’s competence. They also further showed how the procedural application 
of the subsidiarity principle74 and Article 114 TFEU75 is enhanced by employing the test of 
legality and standard of review proposed in chapter 3.  
These examples and the discussion in the thesis show that while EU harmonization is often 
defended on the basis of the EU’s commitment to protect the internal market76 and on the basis 
of the regulated problems’ cross-border nature and effect77, the EU legislator’s justification for 
approximation on the basis of alleged market failures are often either exaggerated or not 
supported by the facts of the individual case.78 This cautiously suggests that, in relation to 
harmonizing criminal law measures, the objective of the EU legislator objective is 
harmonization as such. Harmonization of national criminal laws cannot, however, be a goal in 
itself79 but must meet the precepts of the Treaties and only be triggered if there is a legitimate 
justification for approximation.80  
One of the key procedural limits to the exercise of EU criminal law powers is the need to 
have harmonization measures in place before the adoption of criminalization measures 
 
In addition, the thesis established some important procedural limitations to the exercise of EU 
regulatory criminal law competences. One of these limitations is that the EU under Article 
83(2) TFEU must have ‘harmonization measures’ in place before it can adopt criminal law 
measures. I argued that it is only secondary legislation adopted through the ‘ordinary’ or 
‘special’ legislative procedures that have been adopted prior to the criminal law directive can 
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constitute ‘harmonisation’ measures within the meaning of Article 83(2) TFEU. This meant 
that harmonisation through Treaty amendments, recommendations or international agreements 
would not qualify as ‘harmonisation’ measures under Article 83(2) TFEU as such 
harmonisation measures have not taken place through the ‘special’ or ‘ordinary’ legislative 
procedure as required by this legal basis. It was also argued that the precondition for 
employing Article 83(2) TFEU is ‘substantive’ harmonisation of the relevant prohibitions or 
harmonization of conditions for non-criminal liability which describe the prohibited types of 
behaviour in detail.81  
 
I examined the application of the ‘harmonization’ requirement by considering two fields of 
EU law; EU competition law and EU market abuse law. It was first demonstrated that EU 
competition law could not be harmonized under Article 83(2) TFEU because this field of law 
has not been subject to ‘harmonization’ measures within the meaning of Article 83(2) TFEU. 
Because of the requirement that the legislative procedure must be of an ‘ordinary’ or ‘special’ 
nature, the EU legislator could neither use the Treaty harmonization in Article 101 TFEU and 
Article 102 TFEU nor Regulation 1/2003 TFEU to trigger the competence in Article 83(2) 
TFEU.82 In the case of EU financial regulations, it was conversely shown that the Market 
Abuse Regulation (MAR) provides for sufficient ‘harmonisation’ within the meaning of 
Article 83(2) TFEU to sustain the recently adopted Market Abuse Crimes Directive. The MAR 
was firstly intended to constitute a ‘substantive’ harmonisation measure. It was adopted on the 
legal basis of Article 114 TFEU, which is the general harmonization provision of the Treaties, 
and aims to remove distortions of competition and obstacles to trade arising from divergent 
national laws on the regulation of market abuse. It was not only intended as a substantive 
harmonization measure but was also found to be a de facto ‘substantive’ harmonisation 
measure. This is because it lays down the material prohibitions against insider dealing, 
unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulation, which are then directly 
linked to the description of the offences in the Market Abuse Crimes Directive. 83 
 
These examples showed the importance of the ‘harmonization’ requirement in practice and 
why it is ‘essential’ that EU adopts harmonization measures before it resorts to 
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criminalization. While the application of this requirement could at first sight seem overly 
formalistic, its application could be defended on logical and principled grounds. First, unless 
the EU has rules in place in a specific area, there is no logical necessity to have criminal rules. 
Secondly, if we intend criminal law to be the last resort we should first try non-criminal 
harmonization measures. Only if non-criminal rules and harmonization of substantive EU 
rules prove insufficient to achieve compliance with the underlying EU rules, is there a need to 
adopt criminal sanctions.84 The application of this condition showed how the Lisbon Treaty 
has changed the legal landscape of EU law on competences by imposing new, demanding 
conditions for harmonization.85  
The nature of Article 83(2) TFEU can act as a restraint for the adoption of criminal law 
‘directives’ under Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU 
 
One of the most important general limitations to the exercise of EU competences is the need to 
act on the correct legal basis. I analysed this limitation by examining what the correct legal 
basis for criminalization of existing EU policies after Lisbon is. By scrutinizing the 
relationship between Article 83(2) TFEU and the general legislative powers under Article 114 
TFEU and Article 352 TFEU, I demonstrated that the Lisbon Treaty, despite the Member 
States’ attempt to limit criminal law cooperation to Title V and Article 83 TFEU, has not been 
able to resolve the potential for litigation over the appropriate legal basis for criminalization 
measures. 86 
First, it was shown that Article 83(2) TFEU has assumed the role of lex specialis within the 
field of criminal sanctions for the enforcement of existing EU policies.87 It was demonstrated 
that the existence of Article 83(2) TFEU could restrain the adoption of criminal law measures 
on the basis of other legal bases of the Treaties such as the broad functional power of Article 
114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU. The wording of Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU 
and the Court’s case-law suggests that those provisions are subsidiarity to other more specific 
legal bases. Given the fact that most legislative proposals adopted in the field of criminal law 
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must be adopted on the more specific legal basis of Article 83(2) TFEU, I maintained that the 
nature of this provision generally limits the exercise of criminal law powers under the 
functional powers of Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU.88 
 
However, the nature of Article 83(2) TFEU could not entirely extinguish the exercise of an 
implied criminal law competence under other legal bases of the Treaties. This was firstly 
because EU criminal law measures in the form of ‘regulations’ which both criminalize and 
‘de-criminalize’ certain behaviours fall outside the scope of the power contained in Article 
83(2) TFEU. Secondly, the existence of Article 83(2) TFEU could not limit the 
criminalization of EU competition law infringements under other legal bases of the Treaties. 
This was because such criminalization cannot take place under Article 83(2) TFEU due to the 
lack of previous ‘harmonization’ measures in the field of competition law. Thirdly, because 
the EU’s general competence to harmonize criminal laws derived from the Court’s judgments 
in Environmental Crimes and Ship-Source Pollution was premised on the ‘effectiveness’ 
principle and because the enforcement of several EU policies in theory could benefit from 
criminalization, there was a strong case for employing this power for criminalization even 
after Lisbon.89 Criminal law can therefore, subsequent to the Lisbon Treaty, be pursued under 
different legal bases in the Treaties depending on the content of the measure. This means that 
EU criminal law ‘regulations’ and EU measures de-criminalizing certain behaviours in the 
fields of EU environmental law, EU market abuse law and EU competition law, can still be 
adopted under legal bases of the Treaties other than Article 83(2) TFEU. The legal bases of 
Article 114 TFEU (competition90 and market abuse91), Article 192 TFEU (environment92) 
would be strong candidates for such measures.  
These findings reinforced a well-known lesson from EU law that the EU’s system of 
competences is not coherent. The Treaties have created a complex system of specific and 
general legal powers, which is inconsistent in many ways. Since the system of competences is 
founded on the EU’s objectives, given the fact that not all the EU’s competences are 
specifically designated for one specific policy and because there are no clear demarcation 
criteria between the different competences there is plenty of space for disputes over the right 
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legal basis for a potential EU measure.93 The general argument of the incoherence of the EU’s 
system on competences is strengthened by another example provided in the thesis, i.e. the 
problem of retained EU powers.94 As we know there are constitutional prohibitions against 
harmonization in the Treaties of certain policy areas such as human health. In this policy area 
it is clear that the Union only has a complementary or supporting competence.95 However, 
since the Union has been conferred with a Treaty mandate to take into account human health 
when it defines its polices, the construction of the Treaties has failed to secure the existence of 
exclusive Member State powers in this field.96 While measures that directly harmonize 
national laws in culture, human health or education are contrary to the Treaties, it must be 
recognised that those fields97 may be affected when the Union exercises its competence under 
Article 114 TFEU.98 This is for the simple reason that the Union is tasked with promoting 
these policies when it implements its policies.99  
This discussion reinforces the initial observation of the thesis100 that the EU, by enshrining 
reserved powers to the Member States and by describing the nature of EU powers in certain 
fields, was not able to construct a sharp dividing line between the powers of the EU and the 
Member States. If the Member States wish to draw a clearer demarcation line between the 
different Treaty competences and between the EU’s powers and their own, one would have to 
renegotiate and draft the Treaties differently. There would have to be an additional provision 
in Title V of the TFEU to the effect that EU criminal law harmonization can only be pursued 
under Article 83 TFEU and an additional clause in Article 114 TFEU stating that EU internal 
market legislation cannot have a significant effect on the Member States’ retained policy fields 
such as public health and culture.101 
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III OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 
 
EU law on competences is a vast topic which has been subject to countless examinations and 
academic books.102 The intention of the thesis was not to comprehensively cover the whole 
subject-matter. The ambition was more modest. The thesis firstly aimed to identify the 
important questions regarding EU law on competences after the Lisbon Treaty.103 Secondly, 
the thesis endeavoured to contribute to an understanding of how limits to the exercise of 
Union competences can be constructed.  
The thesis made important choices by restricting the scope of the examination. First, the 
enquiry was restricted to the EU’s competences to impose individual criminal sanctions for the 
enforcement of substantive policies, i.e. EU regulatory criminal law. This was because EU 
regulatory criminal law illustrates the general evolution of EU competences, showing a shift in 
focus from the existence to the exercise of EU competences and because an examination of the 
EU’s competences in this field nicely demonstrated the limitations to the EU’s 
competences.104 There are obviously other EU policy fields that would further help to 
understanding the limits to EU competences.105 Because my enquiry was limited to EU 
regulatory criminal law, my thesis only covered the legal bases of Articles 83(2) TFEU, 103 
TFEU, 114 TFEU, 192 TFEU and 352 TFEU.106 While the chosen legal bases are important in 
terms of their impact on harmonization (Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU) and in 
terms of EU criminal policy (Article 83(2) TFEU and Article 192 TFEU)107, a more accurate 
understanding of the limits to EU competences would require an analysis of the scope of 
several other legal bases of the Treaties.108 Moreover, although I examined Article 114 TFEU 
and Article 352 TFEU, my examination was focussed on the scope to impose criminal 
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sanctions under these provisions and not on the general scope of these provisions for 
harmonization.109 
Secondly, the scope of the examination was limited to the legal grounds of subsidiarity and 
lack of competence. While the thesis justified this limitation on the basis of the relevance of 
these legal grounds110, it is clear that I did not examine all of the main grounds for judicial 
review.111 It is arguable that other legal grounds such as proportionality112 or fundamental 
rights113 can act as checks on the exercise of EU powers in other contexts, such as review of 
EU administrative decisions.114 For this reason, an important direction for future research is to 
consider which of the other general principles of law115 and the other limits of the Treaties can 
be used as ground on which the exercise of EU powers can be challenged. This is particularly 
the case for EU criminal law where several fundamental rights can restrict the exercise of EU 
legislative competences.116 
It must also be recognised that although the thesis contributed to the debate on judicial review, 
this field is still an undeveloped field of EU law. While some scholars have begun to examine 
the rationale for, the nature of and the standard of judicial review in EU law117, this is still an 
emerging research area. This can easily be demonstrated with a comparison to the US where 
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the debate on judicial review has been a central issue of constitutional debate for centuries.118 
There is also substantial scope for more research on the general relevance of procedural 
review for other fields of EU law, such as competition law and state aid, or considering its 
relevance for other jurisdictions.119 There is also room for examining further the legitimacy of 
judicial review in the EU legal order. This thesis provided a narrow example of how judicial 
review of EU legislation can be defended on principled grounds.120 There is definitely scope 
for doing more general research on how different factors, such as the nature of democracy in 
the Union, the workload of the Court, its resources, the amendments of the Treaties, political 
climate, influence and affect the standards and scope of judicial review.121 While some of my 
arguments discussed these factors, the relevance of these factors may change and some of my 
assumptions may then be shown not to substantiate my argument. There is particularly ample 
opportunity for research on comparative institutional analysis to understand both why and how 
the Court of Justice intervenes in litigation. There is certainly a need for more transparent rules 
on when the Court should leave decision-making power to the political institutions and when it 
should intervene.122 
In terms of the substantive areas of law, EU criminal law is still a young field of EU law. 
There is thus a broad scope for more substantive research on the scope of the legislative 
powers in this field. It should be remembered that my thesis was limited to the field of EU 
regulatory criminal law. There are obviously good reasons to also consider the scope of 
Article 83(1) TFEU, the workings of the ‘emergency brake’ procedures in 82(3) and 83(3) 
TFEU and the scope for adopting criminal law measures on other legal bases of the Treaties 
such as Articles 67, 79 or 325 TFEU, all of which have been suggested as providing a basis for 
criminal legislation.123 My enquiry was also limited to substantive EU criminal law and did 
not cover EU procedural criminal law, which is emerging as an important field of EU criminal 
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policy.124 A good deal of research is consequently still lacking in order to understand this field 
of EU law. It is also clear that the EU criminal law is rapidly developing. The initiatives in this 
field are substantive and complex and give rise to new legal problems, which must be tackled 
by EU scholarship.125 In fact, it is plausible that much of what was being said in this thesis, 
although it may continue to have relevance for the general field of EU law, is not going to be 
particularly topical in say twenty to thirty years time.126 What is certain, however, is that the 
EU legislator already has and will have to tackle many of the issues raised in this thesis in the 
coming years.127 This is particularly related to the interpretation of Article 83(2) TFEU, the 
question of legal basis and the question of subsidiarity. It is apparent that the EU legislator is 
already struggling with how it should use its competence and under what legal basis it should 
act.128 Given this, it seems that this thesis has not only theoretical but practical value.  
This being said on the future directions of EU criminal law, it is time to wrap up this thesis. As 
we recall from the introduction, the thesis set out to examine how we can construct limits to 
the exercise of EU competences. The problem of controlling the exercise of Union 
competences is not only central for EU law but also for the legitimacy of the Union legal 
order. Today, the legitimacy of the EU legal order is subject, probably more than ever, to very 
serious challenges and one of the fiercest challenges is based on the assumption that the EU 
political institutions use their powers in arbitrary and illegitimate ways thereby usurping 
national powers.129  
Whilst these challenges are legitimate, the thesis has shown that the EU’s competences are not 
‘unlimited’. There are limitations that act as checks on the exercise of the EU’s competences, 
such as the need to act on correct legal basis, the ‘harmonization’ requirement and 
‘essentiality’ condition in Article 83(2) TFEU and the requirement in Article 114 TFEU and 
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Article 5(3) TEU to give proof that EU harmonization contributes to correcting or removing 
existing or imminent ‘market failures’. While the thesis was able to theoretically reconstruct 
limits to the exercise of EU competence, this was not enough to provide for a general theory of 
EU competences. If these limits cannot be made operational before the Court, we cannot claim 
that they can act as checks on excessive EU harmonization. In order to construct limits on the 
basis of which EU legislation can be successfully challenged, it was necessary to tackle the 
question of judicial enforcement. By implementing judicial mechanisms such as procedural 
review, the Court was able to move from a light touch enquiry to a more demanding judicial 
review without impinging on the discretion of the EU legislator through engaging in 
substantive review. Because this review is operationalized through a test of legality that 
requires the EU legislator to offer at least one compelling rationale to defend the exercise of 
competence, and that this rationale is defended by ‘sufficient’ and ‘relevant’ evidence, the 
Court’s capacity to enforce the limits of the Treaties became substantively enhanced. 
This thesis has provided a modest contribution to the understanding of the limits of the EU’s 
competences and thus provided us with insights into the nature of the EU’s legal order. It has 
also given some direction to where scholarship on EU competences should move in the future. 
If we wish for more transparent and legitimate workings of the EU legal order, it is argued that 
competence monitoring must be taken more seriously by both scholarship and the EU political 
institutions. In particular, I strongly encourage the EU legislator and the Court to move to a 
more evidence-based test for examining the legality of EU legislation.130 I hope this will not 
remain simply a hope but a principle that both the European Union legislator and the Court 
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